

# THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS

*A HISTORY*

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## *Foreword*

The purpose of this book is to give the reader a picture of the process by which the former European colonies in South and Middle America have developed into twenty different nations, each with its own political and social problems and its own individuality. Any attempt to paint such a picture must necessarily be tentative because so much research in their archeology and history and political and social problems still remains to be done. The result will be less satisfactory when one endeavors to compress the whole story into one short volume. It should still be possible, however, to give the student and the general reader an understanding of the main outlines of Latin American history, and it is essential that informed public opinion in the United States have such an understanding if inter-American cooperation is to rest on a sound basis.

Any discussion of Latin American history will almost inevitably emphasize political development. In the first place we can speak with some assurance about the course of political events since independence, whereas neither Latin American nor foreign historians have done much work in other fields. In the second place, the most important problem that confronted the Latin American states after their separation from Spain was achievement of political stability, which was a prerequisite for progress in other directions. One of the central themes in their history is the effort to attain stability by making a reality of the republican institutions which they adopted, on paper, at the time of independence.

An understanding of Latin American political development is especially important at this time. One of the fundamental bases of inter-American cooperation is a common determination not to permit alien political philosophies to submerge the democratic ideal in the Western Hemisphere. This concept has been questioned by persons who point out that most of the Latin American countries today are not democracies but dictatorships, but when we appreciate the great obstacles to the achievement of democracy in Latin America, and the extent to which these obstacles have already been overcome, we shall

have more faith in its validity. At the same time, however, we shall be brought to a realization of the new dangers that confront our neighbors and ourselves from the rise of political doctrines calculated to give aid and comfort to antidemocratic forces.

In an effort to avoid the accumulation of footnotes, sources of information are not generally cited in the text. I wish, however, to acknowledge my indebtedness to the numerous American historians who have given us authoritative studies of various aspects of Latin American history and civilization. Most of the more important books in English are listed in the reading list on pages 619-633. For the history of individual countries I have relied heavily upon some of the Latin American historians: Levene, Galdames, Henao and Arrubla, Acevedo, Amunátegui Solar, Arguedas, Basadre, Varnhagen, Gonzales Guinán, Reyes, and others.

D. G. M.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The map of Indian tribes facing page 20 is a modification of a similar map in W. S. Robertson, *History of the Latin-American Nations* which in turn is adapted from maps by J. W. Powell, C. Thomas, J. R. Swanton, and A. E. Chamberlain. The maps on pages 151 ("Latin America in 1800") and 307 ("Territory in Dispute in the War of the Pacific") have also been adapted from similar maps in the Robertson book.



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## *Chapter I*

### AMERICA BEFORE THE CONQUEST

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The twenty independent republics below the Rio Grande are spoken of as "Latin American" because of their historic relationship to three of the Latin nations of Europe. Eighteen of them were originally colonies of Spain. Of the other two, Brazil was Portuguese, Haiti was French. They owe their official languages, the culture of their upper classes, and much of their political and social tradition to the European mother countries, and in almost all of them the better educated and more influential families are largely of European descent.

This is not true, however, of the population as a whole. Only in Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and to a less extent in Chile, are people of white blood greatly in the majority. In Brazil, the West Indian Republics, and Panama a substantial part of the laboring classes, as in our own southern states, are the descendents of African slaves. Everywhere else they are Indian or part Indian; and in the highlands of Mexico and the Central Andes, where populous, highly civilized communities existed long before the Spaniards came, there are still thousands of rural communities that retain the languages and to some extent the customs and the social organization of the period before the Conquest. It is difficult to understand the history of the Latin American nations, or their political and social problems today, without knowing something of the background of this portion of their people.

The ancestors of the American Indian were probably mongoloid tribes that crossed Behring Strait from Asia toward the end of the paleolithic or at the beginning of the neolithic era perhaps some ten thousand years ago. They were a primitive people, living by hunting

and fishing, with no domestic animals except the dog. Coming presumably in successive waves of immigration, they spread throughout the continent from Hudson's Bay to Tierra del Fuego. In the thousands of years that elapsed before the Spanish conquest, they developed varying degrees of civilization and many different languages, but the race remained "singularly uniform in its physical traits, and individuals taken from any part of the continent could easily be mistaken for inhabitants of numerous other parts."<sup>1</sup> There were many similarities in social organization, customs, and religious beliefs. Nearly all cultivated maize, beans, cotton, and tobacco where the climate permitted, and all depended mainly on polished stone weapons and instruments, though copper, gold, and silver were used by some of the more advanced peoples. They had been compelled, however, to adapt themselves to a great variety of physical environments, and these had doubtless done much to determine the character of the culture of each group.

This was especially true in the tropical regions where the great majority of the people of America lived before the Spanish conquest. In the tropics, variations in altitude and rainfall have a greater effect upon human life than in the temperate zone. A study of the map opposite will show how important these variations are. The great mountain systems along the west coast of the continent from Mexico to southern Chile rise almost everywhere from ten to twenty thousand feet above sea level. In many places there are two or more parallel chains of high peaks with extensive valleys or plateaus between them. On the west they fall sharply to a narrow coastal plain. To the east, in South America, there are millions of square miles of lowlands drained by the Amazon, the Orinoco, and the streams that flow into the River Plate, and broken only by the mountains of southern Brazil and the less important Guiana Highlands. In the lowlands the heat is intense, but the average temperature falls approximately three degrees with every thousand feet of elevation, so that regions in the highlands have a climate as agreeable as that of the temperate zone, and without seasonal extremes of heat and cold. The amount of rainfall is equally varied. The trade winds, blowing constantly from east

<sup>1</sup> Brinton, *The American Race*, p. 41.



to west, deposit so much of their moisture in the lowlands and the eastern slopes of the mountains that agriculture in some regions becomes difficult if not impossible. In the interior valleys a more moderate rainfall encourages the existence of settled agricultural communities. The higher regions, moreover, are far more healthful because malaria and some of the other common tropical diseases are less prevalent there.

The civilizations that some of the Indian groups had developed seem to have been completely indigenous. They had their beginnings, apparently, in the highlands of Mexico and northern South America, where the remains of a wide-spread "archaic culture" are found in deposits underlying those left by the more advanced peoples of a later day. When and how this developed into the higher cultures found by the *conquistadores* we cannot say, for only a relatively small part of the fascinating field of American archeology has thus far been explored. We do know that the transition was taking place many centuries before America was discovered. Very early in our own Christian era, if not some time before, many of the people of Central America and Peru were already living in populous, well-ordered cities. They had reached a high degree of proficiency in the arts of civilization, despite their failure to learn the use of iron or to discover the wheel. The cultures of these two centers, different in many ways, had apparently developed independently of one another except for their remote connection through the archaic culture, and there seems to have been little or no intercourse between the two groups down to the time of the Spanish conquest.

#### THE MAYAS

In the north, the earliest advanced culture of which we have any knowledge was that of the Mayas, a people who occupied most of what is now Guatemala, Yucatan, and British Honduras. Curiously enough, the region where this culture had its most notable development was one where few Indians or white men would wish to live today—a hot humid belt extending from northwestern Honduras across Guatemala into the base of the Yucatan peninsula. At several

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different places, buried in tropical jungle, are the imposing remains of a flourishing civilization: massive, skilfully built stone temples, beautifully sculptured monuments, and, especially noteworthy, series of monoliths or *stelae*, often thirty or forty feet in height, bearing row after row of intricate glyphs which show that the Mayas had a system of writing superior to that of any other American people. Some of these word signs, especially those standing for dates, can be deciphered because they were still in use in Yucatan at the time of the Conquest. Archeologists disagree as to the correlation of Maya chronology with our own, but the inscriptions apparently indicate that these cities, or rather, perhaps, religious centers, were in existence as early as the second century A.D. and that their people had already developed an intricate and accurate calendar and a skill in mathematical and astronomical calculations that surpassed anything of which Europeans were then capable.

We know little of the people who built these monuments except what we can learn from the monuments themselves. The similarity of the architecture and the glyphs at the various sites seems to indicate that there was constant intercourse and probably a close political and religious connection between them. The absence of pictures of weapons and warlike subjects suggests that they were peaceful communities, little troubled by civil strife or foreign invasion. The sculptures show clearly that religion was the subject most important to the people who made them, and bear out the tradition of the later Mayas that their ancestors were ruled by priests. They tell us little of customs or social organization or historical events.

The dates on the monuments throughout the southern region cease suddenly at about the same time, probably in the sixth century of our Christian era. Then, or later, what is sometimes, though incorrectly, called the "Old Empire" was abandoned. Whether its inhabitants were driven to seek new homes by a pestilence, or by foreign enemies, or simply by the superior attractions of other regions, it is impossible to say. Some authorities have suggested that the *milpa* system of agriculture, the clearing of small patches in the forest which are cultivated for a few years and then abandoned to weeds and brush, had exhausted the arable land just as it is still impoverishing agricultural areas in some parts of the Caribbean. Whatever the cause, it is clear

that from this time on the center of the Maya culture seems to have been in the northern part of the Yucatan peninsula.

The people of this "New Empire" were even more skilled in architecture than their predecessors, though their sculpture never attained the perfection of the monuments in the ancient cities. They had the same system of writing, not only carving records on stone but keeping histories and genealogies in books of maguey fiber. Only a very few of these escaped the fanaticism of the Spaniards, who sought to destroy everything that could possibly have any connection with the ancient religion, and only a part of their contents can be deciphered. We know something of the history of the later Mayas, however, not only from archeological investigation but from traditions still extant at the time of the Spanish conquest. They seem to have been a more warlike people than their predecessors. This was especially true after the end of the twelfth century when the confederation of the three chief cities, Chichén Itzá, Mayapán, and Uxmal, which had ruled the peninsula for a long period, broke down and their leaders fell to fighting among themselves. It is probable that this strife, combined with hurricanes and pestilences, brought about the decline in the Maya culture which was noticeable by the end of the fifteenth century.

The Mayas were nevertheless among the more advanced of the American peoples at the time of the Conquest. Though none of the cities which they then occupied were as imposing as Palenque and Chichén Itzá must once have been, or as Mexico and Cuzco were when the Spaniards arrived, they were still skilful architects. They made fine pottery and textiles, and continued to use their elaborate calendar and system of writing. Their agricultural methods were primitive, as they probably always had been, for land was plentiful and they were able to supplement their food supply by hunting. In Yucatan, the great majority of the people lived in simple wooden huts, well adapted to the needs of a population that frequently moved from place to place in search of new lands. In the highlands of southern Guatemala and Chiapas, on the other hand, there were populous nations of Maya stock which had stone-built cities and well-organized governments, though their culture was otherwise inferior to that of the people who had built the magnificent ruined cities farther north.

Throughout the Maya region, the government in historic times was in the hands of hereditary chiefs who seem to have exercised somewhat more power than the priests.

#### THE AZTEC EMPIRE

It would seem, from such scanty information as archeological investigation has thus far furnished us, that the influence of ancient Maya culture very early spread west and north into the regions beyond the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Mexico, north of this isthmus, is a great triangular plateau, flanked by mountain ranges that fall off sharply to a narrow coastal plain on either side. The highest and most fertile part is at the south, where the Valley of Mexico, 7,500 feet above sea-level, has a climate far more invigorating than the tropical lowlands to the east and west. In this valley and elsewhere in the highlands near-by, there are remains indicating the presence of highly civilized peoples who used calendars and systems of writing closely related to those of the Mayas some centuries before the Spaniards arrived. Of their history we know very little. The natives who held the land at the time of the Conquest had traditions about a more civilized race, the "Toltecs," who had previously occupied the country, but they themselves were by their own account the descendents of nomadic hunters from regions far to the north. Most of them were of the Nahuatl stock, related linguistically to many of the Indians of the western United States. They had come into the valley in successive waves, absorbing much of the civilization of the earlier inhabitants, but retaining their own language and to some extent their own social organization.

The Aztecs, the most powerful of the Nahuatl tribes at the time of the Conquest, had probably entered the valley in the thirteenth century. Finding the best lands already occupied by stronger nations, they settled in a spot that was vacant because no one else wished to occupy it, a small area surrounded by marshes and water in the lake region in the center of the valley. Here they built their city of Tenochtitlán, or Mexico. At first they maintained a precarious existence by fishing, hunting, and growing such scanty crops as their limited territory permitted, but it was not long before their warlike qualities made

them welcome allies of their stronger neighbors in the continual struggles between the cities of the lake region. The inaccessibility of Tenochtitlán gave them an advantage over the people of the more exposed cities on the mainland, and this was increased by the construction of a causeway that penned up the waters flowing through the near-by marshes, so that the city came to be entirely surrounded by a large lake. About the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Aztecs defeated the people of Azcapotzalco, who through their aid had acquired a temporary supremacy over the other tribes of the valley. Not long afterwards, Tenochtitlán joined with the cities of Tezcoco and Tlacopán in a confederacy which defeated one by one the other cities of the valley and then extended its conquests into other parts of the plateau and into the lowlands of the coasts. When the Spaniards reached Mexico, the Aztecs and their allies were dominant from the Pánuco River and Lake Chapala on the north to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec on the south.

Their territory was not, strictly speaking, an "empire." Many tribes within its boundaries were constantly in revolt, and some, like the Tlascalans, who were to play an important part in the Spanish conquest, had never been subjugated. Even those tribes that paid regular tribute to the confederacy were practically independent in the management of their internal affairs. The Aztecs and their allies sent officials among them to supervise the collection of tribute and possibly to watch for signs of revolt, but in most cases these officials had no other governmental authority and were not supported by resident garrisons. The three cities that were members of the confederacy had entirely separate governments, and each might engage in private wars on its own account. It was only when they engaged in joint operations that the Aztec war chief assumed the leadership of the combined armies. In this case the spoils of victory were divided, usually, at least, at the rate of two-fifths for Tenochtitlán, two-fifths for Tezcoco, and one-fifth for Tlacopán. The confederacy was thus a partnership for military purposes between three independent tribes which availed themselves of their superior power to exact tribute from neighboring peoples in an extensive territory.

Although there were many different languages and racial stocks in central Mexico at the time of the Conquest, there seems to have been

a general similarity in social organization and religion. The formerly barbaric Nahuas had by this time assimilated much of the ancient culture and adopted many of the customs of the earlier inhabitants. A fairly accurate idea of the customs of all of the civilized peoples of the so-called Aztec Empire may therefore be obtained from a study of the institutions of the Aztecs themselves. We know somewhat more about them, from early Spanish reports and from Indian traditions and the very small number of Indian manuscripts preserved after the Conquest, than we do about some of the less important peoples.

Tenochtitlán, the Aztec city-state, seems originally to have had a fairly democratic government. Its people were divided into twenty clans, or *calpulli*, which were the most important feature of its internal organization. It was the clan, rather than the individual, which owned most of the land—a fact of great importance to students of Mexico's social problems today. Lots were distributed among the heads of families and might be held and passed on from father to son so long as they were properly cultivated. Other lots, cultivated either by the members of the clan working coöperatively or by hired laborers or slaves, were set aside for the support of the officials and the priesthood. Each clan had its separate temples and its own gods, though all joined in the worship of the great tribal gods also; and each received its share of the war prisoners for sacrifice and of the tribute from subject cities. Within the clan, a council of old men, probably the heads of families or of households, exercised supreme authority, except on the rare occasions when all of the members met to consider an especially weighty question. The council elected two chief officials: the *Teachcauhli*, who led the troops of the clan in time of war and was responsible for the maintenance of order and the military education of the young men, and the *Calpollec*, the principal civil official. The latter collected the taxes and distributed the land and the clan's share of the tributes, keeping written records with colored plats to show the lots held by each family. Both officials administered justice in minor cases, but more serious matters were reserved for action by the council.

For the government of the city as a whole the *tlarocán*, composed of representatives of the clans, met about once in twelve days to decide questions of general interest. Matters of very great moment,

however, were reserved for consideration by a grand council in which not only the members of the *tlatocán* but a number of other important officials and priests participated. The city, like the clan, had two principal executive officers: the *tlaca-tecuhtli*, or war chief, and the *cihua-cobuatli*, who was in general charged with the administration of civil affairs though he was also a war leader. The *tlaca-tecuhtli* was also the representative of the city in dispensing hospitality to strangers, and Montezuma, who held the office when Cortez entered Mexico, so impressed the Spaniards by the ostentatious reception which he gave them that they immediately concluded that they were dealing with a monarch of the European type. In reality he was not an "emperor" but an elected leader, subject probably in more important matters to the decisions of the tribal council. The war chief, however, seems usually to have been chosen from among the members of certain powerful families; and his authority may well have been increasing in the years just before the Conquest. There is some evidence to show that the democratic institutions which the Aztecs had brought to the valley with them were breaking down as a result of their military conquests and the rising power and wealth of a few influential groups.

Besides the two principal officers there was a very numerous official personnel, supported by tribute and by the produce of the lands set aside by each clan for the support of the tribal government. These included the military chiefs of the four principal quarters of the city, a very large corps of officials to collect and distribute the tributes from subjugated tribes, numerous runners or messengers, and other functionaries. These officials were appointed or elected, and had definite administrative duties to perform, but there also was a class of honorary chiefs, or *tecuhitl*, who had acquired special distinction in battle or had earned the title by going through severe penances. These were treated with the greatest respect, and the officials and war chiefs seem always to have been chosen from among their number.

Nearly all of the activities of the Nahuatl communities, and especially their constant wars, were closely connected with religion. There were a multitude of gods. Some of them, like the war god Huitzilopochtli, were apparently tribal deities whom the Aztecs had worshipped before their arrival in Mexico. Others had been taken over

from the more civilized earlier inhabitants of the valley. Of these, the most interesting was Quetzalcoatl, the god of the arts, who was also worshipped by the Mayas under the name of Kukulcán. Still others were idols taken from conquered tribes and installed in a sort of prison house in the great temple, where they were worshipped by the Aztecs themselves. The priests, of whom there were said to be five thousand in Tenochtitlán alone, were educated in special schools in the temples where they were subjected to rigorous discipline and trained to an austere life. One of their principal occupations was the study of astronomy and the calculation of the dates of the numerous religious festivals, in accordance with an intricate calendar which bore marked resemblance to that of the ancient Mayas. The priests were also the scribes of the community and prepared the religious and historical manuscripts, a few of which have come down to us. Their system of writing was far inferior to that of the Mayas. Events and ideas were represented pictorially, much as in the picture writings of the North American Indians, but the conventionalization of certain signs and the adoption of symbols to represent certain words or ideas facilitated expression.

The religious festivals that occurred in each of the eighteen months into which the Nahua year was divided, as well as numerous other special occasions, were celebrated in a way that horrified the Spanish conquerors. Human sacrifices were practised to some extent by many of the American peoples, but nowhere did they assume such gruesome form as at Tenochtitlán. Nearly all of the Aztec festivals were celebrated by the immolation of numbers of war prisoners or women or children, whose bodies were usually eaten after the sacrifice by the priests and the populace. Wherever the first Spanish invaders went, they found the temples noisome with the smell of blood. The Aztecs frequently engaged in war solely for the purpose of obtaining victims for sacrifice, and the warriors on the battlefield always sought to capture their enemies rather than to kill them, a fact which materially aided the Spaniards in their conquest of the country.

The city of Tenochtitlán, surrounded by water and accessible only by three causeways, each several miles long, excited the wonder and admiration of the Spanish conquerors. It was apparently the home of



some sixty thousand families when it was first visited by Cortez.<sup>1</sup> At its center were the great temple of the tribe; the *Tecpán*, where the war chief, with his numerous family and a great host of officials, lived and dispensed hospitality, and other public edifices of vast size. Less important temples and public buildings were scattered throughout the city. The houses were of stone or adobe, many of them built on piles in the water and accessible only by boat. The inhabitants were supported not only by the product of their own lands but by the tribute paid by other cities. This took a great variety of forms—slaves, pottery, textiles, feather work, gold ornaments and other works of art, as well as food. The city also carried on an active commerce with other parts of the “empire” and with regions not yet conquered, sending out carefully organized trading expeditions which also obtained much valuable military information. The safe return of these expeditions was celebrated with feasts and religious observances and the merchants themselves were accorded the respect due to men who had been successful in a dangerous and difficult undertaking.

There were many other large cities in the lake region and elsewhere in Central Mexico, though few of them were so populous or so wealthy as Tenochtitlán. The Nahuas had made great progress in the arts of civilization since their wandering ancestors had entered the valley only a few centuries before. They were skilful workers in gold and silver and they made weapons and other articles out of copper and copper alloys, although the limited supply of copper forced them to rely mainly on stone as material for weapons and utensils. A high degree of artistic skill is shown in their architecture, their stone carving, their painting, and their pottery. They wove textiles from maguey fiber and cotton and made paper from maguey fiber. There were artisans especially trained in each craft, and those following certain callings, and especially the gold and silver smiths, were highly honored.

Descendents of the Mayas and the Nahuas form the great majority of the population of Mexico today. There are still some millions of people of pure or almost pure Indian blood, many of them speaking their aboriginal languages and retaining much of their ancient way of

<sup>1</sup> Merriman, *Rise of the Spanish Empire*, Vol. III, p. 470.

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life, and other millions of mixed blood owe much of their culture to their Indian heritage. In Central America, the situation is much the same. The population of Guatemala is predominantly Maya, and a part of the people of Nicaragua are descended from Nahua tribes that penetrated far to the south in some early migration. Other Central American Indians were of various linguistic stocks, some of them with fairly high cultures and others much more primitive. We shall see in a later chapter how differences in the distribution and the relative advancement of the pre-conquest inhabitants were an extremely important factor in the later history of the Central American countries, as they were in the history of Latin America as a whole.

### THE INCAS

In South America the most important Indian groups were those of the Andean highlands and the adjacent coastal valleys in what is now Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The Andes, in Peru and Ecuador, form two or three generally parallel chains, snow-covered at their summits but enclosing fertile valleys where the climate is tempered by the altitude and tropical diseases such as malaria do not flourish. These were occupied at the time of the Conquest by a dense population which cultivated every foot of arable soil. There were other flourishing communities in the narrow strip of plain along the Peruvian coast, a region of rainless desert where only the rivers coming down from the Andes made agriculture possible. Here also there was a relatively cool climate, thanks to the Humboldt current which flows from the Antarctic along the western shore of South America almost to the equator. A third center of population was the great, almost level Bolivian plateau, twelve to fourteen thousand feet above sea-level. Much of this was too arid for agriculture, but was well suited to the llamas and alpacas which formed the pastoral wealth of the inhabitants, a hardy race who had adapted themselves to the cold and the high altitude which makes life cheerless and uncomfortable for persons accustomed to other climates. At the northern end of the plateau around Lake Titicaca crops such as potatoes and *quinua*, a sort of buckwheat, could be grown, and a larger population could be supported. At the time of the Spanish conquest, these three regions,

extending for more than two thousand miles along the western coast of South America, formed one prosperous empire, ruled by the Incas of Cuzco, with a more elaborate political and social organization than existed anywhere else in the continent.

Of the history of this region before the time of the Incas we know very little. Archeological exploration is only gradually revealing something of the character and relationship of the various cultures which existed at different times in different parts of the Andean area. The domestication of the llama and the alpaca, and the development of the potato and other useful plants from very different ancestral varieties, must clearly have been the work of many generations of people who had already emerged from a state of savagery.

The earliest high civilization in South America, so far as we can judge from the evidence now available, existed in the coastal valleys of what is now northern Peru. The Chimu, whose capital was at Chan-Chan near the modern city of Trujillo, were a powerful nation when they were conquered by the Incas in the fifteenth century, and their tradition that their ancestors had long enjoyed an advanced form of culture is substantiated by the archeological remains in their territory. At about the same time, perhaps, that the Mayas were bringing to perfection the architecture and sculpture of the "Old Empire," the early Chimu were living in large and well-organized communities, portraying much of their daily life and occupations with a realism unusual in primitive American art on pottery of exquisite workmanship. A somewhat different type of pottery, also of fine workmanship, is found in graves of about the same period in Nazca and other valleys farther south.

At a somewhat later time the center of civilization, and perhaps of political power, seems to have shifted to the highlands. At Tiahuanaco, in the cold, bleak region south of Lake Titicaca, there are remains of what must have been impressive temples or palaces, with carvings, including especially a famous monolithic doorway, that indicate that notable progress had been made in sculpture as well as architecture. The buildings could only have been erected by a strong populous state, for an effective control over great numbers of workmen must have been required to transport and put in place the great blocks of stone, carefully and accurately cut, of which they were

constructed. Vestiges of similar "megalithic" masonry are found at several places in the highlands north of Lake Titicaca, especially in parts of the walls of the great fortress at Cuzco, and other remains, including designs on pottery, seem to show that the cultural influence of Tiahuanaco reached many places on the coast. The city was very possibly the center of a great empire foreshadowing that of the Incas. When it flourished and why it fell we can only guess, for the Peruvians knew little or nothing of the history of its ruins at the time of the Spanish conquest. The archeological evidence indicates that its fall was followed by a period of general cultural decline. On the coast a higher type of civilization soon reappeared, but the people of the highlands seem to have reverted to more primitive conditions, under the rule of a great number of petty local chieftains.

Among these, perhaps, were the Incas of Cuzco, a fertile valley in the mountains north of Lake Titicaca, where something of the civilization of Tiahuanaco may have survived. The Incas believed that their ancestors, claiming to be children of the Sun, had come into the valley from outside and had persuaded its people and those of other districts near-by to accept their rule. Native traditions gathered by the early Spanish chroniclers recorded the names of some twelve rulers as successors of Manco Capac, the legendary founder of the dynasty, and indicated that the family came into power at Cuzco about four hundred years before the Spanish conquest. They soon began to expand their domain by the systematic conquest and assimilation of neighboring tribes, first in the basin of Lake Titicaca and later in the higher valleys north and west of Cuzco. At the beginning of the fifteenth century the empire was still a fairly compact state in the mountains of what is now southern Peru and northwestern Bolivia, but three great rulers who immediately preceded the Spanish conquest extended its frontiers until it included present-day Ecuador and much of Chile and northwestern Argentina, as well as the greater part of modern Peru and Bolivia. The coastal regions, which had been powerful independent kingdoms, became one of the most important parts of the Incas' realm.

The conquered territories, except perhaps some of the frontier regions, were not merely tributary states, like those dominated by the Aztecs, but integral parts of a highly centralized kingdom. The

Incas seem from the beginning to have shown an astonishingly high degree of statesmanship in the measures which they took for the consolidation of their conquests. Their dominance was effectively secured by building fortresses and roads, and the loyalty of each group of new subjects was obtained by skilfully harmonizing their political and social system with that of the empire. In most cases the former rulers were allowed to remain in power, under the supervision of the Inca's representative, and local customs were interfered with as little as possible. The inhabitants were required, however, to learn *Quechua*, the language of Cuzco, in order to simplify the problem of administration, and this is the prevalent tongue in the Andean highlands today. The process of assimilation was doubtless made easier by the fact that the more important parts of the Andean region were occupied by tribes of a similar culture and closely related languages, and also by the great prestige which the Incas acquired as their power grew.

The *Sapa Inca*, the ruler of the empire, was an absolute monarch whose claim to descent from the Sun invested him in the eyes of his subjects with a divine character which strengthened his temporal power. When he was not leading the army or engaged in long tours of inspection in outlying parts of his domains, he lived in great state at Cuzco, surrounded by a numerous court and a large harem. Among the later Incas, at least, the heir to the throne must be the son of the monarch by his own sister—a custom evidently adopted to enhance the sacredness of the royal family in the eyes of the people. The other princes of the royal blood, including all legitimate descendents of former rulers, formed the high nobility from whose ranks were selected the principal military and civil officials and the chief priests. They, with the other descendents of the original inhabitants of Cuzco, were entitled to call themselves Incas and to wear the large ornaments distending the lobes of their ears which led the Spaniards to call them *orejones*. Many of the special privileges which they enjoyed were also enjoyed by the *curacas*, the hereditary chiefs of conquered provinces, whose children were usually educated at the court at Cuzco to imbue them with a spirit of loyalty. Below these were a host of minor officials, charged with the supervision and control not only of the political life but of the economic life of the people of the empire.

The social and economic organization was perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Inca regime. Its basis was the communal ownership of land by the *ayllu*, or clan, which had doubtless existed among the Andean peoples for many centuries. Each family was allotted annually an area sufficient for its needs, and was obliged to cultivate it under the close supervision of the royal officials. Other portions were set aside to be tilled by the inhabitants for the benefit of the government and the priesthood. The products of these latter lands were available also for the relief of famine in any part of the empire, and the well-filled storehouses of the Inca thus afforded a security against want which might be envied by the people of many modern countries.

Agriculture was the principal occupation, and a great variety of fruits and vegetables were grown in the various climatic zones from the hot valleys east of the mountains to the cold *páramos* near their summits. Potatoes, in the highlands, and maize, at altitudes of less than eleven thousand feet, were the chief crops. In the mountains the scanty area of arable land was increased by well-built terraces following the contours of the hillsides. Agricultural implements were crude, but the use of fertilizers, including guano in the coast regions, was understood and practised. In the higher and less fertile parts of the mountain regions the people were herdsmen rather than farmers. The llamas and alpacas were the property of the state and their meat and wool was divided among the inhabitants according to the needs of each household, so that *charqui*, or dried flesh, supplemented agricultural products as a staple article of diet. Wild game was captured only in great, officially organized annual hunts.

The control of the Incas, in theory at least, extended to the most minute details of the life of their subjects. There were officials charged with the supervision of each group of ten families, over whom were others ruling groups of fifty, one hundred, and one thousand. The people were divided into ten classes, according to age, and the character of the work to be done by individuals of each class was fixed by law. Certain inhabitants of each community were selected in turn to serve the Inca as soldiers, shepherds, miners, artisans, messengers, or laborers on public works and this service was credited to the com-

munity as a part of its tribute. Marriage, travel, and costumes were officially regulated. Violations of the laws were severely punished because even trivial offenses were looked upon as a sacrilegious disobedience of the Inca's commands, but crime is said to have been rare.

The vast power that the Incas exercised was shown by the manner in which they were able to move the people of any district from their homes to other sections of the country when they considered this advisable. In some cases these *mitimaes*, or colonists, were the inhabitants of a newly conquered district whose loyalty was doubtful and who were therefore compelled to exchange homes with people from an older section of the empire. In others they were pioneers, sent from overpopulated provinces to newly conquered and undeveloped frontier regions. In either case the colonists were given special privileges and material assistance designed to mitigate the hardships that such transfers must have caused.

The public works constructed by the Incas were among the most notable of their achievements. Irrigation systems, which must already have existed in the coastal valleys, were improved and extended. Water was brought in some cases for many miles, through tunnels or channels cut in the mountains or over aqueducts supported by masonry walls, and reservoirs were built to assure a continuous supply. The country thus supported a far larger population than it did after the Spaniards, in their ignorance and improvidence, allowed these works to fall into disrepair. The roads, which connected Cuzco with all parts of the empire, were scarcely less remarkable. They were frequently surfaced either with slabs of stone or a mixture of stone and clay, beaten hard, and the steeper slopes were ascended by steps cut in the rock. The gorges in the mountains, which would otherwise have been almost impassable, were crossed by suspension bridges of osier or maguey fiber. At intervals there were storehouses of grain and other supplies for the use of the army, and at more frequent intervals huts for the accommodation of travellers. Messengers, stationed at posts so near together that it was possible to run from one to another at top speed, enabled the Inca to send orders to any part of his domains, and to be informed within a few days of all important happenings in the outlying provinces.

So elaborate an administrative organization could hardly function without some means for recording and conveying information. The Incas had no system of writing, but they had developed a substitute in the form of the *quipus*, which served to show the quantities of articles of various kinds on hand in the storehouses, the population of each district in the empire, and the amount of tribute rendered by their people.

These quipus were cords on which were made knots of almost infinite multiplicity. For the purposes of reckoning, each form of knot represented a different number, and each string a different subject, to some of the strings, subordinate strings were attached, serving as footnotes, and the strings forming one set of accounts were arranged as a fringe along a master-string. An indication of the nature of the objects enumerated was furnished by the colour of each string, and the combinations of colours and types of knots gave an almost endless variety to the uses to which this method of recording could be put.<sup>1</sup>

A specially trained force of *quipucamayac* or accountants was entrusted with the keeping of these records. The *quipus* seem to have served even to keep alive the memory of historical events, though their usefulness in this connection was obviously limited.

The cities, and especially the capital, were adorned with public buildings of stone laid in regular tiers and cut and fitted with marvellous exactness. The traveller who visits Cuzco today can walk through streets where the beautiful Inca masonry still serves as the outside walls of the houses. Many of the temples and palaces covered large areas and were lavishly decorated with plates of gold and silver. Since each Inca built a new residence for himself, leaving that of his predecessor closed as a sort of shrine, their palaces and the great buildings erected for religious purposes covered a large part of the area of the capital.

The most impressive edifices were naturally the temples. The *Coricancha*, in the holy city of Cuzco, was the religious center of the empire. Here, besides the sanctuary of the Sun itself, where the mummies of former Incas were seated before the great altar, there were chapels dedicated to the Moon, the planet Venus, the Lightning, and the Rainbow, besides many apartments for the use of the priests.

<sup>1</sup> Joyce, *South American Archaeology*, pp. 102-3.



In the temple precincts, according to Garcilaso de la Vega, a descendant of the Incas who wrote their history after the Spanish conquest,<sup>1</sup>

[There was] a garden of gold and silver. . . . It contained many herbs and flowers of different kinds, many small plants, many large trees, many large and small animals both wild and domestic, and creeping things, such as serpents, lizards, and toads, as well as shells, butterflies, and birds. Each of these things was placed in its natural position. There was also a large field of maize, the grain they call *qumua*, pulses, and fruit trees with their fruit; all made of gold and silver.

Religion, as among the other civilized peoples of America, played an important part in the life of the community and was closely identified with the civil authority. Both the peoples of the sierra and the peoples of the coast worshipped a great multitude of local gods, or *huacas*, such as rocks, rivers, natural forces, and animals which the various tribes regarded as their ancestors. Homage was also universally paid to the dead. The Sun, the special *huaca* of the Incas, was the great deity of Cuzco, and its worship was imposed upon the conquered peoples as the empire expanded. The already existing local cults, however, were not in most cases suppressed, and even among the Incas the Sun was by no means the sole deity. Each locality, and even each family, had its *huacas*, and all of the people, from the Sapa Inca down, had personal fetishes that were supposed to influence the fortunes of the owner during his life and to be buried with him at death. A higher religious conception was represented by the creator god, Huiracocha or Pachacamac, who was worshipped by the Incas and also by some of the coast people, and whose worship, at least among the Inca nobility, was abstract and spiritual rather than material. This deity is thought to have been the principal god of the ancient pre-Inca civilization, whose likeness appears on the carved doorway at Tiahuanaco.

There was a numerous priesthood, headed by the *Villac Umu*, who was always a brother or close relative of the ruling Inca. Under him were other religious functionaries of high rank, for the most part of royal or noble blood, but the minor positions were filled by persons serving only for short periods and thereafter returning to their usual

<sup>1</sup> *The Royal Commentaries of the Incas*, Part I, Book III, Chapter 24, Markham's translation, Vol. I, pp. 282-3.

occupations. An important function of the priesthood was to ascertain the will of the deity by omens of various sorts, or by consulting oracles. Sacrificial offerings of llamas, precious metals, and food were made to the Sun and also to other *huacas* and to the spirits of ancestors. Human sacrifices, which had been common in earlier times among the Andean tribes, were to a great extent suppressed by the Incas though it is probable that they were practised on rare and important occasions.

Among the most famous institutions of the empire were the convents of the Virgins of the Sun attached to the temples of the Sun in the chief cities. In these buildings, hundreds of maidens, selected for their noble birth or their beauty, wove the garments used by the royal family and the priests and made bread, *chicha*, and other articles for religious purposes. They were rigorously secluded from contact with the outside world, under the guardianship of older women, but after some years a few of the more beautiful were permitted to leave the convents to enter the harem of the ruler or to become the wives of lesser chiefs.

In practical statesmanship and in their genius for organization and administration, the Incas far surpassed any other group of American Indians about whom we have definite knowledge. If their culture was in some other respects inferior to that which the Aztecs and their neighbors had inherited from the earlier inhabitants of the Mexican Valley—for the Mexicans surpassed the Peruvians in architecture and sculpture, in their astronomical knowledge and in possessing a system of writing—it was nevertheless of a high order. Such fragments of their poems and prayers as have come down to us give evidence of a highly developed capacity for self-expression and a depth of real spiritual feeling. Intellectual progress, however, seems to have been confined almost entirely to the ruling class. The masses of the people, living in rude and comfortless stone huts, were doubtless better fed and better cared for than they had been before the time of the Incas, or than they have been since the Spanish conquest, but they were kept in a state of ignorance and the system under which they lived must have precluded the growth of any spirit of initiative or self-reliance. It was the tradition of unquestioning obedience to despotic authority which made it relatively easy for the Spaniards to conquer





and hold Peru after they had once obtained control of the person of the monarch.

How Pizarro and his followers wiped out or assimilated the Inca ruling upper class and established themselves as rulers over the submissive masses of the population will be told in the next chapter. As in Mexico, the higher aspects of the Indian civilization were completely destroyed, but the common people retained their language and many of their customs, including the communal ownership of lands by the ancient *ayllus*. The influence of the Inca culture is still evident today among the people of Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and north-western Argentina.

#### THE CHIBCHAS

In the highlands north of the Inca Empire, in what is now the Republic of Colombia, there were a number of other relatively advanced Indian groups. Of these the Chibchas or Muisca of the plateau of Bogotá were the most important. Their culture was inferior to that of the Aztecs and the Incas, but they nevertheless lived in large cities, built of wood rather than stone, and the numerous formerly independent tribes had been brought together before the Conquest into five well-organized states under priest-kings, who lived in great pomp and were regarded as semi-divine by their subjects. Of these the *zipa*, whose capital was near modern Bogotá, and the *zaque* of Tunja were the most important. The Chibchas worshipped several deities, including the Sun, the Moon, and Bochica, the legendary teacher of the arts of civilization. Their culture in general was similar to that of the other Andean peoples though they did not have the llama and alpaca which are not found north of Ecuador. They spun and wove cotton, made good pottery, and were skilful in working with gold.

One of the customs of the Chibchas gave rise to the famous myth of *El Dorado*, the gilded man. Certain lakes in their territory, and especially those of Guatavita and Ubaque, were places of pilgrimage at which all of the tribes gathered from time to time, laying aside hostilities to engage in foot-races and drinking bouts. There were especially elaborate ceremonies when a new chief of the principality of Guatavita was to be consecrated. While his subjects gathered on the

shore, lighting bonfires and making prayers, the prince, with several priests, embarked on a raft. He was stripped of his clothing, covered with adhesive earth, and sprinkled with powdered gold, while the raft itself was laden with gold and emeralds to be thrown into the sacred waters. Reports of this ceremony were carried into distant lands, so that Belalcázar, the conqueror of Ecuador, heard reports at Quito of a country so rich in gold that the prince was covered from head to foot with the precious metal for his coronation. The legend grew, and many Spanish expeditions braved terrific hardships in search of the mythical El Dorado long after Guatavita itself had been conquered.

Unlike the Indians of Mexico and Peru, the Colombian tribes took over the language and to a great extent the customs of their Spanish conquerors. There has been much mixture of blood and the Indians do not now form an important separate community, but a large part of the Colombian nation is still wholly or partly of Indian descent.

#### OTHER INDIANS

There were a great number of other Indian groups in Spanish and Portuguese America, but most of them were of a more primitive type. Those who were practically exterminated after the Spanish conquest, like the inhabitants of the Antilles, or who merely survived as primitive savages in regions never effectively occupied by Europeans, need not be described here. There were other tribes, however, that played an important rôle in the history of the European settlements.

Among these were the peoples of the Tupi-Guaraní linguistic stock, living in the sub-tropical regions south of the Amazon valley and east of the Paraná-Paraguay River system, a wide area embracing the modern republic of Paraguay, much of south-central Brazil, and near-by portions of Argentina. The Tupis, in the eastern part of this area, were a savage race given to cannibalism and constantly at war among themselves, and they and the numerous other native tribes of the Brazilian coast fought savagely against the Portuguese, who reduced great numbers of them to slavery. Though relatively few of them survived, because they were unaccustomed to hard labor and susceptible, like other Indians, to the white man's diseases, their blood

is still noticeable among the people of several regions in modern Brazil.

More important were the Guaranís, a somewhat more civilized race who lived in semipermanent communities with large houses of lattice work and straw accommodating twenty or thirty families. They were fairly skilled in making pottery and polished stone implements, and they cultivated the usual Indian crops—corn, beans, and tobacco. At the same time they depended for much of their food on hunting and fishing. Less warlike than their Brazilian relatives, they were easily brought under control by the early Spanish settlers and later by the Jesuit fathers, who established among them the famous Paraguay missions. These were the only Indians east of the Andes who survived to become an important element in the population of one of the modern South American republics. Their descendents, with an admixture of white blood, today form the bulk of the inhabitants of Paraguay, and their language is still generally spoken in that country.

On the grassy pampas of Argentina there was another group of tribes whose culture was entirely different. Nomads, living by hunting and practising agriculture, if at all, only in a rudimentary way, they were a warlike people, incorrigibly attached to their personal and tribal independence. Like the Indians of North America, they were pushed back but not conquered by the European invaders, and they continued to make trouble for the Spanish settlements until they succumbed to overwhelming military force and the destructive effect of the white man's vices and diseases in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The fact that the aboriginal inhabitants could neither be enslaved nor absorbed explains the absence of Indian blood in the central part of Argentina today.

Closely related linguistically to the Pampean tribes were the celebrated Araucanians, who lived in the valleys of central Chile. North of the Bio Bio River, the people of this stock were somewhat more civilized than their neighbors on the other side of the Andes, for they had fallen under the influence of the Incas and had adopted a more settled way of life. They were conquered by the Spaniards after some hard fighting, and formed the bulk of the laboring class in Chile during the colonial period. The Indians south of the Bio Bio savagely resisted the invaders for more than three hundred years.

Like the Pampean tribes, they were finally defeated late in the nineteenth century, and those who survive are living peaceably on reservations today.

The history of a colony on the estuary of the River Plate, where the wild, nomad Indian tribes could only be pushed back and gradually exterminated, was certain to be different from that of one planted among the settled agricultural people of Mexico or Peru, where the pure-blooded Spaniards would always be a minority and a considerable part of the Indian culture would survive. The striking contrasts in political and social development that impress the modern traveller as he goes from one Latin American republic to another have their origin primarily in differences in the character and relative advancement of the original Indian inhabitants and in their ability or inability to survive contact with Europeans. The development of truly democratic political institutions, for example, was far easier in Argentina and Uruguay, where the people were almost wholly of European descent, than in countries which had large Indian populations, subjected for centuries to economic exploitation by the conquering race. Throughout our study of Latin American history the Indian background must constantly be borne in mind.



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## *Chapter II*

### THE COMING OF THE SPANIARDS

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#### THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN SPAIN

The Spanish peninsula is peopled by the descendents of many dissimilar races. The earliest inhabitants of whom we know were Iberians, closely related to the Berbers of the near-by African coast, and Celts, who occupied parts of the north and west. These primitive people had had some contact with Phoenician and Greek traders, and later with the Carthaginians, but it was their conquest by Rome late in the third century B.C. which first made them a part of the civilized world. Spain became one of the most prosperous parts of the Empire, and Roman political and social institutions were not entirely destroyed when the peninsula was overrun by Germanic tribes in the fifth century. The language of the Romanized inhabitants also survived, and religious differences which at first existed between them and the invaders disappeared when King Recared was converted from Arianism to Roman Catholicism. The Visigoths, the most important of the Germanic tribes, ruled the greater part of Spain until the Saracens from North Africa took possession of the country early in the eighth century.

The new conquerors brought with them an advanced culture which made Moslem Spain the most civilized portion of Western Europe during the next three centuries. The original inhabitants, on the whole, were well governed and fairly treated. There was little attempt to convert them by force to Islam, though many of them embraced that faith to escape the taxes imposed on non-believers, or, in the case of slaves, to obtain freedom from their Christian masters. The tolerant policy of the Moorish rulers also embraced the Jews, and large num-

bers of these came to Spain to add yet another to the many racial strains in the peninsula. The sixteenth-century Spaniard was thus the product of a mixture not only of Iberian, Celtic, and Goth, but often of Arab or Jewish blood.

#### THE RECONQUEST

The Moors had hardly established themselves in Spain before the long wars of the reconquest began. After the Saracen advance into France had been turned back by Charles Martel at Poitiers in 732, the Frankish kings helped to preserve Christian rule in Aragon and Catalonia at the base of the Pyrenees; and farther west, in the mountains of Asturias, there were other independent Christian communities that later grew into the kingdoms of Leon and Castile. All of these little states gradually extended their domains. The Moors early abandoned much of the bleak plateau of northern Spain, and their hold on the more attractive regions in the south was often made precarious by factional strife between the Arabs and the North African Berbers or between ambitious local potentates. The Christians also fought among themselves as often as against the infidels, but they were occasionally able to combine their forces, and in 1212 they decisively defeated the Moors in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. During the next half century all of southern Spain was reconquered except the little kingdom of Granada, which remained under Moorish rule until 1492.

For two hundred years after the break-up of the Moorish empire the Spanish peninsula was divided between five separate kingdoms. Castile and Leon, united under one crown after 1230, had the largest territory and the most numerous population. The realms of the Kings of Aragon, who had acquired Catalonia in the twelfth century and the Moorish kingdom of Valencia in the thirteenth, lay east of Castile along the Mediterranean coast. To the west was Portugal, which had become independent in the twelfth century; to the south Granada, and in the northeast the little kingdom of Navarre. These states were constantly at war with one another or torn by internal struggles. In Castile especially there were but few intervals of peace in the strife between rival claimants to the throne and between the Crown and the great nobles—a state of affairs that left little opportunity for

intellectual or economic advance. Aragon, with more stable political institutions, fared better, and Catalan merchants developed an important commerce throughout the Mediterranean region.

It was the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile and Leon in 1469 that made it possible for Spain to become a great nation. The union of the heirs to the thrones of the two principal Spanish states came at a time when much of the peninsula was in a state of anarchy. Isabella obtained recognition as Queen of Castile and Leon only after a long struggle, but once established on her throne, in 1474, she showed an ability and statesmanship that her predecessors had lacked. The unruly nobles were brought under control and compelled to cease their private wars, while brigandage and disorder were checked by the organization of an effective police force. When Ferdinand succeeded his father as King of Aragon in 1479, the two realms were united under one effective government, though they retained their separate constitutions. The new monarchs were not only intelligent and energetic but popular, and the harmony in which they worked was an important element in their prestige. Their first great enterprise, after the establishment of order at home, was the conquest of Granada, which was accomplished in 1492 after ten years of warfare. It was only a few months after the fall of the Moorish capital that the sovereigns entered into an agreement with Christopher Columbus for a voyage into the western ocean.

The discovery of America thus came just at the time when the long wars of the reconquest ended, and when much of the crusading spirit that had been aroused during the campaign against Granada could be transferred to the enterprise of converting the heathen of the New World. The history of Spain in the centuries before the discovery helps to explain the character of the Spaniards who came to America. The earliest colonists were largely from the hitherto turbulent realms of the crown of Castile, to which the Indies particularly belonged. Generations of almost constant fighting had developed in them the audacity and indomitable courage which made possible the achievements of the conquistadores; but they had also brought out other traits of character that were less desirable among permanent settlers in a new country. Among these was a deep-seated aversion to manual labor, either in tilling the soil or in manufacturing. In Castile and

Leon climatic and topographical conditions had made stock-raising more attractive than agriculture, and in the more fertile southern provinces the presence of a subject Moorish peasantry had discouraged the conquering race from engaging in farming. The Moors were also more skilful as artisans, and manufacturing was left in their hands. Partly at least because work in the fields or in the shop was regarded as degrading by the Christian Spaniards,<sup>1</sup>

... there was an enormous preponderance of personal service in the industrial organism, and much of this was purely for ostentation. Nowhere in the world were there so many nobles, so many officers, civil and military, so many lawyers and clerks, priests and monks, so many students and school boys, with their servants. But as truly, nowhere in the world were there so many beggars and vagabonds.

The lesser nobility, the *caballeros* or *hidalgos*, were an especially numerous class. During the wars of the reconquest, any Castilian who maintained a horse and weapons in a city in newly conquered territory, without engaging in trade, was regarded as a member of this class with extensive privileges, including exemption from general taxation. All of his sons, legitimate and illegitimate, inherited his status.<sup>2</sup> There was thus a great class of fighting men who were little suited for other occupations when Ferdinand and Isabella established internal peace in Spain; and it was they who made the Spanish armies a formidable factor in the European wars of the sixteenth century and who filled the ranks of the expeditions to America.

#### THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA

The discovery of America was but one event in a great era of exploration which began long before 1492, and in which Portugal, rather than Castile, at first played the leading rôle. The development of the art of navigation which made Columbus' voyages possible was largely the work of a Portuguese prince, Henry the Navigator (1394-1460), who had devoted his life to the extension of geographical knowledge and the improvement of seamanship. Expeditions which he sponsored explored much of the African coast and paved the way for Bartholomeu Dias' discovery of the Cape of Good Hope in 1488

<sup>1</sup> Roscher, *The Spanish Colonial System* (translated by E. G. Bourne), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cheyney, *European Background of American History*, p. 108.

and Vasco da Gama's voyage to India in 1497-99. The Spanish voyages into the western ocean were at first little more than an effort to emulate these enterprises of a rival court. Commerce with the Orient was the goal in both cases, and while the Portuguese were still endeavoring to reach the East by sailing around Africa, Columbus persuaded Ferdinand and Isabella to attempt to attain the same result by an expedition westward across the Atlantic.

Columbus had himself been in the service of the King of Portugal, and had married a near relative of one of Prince Henry's captains. He had attempted to interest the Portuguese court in his project and it was after his failure at Lisbon that he began his long, uphill struggle to obtain support from the Spanish monarchs. The story of his efforts is a familiar one and need not be retold here. He finally signed an agreement with Ferdinand and Isabella which assured the needed financial support and granted him the position of Viceroy and the hereditary rank of Admiral in any new lands that he might obtain for the Crown. Such promises were easy to make when dealing with territories not yet discovered, but they were to cause much embarrassment to the Spanish monarchs in later years.

Columbus' three little ships sailed from Palos on August 3, 1492, and from the Canary Islands on September 6. On October 12 the expedition reached one of the smaller islands of the Bahamas, probably that now called San Salvador, and the admiral took formal possession of it in the name of the King and Queen. Understanding from the gestures of the natives that a larger island, rich in gold, lay farther south, he went on to the coast of Cuba, and then eastward to an island which he named Española, because its mountains reminded him of Spain. Here the Indians were friendly, and had considerable quantities of gold, which came, they said, from mines farther east and in the interior. He was sailing along the north coast in the direction which they indicated when his flagship, the *Santa María*, ran ashore and was wrecked. This compelled him to leave some forty of his men on shore in a fort which he named La Navidad, while he returned to Spain.

The admiral's report of his discovery and his exaggerated description of the riches that he had found created a sensation. Ferdinand and Isabella at once took steps to obtain recognition of their sov-

ereignty in the new lands. A papal bull issued in 1455 had confirmed Portugal's exclusive dominion "through all Guinea and beyond toward that Southern shore,"<sup>1</sup> and it was feared that this vague grant, which had been formally recognized by Spain, might be interpreted to include the islands that Columbus had reached. The Pope, therefore, was persuaded to lay down a line one hundred leagues west of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, beyond which lands not already in the possession of any Christian prince were to belong to the Crown of Castile. This was unsatisfactory to the King of Portugal, and the Treaty of Tordesillas, signed in 1494, finally provided that the "line of demarcation" should run from pole to pole 370 leagues west of the Cape Verdes. Not until six years later was it discovered that a part of South America lay east of this new line—a fact which gave Portugal her claim to Brazil.

The Spanish monarchs meanwhile made hurried preparations to establish a permanent colony in the New World. On September 25, 1493, Columbus sailed from Cadiz with seventeen ships and a large company of artisans, farmers, and missionaries, as well as seamen and soldiers. Because of the danger no women were taken along, but the fleet carried everything else necessary for a permanent settlement: domestic animals, seeds, fruit trees, and tools. When the expedition reached La Navidad, Columbus was horrified to find only the ruins of his fort. The Indians, at first so friendly, had been enraged at the abusive conduct of the Spaniards and had murdered them to a man.

A new settlement, called Isabela, was established on the coast farther to the east, but things went badly from the start. The admiral, as a foreigner, was unpopular with his followers, and the Spanish soldiers resented his insistence that they as well as the paid laborers should take part in the work of building the town. Disease and the effects of unaccustomed exertion in a hot climate thinned the colonists' ranks. The Indians, though at first docile and willing to help, were soon driven into open hostility by the settlers' demands for food and the abuse of their women, and were only defeated after several months of hard fighting. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Columbus found

<sup>1</sup> Davenport, *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648*, p. 24.

time to explore the south coast of Cuba and to discover Jamaica, but in 1496 he was compelled to return to Spain to defend himself against charges brought against him by discontented colonists. He was so far successful that he was again permitted to set sail for his colony in 1498.

On this third voyage the admiral followed a new route in the hope of finding richer lands to the south of those already discovered. He reached the Island of Trinidad and soon afterward the near-by mainland, where he found natives more civilized than those of Española, wearing golden ornaments and strings of pearls. Impressed by the Indians' appearance, by the pleasant climate, and by the beauty of the landscape, the admiral concluded that he had reached the very border of the terrestrial paradise itself, for this was reported to be in Asia, beyond the realm of Cathay. After exploring the coast for some distance to the west, he turned north to Española. There he found that his brother Bartholomew, left in charge in his absence, had moved with most of the colonists to the south shore of the island and had established the City of Santo Domingo, the first permanent settlement in America. The troubles with the Indians had continued, and even some of the Spaniards, under one Roldán, had revolted and established a separate camp in the interior. Columbus succeeded in making an agreement with the malcontents, but not in allaying the bitter feeling caused by the severity with which his brother had attempted to rule the colony—a bitterness which was aggravated by the colonists' sufferings from want and disease. Many of the settlers had returned to Spain with stories which intensified the painful impression made upon the King and Queen by the admiral's own reports.

Isabella was especially displeased when Columbus sent some six hundred Indians to Spain for sale as slaves. The slave trade had long been the chief factor in the development of Portugal's profitable African commerce, and it was not unnatural that Columbus should turn to this source of potential wealth when he was disappointed in his hopes of finding substantial amounts of gold or other valuable products in the lands which he had discovered. But Isabella from the outset adopted a more enlightened view of her obligations toward the inhabitants of her new possessions. Her disapproval of Columbus'

action was the first of a long series of efforts by the Spanish crown—efforts which as we shall see were not very successful—to protect the Indians from the rapacity of the Spanish conquerors.

The Monarchs were finally convinced that Columbus was unfit to act as governor of the new colony, and in 1500 Francisco de Bobadilla was sent to Española to take his place. The admiral and his brother Bartholomew were shipped back to Spain in irons after a one-sided investigation. They were soon released, but Columbus was never restored to the authority which had been promised to him for life. During his fourth and last voyage to America, upon which he embarked in 1502, he was not even permitted to land at Santo Domingo. He explored a long section of the Central American coast, suffering much from storms and other disasters, and returned to Spain broken in health, to die at Valladolid on May 20, 1506.

Since access to the rich markets of the Orient seemed more important than the possession of lands occupied only by primitive savages, exploration of the American coast during the first quarter century after the discovery was directed chiefly toward the search for a route past the new continent to Asia. Several other mariners had made important voyages before Columbus' death. In 1497 and 1498 John Cabot, an Italian sailing under a patent from the King of England, visited the North American coast. In Spain, Columbus' claim to a monopoly of the right of exploration in the Indies was respected until the admiral's enthusiastic account of his fourth voyage led both Alonso Niño and Alonso de Ojeda to visit the north coast of South America in 1499. Niño returned with a cargo of pearls and dye-wood, and Ojeda, who gave Venezuela its name because an Indian village built on piles in the Gulf of Maracaibo reminded him of Venice, also seems to have been fairly successful financially. In 1500 Vicente Yáñez Pinzón reached the Brazilian coast, discovered the mouth of the Amazon, and followed the shore north and west for some 2,000 miles. Only three months after Pinzón, the Portuguese navigator Pedralvares Cabral also landed in Brazil while on a voyage from Lisbon to India. There were other expeditions of less note, and in 1504, when Columbus returned from his fourth voyage, it was possible for geographers to draw a fairly accurate map of the coast



line from Cape Gracias a Dios in Central America to the easternmost point of Brazil.

It is one of the great injustices of history that the American continents were named not for their discoverer but for another Italian mariner who achieved fame more by accident than by desert. Amerigo Vespucci had taken part in some of the early voyages to the New World, and letters that he wrote describing them had been printed and widely read throughout Europe. In 1507, a German professor of geography reprinted one of these, and proposed that the land that had been discovered in the South Atlantic should be named "America." This suggestion was gradually accepted in other European countries, but in Spain the new possessions continued to be called "The Indies."

#### SANTO DOMINGO AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ENCOMIENDA SYSTEM

For some years after 1504 the search for a strait lagged and Spanish activity in the New World centered in the Caribbean. The little town of Santo Domingo, still the chief settlement, gradually became more prosperous. Its white population had numbered only 300 when Columbus' none too successful management of its affairs ended, but Governor Ovando, who came to the island in 1502, brought with him 2,500 new settlers. Although many of these died of hardship and disease, further immigration increased the number of Spanish inhabitants to 12,000 by 1506. After 1508 the colonists gradually spread into the neighboring islands of Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. Columbus and his followers had devoted themselves chiefly to gold mining, with disappointing results, but the governors who succeeded him devoted more attention to agriculture. Hides and sugar were exported to Spain in increasing quantities, and somewhat later, when expeditions to the mainland were undertaken, the breeding of horses for their use became profitable.

As the plantations expanded there was a more and more urgent demand for Indian laborers. The Arawaks, who occupied the larger West Indian islands when Columbus arrived, were a peaceable, primi-

tive people who had little inclination or strength for regular, sustained labor. Their first friendliness had turned to enmity when they found that the Spaniards expected to exploit them as a subject race, but then resistance to the invaders had been ineffective. After the general uprising of 1495, Columbus had imposed on them a heavy tribute, payable either in gold or in work. Two years later, to placate the discontent which had found expression in Roldán's revolt, the admiral did what Spanish kings had often done after the conquest of territory from the Moors, and granted many of his followers tracts of land with the right to make use of the labor of the Indians who were already cultivating them. From that time on the Indians were exploited more and more ruthlessly, despite the Crown's efforts to protect them.

Isabella was interested in the welfare of the natives, but she realized that the colony could not prosper, or even exist, without their labor. Both the climate and inherited prejudices made it impossible for the Spaniards to cultivate their plantations themselves. It seemed reasonable that the Indians should do manual labor, in return for wages, and their reluctance to give up their own simple life was regarded only as evidence of their indolence. Furthermore, the Queen desired the conversion of the natives to Christianity, which would be difficult if they were permitted to flee from any contact with the Spaniards, as many of them were doing. Ovando, who had at first been instructed to leave the Indians free to go where they wished, was therefore authorized in 1503 to gather them in villages near the white settlements. Each village was to be placed under the protection of a Spanish colonist, who was to see that the Indians were instructed in the Christian faith, and was to be recompensed by the tribute that the Indians were required to pay. The Indians might also be compelled to work for their protector, though as free men and for fair wages. Thus originated the *encomienda* system, which was extended to Mexico and Peru when those countries were conquered and became one of the most important institutions of Spain's American colonies.

Among the primitive people of the Greater Antilles, the *encomienda* lent itself to shocking abuses. The *encomenderos* paid little attention to their obligations although they exploited their charges to the utmost. Overwork and mistreatment, combined with the new

diseases brought by the white men, practically wiped out the Indians of Santo Domingo and Cuba within a generation. As the local labor supply diminished, it was replenished by raids in other parts of the West Indies and on the mainland. The victims of these did not even enjoy the doubtful benefits of the *encomienda*, for the Crown had been persuaded to authorize the reduction to slavery of Indians guilty of rebellion or cannibalism, and this afforded a pretext for the capture of thousands of inoffensive savages in regions not yet occupied. People torn from their homes in this way died off even faster than the local Indians, and it was not long before hardly a trace of native blood remained in the island colonies.

#### THE DISCOVERY OF THE PACIFIC

In 1509 an effort was made to establish permanent settlements on the mainland. Alonso de Ojeda was given permission to colonize and govern the coast from Cape de la Vela to the Gulf of Urabá, while Diego de Nicuesa received a similar grant from the Gulf of Urabá to Cape Gracias a Dios. Both leaders met with terrific obstacles. Ojeda, finding his efforts to obtain a foothold on the coast defeated by the savage Indians, left the sixty remaining members of his original force of 300 in a fort near the Gulf of Urabá and returned to Santo Domingo in an unsuccessful effort to obtain help and supplies. Shipwrecked on the voyage, he died soon afterward in poverty without returning to his province. Nicuesa established a settlement which he called Nombre de Dios, near what is now the Caribbean end of the Panama Canal, but hunger and disease reduced the number of his followers from 700 to sixty or seventy. When he learned that the survivors of Ojeda's expedition had moved across the Gulf of Urabá into his territory, he attempted to assert his authority over them. This was a mistake, for the colonists compelled him to put to sea in a worm-eaten vessel which never was heard from again.

The transfer of Ojeda's colony to Santa María la Antigua de Darién, as the new settlement was called, had been the work of Vasco Núñez de Balboa, an adventurer who had escaped from his creditors at Santo Domingo only by having himself nailed in a cask and loaded on one of Ojeda's ships. Balboa's energy and natural gift for leader-

ship had led the discouraged colonists to follow him rather than the lawyer Enciso, whom Ojeda had left as his representative. The result showed the wisdom of their choice, for by their new leader's diplomacy the Spaniards were able to obtain food and a small amount of gold from the near-by Indian tribes. They also learned of a great sea, lying beyond the mountains, on the shores of which there were said to be kingdoms far richer in the precious metals than any they had yet seen. On September 25, 1513, after an arduous journey of twenty-four days through the tropical jungle, Balboa saw the Pacific from the top of a hill, and four days later he walked into the waters of the Gulf of San Miguel and took possession of the ocean in the name of the King of Spain.

Balboa's exploit caused the King to excuse his usurpation of leadership and to grant him the title of "Adelantado of the South Sea," but before the report of the expedition reached Spain the King had already appointed Pedrarias Dávila Governor of the Darién colony. Pedrarias was a narrow-minded and vindictive but energetic official, already past his seventy-second birthday but destined to play an important part in the history of Central America until his death eighteen years later. He was jealous from the start of Balboa's popularity and independent spirit, and in 1519 he had his rival beheaded, on apparently trumped-up charges of plotting a revolt. In the same year he moved the seat of government from Santa María across the isthmus to Panama, so as to carry on more effectively the exploration of the coast on that side.

The discovery of the South Sea led to new efforts to find a way past the continent to Asia. The veteran explorer Juan Díaz de Solís, carrying the search for a strait farther south, reached the River Plate in 1516, but was killed by Indians when he attempted to land. In 1520 Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese in the service of the King of Spain, sailed down the coast of Patagonia and succeeded with much difficulty in passing through the strait which still bears his name. He found the ocean on the other side unusually calm, and it was he who christened it the Pacific. After exploring part of the Chilean coast, he struck out boldly westward, and finally reached the Philippines. There Magellan himself was killed in a battle with the natives, but some of his followers continued their journey and in 1522 completed

the first circumnavigation of the world. The route to the Orient had been found, but it did Spain little good since neither the Strait of Magellan nor the later discovered route around Cape Horn were easily navigated by the clumsy sailing vessels of the sixteenth century.

#### THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO

The net result of the first quarter century of Spanish enterprise in America had been disappointing. Little profit was to be hoped for from lands occupied only by primitive Indians like those who had been encountered along the coast all the way from Central America to the River Plate. It was not until the Spaniards came into contact with the richer and more civilized people of Mexico that the real value of Columbus' discovery began to be appreciated.

The first explorers to visit Mexican territory were the members of a slave-catching expedition from Cuba led by Francisco Hernández de Córdoba, who was badly defeated by the Mayas when he attempted to land in Yucatan in 1517. In the next year, another expedition under Juan de Grijalba explored the coast as far north as Vera Cruz and returned with a small quantity of gold. The reports of these two captains encouraged Diego Velásquez, the governor of Cuba, to send out a larger force, which he placed under the command of Hernando Cortez.

Cortez had come to Española in 1504, when he was only nineteen, and had played a distinguished part under Velásquez in the conquest of Cuba. He had later quarrelled with the governor, and had at one time been imprisoned. Relations between the two men had evidently improved, but when Cortez was about to sail the governor became suspicious of him and ordered him to surrender his command. Cortez refused, and proceeded to recruit men and obtain supplies at the smaller settlements along the Cuban coast in spite of Velásquez' effort to stop him. He was thus practically an outlaw when he finally set out for Yucatan in February, 1519. His defiance of the king's representative was to affect the whole course of his expedition.

Cortez set sail with eleven ships and about 600 men. He had ten bronze cannon and a few smaller firearms, as well as a number of

crossbows, but his most important military assets, as events later proved, were sixteen horses. It was the terror caused by these strange and apparently supernatural beasts, more perhaps than that inspired by the artillery, which repeatedly gave the Spaniards the victory over far larger native armies in the months to come.

At Cozumel Island, where Cortez first landed, he was well received by the natives and was so fortunate as to find a Spaniard named Jerónimo de Aguilar, who had been shipwrecked there eight years before and had learned the Maya language. From Cozumel he went on to Tabasco where the Indians opposed him but were defeated with much slaughter. As a peace offering they gave the Spaniards twenty women, and one of these, by great good luck, was able to speak both Maya and Nahuatl. This was the famous Marina, who later became Cortez' mistress and played an important part in the Conquest. Through her and through Aguilar the Spanish leader was now able to communicate freely with the inhabitants of the territories that he was about to invade.

On April 22 the Spaniards landed near the site of modern Vera Cruz. Two days later they were greeted by emissaries from Montezuma, the *tlacatecuhtli* of Tenochtitlán. Reports of Grijalba's arrival on the coast in the preceding year, with pictures of the Spaniards and their ships, had already reached the Aztec capital, and they had aroused superstitious fear as well as interest. The Nahuas had a legend that Quetzalcoatl, the fair god who was often portrayed with a long beard, would one day return from the East across the sea, and they were by no means sure that the light-skinned, heavily bearded foreigners were merely human beings. They were thus disposed to accord them a respectful if not enthusiastic welcome.

The Spaniards could see that they had to deal with a state far wealthier and more powerful than any thus far discovered in America, and there were many who felt that its conquest would be too difficult and dangerous a task for a few hundred men to undertake. Cortez, however, could not turn back, for his only hope of escaping punishment as a rebel was to win the King's forgiveness by some sensational achievement. His immediate problems were to give at least an appearance of legality to his actions and to make sure that none of his force could desert him, and he proceeded at once to attain both objectives.

First, after giving secret instructions to his own loyal supporters, he announced that the expedition was about to return to Cuba because it had already gone as far as Velásquez' instructions authorized. The men whom he had taken into his confidence at once objected, asserting that they had been promised an opportunity to found a new colony. Cortez ostensibly yielded to their demands and permitted them by formal vote to create the municipality of Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz. After he himself had been elected Captain General he sent messengers to Spain to explain and attempt to justify what had been done. He then cut off all possibility of retreat by secretly ordering that all of his remaining ships be sunk. The most discontented and faint hearted had now no alternative but to follow him.

In the meantime Cortez had been gathering much useful information about conditions in Mexico. He learned that the Totonacs along the coast were restive under the domination of the Aztec confederacy and he encouraged them to revolt. At the same time he endeavored to assure the Aztec leaders of his good intentions. When the people of a near-by town at his suggestion seized the confederacy's tribute collectors, he saved the prisoners from death and secretly sent two of them back to Montezuma with friendly messages. He had already sent gifts to the Aztec war lord and announced his intention to visit Tenochtitlán, but Montezuma, though he sent magnificent presents in return, had urgently begged him not to undertake so difficult and dangerous a journey.

After four months on the coast the Spaniards started into the interior, leaving a strong garrison at Vera Cruz. They met with no resistance as they ascended into the highlands, and after two weeks of marching they entered the territory of the Tlascalans, one of the few peoples of central Mexico whom the Aztecs had never been able to conquer. Here they were attacked by tremendous forces of natives, but the horses and the artillery gave them decisive victories in two hard-fought battles. The Tlascalans then decided not only to make peace but to join the Spaniards in their march against the tribe's traditional enemies at Tenochtitlán. Their help from that time on was of the greatest importance, and the remembrance of it gave the Tlascalans a privileged position among the Indians of Mexico throughout the colonial period.

With some thousands of his new allies Cortez now proceeded to Cholula. The Tlascalans had warned him that Montezuma planned to have the Spaniards entrapped and murdered in this city but he refused to show any evidence of fear and the Cholulans welcomed him with protestations of friendship. He soon learned through Marina, however, that the Tlascalans had been well informed, and he promptly forestalled his hosts' treacherous plans by massacring all of the chiefs and some thousands of the other inhabitants. This exhibition of cruelty, following so closely upon the apparently miraculous defeat of the overwhelmingly superior Tlascalan armies, doubtless did much to dissuade the Aztecs from offering further resistance to their unwelcome visitors.

Early in November, 1519, the invaders reached Tenochtitlán, where Montezuma came out in great state to welcome them and to assure them of his friendship. The Spaniards, with their horses and their native allies, took up their residence in one of the great buildings on the public square. The Indians brought them rich gifts and entertained them royally, but their situation, in an island city surrounded by hundreds of thousands of potential enemies, was clearly a precarious one. As usual Cortez decided to secure control by a bold stroke before his adversaries had time to consider their own next step. Taking as a pretext a reported plot against the garrison at Vera Cruz, he visited Montezuma with a strong guard and compelled him to come to live with the Spaniards in their quarters. Cortez rightly conjectured that the inhabitants of the city would be reluctant to attack while he held their ruler as a hostage, and he was able in fact to give orders to the Indians through his unwilling but thoroughly frightened guest. One of his first acts was to have Montezuma send for large quantities of gold and silver which were promptly divided among the officers and soldiers. The Emperor was treated at times with respect, at times with a brutality calculated to impress on him the danger of resistance. His princely bearing and noble character soon won the sympathy and admiration of his captors.

For a time all went well, though the extreme danger of the invaders' position was always evident. The temper of the Indians grew more and more ugly, especially after Cortez decided that he could no



longer postpone an attack on the native religion. The crusading spirit was always a powerful motive with the Spanish expeditions to the New World, second only to the desire for wealth and power, and it was impossible for the conquistadores to imagine the toleration of pagan cults among Indians who came under their control. Cortez had already compelled the Indians near Vera Cruz to accept Christianity, and he had attempted to convert his Tlascalan allies. Here, however, he had met strong opposition, and with a realism unusual among his contemporaries had compromised by permitting the Tlascalans to combine the Christian religion with their own. At Tenochtitlán, closer acquaintance with the horrible character of the native rites made a compromise impossible, and when all efforts at persuasion had failed Cortez proceeded to destroy the Indians' chief idols himself. For the moment the natives did not openly resist, but it was evident that they were horrified and infuriated.

When Cortez had been at Tenochtitlán about six months, a new and more serious threat suddenly loomed up. Pánfilo de Narváez, sent by Governor Velásquez, appeared on the coast with a force that outnumbered Cortez' by more than two to one. Between the Aztecs on the one side and this new enemy on the other resistance seemed hopeless, but Cortez left Pedro de Alvarado at Tenochtitlán with a part of his men, and boldly went to meet Narváez with the rest. For some days the two Spanish forces camped a short distance from one another. Cortez took advantage of the interval to bribe or cajole many of his opponent's lieutenants, and when the overconfident and careless Narváez was surprised by a night attack and badly defeated, the greater part of his followers returned with Cortez to Tenochtitlán.

There the situation had grown much worse. Alvarado, aroused by the Aztecs' continued refusal to abandon their idols, had attacked the participants in one of their religious festivals with great slaughter. The Indians had taken up arms in earnest, and when Cortez arrived the Spanish garrison was besieged in its quarters. Cortez entered the city without resistance but on the following day the Indians made a savage general onslaught. They had elected Montezuma's brother Cuiclahua as *tlacatecubtli*, and when the former ruler appeared on

the roof of the barracks in an effort to pacify them he was mortally wounded by a shower of stones. The Spaniards, short of provisions, realized that their only salvation lay in getting out of the city.

On the night of June 30, 1520, still famous as the *noche triste*, the sad night, they made their retreat. They had to cross one of the long causeways, hard pressed from their rear and attacked by fleets of war canoes on their flanks. Crowded in a narrow space and loaded down with spoils which they vainly hoped to carry away, they could make little use of their superior weapons. Hundreds of them and thousands of their Tlascalan allies were cut down. Scores were captured, to be sacrificed later to the Aztec gods. The heaviest losses occurred at the openings in the causeway, where the Indians had raised the draw-bridges. Less than half of those who started finally reached the mainland, and all of the cannon and most of the precious horses were gone. The survivors were again attacked by the Aztecs a few days later, but this time, after a hard fight, they won a sanguinary victory. They then marched to Tlascala, where their faithful allies received them with undiminished friendship.

Cortez still refused to abandon his purpose. After a short rest he proceeded to restore the Spanish prestige and the morale of his forces by a series of successful raids against allies of the Aztec confederacy. He also received much needed reinforcements and supplies, for a number of men whom Velásquez had sent to join Narváez were persuaded to join him, and other adventurers, attracted by reports of the wealth of Mexico, were beginning to arrive. One of these was a Negro ill with smallpox, a disease hitherto unknown among the Indians, which at once spread throughout the Mexican plateau carrying off vast numbers of the inhabitants and helping to undermine the Aztecs' powers of resistance. Cuiclahua was among those who died, and his nephew, Guatemoc, took his place.

By the end of 1520 Cortez was again ready to invade the lake region and to begin systematic preparations for the reduction of Tenochtitlán. He defeated, or won over by diplomacy, several of the tribes hitherto allied with the Aztecs, and occupied the points where the causeways reached the mainland. More important still, he launched on the lake a fleet of small vessels that had been built at Tlascala and brought in pieces from that city by 8,000 Indian carriers. He also

discovered and suppressed an incipient revolt among his own followers, led by those who still disapproved, or feared the results to themselves, of his defiance of Velásquez. In May, 1521, he began more active operations against the Aztec capital. The causeways and the aqueduct that supplied the city with fresh water were seized and a part of the city itself was occupied. The Indians fought so savagely that progress was slow. On one occasion some fifty Spaniards were captured and sacrificed in plain view of their horrified comrades. The invaders were not to be turned back, however, and the terrific losses inflicted by their firearms and pikes combined with suffering from lack of food and water to bring about the collapse of all resistance on August 13. Hardly more than desolate ruins were left, and the Spaniards found disappointingly little treasure, although they cruelly tortured Guatemoc in an effort to compel him to reveal where more was hidden. ✓

Cortez' persistent effort to obtain the approval of the Crown now met with success. He had so far had the worst of the contest between his emissaries and those of Diego Velásquez at the court in Spain. Bishop Fonseca, the official most concerned with affairs in the Indies, had in fact sent an official to Mexico in 1521 to investigate his conduct, but Cortez had refused on specious pretexts to recognize the commissioner's authority and had bribed him to return to Spain. With the fall of Tenochtitlán, the conqueror of Mexico had become so powerful that prudence as well as gratitude counseled a recognition of his services. In 1522, therefore, the Emperor formally appointed him Governor, Captain General, and Chief Justice of what was now christened New Spain. Cortez was thus free to turn with characteristic energy to the rebuilding of Tenochtitlán, henceforth called Mexico City, and to the completion of his conquest. The tribes of central Mexico were rapidly reduced to submission, and in 1523-24 expeditions were sent into Guatemala and Honduras.

In Guatemala, Pedro de Alvarado defeated the powerful Maya tribes of the highlands after severe fighting and established what was later to become an important colony. He also invaded what is now El Salvador, where he met with more persistent resistance. He later became governor in his own right of most of the territory that he had conquered.

In Honduras the conquerors of Mexico came into contact with the advance guard of Spanish penetration from Panama. In 1522 Gil González Dávila had marched overland from the Chiriquí region into Nicaragua. There he found several populous communities of Indians who were at first friendly and willing to be baptized but later attacked him. González defeated them, but then returned to Panama and from there to Santo Domingo to prepare for another expedition. This time, to avoid interference from Governor Pedrarias at Panama, he decided to invade Nicaragua from the north but when he landed on the coast of Honduras he came into conflict with Cristóbal de Olid, whom Cortez had sent to conquer that country.

Olid had already decided to obtain Honduras for himself, rather than for Cortez, and had imprisoned Francisco de las Casas when the latter arrived at the head of a force sent to restore Cortez' control. He now arrested Gil González also, but the two leaders were treated more like guests than captives and they soon freed themselves and murdered Olid. Meanwhile Cortez himself had marched to Honduras overland, suffering great hardships on the journey. He was warmly welcomed by the Spaniards there but reports of dissensions among his followers in Mexico forced him to return after a short stay, leaving his cousin Saavedra in command.

About this same time Pedrarias had sent Francisco Hernández de Córdoba from Panama to complete the conquest of Nicaragua. This leader defeated the Indians and founded the towns of León and Granada, but when he attempted to claim the province for himself the aged Pedrarias suddenly appeared on the scene and beheaded him. Soon afterward Pedrarias obtained an appointment as Governor of Nicaragua, having recently been supplanted in his post at Panama. His efforts to establish his control over Honduras as well brought him into conflict with Cortez' representatives, and the situation became more confused when a new governor appeared with a commission from the royal authorities at Santo Domingo. For some years intermittent armed strife between the various factions as well as frequent Indian revolts made the history of Honduras a gloomy one.

Cortez, when he returned from Honduras to Mexico in 1526, found not only that things had gone badly in his absence but that his enemies had succeeded in persuading the Emperor to send another officer

to investigate charges against him. Though the investigation produced no result, because both the commissioner and his successor unfortunately died, Cortez decided to go to Spain in an attempt to clear himself. There he obtained a title of nobility and the grant of great estates in Mexico, but the Emperor had already decided to deprive him of any real power. He retained the title of Captain General, but an *audiencia*, a commission of five judges, was created in 1527 to take over the civil government. Two years later the Spanish government decided to appoint a viceroy to exercise both military and civil authority, and after this official reached Mexico in 1535 Cortez was deprived of most of his authority. The great conqueror busied himself for a few years in attempts to explore the coast northwest of Mexico, but his luck seemed to have deserted him and he returned to Spain where he died in 1547. Antonio de Mendoza, the new viceroy, was one of the ablest rulers in Spanish colonial history. The colony soon became orderly and prosperous under his administration, and a long series of expeditions which he and his successors directed gradually incorporated New Mexico, California, and Texas in the domain of New Spain.

#### THE CONQUEST OF PERU

While Cortez was in Mexico, the Spaniards at the newly established settlement of Panama were exploring the Pacific coast, not only toward Nicaragua but also in the opposite direction. They soon heard vague stories of a great and rich empire far to the south, and in 1524 an expedition was fitted out to investigate them. Its leader was Francisco Pizarro, an illiterate adventurer who had been prominent in the affairs of the colony on the Isthmus since its first establishment. Pizarro obtained resources for the enterprise by forming a partnership with Diego de Almagro, another adventurer of the same type, and with a priest at Panama named Hernando de Luque. Almagro was to help in the work of exploration, whereas Luque, who did not live to see his partners' final triumph, was helpful in raising funds.

Two small ships were obtained and Pizarro set out in one of them in November, 1524. The weather at that season was especially unfavorable and he struggled for ten weeks against head winds and cur-

rents without reaching any well-settled region where he could replenish his provisions. He finally had to send the ship back to Panama, while he and the greater part of his men waited on the shore, almost starving on a diet of seaweed and palm nuts. When the ship returned, he went on down the coast, but a costly encounter with savage Indians convinced him that he could accomplish nothing without a larger force and he turned back to Panama. Almagro, who had followed with the other ship, had also had bad luck, and of 180 men who had sailed with the two leaders only some fifty survived.

The partners were nevertheless able, with some difficulty, to raise money and enlist men for a new expedition which left Panama in 1526. This time they reached the more populous districts along the Ecuadorean coast and were so encouraged by what they saw that Pizarro decided to remain on the small island of Gallo, in the Bay of Tumaco, while Almagro returned for reinforcements. When Almagro reached Panama, however, he met with a heart-breaking disappointment. Pedro de los Rios, who had succeeded Pedrarias, not only refused to permit the recruiting of additional men but sent a ship to bring back those who had remained with Pizarro.

There was a dramatic scene at Gallo when the ship arrived. Pizarro refused to obey the governor's order to return, and sixteen of his companions responded to his eloquent appeal not to abandon the undertaking in which they had already suffered so much. The little group were to suffer still more in the months that ensued, but their associates at Panama finally obtained permission to send a ship to relieve them and to continue, though only for a limited time, the exploration of the coast.

This was the turning-point in Pizarro's fortunes. In the six months that the governor had allowed him he reached northern Peru and saw unmistakable evidences of the wealth and the high civilization of the Inca Empire. The natives seemed fairly friendly, and the explorers were able to obtain gold and silver and fine textiles, and even llamas, to convince the incredulous at home of the truth of their story. They also carried off two Peruvians, who were invaluable later on as interpreters.

There could no longer be any question of the importance of their discoveries, but the partners had exhausted their resources and their

credit and the governor of Panama was still unfriendly. It was decided, therefore, that Pizarro should go to Spain to seek the support of the Crown. His efforts were successful and a royal capitulation, signed July 26, 1529, authorized him to discover, conquer, and settle the west coast of South America for a distance of two hundred leagues south from the Gulf of Guayaquil. Pizarro was promised a life appointment as Governor and Captain General of this territory; Almagro and Luque were treated less generously, though the agreement between the partners had stipulated that all three should share equally. The Crown provided a substantial sum toward the expenses of the new expedition, freed those settling in Peru from certain taxes for a period of years, and authorized Pizarro to distribute land and *encomiendas* of Indians in the territory that he might conquer.

After enlisting several followers in Spain, including his brothers, Hernando, Gonzalo, and Juan, Pizarro returned to Panama. In January, 1531, he sailed from that port with 180 men and twenty-seven horses, in three ships. Landing at a point in northern Ecuador, he proceeded along the coast, finding much gold and silver and meeting with little serious resistance from the natives. The ships meanwhile were sent back for reinforcements which arrived in small groups as the march continued. At the populous island of Puna, in the Gulf of Guayaquil, the natives were at first friendly, and the Spaniards remained among them for some time, resting and gathering information. When the Indians began to show signs of hostility, they were defeated with much slaughter and Pizarro then crossed to the mainland and entered what is now Peru. A city, which he named San Miguel, was founded to serve as a base of operations, and the Indians near-by were divided in *encomiendas* among the fifty-five soldiers who became its first citizens.

The Spaniards could hardly have proceeded so far without encountering serious resistance had it not been for events that had recently occurred in Peru. The Inca Empire had reached the height of its power shortly before they arrived. Huayna Capac, who lived to receive reports of Pizarro's first expeditions along the coast, had completed the conquest of what is now Ecuador and had devoted much of his life to the consolidation of his authority there. He had been much troubled by rebellions in the recently acquired territories, and

it was perhaps a feeling that the empire had grown too large to be controlled from Cuzco which led him to arrange for the division of his possessions after his death. Atahualpa, his son by a princess of the royal family of Quito, was given the territory that his mother's ancestors had ruled, and Huascar, the legitimate heir, succeeded to the throne at Cuzco. It was not long before the two brothers quarrelled and war began. Huascar was defeated and made prisoner, and many Incas of the blood royal were massacred. When Pizarro arrived, Atahualpa, who had assumed the crimson fringe of the Sapa Inca, was not yet firmly established on the throne, and the imperial government's control in outlying, recently conquered districts, like those through which the Spaniards first marched, was doubtless relaxed.

The Spaniards had already heard much of the civil war and had learned that Atahualpa was at Cajamarca, ten or twelve days' journey from San Miguel, with a large army. Pizarro, therefore, resumed his southward march, proceeding slowly from one valley to another along the coast and then over the mountains to meet the Emperor. On the way, he received envoys with gifts and a friendly message from Atahualpa, to which he made suitable replies. The storehouses along the Inca road provided ample food and lodging, but the Spaniards suffered much from the cold and the altitude when they crossed the coastal range and were not a little alarmed lest the troops of the Indians should attack them in the narrow defiles. They finally reached Cajamarca, on November 15, 1532, and took up their quarters in stone buildings surrounding the plaza, or open space, in the center of the town. With his little force of sixty-two horsemen and 102 foot-soldiers, Pizarro calmly laid his plans for the defeat of an army that numbered, according to his Indian guides, fifty thousand men. The Inca's encampment, two or three miles away, was clearly visible.

Hernando Pizarro and Hernando de Soto, later the discoverer of the Mississippi, were sent to speak with Atahualpa and returned with a promise that the Inca would visit the newcomers on the following day. It was evening before he came, accompanied by a vast force of soldiers. What followed is best told in the words of Pizarro's secretary, Francisco de Xerés:<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The quotations are from Sir Clements Markham's translation of Francisco de Xerés' *Narrative of the Conquest of Peru*, in Volume 47 of the Publications of the Hakluyt Society, London, 1872, pp. 51 ff.



The Governor ordered all the Spaniards to arm themselves secretly in their lodgings, and to keep the horses saddled and bridled, and under the orders of three captains, but none were to show themselves in the open space. The Captain of the artillery was ordered to have his guns pointed towards the enemy on the plain, and, when the time came, to fire. Men were stationed in the streets leading to the open space, and, taking twenty men with him, the Governor went to his lodging. These had the duty entrusted to them of seizing the person of Atabaliba [Atahualpa], if he should come cautiously with so large a force as was coming, but the Governor ordered that he should be taken alive. All the troops had orders not to leave their quarters, even if the enemy should enter the open space, until they should hear the guns fired off. The sentries were to be on the alert, and, if they saw that the enemy intended treachery, they were to give the signal; and all were to sally out of the lodgings, the cavalry mounted, when they heard the cry of *Santiago*.

Soon the van of the enemy began to enter the open space. First came a squadron of Indians dressed in a livery of different colors, like a chess board. They advanced, removing the straws from the ground, and sweeping the road. Next came three squadrons in different dresses, dancing and singing. Then came a number of men with armour, large metal plates, and crowns of gold and silver. Among them was Atabaliba in a litter lined with plumes of macaws' feathers, of many colours, and adorned with plates of gold and silver. Many Indians carried it on their shoulders on high. Next came two other litters and two hammocks, in which were some principal chiefs; and lastly, several squadrons of Indians with crowns of gold and silver.

Father Valverde, the chaplain of the expedition, went forward and spoke briefly to the Inca about the Christian religion, handing him a copy of the Bible. This Atahualpa threw to the ground, with a scornful demand that the Christians return at once the cloths which they had taken from the storehouses along the road. When Valverde reported what had happened to Pizarro,

. . . the Governor put on a jacket of cotton, took his sword and dagger, and, with the Spaniards who were with him, entered among the Indians most valiantly, and, with only four men who were able to follow him, he came to the litter where Atabaliba was, and fearlessly seized him by the arm, crying out *Santiago*. Then the guns were fired off, the trumpets were sounded, and the troops, both horse and foot, sallied forth.

Within a few minutes Atahualpa had been captured and some thousands of his followers had been killed.

During the whole time no Indian raised his arms against a Spaniard. So great was the terror of the Indians at seeing the Governor force his way through them, at hearing the fire of the artillery, and beholding the charging of the horses, a thing never before heard of, that they thought more of flying to save their lives than of fighting.

The captive Inca was treated with consideration, eating at Pizarro's table and sleeping in the Governor's own room. He soon learned some Spanish, and told his captors much about the affairs of Peru. His authority among his subjects seemed little diminished, and the safe conducts that he gave enabled small groups of Spaniards to visit Cuzco and other parts of the empire without molestation. Atahualpa's first thought was naturally to regain his liberty. To this end he offered as a ransom gold sufficient to fill a room twenty-two feet long and seventeen wide, up to a line eight or nine feet from the floor, and enough silver to fill another smaller room twice over. Pizarro agreed to this proposal, and the Indians during the next few weeks brought great quantities of precious vessels and ornaments from palaces and temples. The full amount was not perhaps completed, but Pizarro accepted it, and a treasure worth at the lowest estimate some millions of dollars was divided among the members of the expedition according to their rank and services. The king's share of one-fifth was set aside as the law required, and another portion was given to Almagro and his followers, who had just arrived from Panama.

The Inca, however, was not released. His faithless captors had decided that his death would be expedient, and he was placed on trial for a long series of offenses ranging from adultery and idolatry to murder and rebellion. Of murder, he was probably guilty, for his brother the ex-Inca Huascar had been drowned, presumably by order of Atahualpa, soon after the latter had fallen into Pizarro's hands. The trial was a mere formality, and the Inca was publicly executed in the plaza of Cajamarca on August 29, 1533.

With his force augmented by the men whom Almagro had brought, Pizarro now undertook the long and difficult march through the mountains to Cuzco. They encountered some resistance along the way, but none at the capital itself. There they obtained another great amount of treasure and formally established a city government in the name of the King. They also installed as Inca a brother of Huascar

named Manco, for a younger brother of Atahualpa, who had been invested with the royal fringe after the latter's execution, had died on the road to Cuzco.

By this time reports of the riches of Peru were reaching the outside world, and arousing the interest of the hordes of adventurers in the older settlements of the Indies who were always on the lookout for an opportunity to improve their lot. The forces of Pizarro and Almagro were constantly augmented by new arrivals and their hold on the conquered territory became gradually stronger. They had been at Cuzco only a few months, however, when they received alarming news. Pedro de Alvarado, the conqueror of Guatemala, had conceived the idea of obtaining for himself the region of Quito, and had landed at the Bay of Caráquez in March, 1534, with five hundred Spaniards and two thousand Indians—an army stronger than any which Pizarro could well hope to send against him. Almagro at once left Cuzco for the north to deal with this invasion of the partners' rights. He found that Quito had already been occupied by Sebastián de Belalcázar, the commander of the garrison at San Miguel. The combined forces of the two leaders were still smaller than Alvarado's, but the latter's men were worn down by hunger and the exposure that they had suffered while crossing the mountains. They showed little wish to fight, especially when they learned how small a quantity of treasure had been found at Quito, and realized how much more attractive their prospects would be if they joined Almagro and Pizarro in the south. Alvarado was rather easily induced to sell out his whole expedition for 100,000 *pesos de oro* and to return to his own domain in Guatemala.

Meanwhile, Hernando Pizarro had reached Spain with the royal share of Atahualpa's ransom and had persuaded the King to extend the limits of his brother's territory to a point seventy leagues farther south. At the same time Almagro was given a domain of his own extending two hundred leagues down the coast beyond Pizarro's grant. The jealousy that had long existed between the two partners was revived by this arrangement, for Cuzco lay near the border line and was claimed by both. Each was hotly supported by his own followers and actual fighting occurred before an agreement reached in June, 1535, averted further conflict for the time being but left the main question

undecided. Soon afterward, Almagro left Cuzco with a strong force to undertake the conquest of Chile, which was indisputably his. Pizarro returned to the coast where he had been engaged since the first of the year in building the new City of the Kings, now called Lima, which was soon to become the chief center of Spanish power in South America.

The dissensions among the conquistadores, and the weakness of the force that remained after Almagro's departure, encouraged the Inca Manco to make a last desperate effort to drive the Spaniards from Peru. The Indians of the whole highland area suddenly rose in arms, and Hernando Pizarro was besieged at Cuzco for several months in 1536. Four relief expeditions which Francisco sent from Lima were defeated with heavy losses, but with the approach of the planting season Manco could no longer hold his forces together. He retired to Ollantaytambo and in 1537 he was defeated by the force which Almagro had just brought back from Chile. This ended the revolt, though Manco escaped into the fastnesses of the eastern slope of the Andes and continued for some years to commit depredations against the Spaniards.

Almagro had returned to begin the first of a series of civil wars in which many of the conquerors of Peru were to lose their lives. He had found nothing in Chile to console him for the loss of his rights in Peru. The journey thither, through the desolate and sparsely inhabited Andean highlands, had been a trying one even for men inured to the hardships of South American exploration, and the fertile soil and delightful climate of central Chile offered little attraction to adventurers whose appetites had been whetted by the gold and silver of the Incas. Almagro was easily persuaded by his followers to return to reassert his claim to Cuzco. The trip back, through the waterless deserts of the coast, was even more difficult than that through the mountains, but his forces were none the less ready to fight when they reached southern Peru. After defeating Manco they occupied Cuzco, in violation of a truce arranged a short time before, and imprisoned Hernando and Gonzalo Pizarro. Gonzalo Pizarro soon escaped, but Hernando was not released until his brother Francisco had agreed that Almagro should hold Cuzco until the King decided to whom it belonged. Such agreements meant nothing to men like the conquerors

of Peru, and Francisco Pizarro renewed the war as soon as his brother was free. Almagro's forces were defeated in the battle of Las Salinas, near Cuzco, on April 6, 1538, and Almagro himself was captured and put to death.

Pizarro did not long enjoy the fruits of his victory. His harsh treatment of the defeated party kept alive the bitter feeling between the two factions. The "men of Chile," as they were derisively called, were deprived by the governor of their estates and their *encomiendas*, and they became desperate when they heard an untrue report that a royal official who was on his way to Peru to look into the recent occurrences had perished in a shipwreck. On June 26, 1541, a group of them killed Francisco Pizarro in his own house and forced the cabildo of Lima to recognize Almagro's young son, Diego, as governor of Peru.

Vaca de Castro, the king's representative, had indeed been shipwrecked, but he had reached shore and had continued his journey overland. He had been authorized by the King to assume the governorship in case of Pizarro's death, and the Pizarro faction at once recognized his authority. Almagro retired to Cuzco, asserting that the city belonged to him under the Crown's grant to his father, but his forces were defeated in a bloody battle near that city on September 16, 1542, and the young leader and many of his advisers were executed as rebels.

The turbulent and greedy adventurers who had flocked to Peru in the hope of sharing in the spoils of conquest were still little disposed to recognize any authority that threatened to interfere with the gratification of their own ambitions, and further trouble occurred when the Crown attempted to check their pitiless exploitation of the conquered Indian population by promulgating the "New Laws of the Indies" in 1542. These laws, which provided for the gradual abolition of *encomiendas* and prohibited many other abuses, aroused a storm of protest in all of the American colonies. In Mexico, the royal officials wisely suspended their operation, but in Peru a new viceroy, Blasco Núñez Vela, attempted to enforce them. His ill-judged and tactless actions soon goaded the colonists to revolt, and in October, 1544, Gonzalo Pizarro occupied Lima at the head of a rebel army and forced the *audiencia*, or high court, to recognize him as governor.

The viceroy continued the war in northern Peru, but he was killed in January, 1546, in a battle near Quito.

Before Núñez Vela's death, the King had ordered a priest named Pedro de la Gasca to go to Lima as President of the *audiencia* to reassert the royal authority. La Gasca had no forces at his disposal, but at Panama he succeeded in winning over the commander of Gonzalo Pizarro's fleet, which had seized the town. While still on the Isthmus he sent messages promising a free pardon to those who returned to their allegiance and announcing the suspension of the most objectionable provisions of the New Laws, and when he reached Peru the rebel army gradually melted away. Gonzalo Pizarro was captured and executed in April, 1548, and La Gasca remained at the head of the government until he returned to Spain in 1550.

The great viceroy of Mexico, Antonio de Mendoza, was appointed to the same office in Peru in 1551, but he died ten months after his arrival and left the government in the hands of the *audiencia*. This body was too weak to control the unruly Spanish settlers, many of whom were discontented because they had not received *encomendas*. There were further disturbances, and a rebellion under Francisco Hernández Girón, in 1553-54, was not put down until after the royal forces, led by the archbishop and the senior judge of the *audiencia*, had suffered humiliating defeats. The disorder and bloodshed that had characterized Peru since the beginning of the Conquest was finally brought to an end by Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza, the Marquis of Cañete, who took office as viceroy in 1556.

The Inca dynasty had not yet been extinguished. Manco, after the failure of the rebellion of 1535-37, took refuge in an almost inaccessible fortress in the gorges of the Andes, where several Spanish expeditions failed to reach him. A few refugees or fugitives from justice found their way to his citadel, and it was one of these who killed the Inca in a quarrel in 1545. Sayri Tupac, his successor, made peace with the Spaniards thirteen years later and went to live at Cuzco, but when he died in 1560 his brother Titu Cusi Yupanqui reestablished the Inca court at Vilcapampa in the mountains. He ruled quietly there until 1571, and two Spanish priests lived for some years among the Indians endeavoring, not very successfully, to convert them. One was driven away after a courageous if impolitic effort to destroy the Inca's holi-

est shrine, and the other is said to have been killed because he failed to cure Titu Cusi in his last illness. In 1572 a Spanish force finally made its way to Vilcapampa, defeated the Indians, and captured the new ruler, Tupac Amaru, after a long pursuit into the jungle east of the mountains. The unfortunate Inca with his principal chiefs and the members of his family were publicly executed at Cuzco.

#### NEW GRANADA

The reports of Cortez and Pizarro not only drew great numbers of fortune seekers to the territories that they had conquered, but encouraged many others to fit out expeditions to seek for new Mexicos and Perus in regions hitherto unexplored. Some were partially successful, more, perhaps, came to grief. Only a few, which played a part in the establishment of permanent colonies, can be described here.

The chief requisite for the establishment of a permanent colony was a settled, agricultural Indian population that could provide the colonists with food and pay tribute to the Crown and the *encomenderos*. The principal region where such a population remained to be conquered, after the occupation of Peru, was the highlands of New Granada. This was one of the most inaccessible portions of South America, shut off from the outside world by rugged, heavily forested mountain ranges to the west and by hundreds of miles of swamp and jungle in the Magdalena Valley to the north. The coast, on the Caribbean side, had been explored at an early date and had been much frequented by pearl fishers and slave hunters, but the deadly climate and the implacable hostility of the Indians made the region unattractive to colonists.

A few settlements had nevertheless been established. In Venezuela, Cubagua Island, the center of the pearl fisheries, was the scene of much activity until the oyster beds began to give out about 1535,<sup>1</sup> and the town of Cumaná, on the mainland, had been founded about 1520. In 1529 a more ambitious attempt to exploit the region was inaugurated. The Emperor Charles, who of course ruled over much of Germany as well as Spain, had granted a large section of the Venezue-

<sup>1</sup> Merriman, *Rise of the Spanish Empire*, Vol. III, p 532.

lan coast to the Welsers of Augsburg, and this banking firm sent out a mixed company of German, Spanish, and Portuguese adventurers to take possession of the territory. These explored much of the hinterland, and one party, as we shall see, reached the Chibcha country in the interior. The colony did not thrive, however, and the cruelty with which the German leaders treated the Indians aroused criticism even among the none too soft-hearted Spaniards. The experiment was finally given up when the company's grant was rescinded in 1546.

Farther to the west, Santa Marta had been established in 1525, and Cartagena in 1533. In 1535 Pedro Fernández de Lugo, a member of a powerful Spanish family, was made governor of these settlements, and came out to the colony with a large following. He found it necessary to organize a number of expeditions into the interior to keep the newcomers occupied, and it was one of these, under the leadership of the colony's chief magistrate, Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, which set out in April, 1536, to investigate reports of a nation of civilized Indians far in the interior.

Since Quesada planned to follow the valley of the Magdalena, he marched overland to that river from Santa Marta while several boats carrying supplies were sent around by sea. From the point where the boats finally met him, after a vexatious delay, he pushed on through the jungle along the river bank, suffering from heavy rains and the attacks of insects, and often from hunger, for the country was practically uninhabited. Eight months after the expedition left Santa Marta, a large part of his force had perished from starvation, disease, and the attacks of the Indians, and no sign of human habitation had been seen for a month. Quesada's companions wished to return, but he himself insisted upon pushing on. The boats were sent back down the river with the sick and wounded, and the leader, with 200 picked men and sixty horses, began the tedious and dangerous ascent from the river valley into the mountains, now confronting the new enemies of cold and exposure. It was not long before the party came out upon the broad plateau of Bogotá, where cultivated fields and human habitations told them that they were near their goal.

They had reached the country of the Chibchas, and they were soon attacked by a large army under the Zipa of Bogotá. Quesada defeated and dispersed this force with relative ease, for the Indians, as



always, were terrified of the Spanish cavalry. He then proceeded to Tunja where the other great Chibcha chief, the Zaque, was likewise defeated and captured. Here the invaders found gold and emeralds to the value of perhaps half a million dollars. The Indians continued their resistance until an invasion by their savage neighbors the Panches, whom they feared more than the Spaniards, led them to submit and to beg the Spaniards for help. A successful campaign against the Panches made Quesada master of the plateau region, but he was not satisfied with the treasure which he had obtained, and the Zipa, who had joined the Spaniards as an ally, was tortured to death in a vain effort to force him to disclose where his wealth was hidden.

In 1538, Jiménez de Quesada founded the city of Santa Fe de Bogotá, where he proposed to leave a part of his forces while he returned to Spain to give an account of his conquest. He was preparing for the journey when he was astonished to learn that another group of white men had appeared on the plateau. This was an expedition from the German colony in Venezuela, led by Nicolas Federmann, which had reached the highlands by way of the upper tributaries of the Orinoco—an exploit hardly less remarkable than that of Quesada himself. At almost the same time Sebastián de Belalcázar, whom we last heard of at Quito, appeared on the banks of the upper Magdalena. He had already conquered the important tribes of western Colombia, and he now laid claim to the Chibcha territory as a part of the king's grant to Pizarro. Ordinarily such an encounter between rival explorers would have resulted in bloodshed, but the three leaders finally reached a friendly agreement to lay their case before the King in Spain. They departed for the coast together, leaving a strong force to hold the newly conquered territory.

All of them were to be disappointed, for the Crown decided to place Bogotá under the governor of Santa Marta. Alonso Luis de Lugo, the son of Fernando, had absconded to Spain with a large sum of money, defrauding both his father and the royal treasury, and he was at court when Quesada and his companions arrived. He had just acquired the right to the governorship of Santa Marta by reason of his father's death, and he enjoyed so much influence at court, through his relationship by marriage with the Emperor's secretary, that he was able not only to obtain immunity for past misdeeds but to deprive the

conquerors of New Granada of the fruits of their toil. Belalcázar was somewhat consoled by an appointment as governor of Popayán, but Quesada and Federmann got nothing. Jiménez de Quesada was finally permitted to return to Bogotá in an honorable official position in 1550, and he died there in 1579.

#### EARLY SETTLEMENTS IN THE RIVER PLATE REGION

The River Plate, discovered by Solís in 1516, was further explored by Sebastian Cabot between 1527 and 1530. The first real attempt at permanent occupation was made by Pedro de Mendoza who left Spain with a large expedition in 1535 and, early in the following year, founded a settlement which he named Nuestra Señora de Buen Ayre. Mendoza's chief purpose was to open up communications with Peru, and an expedition which he sent up the Paraná and Paraguay rivers, under Juan de Ayolas, is said to have reached the Inca territory and to have been returning laden with treasure when it was wiped out by the Indians in the wilderness. This was but one of many misfortunes that beset the new colony. Other expeditions into the interior accomplished little, and Mendoza himself fell ill and died in 1537 while on his way back to Spain. Worst of all, the Indians around Buenos Aires were warlike nomads whom the Spaniards were unable to conquer and who soon made life in the little town almost intolerable.

A group of Spaniards whom Ayolas had left behind him in what is now Paraguay had fared better. Partly by diplomacy and partly by force they had gained an ascendancy over the peaceable Guaranís of the interior and most of them had married native women. In 1541 the survivors at Buenos Aires went up the river to join them, and the little town of Asunción became the center of Spanish enterprise in the River Plate region. Far in the interior of the continent, the colony had little contact with Spain, and the colonists, under a royal order issued in 1537 after Mendoza's death, frequently elected persons to govern them in the absence of a royal appointee. The first governor so chosen was Diego Martínez de Irala, the founder of Asunción, who married the seven daughters of one of the principal Indian chiefs. Irala was superseded in 1542 by the great explorer Alvar Núñez Ca-

beza de Vaca, who came out from Spain with a royal commission, but he was reelected two years later after the discontented colonists had deposed the king's representative and sent him home. Irala continued as governor until his death in 1556.

The citizens of Asunción gradually extended their control over other parts of the River Plate basin. Under the leadership of Juan de Garay they founded Santa Fe in 1573 and made a permanent settlement at Buenos Aires in 1580. This gave them a sea port which ultimately outstripped Asunción. Even Buenos Aires, however, was a relatively unimportant town until late in the colonial period because few of the Spaniards who went to America were interested in a region that had neither precious metals nor Indians who could be made useful as laborers. The one source of wealth was the great herds of horses and cattle, some wild, some half-wild. A number of horses left behind by Mendoza's followers when they abandoned the first settlement at Buenos Aires had multiplied until there were wild herds throughout the rich pampas, and the horned cattle imported a little later had been hardly less prolific.

The northwestern and western parts of modern Argentina were settled not from Buenos Aires and Asunción but from Peru and Chile. The northwest, with its relatively advanced Indian population, had been a part of the Inca Empire, and its chief cities, including the important town of Córdoba, were founded by expeditions from Peru. Mendoza and the near-by towns in the west, on the other hand, were settled from Chile, and long formed a part of that province.

#### VALDIVIA IN CHILE

Chile had been conquered by Pizarro's lieutenant, Pedro de Valdivia, who had obtained permission after Almagro's death to undertake an expedition thither. He left Cuzco early in 1540 with a small force of Spaniards and a thousand Indian auxiliaries. Since he planned to establish a permanent settlement, he took with him seeds, domestic animals, and agricultural implements as well as a number of Indian women. The journey across the deserts of the coast was long and arduous, but the party finally reached the first irrigated valley, where Copiapó now stands, and formally took possession of the country. The

Indians, who had not forgotten the cruel treatment which they had suffered from Almagro's followers, were sullen and refused to furnish food, but they made no organized resistance and Valdivia pushed on until he reached the northern end of the great central valley, then as now the most populous and fertile part of Chile. Here, on February 12, 1541, he founded a city which he called Santiago de la Nueva Estremadura—a vain attempt to cause the colony's earlier name, associated as it was with poverty and failure, to be forgotten.

At first the colony did not prosper. A few gold and silver mines were discovered, and an effort was made to raise crops, but the natives were unwilling and intractable laborers. A few months after the colonists had established themselves at Santiago the Indians revolted and burned most of the new city before they were overcome. It was clear that more men and greater resources would be needed to hold the colony and to conquer the fertile regions south of Santiago, and Valdivia determined to return to Peru to obtain recruits and supplies. Since he could not succeed in such a mission without money he offered to permit those of his followers who had accumulated a little more gold and silver than their comrades to return to Peru with their wealth, and then, when the treasure had been placed on board his ship, quietly slipped away without its owners. He reached Lima just in time to help La Gasca suppress Gonzalo Pizarro's rebellion, and thus not only won the viceroy's favor but gained a prestige which was helpful in obtaining recruits for his own enterprise.

Returning to Chile, Valdivia led a force southward from Santiago as far as the Bio Bio River, where he founded the city of Concepción in 1550. Here he came into contact with the savage Araucanians, a rude nation of hunters with little organized government outside of the temporary confederacies that they formed for war. These Indians had defied the Incas, and it was to be more than 300 years before they were finally conquered by the Spaniards. Valdivia at first defeated them after severe fighting, and established several forts and towns, including that which still bears his name, in and near their territory. In 1553, however, the Indians rose in rebellion under a young chief named Lautaro, who had for a time been employed by Valdivia as a stable boy. They had learned to seek cover against firearms and to dispose their forces so that the Spanish cavalry was of little use against

them, and when Valdivia marched against them he was captured and killed.

During the next four years, Lautaro destroyed most of the new Spanish settlements. At one time he penetrated almost to Santiago, but it was difficult for him to persuade his unorganized troops to leave their own homes and their scanty crops for a long campaign, and an epidemic of disease caused severe suffering and seriously reduced the fighting population. Fortunately for the Spaniards, moreover, the Indians in the northern part of the central valley showed no inclination to join the Araucanians. Lautaro was finally defeated and killed, and his followers withdrew beyond the Bio Bio, which continued to be the frontier between the Indian and the Spanish settlements throughout the colonial period.

#### OTHER EXPLORERS

We can hardly leave the story of the Conquest without mentioning a few of the other great feats of exploration that added to the world's knowledge of the new continent in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. One of the most notable was the journey of Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, who landed in Florida in 1528 as a lieutenant of Cortez' former rival, Pánfilo de Narváez, who had been authorized to conquer and colonize the Gulf Coast of the United States. Narváez lost touch with his ships and finally attempted to return to Mexico by sailing along the coast in small unseaworthy boats that his men built themselves. He and all but fifteen of his 300 men perished from the perils and hardships of the journey, and the survivors, who had reached the coast of Texas, were captured by the Indians and spent long years among them as slaves. Finally Cabeza de Vaca and three companions escaped. The Spaniards had made a great reputation as healers and sorcerers and hordes of Indians followed the four men as they made their way westward on foot across the continent to the Pacific, a ten-month journey. They finally reached Mexico in 1536 and Cabeza de Vaca was so far from being discouraged that he not long afterward obtained the post of Governor of Paraguay and made other remarkable journeys from the Brazilian coast to Asunción, and later from Asunción to the borders of Peru.

Cabeza de Vaca revived interest in rumors of great cities to the north of the country through which he passed, and in 1540-42 Francisco de Coronado made a long and unprofitable journey through the southwestern part of the United States as far as Kansas in search of them. About the same time, between 1539 and 1542, Pizarro's former lieutenant Hernando de Soto was exploring a great area from South Carolina to Arkansas and discovering the Mississippi River. De Soto died of fever, after three years in the wilderness, and his expedition like Coronado's accomplished little beyond a demonstration of the fact that there was nothing in what is now the southern part of the United States to attract Spanish settlers.

In South America there were several expeditions into the low-lying, sparsely inhabited region east of the Andes. *El Dorado* was long believed to lie somewhere in the upper part of the Orinoco Valley, and many lives were lost in fruitless exploration of the inhospitable *llanos*, where heavy rains made travel difficult during several months of each year. Farther south, in the forests on the east side of the mountains, there was said to be a land rich in cinnamon and other precious spices, and one expedition in search of these had somewhat more important results.

This was led by Gonzalo Pizarro, recently appointed Governor of Quito, who set out from that city with a large force in 1539. The party met with terrific obstacles in crossing the Andes and descending into the jungles at their base, and they were in desperate straits when they reached one of the larger tributaries of the Amazon. A boat that had been built to carry the sick and the baggage was finally sent ahead down the river in search of food. Pizarro entrusted the command to Francisco de Orellana, who seized the opportunity to win fame for himself by an act of treachery. Leaving the men with Pizarro to shift for themselves, Orellana and his companions went on down the river and then down the much larger stream which they soon reached. Among the Indians with whom they had encounters along the way there were some whose women fought as fiercely as the men, and it was from these that the Amazon received its name. With great good luck Orellana and his companions finally reached the sea in 1541 and made their way to Spain by way of the West

Indies to receive credit for their exploit. Gonzalo Pizarro, with the remnants of his party, did not get back to Quito until 1542.

So brief a sketch, covering as it does only a few of the more important expeditions, can convey but an inadequate idea of the amazing story of the Spanish conquest of America. To have any real conception of the dangers and hardships that the conquistadores encountered, or of the courage and persistence with which they faced them, one must read the accounts of those who actually participated in their expeditions, like the fascinating *True History of the Conquest of New Spain* by Bernal Díaz del Castillo. The physical obstacles—the all but impassable, disease-infested jungles of the lowlands, the waterless deserts of the South American coast, and the precipitous slopes of the Andes—were if anything more formidable than the resistance of overwhelmingly more numerous Indian armies. We cannot but admire the audacity with which little bands of Spaniards boldly embarked upon the conquest of unknown empires, even though we may be equally impressed by their cruelty and treachery to the Indians and to one another. Bravery and brutality, crusading zeal and sordid greed, an ability to command the loyalty and confidence of followers, coupled with a complete lack of principle in dealing with rivals, were the conspicuous qualities of the successful conquistador.

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## *Chapter III*

### THE PEOPLE OF THE SPANISH COLONIES

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In little more than a quarter century after Cortez' first landing at Vera Cruz the greater part of the vast area that was to be known as Spanish America had been overrun and occupied. There were European settlements throughout the highlands from Mexico to Chile. Most of these towns had but a few score or at most a few hundred white inhabitants, but they were the centers from which large numbers of Indians in the country roundabout were governed and exploited. They grew in size as the settlers raised families and as new immigrants arrived from Spain. The taxes and especially the mining royalties that the colonists paid soon became an important part of the Spanish government's revenue and caused the Indies to become the Crown's most valued possession.

The Spain that ultimately left its impress on the political and cultural life of the colonies was very different from the Spain of the Catholic Monarchs and the Emperor Charles V. The stirring days of the discovery and conquest were followed by a long period of stagnation and decline. Charles had been perhaps the most powerful ruler in Europe, with extensive territories in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. His son Philip II had inherited most of these, though without the imperial title, and had annexed Portugal by force when the royal line in that country died out. It was evident even before Philip's death, however, that Spain's greatness rested on insecure foundations. Constant wars had drained her wealth and her manpower, and her population had begun to decrease. The seventeenth century was a period of brilliant achievement in literature and art but of retrogression in other respects. Commerce, industry, and agriculture had been severely affected by the expulsion of Jews and Moors who refused to



accept Christianity, and even the treasure pouring in from the Indies could not check the country's economic decline. The kingdom's military strength was likewise affected, and a series of disasters beginning with the defeat of the great armada sent against England in 1588 all but destroyed its naval power. Other nations were not slow to take advantage of this state of affairs. In the seventeenth century the Dutch and Portuguese obtained their independence, and the Dutch and English and the French attacked the Spanish possessions in America. The conquest of the more populous colonies was not possible, because the transportation of forces sufficiently large to overcome the resistance of the settlers themselves was out of the question, but outlying regions and smaller islands in the West Indies were occupied and many coastal towns suffered from attacks by pirates.

The military weakness of the home government and the utter incompetence of the later Hapsburg kings in civil affairs were naturally reflected in conditions in the colonies. Little could be expected in the way of economic or social progress, especially as they were virtually shut off from the world by geographical barriers as well as by Spain's exclusive commercial policy. Colonial society presented much the same characteristics at the beginning of the eighteenth century as at the end of the sixteenth. Changes in political institutions and in the intellectual outlook of the ruling classes began to take place after the Bourbons came to the throne in Spain, but even these did not very greatly affect the daily life of the masses of the people. It is consequently possible to deal with the whole, long colonial period as one epoch in their development, with more emphasis on social and political institutions than on events or trends of development.

#### THE TREATMENT OF THE INDIANS

Unlike the British colonists farther north, the Spaniards came to America primarily as conquerors who sought to appropriate the wealth and exploit the labor of people living there. They were little interested in regions like the River Plate and what is now the territory of the United States, where the Indians were too few in number and too savage in their ways to be readily utilized as workers, and even the early settlements in the West Indies were almost abandoned

after the extinction of the aborigines. It was the countries with the most numerous and civilized Indians—Mexico, New Granada, and the former realms of the Incas—which became the most important Spanish colonies. The population of these countries was much reduced after the Conquest by the white man's diseases, the breakdown of the Indian economic and social organization, and, in Peru, by the neglect of the great Inca irrigation systems, but the Indians continued to form the great majority of their inhabitants, still speaking their own languages and retaining much of their aboriginal culture. They were all-important in the colonies' economic life, and the problem of establishing a satisfactory relationship between them and the European settlers was from the beginning one of the chief preoccupations of the Spanish government.

This was not an easy matter. Both outright slavery and the *encomienda* system had been disastrous to the Indians of the West Indies. The Emperor Charles V wished for practical as well as humanitarian reasons to prevent the destruction of the population of the newer colonies on the mainland, but the Indians must be forced in some way to work, for it would otherwise be impossible to feed the European settlers without whom the colonies could not be held. Charles desired to protect his new subjects, but not at the expense of losing them. He also needed revenue. The shipments of gold from Española had been disappointing, but Mexico and Peru had silver mines which soon began to produce much treasure. Some one must work in these, and only the Indians were readily available. On the other hand, the extinction of the natives, which seemed likely to be the result of forced labor, would make the mines and the colonies themselves worthless.

Confronted by this dilemma, the Spanish government's policy was a vacillating one. It set its face against actual enslavement of the Indians, but then authorized exceptions in the case of cannibals and "rebels." It also permitted the *rescate*, or purchase of slaves from the Indians themselves, until it became clear that this practice gave rise to infinite fraud and abuse. On the other hand, it insisted that the Indians in general were free subjects of the Crown, who should work "voluntarily" for the Spaniards for fair wages. The chief problem was to compel them to do so. The idea of wages was entirely foreign to the Indians' customs and experience, and money meant little to

them even when they actually received pay, as they too often did not. The *encomienda* proved for the time being the most practicable solution.

The survival of the *encomienda* was more the result of the Crown's inability to control the colonists than of its own decision. The Emperor Charles V, shocked by its results in the islands, repeatedly tried to abolish it. He warmly approved Cortez' first recommendation that it should not be established in Mexico, but Cortez changed his mind when he was confronted by the necessity for rewarding his soldiers and persuading them to remain in the newly conquered territory, and Charles was finally reluctantly compelled to acquiesce in his decision. The Emperor made another effort to suppress the system after Cortez had been supplanted by the *audiencia*, but without success, and Pizarro was authorized to grant *encomiendas* when he conquered Peru. The system was thus firmly implanted in both regions when still another effort to destroy it was made in 1542.

The New Laws of that year were the result of a long and bitter conflict between the vested interests of the colonists and humanitarian elements at court. The Indians' most ardent defender was the Dominican friar Bartolomé de las Casas, who had been an *encomendero* in Española and Cuba until the sufferings of the natives touched his conscience and inspired him to start a lifelong campaign for their relief. Las Casas had gone to Spain in 1515 and had so impressed the regent that he returned to Santo Domingo as Protector of the Indians, with authority to bring about reforms. His efforts were defeated by the opposition of the colonists, and a settlement which he then tried to establish in Venezuela to demonstrate that a colony could succeed without enslaving Indians was a miserable failure. Thereafter he passed eight years in a convent in Santo Domingo studying and writing, for he was one of the notable contemporary historians of the Conquest. In 1529 he emerged from his seclusion to continue his crusade in Spain and in various parts of the Indies, and he finally won what seemed to be a great victory when the New Laws were issued.

These did not abolish the *encomiendas*, but they provided that no new ones should be granted and that those already in existence should revert to the Crown on the death of the holders. All officials, priests, and religious institutions were to give up their *encomiendas* at once—

an important provision since many of those whose duty it was to protect the Indians in their legal rights had been personally interested in perpetuating the abuses of the system. Such abuses were henceforth to be punished, and enslavement of natives, on any pretext, was to stop. Indians who ceased to be subject to the *encomenderos* were to pay their tribute to the Crown.

There was consternation in the colonies when the provisions of the New Laws became known. The *encomendas* were the chief wealth of the more influential settlers, and their holders had in most cases been granted the right to pass them on at least to their children and in many cases to subsequent generations. The former companions of Cortez and Pizarro were little disposed to give up what they had won at the cost of many perils and hardships. Feeling ran so high in Mexico that both the Viceroy Mendoza and a special representative sent to put the reforms in operation recommended that they be not enforced. In Peru, as we have seen, the colonists revolted under the leadership of Gonzalo Pizarro, and the Crown's control was not reestablished for some years. As the result of these events, the government repealed some of the most important parts of the new code, including the clause prohibiting the granting of new *encomiendas* and the provisions against inheritance. Even the ban on Indian slavery could not at once be fully enforced though outright enslavement grew less common and finally practically disappeared as conditions in the colonies grew more settled.

A large proportion of the Indians continued for the time being to be subject to the *encomenda*. According to the Laws of the Indies "the motive and origin of the *encomendas* was the spiritual and worldly welfare of the Indians, and their indoctrination and instruction in the articles and precepts of our holy Catholic faith, and that the *encomenderos* should have charge of them and defend their persons and properties, endeavoring to see that they receive no injury."<sup>1</sup> The *encomendero* must take oath to treat his Indians well, and was to be deprived of his position if he did not do so. One of his chief obligations was to maintain horses and weapons, since grants of Indians were made not only to reward the conquerors but to provide them with means to defend the colony. He must live in the province, and he

<sup>1</sup> *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias, Libro VI, Título IX, Ley 1.*

could not sell or transfer his privileges. The man to whom the *encomienda* was granted might pass it on to his immediate heir, or in some cases, especially in Mexico, to the third or fourth generation, but thereafter it lapsed and might be incorporated in the Crown or given to some one else.

The Indians lived for the most part in separate communities, maintaining much of their ancient social organization. It was the policy of the Crown to gather them in fair-sized towns where they could more easily be instructed and ministered to by the priests, and to give these towns communal lands for their support. The natives were governed in local matters by their own officials, who were in many cases their hereditary *caciques* or chiefs. These were a privileged class, for the Spanish authorities relied on them for help in holding their subjects in subjection. They represented the community in its dealings with the Spaniards, and collected the tribute due to the *encomenderos* or the king.

The tribute, which legally was the *encomenderos'* sole source of revenue from their charges, was a head tax upon male Indians of working age. Its amount varied from time to time and from place to place, and was theoretically based on ability to pay and on the amount customarily paid to native rulers before the Conquest. In parts of New Spain, it seems to have been a dollar or less at the beginning of the colonial period and somewhat more than four dollars at the end. In South America it was higher, and reached as much as ten dollars in certain regions. It might mean a week's wages or several months'. The law forbade its being commuted into labor and required that it be paid in money or produce.

This last provision was one of many designed to prevent the exaction of "personal service" from the Indians by the *encomenderos*. The earlier practice of the *encomenderos* to make the Indians work for them, either under the pretext of collecting tribute or nominally for wages, had led to cruel abuses. The Crown repeatedly ordered that no such privilege be included in new grants of *encomendas* and enjoined its representatives to protect the natives in their legal right to work for the employer whom they might choose, as free men and for fair wages. Unfortunately its efforts along this line were not very successful, and the exploitation of Indian labor by the *encomenderos*

ceased only as the *encomiendas* themselves disappeared in the eighteenth century.

It may be doubted whether the earlier abolition of the *encomienda* would have helped the Indians very much. The extinction of the system would have left all of them directly subject to the Crown, as a considerable number always had been, and one reason for not fully enforcing the New Laws of 1542 was probably the realization that control by the *corregidores* was about as bad from the natives' standpoint as control by the *encomenderos*. The Crown Indians paid the same tributes, and the *corregidores*, being appointed only for a short term, were apt to be more grasping and unscrupulous in collecting these than permanent overlords who had come to look on their dependents as valuable property. The *corregidores* also exploited Indian labor, often going into business on their own account or selling groups of natives to employers whose only aim was to get the most possible out of them during the short time that they had the Indians at their mercy.

The abuses committed by the *encomenderos* and *corregidores* led to the adoption of a series of measures intended to regulate Indian labor and to give all Spanish employers a fair chance to obtain workmen. A law of 1609, later incorporated in the great code of the Indies, well illustrates the principles on which these were based. In view of the Indians' dislike of work and the necessity for compulsion, the king authorized *repartimientos*,<sup>1</sup> or drafts of labor, in places where workers were needed to cultivate the fields, to raise cattle, or to operate mines of gold, silver, mercury, or emeralds. Forced labor by the Indians was allowed in these occupations because they were regarded as necessary for the maintenance of the colonies, but it was not to be used in other undertakings of a private character. Neither was it to be used in places where it had not hitherto been customary, and compulsion was to be given up when the Indians learned to work voluntarily or when other laborers, such as Negro slaves, became available.<sup>2</sup> Other laws permitted *repartimientos* for public works, such as the building of roads

<sup>1</sup> *Repartimiento* means a "distribution." There has been much confusion in the use of this term because it was also used to describe the distribution of Indians among the first settlers in *encomiendas* and was later used in connection with forced sales of goods to the Indians by the *corregidores*.

<sup>2</sup> *Recopilación de leyes, Libro VI, Título XII, Ley 19.*

or towns or churches and for such necessary purposes as service in inns or with wagon and mule trains. Ordinarily a certain proportion of the Indians in each town were required to present themselves in the market place each Monday morning to be hired for the coming week by near-by Spanish landowners and other employers. Wages and conditions of work were regulated by the authorities, and an effort was made to see that all Indians except those in privileged positions took their turn. The system of *repartimientos* was frequently called the *mita*, a Quechua word used to describe a similar system which had been in vogue under the Incas.

The *mita* was not used for the cultivation of coca, grapes, or olives. In certain other occupations, like the grinding of sugar cane, the preparation of indigo, and the extraction of pearls, Indians could not be employed even of their free will. The purpose of these restrictions was to protect the Indians from work that was considered too heavy for them, and to prevent the sending of people from the highlands into the hot country where they would soon die. In some cases, as in the attempt to prohibit Indian labor in textile factories, there was likewise a desire to prevent competition with producers in Spain. The restrictions were not always enforced, because Negro slaves, the only alternative source of labor, were scarce and expensive. Late in the eighteenth century, for example, Indians were still being compelled to work under shocking conditions in textile factories in Peru.

The work which bore most cruelly upon the Indians, and which gave the *mita* its fearsome reputation, was that in the mines. Not only was this work harder and more unhealthful, but it usually involved taking large numbers of Indians to a considerable distance from their homes and keeping them for six months at a time under conditions that involved severe hardships. There was an appalling loss of life despite strict regulations adopted in an effort to prevent the complete destruction of the labor supply for what was the government's principal source of revenue. This was especially the case in upper Peru, where many of the mines were at high altitudes in desolate and sparsely populated regions, so that the transportation and feeding of the laborers was difficult. The law provided that only one-seventh of the Indians of that province might be drafted for service at one time, but such limitations were hard to enforce when labor was

needed. The *mita* continued in Peru until the war for independence, though many free workmen, both Indians and *mestizos* or half-breeds, were working in the mines in the last half of the eighteenth century. In Mexico the situation was better. Only one twenty-fifth of the inhabitants could be taken to the mines at one time, and living conditions were not so bad. Indeed, permanent communities of skilled laborers gradually grew up in the mining country, so that the necessity for recruiting forced labor finally disappeared altogether.

Though the Spanish government refused to permit what was repeatedly referred to as the "natural indolence" of the Indians to stand in the way of the economic development of the colonies, it made a real effort to protect them against the greed of the colonists and of its own representatives. The viceroys and other officials were commanded to treat them with special favor and to punish offenses against them more severely than if they had been committed against the Spaniards. A special court was created in Mexico for their protection, and elsewhere the *audiencias* were required to give special consideration to cases where Indians were involved. To prevent their being unfairly exploited the law provided that they could make contracts and sell property only under judicial supervision. No Spaniard, Negro, or mulatto could live in their villages, and no *encomendero* might stay among his Indians more than one night or maintain workshops or farms on their lands.

A whole series of laws prohibited specific abuses. Neither *encomenderos* nor officials might compel Indians to work for them as household servants, or interfere with them in selling their produce. Since Indians under the legal age paid tribute if they were the heads of families, it was found necessary to legislate against the *encomenderos'* practice of compelling children to marry. Indians were not to be kept away from their homes and shut up in workshops, even for debt or crime. Travellers were not to carry off native women nor take food and other articles by force. The use of men as carriers was an especially troublesome question. This had been almost the only means of transport before the Conquest, and it was the only means the Spaniards had before pack animals were introduced and roads were built for them, but it was the occasion of much cruelty and abuse. Laws forbidding the practice could not be enforced, and it was finally



necessary for the Crown to content itself with limiting loads and the length of journeys and with restricting the classes of people by whom carriers might be used.

The mere enumeration of the prohibitions against mistreatment of the natives, and still more the frequent official admissions that these prohibitions were not effective, indicate that the treatment that the Indians received was often different from that which the Crown desired. As a matter of fact, no other class suffered so much from the corruptness and irresponsible self-seeking which characterized the whole Spanish regime. For every case where they obtained redress for injuries or relief from oppression, there were probably many others where they were helpless against the officials and landowners who joined forces to exploit them. Their own *caciques* and other village officials seem to have been among their worst oppressors, and they suffered even more at the hands of the *corregidores*. In Peru and in some of the other colonies these officials were permitted to sell goods to the Indians, as a means of giving them an incentive to regular work, and they abused the privilege by forcing the natives to buy useless articles, such as spectacles and silk stockings, at exorbitant prices. They not infrequently left the country with great fortunes after a five-year term of office.

The Indians also contributed heavily to the support of the Church, paying fees for baptisms, marriages, and burials and numerous "voluntary" offerings. The provisions of the Laws of the Indies, as well as the reports of Spanish travellers, indicate that the parish priests sometimes joined with other members of the ruling class in exploiting the Indians for their own enrichment. On the other hand, the clergy were the Indians' most active advocates and protectors, and the natives' lot would have been far worse than it was had it not been for the Church's influence.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the Indians were nothing more than a race of overworked slaves. The very fact that they offered so rich a field for exploitation indicates that many of them were relatively prosperous. Their condition varied from province to province, and it was improving somewhat at the end of the colonial period. The *encomendas*, which became less numerous as the families of the conquistadores died out, were abolished legally in the

eighteenth century, though some continued in existence until much later. The *mita* was also tending to disappear. Some of the Indians were learning to work for wages, and voluntary labor, while better paid, was more efficient. After Tupac Amaru's revolt in Peru in 1780,<sup>1</sup> forced sales to the Indians were discontinued. On the whole, the natives were probably better protected in their rights, and especially in the possession of their communal lands, than they were during the first century after the war for independence. The distinguished scientist von Humboldt, visiting Mexico at the beginning of the nineteenth century, found them a miserable people, living on the least fertile lands, "indolent by nature and still more because of their situation in the community." We get much the same picture from the accounts of travellers who visited other colonies. The Indians continued, as they still continue, to do the hard work for all other classes in the community and to receive little in return. We shall describe in later chapters the debt slavery and other forms of economic or political compulsion which began to take the place of the *encomienda* and the *mita* during the course of the eighteenth century.

The conquistadores had settled chiefly in the regions where civilized Indian communities existed, but as time went on much additional territory, inhabited by more primitive natives, was also brought under Spanish control. This was largely the work of the Church's frontier missions, directed and supported by the royal authorities, and usually protected by military forces. Compulsion as well as persuasion was used to induce the natives to give up their nomadic life and settle in permanent villages or *reducciones*, where both their economic and their spiritual life was completely dominated by the missionaries. Many of these communities were very prosperous so long as the religious orders retained control of them.<sup>2</sup>

#### NEGRO SLAVES

The Indians were the most numerous but not the only laboring class. There were some regions where they were not available, and some industries in which they could not profitably be used. The colonists consequently early had recourse to the importation of Negroes

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 150-52.

<sup>2</sup> The missions will be described in more detail in the next chapter.

from Africa. These were better workers than the Indians, though more expensive. Since they were legally slaves, even the humanitarians saw little objection to employing them and had in fact advocated their use as a means of saving the Indians. Contracts for supplying them to the American settlements were granted from time to time, usually to Portuguese or other foreigners, and it was not long before they formed a large part of the population of the West Indian Islands, the Caribbean coast of Central and South America, and a few other districts where sugar and other plantation crops were raised. Many were also used as household servants in the larger cities. On the whole they were well treated, as compared with the slaves in the French and British colonies where the fact that the Negro population greatly exceeded the white made it necessary to impose harsh regulations to prevent revolt. Among the Spaniards the general tendency was to treat slaves more as persons than as chattels. Manumission was encouraged both by law and by the Church, so that the free Negroes formed a large part of the total. The Church helped to make the lot of the slaves easier in other ways, and one of the most attractive figures in colonial history is San Pedro Claver, a Jesuit father who befriended and baptized many thousands of newly arrived Africans at Cartagena in the first half of the seventeenth century.

#### THE UPPER CLASS

The labor of the Indians and the Negroes supported the white upper class, the descendents of the conquistadores and the immigrants who arrived from Spain at the rate of a few thousand each year throughout the colonial period. Theoretically, emigration to America was carefully controlled. Unlike other powers, Spain never used her overseas possessions as a dumping place for persons who were not wanted at home, and permits to go to America were granted only to those who were considered desirable as settlers. Since nothing must be permitted to endanger the colonists' loyalty or the purity of their religious beliefs, all foreigners were legally excluded, as were heretics or suspected heretics such as the sons and grandsons of Spanish Jews and Moors who had been compelled to accept Christianity as an alternative to exile or death. The laws, it is true, were not always

enforced, and many foreigners and "new Christians," found their way first and last to Spanish America. The Portuguese were the most numerous, especially between 1580 and 1640 when Spain and Portugal were united under one crown. Nevertheless, the influence of the non-Spanish element was always relatively small.

The white population early divided into two distinct and mutually hostile groups: the *criollos*, or creoles, who had been born in America, and the *peninsulares*, or immigrants from Spain. The former group included the descendents of the conquistadores and in general the great landowners and *encomenderos*, as well as the mass of the Spanish inhabitants of the colonies. The latter were on the one hand officials, priests, and merchants, and on the other poorer immigrants or adventurers who came to America to seek their fortunes. Between the natives and the newcomers there very early developed differences in temperament and a hostility which was not much mitigated by the fact that the children of the peninsular Spaniards, if they stayed in America, became creoles themselves. The mere fact of birth in America was what made the difference. The creoles, as is usually the case among people brought up among a subject people of another race, were little inclined to industry and it was believed in Spain that the American climate had sapped their energy and moral fiber. Partly for this reason, but more perhaps because the Crown desired to maintain a closer hold on the colonies, they were in practice debarred from the higher positions in the government and the more desirable appointments in the Church. They were likewise at a disadvantage in industry and commerce. The immigrant, however poor or humble, seemed to be favored by his fellow Spaniards as well as by fortune, and often rose to a position where he could marry into the best colonial families, to the disgust of his creole rivals. His success, and his assumption of superiority, were bitterly resented. We shall have occasion to return to this subject later, in connection with the causes of the war for independence.

#### MESTIZOS AND MULATTOES

Between the Indians and the Negroes at the bottom and the white settlers at the top of the social scale, there soon grew up intermediate

groups of mixed race who were destined in time to become the most numerous of all. Since few women had come to America with the earlier expeditions, intermarriage with the Indians had been frequent and had been encouraged by the authorities. Less regular unions had been still more common. Some of the *mestizos*, as people of part white, part Indian blood were called, inherited property and the privilege of citizenship in the towns from their white fathers, and others simply became members of the Indian communities, but the majority formed a class apart, not accepted as equals by the Spaniards but feeling themselves superior to the natives. Like other half-castes, they often seemed to combine the worst qualities of both parents. This was only natural in a group which had little chance to benefit by the traditions and moral standards of either of the parent races and which for the most part grew up under the stigma of illegitimacy. The mulattoes, who began to appear with the introduction of Negro slaves, and the part African, part Indian *zambos*, were in much the same situation. Legally, all persons of mixed blood were subject to various discriminations. They could not hold any public office and in the eighteenth century they were barred from the universities and consequently from the learned professions. They were particularly forbidden to have any part in the exploitation of the Indians. The mulattoes were compelled to pay tribute, like Indians or free Negroes, and their women were not permitted to wear gold, pearls, or silk, or to dress like those of the upper class. These provisions were probably not very rigidly enforced, but their existence on the statute book was humiliating and helped to create bad feeling between the different classes.

There were thus a number of castes, based on birth and blood: peninsulars, creoles, *mestizos*, mulattoes, Indians, free Negroes, slaves, and even subdivisions of these groups. The Spanish legislation, with its grants of special privileges to some and its discriminations against others, seemed deliberately designed to create jealousies and rivalries which would prevent unity in the body politic. Each class was jealous of its privileges and prerogatives, and one of the practices which the creoles most resented was the sale to persons of mixed blood of the privilege of being regarded as white. The division of society into sharply defined strata was to be one of the factors which made it difficult to establish democratic institutions after independence.

MINING, AGRICULTURE, AND  
CATTLE RAISING

Economically, the communities which grew up in the Indies were largely self-sufficient. Because of the legal and geographical obstacles to trade with the outside world, which will be described in a later chapter, they imported relatively few goods from abroad, and these were largely luxuries used by a small fraction of the upper class. Nearly everything else was produced locally. Except in the largest cities, even the wealthier families lived simply and had few comforts.

The chief occupations of the colonists in America were mining, agriculture, and stock-raising. In the eyes of the Spanish government mining was the most important, for it was from this source that the Crown derived much of its revenue. The conquistadores eagerly sought for gold and silver in each land which they invaded. They found only small quantities in the islands, though thousands of Indians were worked to death in the mines there, but rich deposits of silver were found in Mexico within a few years after the Conquest and the fabulously profitable mines of Potosí, in the viceroyalty of Peru, were discovered about 1545. The city of Potosí, on the bleak plateau of what is now Bolivia, was for a period the largest in the New World, with all the turbulence and reckless extravagance characteristic of the center of a mining boom. Other provinces also produced much mineral wealth, though none of them compared in this respect with Upper Peru and Mexico. The mines were operated by private individuals, but the government collected a royalty, usually from one-tenth to one-fifth of the product. Evasion of this charge was made more difficult by the fact that the supply of quicksilver, needed for the extraction of gold and silver, was a government monopoly; and the amount of the royalty was based on the consumption of this metal at each mine rather than on the mine's reported product.<sup>1</sup> The great Huancavelica mine in Peru provided quicksilver for that viceroyalty, whereas Mexico was usually supplied from Spain.

Cattle raising and agriculture, however, occupied a far greater number of people. Most of the Indians cultivated their own lands under their ancient communal systems or worked on the *creoles'*

<sup>1</sup> Whitaker, *The Huancavelica Mercury Mine*, p. 6.

estates. Many of the latter were very large, for great tracts had been granted to the more influential conquistadores. These were often entailed, to assure the succession of the oldest son in each generation, and even where they were not, custom discouraged their division despite increases in the number of persons who shared in the ownership. Few of them were efficiently cultivated, for the labor was ignorant as well as unwilling and methods and implements were primitive. The crops that the natives had produced before the Conquest were still raised, and others, such as wheat, were introduced and acclimated. So also were European cattle, which soon became very numerous. Both agricultural and pastoral products were raised chiefly for local consumption and for sale in the larger cities and mining camps. In some regions sugar, indigo, and other crops were grown for export, but the people of the Spanish colonies, partly because of the restrictions on their trade, never made such great profits from these products as did those of the French and British West Indies.

#### LIFE IN THE CITIES

Few of the creole proprietors lived at their mines or on their estates. The wars with the Moors, which forced people to gather inside walls for mutual protection, had made the Castilians a race of city-dwellers, and there was the same need for keeping the white settlers together for defense against possible Indian revolts in the colonies. A distaste for rural life is still one of the striking characteristics of the Latin American of today. Usually, though there were notable exceptions such as Cuzco and the City of Mexico, the Spaniards established new towns, apart from those of the Indians, and these were everywhere laid out on one uniform plan, with streets running at right angles to one another and blocks so far as possible of the same area. Most of them presented much the same external appearance. In the center was the plaza, or open park, about which were grouped the church, the *cabildo* or town hall, and the houses of the principal inhabitants. Less wealthy white families lived in the adjoining streets, and the *mestizos* and the poorer people generally, in the outskirts. In a town of any size there were other churches in the various wards, as well as a number of monasteries and convents. The house of a

wealthy man often covered a large area. Because of earthquakes, even such houses usually had only one or at most two stories, but there were many rooms, grouped about several court yards, and accommodating not only the family with its numerous servants and hangers-on but the horses and other domestic animals. Poorer families lived in less comfort, often crowded into one or two windowless, dirt-floored rooms, though even they usually had a small *patio* which gave access to light and air.

Though the Indies were a land of opportunity for immigrants from Spain, where even the humblest *peninsular* could hope to rise to wealth and social prominence, society in the cities, as in the colonies generally, was divided into sharply defined classes, each looking down upon that below and jealous of its prestige and privileges. At the top were the Spanish officials, the higher clergy, who were also usually *peninsulares*, and the wealthier creoles. Most of the latter were great landowners or miners who visited their properties only occasionally and left their management in the hands of subordinates. Some held titles of nobility, which were not infrequently granted or sold to rich colonials. There were also the more prosperous merchants, both creole and Spanish, for in America engaging in trade did not demean even a noble family as it did in Spain. Below these on the social ladder were the artisans or skilled workmen. In the earlier part of the colonial period, most of these seem to have been whites, and the bakers, carpenters, shoemakers, weavers, and members of other trades were organized into guilds much like those in Europe. These might have provided the basis for a substantial middle class, so completely lacking in Spanish America today, if it had not been for the reluctance of settlers of European descent to engage even in skilled labor when other occupations offered an easier if less certain livelihood. As it was, the trades fell more and more into the hands of the *mestizos* and mulattoes, who also served as overseers and foremen on plantations, muledrivers, teamsters, and in other occupations one step above ordinary manual labor in the fields and mines. At the bottom of the scale were Indian workmen and servants and Negro slaves.

Life in the colonial cities was not uneventful. Earthquakes, epidemics, and violent and sometimes bloody quarrels between governors and bishops or between creoles and Spaniards were frequent.



Armed rebellions and Indian uprisings were not unknown, and many of the coastal settlements were terrorized by pirate raids in the seventeenth century and by attacks of foreign governments in the eighteenth. The day by day existence of the colonists must nevertheless have been somewhat dull. The women especially led a secluded life in which the principal diversions were the afternoon promenade in the park for the younger set and the *tertulias*, or gatherings of families and their closer friends for conversation in the evening. For the men there were cockfighting and other forms of gambling, as well as the incessant intrigue to curry favor with officials or other powerful persons who might aid in obtaining a *repartimiento* of Indians or some other valuable concession from the government. Quarrels and lawsuits were frequent, and those who were more wealthy or influential were constantly called upon to help or protect less fortunate relatives and friends or to give assistance in various ways to the multitude of dependents who attached themselves to each prominent family. Both sexes attended church regularly, and the celebration of religious festivals, with processions and fireworks, afforded one of the community's principal diversions.

Education was controlled almost entirely by the Church. The best schools were those of the Jesuits. They were attended chiefly by children of the upper classes, for the masses remained illiterate and the Indians in general did not even learn to speak Spanish. At many of the provincial capitals there were universities, staffed by members of the clergy and following medieval patterns in their organization and courses of study. That of San Marcos in Lima and the University of Mexico, both founded soon after the middle of the sixteenth century, were important centers of culture long before there was any institution of higher learning in British North America. Theology, law, and medicine were the chief subjects taught.

The royal authorities also dictated, or endeavored to dictate, what the colonists should read. An early decree forbidding the shipment of any but religious books to America was apparently not enforced, but the Spanish government attempted to exclude all literature that might endanger religious orthodoxy or political loyalty. Nothing could be printed in the Indies without the permission of the Inquisition. The colonists were thus to a great extent cut off during most of

the colonial period from contacts with the currents of thought that were changing the outlook of the more advanced European nations. It was not until the eighteenth century that modern philosophical ideas began to affect thought in the universities and a few daring individuals began to risk severe punishment by importing and reading "forbidden" books.

Though the medieval outlook of the educational institutions and the discouragement of original thought by the Inquisition had a deadening effect on the intellectual life of the colonies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the upper classes were by no means without an interest in literature and art. Many important historical and geographical works were written in America by Spanish ecclesiastics, and a few colonial authors, like the poetess Sister Juana Inés de la Cruz, the versatile writer Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, and a little later the dramatist Alarcón, won a distinguished place in Spanish literature. Hundreds of lesser poets produced rather indifferent verse, marked by the artificiality characteristic of Spanish writers of the same period. Many imposing churches were built and elaborately decorated, though here also the same lack of originality was evident. In the eighteenth century the intellectual life of the colonies was stimulated by new foreign influences, which will be discussed in a later chapter. Throughout the colonial period such interest as there was in literature and art was confined to a relatively few of the larger cities. Elsewhere even primary schools were few in number. The majority of the inhabitants, creoles as well as Indians, lived a life in which intellectual and cultural pursuits had no place, and the atmosphere of the provincial towns, separated from the capitals and seaports by many days or weeks of travel by horseback or ox-cart over the worst of roads, probably changed little from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth. The colonies as a whole were among the most backward communities claiming western civilization when they began their war for independence.

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## Chapter IV

### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CHURCH

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The civil administration on the one hand and the Church on the other were the two great mutually supporting branches of the governmental system through which Spain ruled her American colonies. To the Spanish kings, political loyalty and religious conformity were almost inseparable concepts. They did irreparable injury to the economic life of the peninsula by expelling the Jews and the Moors to assure the extirpation of heresy, and preservation of religious purity was a cardinal principle of their policy in America. The conversion of the Indians inevitably followed their reduction to obedience, and the Crown relied upon the clergy to inculcate among them and among the creoles the duty of obedience to its autocratic authority.

It was not difficult to establish a system of absolutism in the colonies because the settlers brought with them no very robust tradition of self-government. The *cortes* or parliaments of the Spanish kingdoms had formerly been important institutions, but in the fifteenth century they had lost much of their independence because the selection of the *procuradores* or representatives had fallen more and more under the control of the Crown, and in the sixteenth century they had ceased to have any real power. The cities likewise had been deprived of much of the autonomy which they once enjoyed. This was especially true of Castile, where Isabella's centralizing policy had been welcomed as an alternative to the disorder and misgovernment prevalent before her accession. The Catholic Queen and her successors ruled that kingdom practically as absolute monarchs, though the consent of the *cortes* was theoretically required for levying new taxes and the forms of municipal self-government were partially observed. It is important to note that the Indies were regarded as belonging to

Castile rather than to Aragon, where the people had retained more of their ancient liberties

The people of the colonies could not claim even such traditional political privileges as might still exist in Castile, for the Indies were the property not of the nation but of the Crown. No one could go there without the royal permission, and no one could acquire rights there except by grant from the king. The conquistadores had been partners of the king in what were essentially business enterprises, and they and their successors in the government were given an absolute authority subject only to such limitations as the king himself might impose. Sometimes, it is true, they were unable to assert this authority and the settlers took matters in their own hands for a time, but such irregular proceedings never resulted in the colonists' obtaining any recognized right of self-government.

#### THE COUNCIL OF THE INDIES

Except for the common authority of the king, the administration of the Indies was from the beginning entirely separate from that of Spain. Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca, a priest who later became Bishop of Burgos, was appointed to make arrangements for Columbus' second voyage in 1493, and continued to handle American affairs at court until his death in 1524. In that year the organization that he built up was converted into the Council of the Indies. This body thenceforth had full authority, under the king, in all matters relating to the overseas possessions. It drew up laws and gave advice on appointments and questions of major policy. As the organ through which the royal commands were transmitted to the colonies it exercised a close and continuous supervision over the conduct of all officials there, both civil and ecclesiastical. It acted as a court of appeals in cases decided by the colonial judges, and had general supervision over the *Casa de Contratación*, which controlled commerce with the Indies. Similar in its organization and functions to the great councils through which the king governed Spain itself, it had in the sixteenth century a president, a chancellor, eight councillors, and a number of secretaries and other officials. Decisions were taken by vote of the councillors, among whom some at least were usually qualified for

their work by previous experience in important official posts in America. The Council was by no means free from the inefficiency, corruption, and favoritism that characterized other branches of the Spanish administration, but it was a hard-working body, in session several hours each day, and the great law code of the colonies, the *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, is a monument to its industry and its good intentions.

#### POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE COLONIES

In America, the first representatives of the Crown were the conquistadores Columbus, Cortez, Pizarro, and a number of other leaders were rewarded for their services by appointments as governors of the territories that they conquered, but few of them long enjoyed the authority which was conferred on them. The very qualities which made their exploits possible caused the Crown to distrust them, and their own conduct frequently increased this distrust. Those who were not killed by other Spaniards or by the Indians were in most cases sooner or later deprived of a part or all of their power.

The machinery through which the colonies were to be governed throughout the colonial period took shape within a few years after the conquest of Mexico. We have seen how the *audiencia*, a royal commission which was primarily a court of justice but also exercised political functions, replaced Cortez in the civil government in 1527. This experiment was a failure, because the judges quarreled among themselves and grossly abused their power for their own benefit, and it soon became clear that a stronger hand was needed to control the turbulent adventurers who made up the white population of the new settlements. The Crown consequently decided to concentrate authority in the hands of one official who would have sufficient power and prestige to inspire fear and command respect, and Antonio de Mendoza was appointed Viceroy of New Spain in 1535. At the same time, the *audiencia* was continued in existence as a check on his authority and as a high court. A second viceroyalty was created in Peru under the New Laws of 1542, but there the civil wars prevented the establishment of orderly government until several years later.

The viceroys were usually great nobles whose loyalty to the Crown

could be implicitly trusted. Subject to the supervision of the Council of the Indies it was their duty to enforce the laws and to see that the revenues were collected, that justice was properly administered, and that the Christian faith was preached among the Indians. They performed the very important task of distributing land and *encomiendas* among the colonists, and had command of the military forces. Since they were expected to maintain a court which by its pomp and ceremony would keep alive among the colonists a sense of the greatness of the Spanish monarch, they were paid princely salaries. That of the Viceroy at Lima in the seventeenth century was probably equivalent to more than \$150,000 in our money.

The viceroy's term of office was limited to three, or later to five years, though in practice many served for longer periods. At its end, he was subject, like all other officials, to the *residencia*. This was a public investigation of his conduct by a judge especially appointed for the purpose, carried out after the viceroy relinquished his authority but before he left the colony. All who had complaints were free to submit them without fear of retaliation and the viceroy might theoretically be compelled to make reparation for any injustices proved against him. The *residencia* often produced much scandal, and the prospect of it perhaps prevented some abuses, but the impartiality of such an investigation was always open to question in the case of persons so influential at court as most of the viceroys. The principal effect of the system, with the viceroy and with other functionaries, was to discourage individual initiative in cases where action might have been desirable. An official who did only what his specific instructions authorized could not be found guilty of exceeding his power or making mistakes of judgment.

The viceroy was further hedged about by many regulations designed to assure impartiality in his official dealings and to prevent him from using his position to benefit himself and his family. He was not permitted to invite residents of the colony to dine at his table, and he might not bring his married sons and daughters to America with him, or himself engage in any commercial enterprise. These provisions, and many others of similar character, suggest that the temptations against which they were aimed were not always resisted.

Second in importance only to the viceroys were the *audiencias*,

which continued to exist at Mexico and Lima and were later established at several other capitals. The *audiencias* were primarily courts of justice, but they also exercised purely political duties. At Mexico and Lima they acted as advisory councils to the viceroy, and had the very important right to hear the complaints of persons who considered themselves injured by that official's acts and to inform the king in cases where they considered that the viceroy had exceeded his authority. At these two capitals they usually assumed control of the government in the viceroy's absence. In other provinces they had a similar relationship to the captain general or governor, or else, as at Quito and Charcas, actually administered political and even military affairs themselves. As courts, they decided criminal and civil cases, though the parties might appeal to the Council of the Indies in suits where large sums were involved. The individual *oidores*, or judges, were also sent out regularly on inspection trips to watch over the conduct of lesser officials. The viceroys and captains general were *ex officio* presidents of the *audiencias* in their capitals, but had no authority to interfere with certain phases of their work. The viceroy, for example, did not have a vote in legal cases unless he were himself trained in the law.

The captains general were officials who exercised practically the same functions as the viceroys in less important areas, and especially in regions where the danger of foreign aggression or Indian depredations made the problem of defense important. These officers were nominally subordinate to the viceroys, but in practice they received their instructions directly from Spain because the great distances from one colonial capital to another and the formidable obstacles to intercommunication made decentralization inevitable.

The principal administrative units might thus be under the direct control of a viceroy or a captain general or an *audiencia*, the president of the *audiencia* being in this last case the nominal head of the government. The boundaries and the status of each unit naturally varied somewhat from time to time with changing conditions. Until the eighteenth century, when new viceroalties were set up in New Granada in 1740 and at Buenos Aires in 1776, the Viceroy of Peru usually had nominal jurisdiction over all of Spanish South America except Venezuela, whereas the Viceroy of New Spain ruled over Mexico,

Central America, and Venezuela. In the latter part of the colonial period there were captains general in Guatemala, Cuba, Venezuela, and Chile.

The larger areas were divided into smaller districts, called provinces, under governors appointed by the king. In still smaller districts, generally but not always subordinate to the governors, were lesser officials who were in some cases called *corregidores* and in others *alcaldes mayores*. These were the representatives of the Crown who had the closest contact with the colonists, and their authority covered a wide range of subjects, judicial, financial, military, and ecclesiastical. We have already seen how much power was exercised and abused by the *corregidores* placed in charge of Indian communities.

The collection of revenues and the custody of funds were entrusted to the *oficiales reales*, the "royal officials," who were in some respects independent of the viceroys and directly responsible to the king. Three of these, a factor, an accountant, and a treasurer, were stationed in each important town. The actual collection of taxes was usually farmed out to contractors, but the royal officials received the proceeds, paid salaries and other expenses authorized by law, and remitted any balance to their superiors for shipment to Spain. Funds in their possession were kept in a chest which had three separate locks and could thus be opened only when all of the officials were present. Except in an emergency, even the viceroy could not draw money from the treasury without an order from the king, and it was the duty of the *oficiales reales* to prevent or report unauthorized disbursements. The home government's avid interest in its income from the colonies made the financial administration very important. Besides the royal fifth upon gold and silver and the tribute paid by the Indians, there were various other taxes. The *alcabala*, which was a levy on sales, was the most disliked and the most burdensome for it reached at times 6 per cent of the value of the merchandise, even upon goods which had already paid a still higher tax before exportation from Spain. Customs duties and other charges upon commerce also produced a substantial revenue.

After the end of the sixteenth century practically all of the officials in the colonies except the viceroys obtained their offices simply by purchase from the royal government, which sold appointments to the



highest bidder. This was true even of the most responsible positions. The more important were usually sold in Spain, the others in the colonies. The new functionary's office thus represented an investment from which he naturally expected a financial return, but there is little reason to suppose that the result was worse than if appointments had been dictated by favoritism and bribery, which would undoubtedly have been the alternative.

#### CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY

Contemporary standards of official morality made graft and speculation inevitable under any system of appointment. Public office was regarded in Spain, as in many other European countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, primarily as an opportunity for self-enrichment. The whole character of the colonial system—the arbitrary power exercised by the Crown's representatives, the special privileges granted to favored persons and classes, and especially the restrictions upon trade which made violations of the law extremely profitable—afforded an irresistible temptation to bribery and extortion. Even the viceroys stooped at times to the establishment of commercial monopolies for their personal profit, or accepted money in return for pardoning criminals. Among their subordinates, from the judges of the *audiencia* to the most humble clerk, corruption was universal and in most cases unpunished. The public treasury was defrauded in countless ways, and justice or more frequently injustice was for sale in the courts. Even private property was not safe from the rapacity of unscrupulous military or civil officials. We have already seen how the Indians were deprived of the protection which the Crown sought to give them, and we shall see in the next chapter how official connivance with smugglers made ineffective the Spanish government's commercial policy. The laws of the Indies contained many provisions designed to discourage official misconduct, through frequent inspections by members of the *audiencia* or specially appointed "visitors," and through the *residencias* which all officials had to undergo at the end of their terms, but these were of little value because they were usually carried out by officials who were themselves profiting by the practices that they were supposed to check. There

was often a recognized customary price for a favorable report after a *residencia*.

The Spanish colonial administration was not only corrupt, but, judged by modern standards, inefficient. The Crown's insistence that even unimportant questions must be decided in Spain discouraged local initiative and made it difficult for the best of viceroys to accomplish much constructive work. Such centralization was the more impractical because communications between the colonies and the peninsula were slow and uncertain, especially when Spain's enemies controlled the seas, and even communications between one colony and another in America often took many weeks. The lack of close contact between the home government and its representatives, combined with procrastination and red tape in the Council of the Indies, often caused matters requiring prompt decision to be discussed back and forth for years. On the other hand the Crown was compelled to allow the colonial officials some latitude in enforcing royal decrees issued without full knowledge of the facts. The viceroys frequently nullified the king's commands by suspending laws until they could explain why their enforcement seemed undesirable, and subordinate officials similarly evaded compliance with the viceroys' orders. Such practices could not but encourage insubordination and abuses of power.

#### EXCLUSION OF THE CREOLES FROM PUBLIC OFFICE

In practice, though the law did not so provide, offices under the Crown were nearly always filled by peninsular Spaniards. The government preferred to have officials whose devotion to its own interests would not be influenced by local ties or family influences, which are especially potent among people of Spanish race. Occasionally a resident of the colonies served as governor of a province or in some lesser post, and three creole nobles were viceroys of Mexico between 1696 and 1741, but such exceptions to the general rule were rare. The fact that the officials were a class apart, forbidden to form local ties which could create any bond of sympathy between them and the native community, did much to intensify the antagonism between *peninsulares* and creoles, and the creoles' lack of administrative

experience was to have disastrous effects when they attempted to set up independent national governments.

### THE CITY GOVERNMENTS

The only branch of the political administration in which residents of the colonies had any participation was the government of the cities. In Spain the municipalities had formerly enjoyed a very considerable measure of freedom in the management of their internal affairs, and had often banded together in leagues to protect their common interests. They had lost much of their liberty during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but the forms and to some extent the tradition of autonomy had survived. City governments modeled on those of the mother country were among the first political institutions set up by the colonists in America and they were established in the Indian towns as well as the Spanish ones.

The municipal corporation, called *ayuntamiento* or *cabildo*, consisted of a council of *regidores* and one or more *alcaldes* or magistrates whom the council elected, together with various minor officials. The original members were usually appointed by the leader who founded the city, although there were cases where they were elected by the *vecinos* or householders. Their successors were chosen in various ways. In the sixteenth century the outgoing *regidores* elected the new council at the beginning of each year. After 1620 the law required that the seats be sold for the benefit of the royal treasury, but there were many cities where the inhabitants were too poor to buy them and the system of election by the outgoing council continued. There were others where some of the seats were hereditary or were given to favored individuals by royal appointment. In most cases, the municipal officials were creoles, or at least immigrants from Spain who had made their homes in the colonies, and the city governments thus represented local interests and were in some measure responsive to local sentiment, even though they were in no sense democratic institutions.

The *ayuntamiento* shared responsibility with the *corregidor*, the representative of the king, for nearly all governmental activities of a purely local nature such as the enforcement of police and sanitary

regulations, the cleaning and repairing of the streets, and the maintenance of markets. It frequently regulated wages and the prices of foodstuffs and other necessities and took action to procure adequate supplies when a scarcity threatened. It often had to administer a considerable amount of property, for besides the areas used in common by the inhabitants for pasture and cutting firewood, it was customary for a newly founded city to be given a tract of land which was rented to private individuals as a means of increasing the municipal revenue.<sup>1</sup> Many towns had representatives in Spain to look after their business interests<sup>2</sup> and in the earlier part of the colonial period, before the colonial administration became so highly centralized as it did later, they frequently appointed *procuradores* to confer with those of other towns about matters of common importance.

The *ayuntamiento's* jurisdiction extended not only to the city proper but to all of the territory up to the borders of the next municipality—a natural arrangement when the landowners lived for the most part in the towns rather than upon their estates. In some cases the area was a large one. Buenos Aires, to take an extreme example, at one time reached 300 miles westward toward Córdoba, 170 miles northward toward Santa Fe, and an indefinite distance southward into the wild Indian territory and eastward across the River Plate into what is now Uruguay.<sup>3</sup>

The power actually exercised by the city officials varied. In the larger capitals they were treated with great respect and membership in the *ayuntamiento* was a distinction for which wealthy citizens were willing to pay a high price, but their authority was completely overshadowed by that of the viceroy or the captain general. In outlying provinces, as in Buenos Aires before the establishment of a viceroyalty, they had more real autonomy. Even in such places, however, they could not effectively assert any right of local self-government against the centralizing policy of the Crown, though they were constantly involved in conflicts with other civil and ecclesiastical officials over questions of authority and prerogatives. The control of the sale

<sup>1</sup> O. G. Jones, *Local Government in the Spanish Colonies as Provided by the Recopilación de leyes*, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 19:65.

<sup>2</sup> Haring, *Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies*, p. 139.

<sup>3</sup> Kirkpatrick, *The Argentine Republic*, p. 19.

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of offices in most of the *ayuntamientos* by the royal treasury officials was enough in itself to assure their subservience.

#### THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

There was no sharp division between administrative and judicial functions in the Spanish political system. The viceroys, governors, *corregidores*, and municipal *alcaldes* all acted as judges. Their decisions were usually subject to review by the *audiencia*, which was the highest court in the colonies, and important cases might be appealed to the Council of the Indies or the king himself.

Only a part of the population was subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Several privileged classes, including the civil officials, the army, and the Church, enjoyed the privilege of being tried by their own special courts both in civil and in criminal cases. The *fueros*, as these privileges were called, were extended until a traveller in Venezuela at the end of the colonial period reported that there were few white persons of any importance who could not claim one.<sup>1</sup> The military *fuero*, for example, extended to all members of the creole militia, even though they were not in active service, and the church courts claimed jurisdiction over great numbers of persons who were not priests. The system led to many abuses, for the special tribunals were always inclined to favor members of their own order, and evil-doers often sought some minor military or ecclesiastical employment for the sake of the immunity which it conferred. The *fueros* were ardently defended, and quarrels over questions of jurisdiction caused scandalous conflicts and not infrequently bloodshed.

#### THE RELATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE CHURCH

Along side of the civilian administration was the powerful hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The clergy not only ministered to the religious needs of the colonists and converted and civilized the Indians, but served as a potent instrument for assuring the loyalty and

<sup>1</sup> F Depons, *Voyage à la partie orientale de la Terre-Ferme dans l'Amérique Méridionale*, Vol. II, p. 60.

obedience of all classes to the Crown. The whole ecclesiastical organization in the Indies was controlled by the government to an extent unusual in other parts of the world. In a bull of 1493 the Pope gave Ferdinand and Isabella the same right to make ecclesiastical appointments in the Indies which he had earlier conferred on Prince Henry the Navigator in Africa, and this right was confirmed and extended in later grants. The Catholic Monarchs were likewise given permission to receive all tithes in the colonies in return for their promise to support the Church there. Taken together, these and other privileges obtained from the Holy See constituted the *patronato*, the right of patronage, which was one of the Spanish kings' most valued and jealously guarded prerogatives.

All members of the clergy were thus dependent upon and responsible to the Crown. Bishops and other high ecclesiastical officials were named directly by the king, whereas less important appointments, such as those of parish priests and curates, were made by the viceroy or his subordinates acting as vice-patrons, though usually from among candidates presented by the bishops after an examination conducted by the church authorities. No priest could go to America without a license from the Council of the Indies, and none could return without express permission from the Crown or the viceroy. The movements of the clergy in the colonies were directed by the authorities, and an order from the king was necessary for the building of a church or a convent or the establishment of a mission among the Indians. The Crown's collection of the tithes gave it control of what was normally the Church's most important revenue. Under such conditions, the Church became an integral part of the government. Many clerics, in fact, held high positions in the civil administration itself, and in Mexico the archbishop frequently served for a short time as viceroy when the office accidentally became vacant or when special circumstances made his appointment desirable.

Among the white colonists, the overwhelming majority were devout Catholics who accepted without question the spiritual authority of the Church and the control which it exercised in many matters of conduct and personal relations which are not now considered purely spiritual. The confessional alone gave the priesthood an immense power, and excommunication was a weapon which inspired fear in

the most influential officials. Offenses against religion might also be punished by fine or imprisonment, and often by more severe penalties.

#### THE INQUISITION

Persons who embraced unorthodox ideas, either religious or political, were likely to run foul of the Inquisition, which was established in Mexico and Lima in 1570 and in Cartagena in 1610, though it was never so active in the Indies as in Spain. It was not given jurisdiction over the Indians, who were regarded as children in the faith and whose frequent backslidings into heathen practices were punished by the ordinary clergy. Among the white and *mestizo* colonists heresy was not common because immigration was so carefully sifted to prevent spiritual contamination and contact with the outside world was so slight. It is said that only a hundred heretics were burned at the stake in Mexico and Peru during the whole colonial period<sup>1</sup> and many of these were captured foreign pirates. The Inquisition nevertheless found much to do with minor heresies and sacrileges and accumulated much wealth. It was especially dreaded because of the complete secrecy surrounding its procedure. The fines that it collected belonged legally to the king, but few royal officials had the courage to ask an accounting of an organization which could imprison and ruin persons of any rank without answering to any other authority for its conduct, and whose officials and employees were immune from prosecution except in their own courts.

One of the Inquisition's most important activities, particularly in the eighteenth century, was the effort to prevent the spread of heretical or revolutionary ideas. No books could be imported or printed without its permission, and those who read prohibited works were liable to severe punishment. In 1806, when questions arose between Spain and the United States about the boundary of the Louisiana purchase, a friar who had been designated to make a report on the question for the information of the King of Spain found it necessary to consult two foreign histories that the Inquisition had banned. He was refused permission to do so, though the Inquisition finally designated

<sup>1</sup> Bourne, *Spain in America*, p. 313.

its own representatives to examine the books and extract such information as they considered useful.<sup>1</sup> This rigid censorship, which extended to the works of many authors who were being widely read in other parts of the world including Spain itself, was an important factor in the colonies' intellectual backwardness.

#### THE WEALTH OF THE CHURCH

Though the Crown controlled the tithes, the Church received most of the money collected and had other fruitful sources of revenue. Its wealth was greatly increased, as the years went on, by pious gifts and bequests. Since it was compelled to accept many of these in the form of liens on undivided landed estates, and since it invested a large part of its other funds in mortgages, it gradually acquired an interest in a very large proportion of the agricultural properties and city real estate, and itself became a great landowner. The Crown made half-hearted efforts to check this process, but with little result, and after independence the Church's wealth became a burning political issue and a source of danger to the Church itself in several Latin American republics.

This wealth was very unevenly divided. Much of it belonged to charitable foundations like hospitals and orphanages and much more to the monastic orders, which had establishments in most of the larger towns. Even in a place like Puebla, in Mexico, with only 10,000 inhabitants, Thomas Gage found six monasteries and four convents in the early part of the seventeenth century. The monasteries often had large incomes from their investments or from *haciendas* which they farmed themselves or rented to private individuals. The incomes of some of the archbishops, bishops, and other important church officials were likewise very great, often exceeding those of the viceroys or of any but the wealthiest members of the creole aristocracy.

Since the more important ecclesiastical officials were appointed by the Crown, the higher clergy, like the officials in the civil administration, were for the most part peninsular Spaniards. The parish priests, most of whom were natives of the colonies, often had little income beyond the fees and contributions paid by the poverty stricken Indians

<sup>1</sup> Lea, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies*, p. 274.



or *mestizos* of the rural villages. This was one of the many causes of bad feeling between the creoles and the *peninsulares*. Both of these groups were represented in the membership of the religious orders, and they sometimes formed factions whose quarrels disturbed the whole community.

The Church gave the colonies their educators, their men of letters, and many of their ablest government officials. Its vast spiritual influence made for social stability, and its schools and universities provided practically the only educational facilities. Its financial resources, and the enterprise and organizing ability shown by some of the religious orders, especially in their missions among the Indians, were important factors in the colonies' economic development. An organization that enjoyed such prestige and wealth was inevitably attractive to persons who were unworthy of membership, and we find severe criticism of the conduct of some of the clergy both in travellers' accounts and in the official reports of the viceroys. It was charged that parish priests frequently exploited or mistreated the Indians and that their moral conduct too often left much to be desired. The ecclesiastical courts, which under the Church's *fuero* had jurisdiction even in suits between clergymen and laymen, were accused of lenience and partiality in dealing with clerical offenders. Disputes over complaints of this sort, and efforts by the civil officials to exercise control over the Church, occasionally led to noisy scandals and even riots in the colonial cities.

#### THE CHURCH AND THE INDIANS

The Indians near the larger Spanish settlements were at least outwardly converted at the time of the Conquest, though we may suspect that it was some time before they grasped the meaning of the mass baptism to which they had been subjected. To see that they were instructed in the faith was an important duty of the viceroys, and ostensibly the main purpose of the *encomienda* system, and the law required that all Indians, Negroes, and mulattoes in each community should be assembled daily for religious instruction. Even where the old pagan worship secretly survived, the new gods, whom the Conquest had proved so much more powerful, were accepted also. The Indians were the more inclined to accord respect and obedience to

the Church because they found it their most effective protector. The Church thus acquired an immense authority over the natives which was reinforced by the support of the government. It was the principal channel through which the Indians absorbed a little of the civilization of the conquering race. The influence of the priests and friars probably did more than any other factor to keep the masses of the Indian population submissive to the Spanish regime.

One of the Church's most noteworthy undertakings was the missionary work of the religious orders on the frontiers. During and after the period of the Conquest, Jesuits and Dominicans and Franciscans penetrated inaccessible mountains and pestilential jungles to preach the gospel, showing the same indomitable courage in their missionary work which inspired other Spanish explorers in the search for wealth and power. Many were killed by the natives or died of hunger and exhaustion, but others won the confidence of the wild tribes, taught them the rudiments of civilization, and brought them into touch with the Spanish community so that the royal authorities could peacefully establish control over them. Somewhat later more elaborately organized frontier missions, directed and supported by the Crown, became the chief means through which the Spanish dominions were expanded. The friars were protected by military forces, and compulsion as well as persuasion was used to induce the Indians to give up their nomadic life and settle in permanent villages, or *reducciones*, where their economic and spiritual life could be supervised by the missionaries. The converts had little or no private property and worked for the benefit of the community as a whole, under constant supervision and direction. Such power as their own chiefs still exercised was subject to the higher authority of the priests. Until they were considered sufficiently civilized to stand on their own feet, they were carefully kept from any contact with the Spanish community and white settlers were excluded from their neighborhood.

The missions brought about a notable improvement in the condition of the more backward tribes so long as they were under the fathers' control. The Indians were taught handicrafts and better agricultural methods, and the introduction of new animals and plants helped to do away with the danger of famine which had formerly been ever present. Many thousands in northern Mexico and the in-

terior of South America were saved from extinction at the hands of slave raiders or in wars with the Spanish troops, but in few cases did the converts learn enough from their instructors to enable them to survive as organized communities after the mission was discontinued. In districts where Spanish colonization later took place, those who did not succumb to disease or mistreatment passed under the domination of white landowners or miners. Elsewhere they usually reverted more or less completely to savagery.

#### THE PARAGUAY MISSIONS

The most famous missions were those of Paraguay. The Jesuits started work among the Guaranís along the upper Paraná River in the latter part of the sixteenth century, and they were especially authorized to Christianize the Indians of that region by a royal order issued in 1608. When their early settlements were destroyed some twenty years later by the raids of slave-hunting Paulistas from Brazil, they moved their converts south into territory which is now partly in southeastern Paraguay, partly in the Argentine province of Misiones, and partly in Brazil. Here they developed a theocratic community which was practically independent of the neighboring Spanish authorities. There were a score of *reducciones*, each under the paternalistic control of two or more missionaries, with a total population of more than 100,000. The life and industry of the Indians was as closely regulated as in other missions, and efficient management made the settlements very prosperous. The creoles of Asunción and the other communities in the Plata basin were bitterly hostile to the Jesuits, who protected the docile Guaranís from white exploitation and also sold their *yerba mate* and agricultural products in competition with those of the white settlements.

This hostility was frequently the cause of serious disorders in Paraguay. In the middle of the seventeenth century Bishop Cárdenas of Asunción, who was unfriendly to the Jesuits, became the ardent champion of the creoles. While serving temporarily as governor of the province, he attempted to restrict the activities of the missions and then led the creoles in resistance to a new governor who was sent to replace him. He was defeated by an army from the missions, for

the Jesuits had been permitted to train and arm their Indians to repel further aggressions from the Paulistas. The mission troops again helped to put down a creole revolt led by José de Antequera, who held control of Paraguay from 1721 until 1731, and another under Fernando Mompó a little later.

The prosperity of the Jesuit missions came to an end when Spain agreed in 1750 to exchange seven missions east of the Uruguay River for the Portuguese town of Colonia, which had long been the center of an obnoxious smuggling trade. The Indians, who had already suffered so much from the Portuguese, rose in revolt. The ensuing "War of the Seven Reductions" was suppressed after a long and costly struggle, and a worse disaster overtook the missions when the Jesuits were expelled from America in 1767. The Indians passed under the control of the civil authorities, aided by friars of other orders, and their population rapidly decreased.

#### THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS

The expulsion of the Jesuits was an event of the first importance. They were the wealthiest and most powerful of the religious orders and they had maintained an unusually high standard of discipline and personal conduct. Besides their extensive missionary work, in other provinces as well as Paraguay, they had been the leaders in education and had had a great influence upon the spiritual life of the white communities. Partly because of their success, they had many enemies. They were not so amenable to royal control as other branches of the colonial Church because their highly centralized organization was directed by a general at Rome. The Spanish government, like the governments of other countries in which they worked, was inclined to distrust them for this reason, and its distrust was increased by various incidents that occurred in Spain and also by the strong suspicion that the Jesuits had inspired the Indian revolt in Paraguay. In 1767, therefore, Spain did what the French and Portuguese governments had already done, and ordered the removal of the Jesuits from all of its possessions. As there was some reason to fear that the people of the colonies might resist the execution of the decree, all members of the order in each district were seized secretly at the same moment

and shipped without delay to Europe, without regard for the hardship inflicted on some of the more aged or infirm priests in regions where travel was difficult. The confiscation of the Jesuits' properties released a very large amount of land from the "dead hand" of ecclesiastical ownership.

#### THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY REFORMS

In the eighteenth century, the Spanish Bourbon kings who succeeded the incompetent later Hapsburgs made several changes in the colonial administration. Most of these were the work of Charles III (1759-88) who infused a new life into all of the government's work. In Spain the Council of the Indies and the *Casa de Contratación* were placed under a Ministry of the Indies, through which the royal government attempted to exercise an even more complete control over American affairs than hitherto. This arrangement was later abandoned, but the Council of the Indies never regained its former power. In America much of the existing machinery of local government was abolished and the *corregidores* and *alcaldes mayores* were replaced by new officials called intendants. In financial matters these were independent of the viceroys and responsible directly to an intendent general, but in other respects they functioned as the viceroys' representatives. The change brought about some improvement, chiefly because better men were appointed.

Measures adopted during the same period somewhat altered the position of the Church. The Inquisition was brought under more effective control by the civil authorities. The civil courts, in 1795, were given jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by members of the clergy.

These changes did not greatly alter the character of Spanish rule in America. The colonists were still governed from across the sea by rulers who had little understanding of their problems. The restrictions on intercolonial trade discouraged any acquaintanceship or co-operation between the people of one province and those of another, and except in purely local affairs the creoles were still deprived of any opportunity for political or administrative experience that would be helpful after independence. The traditions of graft and arbitrary

power were not to be easily eradicated. A still more unfortunate legacy from Spain was the system of caste and special privilege which had been nurtured by the home government as a means of preventing its American subjects from uniting against it, and which drew sharp lines between all other classes and the Indians. The exemption that certain favored classes enjoyed, under the *fueros*, from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts was an essential part of this system. It would clearly be difficult, in a community so divided within itself, to make a success of democratic institutions after the colonies became independent.

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## Chapter V

### COMMERCE, SMUGGLING, AND PIRACY

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#### THE CASA DE CONTRATACIÓN

Trade with the Indies was carried on from the beginning under restrictions designed in the first place to promote the interests of the royal treasury and in the second place to keep the benefits resulting from it so far as possible in the hands of Spanish subjects. Spain's policy was not particularly illiberal, when judged by the standards of the time, but the failure to adapt it to changing conditions, combined with official incompetence and the progressive decay of the economy of the mother country, made it exceedingly harmful in the long run to the interests of the colonies.

For more than two centuries all phases of commercial intercourse between Spain and America were controlled by the *Casa de Contratación* at Seville. This institution had been set up in 1503, when the needs of the little settlements in Española were doubtless best handled by one central organization. The Casa examined cargoes going to or coming from the Indies, arranged for the sailing of the annual fleets, and usually decided what vessels were to be admitted to them. Sitting as a court, it exercised jurisdiction over crimes committed on the voyages and in certain classes of civil suits arising in connection with American trade.<sup>1</sup>

Nothing might be sent to the Indies without the consent of the Casa, nothing might be brought back and landed, either on the account of merchants or of the king himself, without its authorization. Bullion from the colonies consigned to Spanish merchants belonged to them only when

<sup>1</sup> Haring, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies*, pp 33-34. The description of the Spanish commercial system in this chapter is based largely on this book.

the Casa permitted its release. It controlled and regulated the character of ships, crews, and passengers. In short, it saw to the execution of all the laws and ordinances relating to trade and navigation with America.

The Casa also conducted a school of navigation and devoted much attention to the making and improvement of maps and nautical instruments under the general direction of the Pilot Major. The first occupant of this post was Amerigo Vespucci, and the second, Juan Díaz de Solís, the discoverer of the River Plate.

As Seville was many miles from the sea on the narrow and shallow Guadalquivir, the requirement that all cargoes going to or coming from the Indies be inspected there caused much inconvenience. In 1508, therefore, permission was granted for vessels to load at San Lucar, at the mouth of the river, or in the near-by harbor of Cadiz, and in 1535 the *Juzgado de Indias*, an agency of the *Casa de Contratación*, was established at Cadiz in place of the inspectors who had hitherto controlled trade from that port. Vessels coming from the Indies were still usually required to go to Seville, or at least to send their cargoes and documents to the Casa for examination, for the Crown was unwilling to permit any relaxation in its restrictions where shipments of bullion from the Indies were concerned. There was much jealousy between Seville and Cadiz, and the regulations governing their trade were changed from time to time in favor sometimes of one, sometimes of the other. The merchants at Cadiz usually enjoyed some share in the trade of the colonies even when the fleet sailed from the Guadalquivir, and after 1680, when the silting up of the river made its navigation more and more impracticable, especially for the larger ships which were coming into use, Cadiz became the port of arrival and departure for all of the American fleets. The *Casa de Contratación* itself was moved thither in 1717.

Except for occasional special dispensations, Seville and Cadiz were the only ports through which trade between Spain and America could legally be carried on. The Emperor Charles V granted permission in 1529 for ships to sail directly to the Indies from several other Spanish ports, provided they put in at Seville on the return voyage, but this privilege seems to have been little used and was discontinued after a short time. Later efforts of other cities in the kingdom to obtain a share in the American trade were defeated by the influence of the



powerful vested interests which grew up at Seville, or were discouraged because the authorities believed that they could cope with smuggling more effectively if shipments were confined to a single channel. As the commerce of the colonies increased, such centralization became more and more harmful to the mother country and to the overseas possessions, especially as internal customs barriers in Spain made it unprofitable for other regions of the peninsula to send goods to or buy goods from the Indies.

#### THE FLEET SYSTEM

In America, trade was also confined to a few channels. This was partly because of the convoy system which the depredations of foreign enemies compelled the government to adopt. French privateers and pirates began to cause trouble early in the sixteenth century, during the wars between the Emperor Charles and Francis I, and in 1522-23 they captured the ships despatched by Cortez with the king's share of the spoils from the capture of Mexico City. The seas became increasingly unsafe as marauders of other nationalities followed their example. It soon became necessary to have merchant vessels sail in groups protected by warships, and after 1543 practically all trade was carried on in this way. Ordinances adopted in 1564 established the fleet system in the form which it was to retain until well into the eighteenth century.

Normally, two fleets sailed for America each year: the "galleons" with cargo for South America, and the Plate Fleet which served New Spain and the Antilles. There were usually from thirty to ninety ships in each in the sixteenth century, but the number decreased later, partly because ships grew larger and partly because the growth of smuggling caused legitimate commerce to decline. The merchantmen were accompanied by several warships, which themselves frequently carried goods for trade. Great convoys of this sort were awkward to handle, and the losses by shipwreck were heavy.

All trade with the west coast of South America, which was the wealthiest and most populous part of the Spanish Empire in the earlier part of the colonial period, was carried on by way of the Isthmus of Panama. This involved a great expense in transshipment, but there was

no other practicable route because the shifting winds and currents of the Straits of Magellan and the cold and the storms encountered off Cape Horn were too much for the clumsy sailing vessels of the sixteenth century. The galleons made their first stop at Cartagena. There goods were unloaded for New Granada and messengers were sent overland to Lima to give the signal for the departure of the vessels which would carry the products of Peru, Chile, and Quito to Panama. After some weeks of trading the fleet then proceeded to Porto Bello, which at the end of the sixteenth century superseded Nombre de Dios as the principal port on the Caribbean side of the Isthmus. Here hundreds of officials, merchants, muledrivers, and hangers-on were crowded into a hot, unhealthful little village for forty or fifty days until the textiles and other European goods brought by the galleons had been exchanged for the gold, silver, cacao, and other products of the colonies. With insufficient accommodations and appalling sanitary conditions a large proportion of those attending the fair always succumbed to the diseases which made the Isthmus dreaded by travellers until the twentieth century. Only the expectation of great profits, which increased the burden already imposed upon the consumer by heavy taxation and by the greed of the Seville monopolists, could have induced merchants to engage in a commerce so dangerous to life and health.

From Porto Bello goods must be transported overland to Panama for reshipment to the west coast ports. While the distance across the Isthmus was short, the difficulty and risk was great, for the roads were mere trails through a tropical jungle where impassable mud-holes and swollen rivers took a heavy toll of mules and cargo. In the rainy season, goods were sent by sea from Porto Bello to the mouth of the Chagres, a journey often made dangerous by pirates lurking along the shore, and from there poled up the Chagres River in boats to Venta Cruz, which was but five leagues from Panama. In the dry season the safer overland trail was used. The Panama-Porto Bello and Panama-Venta Cruz trails were paved with stone in the eighteenth century but they were still impassable for anything but pack animals.

Commerce with New Spain and the Antilles was less difficult. The settlements in the islands, as well as those in Honduras and Yucatan, were supplied by small ships which left the Plate Fleet after its ar-

rival in American waters. The main part of the convoy proceeded to Vera Cruz. The Mexican fair was held in the interior at Jalapa, where accommodations were better and climate more healthful than on the coast, and the transportation of goods from Vera Cruz to Mexico City was far less costly than from Porto Bello to Lima. It is not surprising that the commerce of New Spain became more important than that of Peru in the latter part of the colonial period.

#### SHIPMENT OF GOLD AND SILVER

The main purpose of the fleet system was to assure the safe and regular shipment of gold and silver from Peru and Mexico to Spain. The Crown seemed more interested in its royalties from the product of the mines than in developing agriculture and stock-raising which were probably a more important source of government income. Most economists of the time believed that the acquisition of precious metals for their own sake was the chief benefit that a nation could obtain from foreign trade, and aside from theoretical considerations the royal treasury was chronically in need of ready money to defray the cost of continual foreign wars. Every effort was made to close all avenues through which bullion might be illegally exported. Although the mines were operated by private individuals, all gold and silver must be presented at the royal assay office for the deduction of the "royal fifth" before it might be sold or used in any way. From there it was shipped under close supervision to the *Casa de Contratación*, where the owner could obtain it "only after long and minute formalities."<sup>1</sup> Despite the most elaborate precautions, there was much smuggling. Aside from the desire to evade the payment of the royalty, there was a powerful temptation to resort to clandestine shipments because the government repeatedly seized properly manifested shipments as forced loans, giving the owner in return a promise to pay bearing a ridiculously low rate of interest.

#### THE SEVILLE MONOPOLY

All attempts to modify the fleet system were opposed by the powerful vested interests which the system created. One of these was the

<sup>1</sup> Haring, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

*Consulado* of Seville, a close corporation of merchants dealing with the colonies organized in 1543. Its main purpose was to decide commercial disputes by a more rapid and satisfactory procedure than that of the *Casa de Contratación*, but it also provided a means by which the exporting houses could combine to exploit the American consumer and to treat with the royal government for special privileges. The *Consulado* was able to obtain many important concessions by payments of money or by its influence with the *Casa de Contratación*, and outside firms found it difficult to trade with the colonies in competition with its members. The regulations of the Casa, in fact, tended to prevent smaller merchants from loading goods on the fleet at all. The Seville houses worked in close cooperation with their correspondents at Mexico and Lima, where the chief importers were also organized in *consulados*. In the South American trade, for example, the exporters at Seville refrained from sending goods on their own account to points beyond Porto Bello, and the Peruvian importers agreed in return not to make purchases in Spain but to supply their needs by purchases at the fair on the Isthmus. There all prices were determined before trading began by an agreement between representatives of the Spanish merchants on the one hand and the American merchants on the other.<sup>1</sup> Such cooperation made possible great profits for the firms participating in the system, and efforts to change the legislation upon which their virtual monopoly rested met with strong opposition.

#### INTERCOLONIAL TRADE

The effort to prevent trade outside of the fleet system led to the imposition of intolerable and unenforceable restrictions upon commerce by other routes. The chief sufferers in this respect were perhaps the settlers in the River Plate region. Although Buenos Aires was 1,000 miles from Upper Peru, the Spanish government feared that the port might become an outlet for illegal shipments of bullion from the mining region and a point of entry for smuggled goods if it were open to trade. At first the settlers there were permitted to engage in a

<sup>1</sup> Juan and Ulloa, *Relación histórica del viaje a la América Meridional*, 1748 edition, Vol. I, pp. 140-41.

limited commerce with Brazil and the Guinea Coast of Africa, where their grain and meat products were in great demand, but after 1618 their direct commerce with the outside world was legally restricted to two or three very small vessels sailing each year from Spain. They did engage in smuggling on a great scale, but the growth of the city and the near-by settlements was much retarded until the liberalization of Spain's commercial policy in the eighteenth century.

Trade between New Spain and Peru, the two great centers of Spanish enterprise in America, was also restricted within narrow limits and at times altogether prohibited. In this case the purpose was to prevent goods imported into New Spain from the Philippines from competing with Spanish manufactures in Peru. All intercourse between Spain and the Philippines was carried on through the Mexican port of Acapulco, and though only one vessel sailed each year it was an exceedingly important part of the colonies' commerce. The Manila galleon brought great quantities of silks and other prized oriental products to Mexico, and they found their way through irregular channels to other centers where the settlers were rich enough to buy them. At the same time great quantities of Mexican silver dollars reached the Orient and became the principal form of money there as they did eventually in the British North American colonies.

#### HIGH PRICES

One result of the Spanish commercial system was that few residents of the colonies could afford to buy imported goods. The fleet system and the restrictions that went with it aggravated the effect of the already formidable natural obstacles to commerce—the long ocean voyage, the difficult transshipment at the Isthmus, and the lack of roads in the interior—and the trade of the colonies was still further burdened by high taxes. Besides the *almojarifazgo*, or customs duties, collected both when the goods left Spain and when they arrived in the colonies, there were the *avería*, a contribution toward the cost of providing the fleets with military protection, the *alcabala*, or sales tax, and a number of lesser imposts. Moreover, the merchants at Seville combined to force prices even higher than they might normally have gone by deliberately undersupplying the colonial markets in order to

make larger profits on each shipment. The cost of bringing an article to Chile, for example, was somewhat more than four times its original value in Cadiz. The various taxes were almost as much as the original value, and the freight across the Isthmus, between Porto Bello and Panama, consumed a similar amount. On the other hand, the price paid by the consumer was often ten times that in Cadiz.<sup>1</sup> The expense of shipping goods through legal channels to Buenos Aires, by way of Panama and Upper Peru, must have been very much greater.

#### ILLEGAL TRADE

The situation of the colonists might have been still more difficult had not a great part of their needs been supplied by goods illegally imported. The commercial restrictions were constantly violated by government officials, by foreign traders, and by the very merchants in whose interests they were maintained. Even in the carefully supervised annual fleets, fraud in loading ships and manifesting cargoes seems to have been the rule rather than the exception. As Spain's industries declined, after the latter part of the sixteenth century, articles originally brought from foreign countries made up an increasing proportion of the exports from Seville to America. The shipment of such articles by Spanish firms was permitted, but many merchants of other nationalities, who could not legally take part in the American trade, also found ways of doing so, sometimes by acting through Spanish firms which merely lent their name to the transaction, and sometimes by loading goods directly from their own vessels in Cadiz Harbor, without the formality of registration. Gold and silver coming from the colonies found their way into foreign hands in the same manner. Official interference was avoided by bribery, or frequently by intimidation, for the Spanish government during the seventeenth century was too weak to risk offending other powers by confiscating the property of their subjects. Louis XIV of France even sent warships to Cadiz on more than one occasion as a warning not to molest French merchants in their illegal operations.

Besides the goods shipped with the fleets, a great quantity of mer-

<sup>1</sup> Galdames, *Geografía Económica de Chile*, p. 215.

chandise was brought to the Indies by smugglers. No one in the colonies wished to see the law enforced. The creoles were glad of an opportunity to obtain foreign goods at more reasonable prices and to sell their own products. The merchants found it convenient to employ their capital in illicit operations during the long intervals between fleets, when it would otherwise have lain idle. The officials were almost universally corrupt, and even if a viceroy or governor were himself honest he could not trust his subordinates. Early in the eighteenth century, for example, one of the viceroys of Peru determined to check the illegal importation of goods in the vicinity of Lima. After encountering many obstacles because of the secret efforts of other officials to protect the smugglers, he finally sent a subordinate to investigate the situation at a port where contraband goods were being introduced with the connivance of the local authorities. This man exacted a share in the profits which the smugglers were making and reported that he had found nothing out of the way. A second investigator followed the same course. A third, sent to confiscate a vessel which had just entered port from Mexico, found dissimulation impossible and was compelled to confiscate the ship and order the arrest of the port authorities. When the case came before the *audiencia*, the highest court in America, only a few of the culprits were punished, and they received very light sentences.<sup>1</sup>

The most active smugglers, especially in South America, were the Portuguese. Despite the long distance and the lack of good roads, goods which they brought to the River Plate could be carried across the continent to Upper Peru and could compete there with those imported through legal channels. So important did this trade become that the great merchants of Lima often maintained agents in Brazil to arrange for shipments by the southern route. Between 1580 and 1640, when the two kingdoms were united under the Spanish Crown, a large number of Portuguese settled in the Spanish colonies and took over much of the wholesale and retail trade. Many of these were of Jewish descent, and in 1635 all business in Peru was disrupted when the Inquisition arrested more than eighty persons, including most of the principal merchants of Lima, on charges of reverting to Hebrew

<sup>1</sup> Juan and Ulloa, *Noticias Secretas de América* (London, 1826 edition), p. 206.

religious practices. Eleven of the accused, after long-drawn-out proceedings, were burned at the stake, and many received less severe punishment.

This affair did not put an end to smuggling by the Portuguese. After 1680 Colonia do Sacramento, across the River Plate from Buenos Aires, was the great entrepôt for their trade. This establishment was a source of constant annoyance to the Spanish officials, and it was repeatedly seized by expeditions from Buenos Aires during the wars of the eighteenth century, only to be restored to Portugal when peace was made. An effort to exchange it for a part of the Jesuit mission territory failed, as we have seen, in 1750, but the post was finally occupied by Spain in 1777 and permanently acquired under a treaty signed in that year.

In the Caribbean region, the "Spanish Main," smuggling was carried on by adventurers of various nationalities who were often primarily pirates. Foreign interlopers began to appear in West Indian waters very early in the sixteenth century, capturing Spanish ships if they could, and trading with the towns in Española and Cuba when they did not have sufficient forces to seize and sack them. They became more active after the settlement of the mainland. Other European governments, jealous of the wealth which Spain was drawing from the Indies, systematically encouraged them, even in time of peace. The most famous of these sea-rovers in the latter part of the sixteenth century were the Englishmen John Hawkins and Francis Drake. Hawkins made several voyages to the Indies after 1562, with cargoes of slaves which he obtained by fair means or foul on the African coast, trading or plundering as the occasion offered. Drake, who was with Hawkins when the two were defeated and nearly captured by the Spanish Plate Fleet at Vera Cruz in 1568, later made several voyages on his own account, seizing Spanish ships and sacking towns along the American coast. One of his most notable exploits was the circumnavigation of the globe between 1577 and 1580. In 1585 he commanded a large expedition which captured both Santo Domingo and Cartagena, and eleven years later he died of fever near Nombre de Dios after an unsuccessful effort to attack Panama. French pirates also continued their activities in the Indies, and the Dutch, while they were still carrying on an uncertain struggle against Spain



for their own independence, began a systematic attack on the overseas possessions of the Spanish-Portuguese monarchy.

Dutch traders had early visited the Venezuelan coast in search of salt, which they needed for curing the product of their great North Sea fisheries. The commercial relations with that region expanded after they conquered the Portuguese posts on the west coast of Africa, for Negro slaves were one of the commodities which were most in demand in the Spanish colonies. They soon controlled the trade in cacao and tobacco from the north coast of South America so completely that nearly all of the chocolate consumed in Spain itself is said to have passed through their hands<sup>1</sup> and the cultivation of tobacco in Venezuela was forbidden by the Spanish government in an effort to check their activities. In 1621 the Dutch West India Company was established in imitation of the East India Company, which had already virtually deprived Portugal of her great trading empire in the Orient. Students of American history are familiar with the story of the West India Company's activities at New Amsterdam, and we shall see in a later chapter how the Company seized and held for several years the most valuable part of Brazil. In the Caribbean it built up a great commerce both with the Spanish settlements and with the colonies which were by this time being established in the islands by other nations. Curaçao, seized from the Spaniards in 1634, and St. Eustatius, a smaller island in the Leeward group east of Puerto Rico, were the principal centers of its activities.

The West India Company, like the East India Company, carried on war on its own account with Spain. In 1628 one of its fleets, under the command of Admiral Piet Heyn, captured the Mexican treasure fleet, with such a quantity of spoil that the Company was able to declare a 50 per cent dividend on its capital stock. Subsequent victories at sea practically destroyed Spain's already decadent naval power, opening the way not only for a great expansion of Dutch commercial activity but also for trading and colonizing activity by subjects of other powers. The Company was ruined after the middle of the seventeenth century by the Portuguese reconquest of its Brazilian and African possessions, but other Dutch traders continued to be active in the Caribbean.

<sup>1</sup> Haring, *Trade and Navigation*, p. 119.

## FOREIGN COLONIES IN THE CARIBBEAN

The Spaniards, absorbed in the exploitation of the rich mainland colonies, made little attempt to occupy the Lesser Antilles and the Guianas, where such natives as survived after the slave raids of the early sixteenth century were of little value as laborers. These portions of the Spanish Main were freely visited by smugglers and pirates, and it was not long before some of these interlopers perceived the possibility of cultivating tobacco and sugar there. The Dutch had successful plantations in Guiana as early as 1616, and the first permanent English colony was established in Barbados in 1625. A year or two before that English and French settlers had occupied St. Christopher, or St. Kitts, but had been driven out by Spanish warships in 1629. They soon returned and gradually spread to the neighboring islands: the English to Antigua and Montserrat, and the French to Martinique and Guadeloupe. Subsequent expansion put the whole chain of the Lesser Antilles in non-Spanish hands. The British colonies grew rapidly in population, for they profited from the same conditions in England that were causing emigration to Massachusetts and Virginia in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. The French, though backed by a company sponsored by Cardinal Richelieu, did not become so prosperous until a few years later. A very important element in the success of both groups of settlements was the aid of Dutch traders who financed their crops, purchased their products, and sold them supplies and Negro slaves.

One result of Dutch enterprise was the establishment of the Danish colony which was later to become the Virgin Islands of the United States. In 1671, finding it difficult to carry on trade under their own flag because Holland was at war with France, a group of Dutch traders persuaded King Christian V to establish a Danish West India Company and to occupy St. Thomas, where several Dutch fugitives driven from St. Eustatius by the French had taken refuge. The island soon became an important center for the slave trade, as well as a rendezvous for pirates. Both the Danish and the Dutch possessions in the West Indies profited during the eighteenth century by the fact that they were generally neutral in the wars between other European powers.

## THE BUCCANEERS

For a hundred years after the discovery of America Spain had insisted on treating all foreigners coming to the Indies as trespassers, but by the seventeenth century she was no longer strong enough to maintain her claim to exclusive possession of territory not actually occupied by Spaniards. She was thus compelled, at first tacitly and later explicitly, to recognize the existence of the colonies of other powers in North America and the Caribbean. She was more stubborn in her refusal to accede to French and English demands for a share in the rich trade of her own possessions. Since these powers refused to respect her rights, and she was unable to enforce them, it became customary to regard the Indies as outside of the scope of treaties made with the Spanish government. Normal relations might exist within the "Lines of Amity," east of the meridian of the Azores and north of the Tropic of Cancer, but it became a common saying that there was "no peace beyond the line." In the Indies there was always a virtual state of war, so that foreign privateers might make good prize of Spanish vessels, and on the other hand might be treated as mere pirates if they were captured.

The activities of the Providence Company are an example of the sort of enterprise which this situation made possible. Organized in 1629 by a group of Englishmen who were also prominent in the affairs of Virginia and New England, this company occupied Providence Island, off the east coast of Nicaragua, with the avowed purpose of using it as a base for preying on Spanish trade. It also established small settlements along the Central American coast, and for a time controlled the famous pirate settlement at Tortuga. The company had hoped for a considerable Puritan immigration, but this did not materialize. Chiefly for this reason the venture was a failure and the colony was destroyed by a Spanish expedition in 1641.

The other English and French colonies continued to offer bases and recruiting grounds for the pirates who became more and more numerous after the destruction of Spanish sea power by the Dutch. The great center for this sort of activity was Tortuga, a small island off the north coast of Española, which had been occupied some time before 1630 by a group of foreign outcasts and adventurers of various na-

nationalities The settlers had first been attracted by the good hunting on the near-by coast of Española, where great numbers of cattle and pigs had run wild after the partial abandonment of Santo Domingo by the Spaniards, and one of their main occupations was the supplying of dried meat and other provisions to passing pirates and smugglers. From their practice of curing this meat on a "boucan," or grill over a fire, they came to be called "Buccaneers"—a term which was later applied in English usage to all of the seventeenth-century freebooters in the Caribbean. Piracy seems to have been merely a side line with the settlers at Tortuga at first, but they abandoned hunting for the more exciting and profitable "course" as the supply of game decreased. Their settlement, meanwhile, had gone through many vicissitudes. It had been repeatedly destroyed by Spanish raids, and there had been fights between the English and French parties among the buccaneers. After being under the control of the Providence Company, the island was ruled from 1641 to 1654 by a representative of the Governor General of the French West Indies. By the middle of the century its inhabitants were a numerous and unruly population devoted almost entirely to piracy. They merely scattered when a new Spanish expedition occupied the island in 1654, and returned a few months later when the Spanish forces were withdrawn to confront an English expedition that was attacking Santo Domingo.

This expedition had been sent by Cromwell, in time of peace and without warning to Spain, simply to conquer a part of the Spanish Main. Its attempt to take Santo Domingo was a rather disgraceful failure, but the less strongly held island of Jamaica was occupied in 1655 and at once became the most important of the English possessions in the West Indies. In the war that followed this act of aggression, British naval forces under Admiral Blake captured or destroyed the greater part of the Porto Bello fleet off Cadiz in 1656, and destroyed the Mexican fleet at Santa Cruz in the Canaries in the following year, though not until the treasure had been safely hidden on land. Meanwhile the English forces in Jamaica were no less active. Spanish counter attacks were beaten off, and naval forces plundered several towns on the mainland. Even after the advent of peace in Europe, following the Restoration in England, the English authorities granted commissions to privateers for attacks on Spanish ships and settlements,

and many of the buccaneers who had hitherto had their headquarters at Tortuga began to resort to Port Royal. The sea-rovers were at first a welcome addition to the defensive forces of the new colony, and it was hoped that their depredations would compel Spain to grant the commercial privileges that had been the real objectives of the West Indian expedition.

The occupation of Jamaica was thus followed by a reign of terror throughout the Spanish Main. "Between the years 1655 and 1671 alone, the corsairs had sacked eighteen cities, four towns, and more than thirty-five villages—Cumaná once, Cumanagote twice, Maracaibo and Gibraltar twice, Rio de la Hacha five times, Santa Marta three times, Tolu eight times, Porto Bello once, Chagre twice, Panama once, Santa Catalina twice, Granada in Nicaragua twice, Campeche three times, St. Jago de Cuba once, and other towns and villages in Cuba and Hispaniola for thirty leagues inland innumerable times."<sup>1</sup> Many settlements in exposed localities were abandoned and many others suffered an injury from which they never recovered. Perhaps the most famous of the buccaneers' exploits was the destruction of Panama City in 1671 by Henry Morgan, who for this and similar achievements was knighted and made Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica.

The buccaneers, however, were not desirable citizens, and the hope that their depredations would force Spain to relax the restrictions on the colonial trade soon proved illusory. The English government consequently entered into a treaty with Spain in 1670 by which it agreed to check their activities in return for the formal recognition of its sovereignty over the English West Indian colonies. For some years after this date piratical undertakings were sometimes secretly encouraged by the authorities at Jamaica, as well as by officials in the North American colonies, but open governmental support gradually ceased.

The freebooters continued to operate from Tortuga and other places in the western part of Española, where there were by this time several settlements of French adventurers. These colonists had shaken off the control that the authorities at Jamaica had tried to exercise, and in 1664 the western end of the island was taken over by the French

<sup>1</sup> Haring, *Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century*, p. 267.

West India Company. The new governor, Bertrand d'Ogeron, was a man of foresight and ability who devoted himself with some success to the task of converting what had been little more than a nest of pirates into a flourishing agricultural colony. He not only encouraged the establishment of plantations, but imported several shiploads of women from France as wives for the settlers. It was his regime which laid the foundations for the prosperity that was later to make French Saint Domingue the richest of the West Indian colonies. As the influence of the home government increased, buccaneering was gradually suppressed there also, for French merchants, who contributed so large a proportion of the goods sent from Spain to the Indies, suffered as much as any one else from attacks on Spanish merchant ships.

By the end of the seventeenth century all civilized powers had abandoned buccaneering as an instrument of national policy, and those corsairs who were unwilling to give up their old occupations became ordinary pirates, treated as outlaws by all nations. Other former buccaneers took to cutting dye-wood in the jungles along the Central American and Mexican coast, establishing small settlements which were later to be the basis for English territorial claims in that region. Still others became planters. Sugar and tobacco cultivation was exceedingly profitable in the British and French colonies during the eighteenth century, and Jamaica and Saint Domingue had many great plantations worked by hundreds of Negro slaves. The owners of these had no desire for a continuance of the old unruly conditions. They still carried on a very extensive smuggling trade with the Spanish colonies, but the old idea that there was "no peace beyond the line" was gradually abandoned, and treaties between Spain and other powers applied in Europe and America alike.

#### THE COLONIAL TRADE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

By the beginning of the eighteenth century it was clear that the Spanish commercial system had been a failure. The effort to confine trade to a few narrow channels and to exclude foreigners from participation had simply diverted the greater part of the colonies' imports and exports into illegal channels. For some time past there had

been fewer and fewer ships in the annual fleets, and at times there were periods of several years when no fleets sailed at all. Smuggling was practised everywhere. Powerful nations continued insistently to demand a legal right to trade with the Indies, and it was more and more difficult for Spain in her weakened condition to refuse them. The French obtained certain commercial privileges during the war of the Spanish Succession (1702-13) and made trouble later when they were withdrawn. In 1713, at the end of the war, the British government exacted from Spain the grant of the *asiento*, or privilege of importing slaves into the colonies, and also the right to send one merchant ship each year to the fair at Porto Bello.

The English South Sea Company, to which these privileges were ceded, built up a large trade. The *navío de permiso* often brought half as much merchandise to Porto Bello as the entire Spanish fleet, for she was accompanied by tenders which remained below the horizon in the day time and replenished her stock of goods at night. The factories, or agencies which the company established at several ports in connection with the *asiento* also carried on much general trade. When the Spanish authorities attempted to check this fraudulent importation of English goods, the Company was supported by the British government and the result was the "War of Jenkins' Ear" in 1739. The Company's privileges were not renewed when peace was reestablished, but British attempts to encroach on the Spanish possessions continued. The old buccaneer settlements in what is now British Honduras were gradually transformed into a colony; Habana was occupied, temporarily, during the Seven Years War; and the Floridas were ceded to Great Britain at the end of that war, though they were recovered by Spain after the American revolution.

The Spanish Bourbons showed less inclination than their predecessors to let matters go from bad to worse. In the two hitherto neglected regions of Central America and Venezuela they attempted to check smuggling by giving chartered companies a monopoly of trade. The Honduras Company, established in 1714, seems to have been fairly successful, and the Guipuzcoana Company, which was given special privileges in Venezuela in 1728, grew rich and powerful. Its oppressive conduct caused a revolt among the colonists in 1749, but its privileges were reinstated when order was restored and were not

abrogated until 1781. In the River Plate region the Crown endeavored, as we have seen, to put an end to Portuguese smuggling through Colonia do Sacramento, and everywhere it attempted to resist foreign intrusion in the American trade.

The Bourbon kings' most important commercial reforms were those which relaxed the restrictions on trade between the colonies and Spain. The fleet system, necessary as it had been in the days of the buccaneers, had clearly outlived its usefulness by the eighteenth century. After 1740, therefore, "register ships," sailing alone, were permitted to trade with all ports in America, though they must still enter and clear at Cadiz. The annual fleets were gradually discontinued, especially in the commerce with South America, and beginning in 1765, a series of measures did away, legally at least, with the Cadiz monopoly. First the West Indies, and then the South American colonies in 1778, and Mexico in 1789, were permitted to trade directly with other Spanish ports. Spain continued, however, to forbid commerce between her possessions and other countries, as did practically all colonial powers during the same period. Smuggling consequently continued, and the commercial ambitions of other nations, England, France and the United States, were to have an important influence on the course of events when the colonies began their war for independence.



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## *Chapter VI*

### COLONIAL BRAZIL

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#### THE FIRST SETTLEMENTS

Though it became evident soon after the treaty of Tordesillas that a large portion of South America lay on her side of the line of demarcation, Portugal for some thirty years made little attempt to occupy the territory thus accidentally obtained. Her scanty population and resources were hardly sufficient for the exploitation of the rich trading empire won by Vasco da Gama and his successors in the Orient, without undertaking to colonize a vast area where there were no civilized Indian communities and apparently no gold or silver. Private adventurers, however, often visited the coast to obtain brazil-wood, a dye-wood from which the whole region took its name, and by 1530 a number of Europeans of different nationalities were living among the Indians there. Some were shipwrecked or marooned sailors; others were convicts or daring adventurers who had been put ashore in the hope that those not eaten by the Indians would learn their languages and thus become useful as interpreters. There had been a small Portuguese agricultural settlement in Pernambuco as early as 1516, but this was destroyed by a French raid in 1530.

Most of the foreigners who frequented the coast were not Portuguese but shipmasters from Brittany and Normandy, half trader and half pirate, whose activities were the first phase of a long-continued and persistent effort to obtain possession of Brazil for France. It was their intrusions which finally compelled the government at Lisbon to send Martim Affonso de Souza to establish a permanent colony in the territory in 1530. Souza's original destination was the River Plate, which was thought or at least alleged to be east of the line of demarca-

tion, but bad weather turned his ships back and he finally landed near the site of modern Santos. There a Portuguese named João Ramalho, who had been shipwrecked on the coast twenty years earlier, helped him to found São Vicente, the first permanent European settlement in Brazil. Ramalho himself had been living at Piratininga in the nearby highlands, and another small group of colonists joined him there, forming a half-Portuguese, half-Indian community from which the great city of São Paulo later developed.

Meanwhile King João III had decided to attempt to colonize the entire Brazilian coast. Since the government itself could not finance such an undertaking, twelve great nobles were granted "captaincies," extending in most cases fifty leagues along the shore and indefinitely into the interior, to settle and exploit on their own account. These "donatories" were to be feudal lords, empowered to charter cities, to apportion land among the colonists, and to administer justice, though they might not inflict the death penalty on persons of gentle blood. Their privileges, both economic and political, were to be hereditary. For itself the Crown reserved little more than the right to receive the greater part of the customs duties, the royal fifth on minerals, and the tithes, leaving the proceeds of other taxes to the proprietor.

Only a few of the grantees had the enterprise or the resources needed for the establishment of successful colonies. Some of them did not seriously attempt to exercise their rights. Others tried but failed. Of the six settlements which endured, three, at Victoria, Porto Seguro, and Ilheos, barely managed to survive the internal dissensions and the constant Indian attacks of their early years. On the other hand, São Vicente, which was granted to Martim Affonso de Souza, gradually increased in population and wealth, and the near-by colony of Santo Amaro, founded by Martim Affonso's brother Pero Lopes, shared in its modest prosperity. A new settlement in Pernambuco was still more successful, chiefly because Duarte Coelho, the energetic and capable proprietor, himself assumed the direction of affairs instead of leaving them, as most of the other donatories did, in the hands of unscrupulous or incompetent agents. Within a few years the mills of this colony were furnishing an important part of the world's sugar supply, and Olinda, its capital, was the chief city in Brazil. A strong hand like Duarte Coelho's was needed in the new colonies. A large

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proportion of the first inhabitants were convicts, banished to America as a punishment, and the task of governing them would have been a difficult one even if the small and widely scattered Portuguese settlements had not constantly been exposed to hostile attacks.

The chief danger came from the Indians. The tribes of Brazil were far less civilized than those whom the Spaniards had encountered in Mexico and the Andean countries, though somewhat more advanced than those of the pampas. The coast and much of the interior was occupied by peoples of the Tupi stock, related to the Guaranís of Paraguay, living in small, semi-nomadic groups, and constantly at war with one another. Nearly all of them were cannibals. At first some of the tribes were glad to accept the help of the newcomers against their enemies, and in return to assist the colonists in establishing their homes and plantations; but the reckless cruelty of the colonists even toward those who were friendly, and their avidity in seeking Indian slaves, made it impossible for the great majority to be anything but hostile. Many of the native chiefs allied themselves with the French, who were still active along the coast and who were glad to furnish them with firearms to make the situation of the Portuguese settlements still more precarious.

It soon became evident that the system of captaincies was a failure. The scattered settlements, weakened by misgovernment and unable to combine their forces for mutual defense, faced destruction unless the Crown could come to their aid. In 1548, consequently, the King decided to appoint a governor general who would take over the political and military authority that the donatories had hitherto exercised. The man selected for this position was Thomé de Souza, an illegitimate scion of a noble family who had distinguished himself as a soldier and administrator in other Portuguese colonies. With him were sent 600 soldiers, 400 convicts, and a number of married couples, as well as a group of six Jesuits whose work was to have consequences of the utmost importance. The sparsely settled region of the Bay of Todos os Santos was purchased from the heirs of the original donatory as the site of a new capital, and the city of São Salvador, better known in English as Bahia, was founded there in 1549. Like Martim Affonso, the new governor general was greatly aided by a Portuguese who had already been living among the Indians for many years—the famous

Diogo Alvares, or Caramurú. Within a short time Bahia was a flourishing village of one hundred houses, surrounded by gardens and new sugar plantations. Meanwhile, Souza had sent representatives to establish his authority and to improve the administration of justice and the collection of the royal revenues in the other captaincies.

The Jesuits, under the leadership of Father Manoel da Nobrega, lost no time in starting their work both among the Portuguese and among the Indians. They were shocked by the low state of religion in the settlements. Many of the inhabitants were not only criminals but suspected heretics, for "New Christians"—Jews who had submitted to baptism in order to avoid a worse fate—had come to Brazil in large numbers to escape the persecution of the Inquisition. The clergy, few in number, were for the most part living in a way that reflected no credit on their calling. The Jesuits endeavored earnestly to improve matters, and on their recommendation a bishopric was created in Brazil in 1551. Nobrega and his followers also established several schools, not only for Portuguese children but for the increasingly numerous *mamelucos*, or persons of mixed blood. One of these institutions was founded on the plains near Piratininga by José de Anchieta, who was not yet twenty when he arrived in 1553 to begin the career which made him one of the most famous members of the order. This "College of São Paulo" soon became the center of a community which took the same name, for the settlers in the neighborhood were persuaded by the fathers to move from João Ramalho's original village to the lands around the new institution.

It was as missionaries that the Jesuits did their greatest work. Visiting the Indians of all the colonies along the coast, they learned their languages and gradually won their affection. The task of conversion grew easier as the savages began to realize that they could rely on their new friends to protect them against abuse by the other Portuguese. By a combination of persuasion and force many of them were gathered in villages where they were taught better methods of agriculture and otherwise encouraged to lead a more civilized life. The Jesuits' activities made it more difficult to obtain Indian slaves and consequently aroused much opposition among the Portuguese colonists, but they were effectively supported during these first years both by the Crown and by Thomé de Souza. Nobrega and Anchieta, in fact,

soon enjoyed an authority hardly inferior to that of the governor himself.

#### WARS WITH THE FRENCH AND THE INDIANS

Internal dissensions and attacks from without brought the colonies very near to destruction after Thomé de Souza was succeeded by Duarte da Costa in 1553. The new governor at once began to quarrel with the other authorities at Bahia and especially with the bishop, and when the latter sailed for Lisbon to defend himself at court he was shipwrecked and eaten by the Indians. This sacrilege, which horrified even the none too devout Brazilians, was followed by worse disasters. Encouraged by the spectacle of the settlers fighting among themselves, the natives revolted all along the coast. Even Pernambuco, which had a weaker government after Duarte Coelho's death in 1554, was seriously menaced. The Indian attacks were systematically fomented by French and other foreign interlopers, and while they were at their height it was learned that French enterprise had taken a still more dangerous form with the establishment of a strong colony in the hitherto unoccupied bay of Rio de Janeiro.

The leader of the French forces was Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon, a distinguished naval officer who had the support of the King of France and also of the powerful Admiral Coligny. The latter hoped that the settlement would serve as a refuge for Huguenots, many of whom had joined the expedition, but he lost interest when Villegagnon quarreled with his Protestant followers and sent home the two ministers whom Calvin himself had appointed to accompany the expedition. The colony nevertheless maintained itself for several years, cultivating friendly relations and trade with the near-by Indians. The Portuguese did little to interfere with it until 1560, when Mem de Sá, the third governor of Brazil, finally attacked it. Father Nobrega, who accompanied the expedition, raised a force of Indians friendly to the Portuguese, and the French were easily dislodged from the fort which they had built on an island at the mouth of the bay. Many of them were captured but others took refuge among their own native allies on the mainland.

Hostile Indians, meanwhile, continued their raids on the Portuguese

settlements all along the coast from Bahia to São Vicente. Communication between the colonies was seriously interrupted and many of the weaker settlements were all but destroyed. São Paulo was attacked by a great force, but was successfully defended by the converted Indians under the Jesuits' leadership. When the situation seemed desperate, Nobrega and Anchieta undertook to visit the principal hostile chiefs in an effort to make peace, and Anchieta remained for five months as a hostage among the natives, repeatedly facing what seemed almost certain death. The two Jesuits' heroism and persistence finally made possible a treaty which ended the immediate danger to the colonies, although it was later broken by some of the tribes who maintained their alliance with the French. The latter were finally driven out of the district around Rio de Janeiro, in 1567, a year after the governor's nephew, Eustacio de Sá, had founded there a city which was later to become the capital of Brazil.

Though both Indians and interlopers continued to cause trouble, the Brazilian settlements advanced rapidly during the latter part of the sixteenth century, and particularly under the able rule of Mem de Sá. In 1549, there had been only some 5,000 colonists, including both white immigrants and Negro slaves. A generation later there were perhaps eight or ten times that number. Bahia and Pernambuco were by far the most important of the captaincies, with many sugar plantations and a flourishing trade in cotton and brazil-wood. Their capitals were little more than villages but many of the planters who lived in them were quite wealthy. Elsewhere along the coast the Portuguese communities were less prosperous, and the life of many of the settlers was hardly less primitive than that of their Indian neighbors. The great majority, in fact, were living with Indian women, giving rise to a population of mixed blood to which a still stronger Negro strain was soon to be added.

#### INDIAN SLAVERY—THE PAULISTAS

During the first century of the colonies' existence it was the Indians who furnished the principal labor supply. Accustomed as they were to the profitable African slave trade, the Portuguese looked upon the natives simply as a part of the exploitable wealth of their new posses-



sions and showed little of the solicitude for their rights as human beings which always had some influence at least upon the policy of the Spanish Crown. Slave hunting was carried on with reckless cruelty even when it endangered the very existence of the new settlements. The first thought of the immigrant was to obtain possession of a few Indians to hunt and till the ground for him. The larger numbers of slaves needed for the sugar plantations had been procured in various ways. Many Indians were simply kidnapped, or induced to sell themselves or their children into servitude for a term of years, often probably without realizing what they were doing. Others were purchased from tribes which had captured them in war, or taken by the Portuguese themselves in suppressing "rebellions." In their endeavor to increase the supply of captives, the settlers often sought pretexts to attack the natives and systematically encouraged feuds between them. Constant fighting, combined with pestilences brought by the white men, rapidly destroyed the natives on the coast, and within a century after the Portuguese arrived it was necessary to go farther and farther into the interior to obtain slaves.

The Jesuits exerted all of their influence to put a stop to these abuses, and their efforts to obtain legislation for the protection of the natives led to a long and bitter conflict. Under pressure from both sides, the Crown followed a vacillating policy. It attempted to confine the taking of slaves to officially authorized wars, and to prevent frauds by requiring that all slaves be registered. The *rezgate*, or purchase of Indians from other Indians, was at one time forbidden but later permitted under restrictions. A law was even issued in 1609, while Portugal was subject to the King of Spain, declaring all Indian slaves free, but protests from the colonists caused this to be modified before any effort to enforce it was made. In northern Brazil, as we shall see, the Indian question gave much trouble during the second half of the seventeenth century. It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century, when the native population had been greatly reduced, that Indian slavery was legally prohibited.

The hardy, energetic inhabitants of São Paulo, themselves of mixed blood, were the chief purveyors of Indian laborers to the sugar plantations of the other settlements. Since the natives of the near-by plateau were mostly under the protection of the Jesuit missions, the Paulistas

began soon after 1600 to make raids farther into the interior to obtain slaves, at first for their own farms and later for sale elsewhere. Accompanied by their families and their domestic animals, their *bandeiras* or expeditions were often buried in the wilderness for years at a time, stopping now and then to sow a crop when their food supply ran low. On their return they brought back droves of Indians and distributed them among the sugar plantations along the coast. We saw in Chapter IV how they destroyed the Jesuit missions in Guayrá, and forced the fathers to abandon their villages and remove what was left of their flocks to southeastern Paraguay. In many other sections the native population was practically wiped out. The Jesuits asserted, probably with some exaggeration, that 300,000 natives were enslaved by the Paulistas between 1614 and 1639. On the other hand, the *bandeirantes* did their country a great service by exploring and occupying the interior of the continent. It was because of their enterprise that great areas which might otherwise have been claimed by Spain, lying west of the line of demarcation, are a part of Brazil today.

#### NEGRO SLAVERY

Indian labor was at best unsatisfactory, and as the settlements became wealthier the planters began to show a preference for Negroes as field hands and workers in the sugar mills. A Negro cost seventy-five dollars or more, whereas an Indian could be bought in some places for as little as five dollars, but the Africans were more tractable and less likely to run away, as well as far better able to endure regular sustained labor. Their importation was encouraged by the Portuguese government, which controlled the chief depots of the slave trade on the African coast. Some had been brought to Brazil even before 1530, but their number greatly increased during the second half of the sixteenth century, and they practically supplanted the Indians as a laboring class in the older settlements. Though the death-rate among new arrivals was exceedingly high, they were on the whole well treated compared with the Indians. As in Spain's colonies both the law and local custom encouraged emancipation so that a large free Negro population, as well as a large mulatto population, soon grew up.

As time went on many Negro slaves escaped into the wild country

back from the coast and established free communities, called *quilombos*, which occasionally gave the colonists some trouble. The most famous of these was one called Palmares in Alagoas, which was estimated to have twenty thousand inhabitants after the wars with the Dutch, and which was finally destroyed in 1697 after ten years of fighting.

#### BRAZIL UNDER SPAIN

The conquest of Portugal by Spain in 1580 had relatively little effect on the internal administration of Brazil because Philip II promised to govern the Portuguese colonies through Portuguese officials and under their own laws and neither he nor his successors attempted to introduce changes of far-reaching importance. The union did, however, expose the Brazilian settlements to new external dangers. Portugal, in her growing weakness, had endeavored to remain at peace by a policy of conciliation, often even paying compensation to interlopers whose ships had been seized by her forces in Brazil or making trade concessions to induce governments like the English and the French to restrain their subjects from buccaneering. Spain, on the other hand, was constantly at war. At the same time she was too weak on the sea, especially after the destruction of the "invincible armada," to protect her trans-Atlantic possessions. Brazil felt this weakness even more than Spain's own colonies, because Pernambuco and Bahia were more exposed to pirate attacks than the chief cities of Mexico and Peru. In the last decade of the sixteenth century, the Englishmen Cavendish and Lancaster sacked several of the settlements, while smugglers from several European nations intensified their activities along the coast north of Pernambuco and incited the Indians to renewed revolt.

The Brazilian authorities were thus compelled to take measures for the more effective occupation of these hitherto neglected northern territories. Settlements were established in Parahyba and Ceará, and in 1614 Jerônimo de Albuquerque was sent to dislodge a group of French colonists who had built a fort in what is now Maranhão. About the same time the captaincy of Pará was established at the mouth of the Amazon. The new settlements prospered, thanks to the

immigration of a large number of industrious families from the Azores, and in 1621, the State of Maranhão was created. This arrangement, which separated all of the northern provinces from the jurisdiction of the authorities at Bahia, was adopted because the trade winds and the equatorial current made it difficult for sailing vessels to weather Cape San Roque from the west.

#### THE DUTCH OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN BRAZIL, 1630-1654

Union with Spain involved Portugal and her possessions in the long drawn out war between the Spanish Crown and the Dutch. This was a serious matter, because the inhabitants of the low countries had hitherto played an important part in Brazil's commerce, and Flanders had been the chief distributing point for Brazilian sugar in Europe. The old relations were carried on surreptitiously for some years, but they were hampered by stricter laws after 1603, and Dutch ship owners began to turn from friendly trade to outright smuggling and piracy. In 1621 the Dutch West India Company was incorporated to attack the commercial monopoly of Spain and Portugal in America, and among the stockholders were a number of Portuguese Jews living in Holland, many of whom had business connections with the "new Christians" in Brazil.

The Company's first Brazilian venture was an expedition against Bahia in 1624. The city was easily taken, because the royal authorities had made no real provision for its defense, but it was recaptured by a Spanish fleet a year later. Other raids on Brazilian ports followed and in 1630, when the West India Company's treasury had been replenished by Piet Heyn's capture of the Plate Fleet from Mexico, a force of nearly eight thousand men, with supplies of all sorts for the establishment of a permanent colony, was sent against Pernambuco. Again the Portuguese were unprepared, and Olinda and Recife, the chief towns of the province, were occupied with little difficulty. In the country districts the inhabitants offered more resistance, and patriot forces operating from a hamlet called the Arraial do Bom Jesus carried on guerrilla warfare for two years, with little help from the peninsula or from the royal officials elsewhere in Brazil. Finally

one of their leaders, a halfbreed named Calabar, deserted to the enemy, and several Indian tribes which had hitherto resisted the invaders followed his example. After this the Dutch rapidly extended their control over an area that contained the majority of the population and the greater part of the wealth of Brazil, extending along the coast from the province of Maranhão in the north to the river São Francisco in the south.

In 1637, the West India Company sent Jan Mauritz, count of Nassau, to take over the government of the conquered territory. Nassau was not only a soldier but a statesman of vision and liberal ideas, with a keen interest in art and science. He completely reorganized the administration of the colony and encouraged trade by removing burdensome restrictions. His policy of religious toleration not only won the cooperation of many of the native inhabitants, who were further conciliated by being given a share in the government, but also attracted to Pernambuco large numbers of Portuguese Jews, whose wealth and business ability helped to make the district more prosperous than ever before. Many of these newcomers bought the confiscated plantations of Brazilians who refused to submit to Dutch rule. With the inflow of capital and with a greater freedom of trade sugar production greatly increased. The commerce in slaves, both Negro and Indian, also took on a new importance, especially after the West India Company occupied some of the principal Portuguese possessions on the coast of Africa. Nassau, nevertheless, met with much opposition from his own people, for the Calvinist ministers who came out with the invaders opposed his tolerant conduct and the directors of the West India Company were by no means convinced that his liberal policy was calculated to produce the largest dividends. He was consequently replaced by a far less capable board of three councillors in 1644.\*

Meanwhile, the Portuguese in Europe revolted against Spain and became allies of the Dutch. The government at Lisbon, however, was too weak and too much in need of Dutch help at home to resist when the States General continued to support the aggressions of the West India Company in Brazil, and it did not dare to aid the colonists openly when the Brazilians themselves resumed the war against the intruders after Nassau's removal. Nevertheless, the people of Maran-

hão were able to expel the Dutch from their province early in 1644. The next year saw the beginning of an insurrection in Pernambuco led by João Fernandes Vieira, a rich merchant who had fought against the Dutch until the fall of the Arraial do Bom Jesus, but had later become one of Nassau's chief advisers. The war dragged on with varying fortunes for eight years. Though the Dutch were too busy with enemies in Europe to send adequate forces across the Atlantic, the Brazilians, in spite of victories in the field, were unable to take the enemy stronghold at Recife. Gradually the Portuguese authorities, who had secretly encouraged the revolt, became somewhat bolder and, in 1649, the *Companhia Geral do Comercio do Brasil* was established by the Crown for the dual purpose of establishing a convoy system to protect Brazilian trade and assisting in the recovery of the invaded provinces. In 1654 the Company's fleet supported the colonists in a successful attack on Recife and the war was brought to an end. It was not until 1661, however, that the Dutch formally abandoned their claim to Brazil in return for money indemnities and trade privileges.

#### PROGRESS AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION —

1654-1700

The protracted struggle against the Dutch had caused much destruction of life and property in northern Brazil, but it had hardly affected the provinces that remained under Portuguese control. After the war there was a period of rapid development, and so many immigrants came from Portugal that the home government was concerned lest its European territory be depopulated. The growing importance of the settlements was recognized by the establishment of bishoprics at Maranhão, Rio de Janeiro, and Pernambuco, while the See of Bahia became an archbishopric. The rapid increase in wealth and perhaps also the stimulating effect of contact with the Dutch were also bringing about a change in the intellectual and social life of the colonies. Education had hitherto been neglected, except for the primary schools under the Jesuits and the courses given rather irregularly for the training of priests, but in the latter part of the seventeenth

century a number of young Brazilians went to Portugal to study at the University of Coimbra.

On the plateau of São Paulo, where sugar cane did not flourish as it did on the coast, the inhabitants continued to lead their rude, wild life. *Bandeiras* were still exploring the far interior and during the period of the Dutch war the Paulistas began the conquest and settlement of the provinces southward along the coast, adding to Brazilian territory a fertile area with a temperate climate which is one of the most important portions of the country today. After they had penetrated into Rio Grande do Sul, with its wealth of wild cattle, Portugal attempted to assure her possession of the entire region as far as the River Plate by establishing a military post at Colonia do Sacramento in 1680. The garrison was at once attacked and expelled by forces from Buenos Aires, just across the river, but Portugal protested to Spain and an agreement was reached through the mediation of England, France, and the Pope by which the place was returned to Portugal pending an investigation to determine the exact location of the boundary fixed by the treaty of Tordesillas. The line in reality passed far to the east of the River Plate, but though Colonia was repeatedly captured by the Spanish in time of war, it was as often returned when peace was made and remained in Portuguese hands for nearly a century. The post did not give Portugal the hoped-for control of the rich country west of the River Plate estuary, which was gradually occupied during the eighteenth century by Spanish settlements, but it was important as a base for the smuggling trade with Peru.

The northern provinces still formed the separate state of Maranhão, with their own government and their own laws. There too the population grew rapidly, though the tranquillity of the settlements was frequently disturbed by trouble with hostile Indians, and still more by bitter strife between the settlers and the Jesuits over the question of native labor. In the north, villages of peaceful Indians were frequently granted to individual colonists as "administrators," an arrangement much like the *encomienda* in the Spanish colonies, and war captives were reduced to outright slavery. The Jesuits, as in other parts of Brazil, persistently attempted to bring all of the Indians under their own tutelage and protection, but the royal orders which

they procured for this purpose had frequently to be revoked when the colonists protested or forcibly resisted their execution.

The most determined defender of the Indians was Father Antonio Vieira, one of the most distinguished Portuguese writers and statesmen of the time, who had earlier played a leading part in the war against the Dutch in Pernambuco. Appointed Superior of the Jesuit order in Brazil, Vieira obtained authority from the Crown in 1655 to deal with the whole problem of Indian relations there. He at once assumed command of military operations against some of the hostile tribes in the north and took many captives. A few of these were assigned to the soldiers in payment for their services, but the great majority were placed in the Jesuit missions. This and other indications of a disposition to interfere in their exploitation of the Indians infuriated the settlers at Maranhão and a revolt ensued during which Vieira was seized and sent to Lisbon, while the Jesuits who remained in the province were compelled to renounce all temporal control over the Indians. When order was restored, the authorities apparently made little effort to punish the rebels, and the laws which Vieira had sought to enforce fell into disuse.

Vieira himself lost favor at court, and at one time was even persecuted by the Inquisition. Later, however, he regained some of his former influence and in 1680 he persuaded the King to enact a law completely forbidding the enslavement of Indians in Maranhão. Two years later, in order to encourage the importation of Negroes, a chartered company was granted a monopoly of the chief branches of trade in the northern provinces. These measures brought on another revolt, under the leadership of one Manoel Beckman, who seized control of the district around São Luiz and expelled both the Jesuits and the representatives of the Maranhão Company. The movement soon collapsed, as such movements usually did in colonial Brazil, because many of the participants lost interest after the first outburst of indignation. Beckman was executed, and the Jesuits were reinstated. On the other hand, the privileges of the commercial company were restricted, and the laws for the protection of the Indians were not enforced.



DISCOVERY OF GOLD AND DIAMONDS,  
1694-1729

By the end of the seventeenth century the sugar industry, which had been the great source of Brazil's wealth, showed signs of declining. Competition from the newer British, French, and Dutch plantations in the West Indies had forced prices down at a time when increasingly rigid and often ill-considered commercial legislation was making the marketing of the Brazilian product more difficult. There was thus all the more excitement when rich gold deposits were discovered in 1698-99 by two Paulista explorers in what is now the state of Minas Geraes. Many thousands of persons abandoned the older settlements, taking their slaves with them, and other thousands came from Portugal. These immigrants from Europe—the *Emboabas*, as the Brazilians called them—were soon engaged in a bloody contest with the Paulistas who considered the mines theirs by right of discovery. The newcomers were better led and better organized, and their chief, Nunes Viana, was for a time virtually the ruler of the mining district. Even the governor was at first refused permission to enter the district, and it was some time before the royal officials were able to assert their authority and to restore a semblance of order.

The Paulistas were somewhat consoled for their defeat in Minas Geraes when they discovered other rich gold mines in Matto Grosso in 1719 and in Goyaz in 1725. Still more important was the finding of diamonds in 1729 in the gold washings along some of the tributaries of the São Francisco River. The influx of population into the mining regions continued on a scale that seemed to threaten the depopulation of the agricultural districts of the coast, and great cities arose where there had been no inhabitants a few short years before.

As in the Spanish colonies, the law required that one-fifth of all gold and silver extracted be paid to the king, but it was so difficult to collect these royalties in the early days of the gold rush that the Crown agreed to accept a relatively small lump-sum payment from the miners' organization in its place. Later, the regular tax on gold was imposed for a time, but in 1735 it was replaced by a less easily evaded head tax on slaves employed in the mines. This measure, by encouraging wasteful methods of exploitation, helped to bring about

the exhaustion of the richer placer deposits during the latter part of the eighteenth century. The collection of the royalty on diamonds was still more difficult because the precious stones were so easily concealed. A head tax on slaves was therefore imposed in the diamond washings also, and this was gradually increased to an exorbitant amount in an effort to check the sharp drop in prices that had occurred when Brazilian stones began to flood the world's markets. In 1771 the government itself took over the control of production and excluded from the diamond district practically every one but its own officials and workmen.

#### THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL, 1649-1750

As compared with the elaborate if not always efficient political machinery of the Spanish colonies, the government of colonial Brazil was a haphazard affair. In Portugal, the king was an absolute monarch. He was assisted by various boards such as the Privy Council, the Inspectors of Finance, and the *Mesa da Consciencia e Ordens*, in charge of ecclesiastical matters, but there was little plan or coordination in the governmental structure. Confusion inevitably resulted when the authority of each board in its own sphere was simply extended to colonial matters. There was never any central organization with full responsibility for the Brazilian administration. A Council of India existed for a brief period after 1604, while Portugal was under the rule of the Spanish kings, and was reestablished as the Council of Ultramar in 1642, but its authority, especially in financial matters, was always limited and it never attained the prestige and importance of its great Spanish counterpart. The general direction of colonial affairs devolved on the king himself, or on individuals like his secretary or his chancellor whom he might happen to entrust temporarily with this responsibility.

There was also little effective centralization of authority in Brazil itself. The Crown's representative at Bahia, whose title varied from time to time but who was usually a governor general after 1601 and a viceroy after 1714, was nominally the head of the colonial administration, but inadequate means of communication made it extremely difficult for him to exercise real authority in the other captaincies.

This was especially true after the conquest of the northern provinces, and these, as we have seen, were made a separate "state" after 1621. Even in places like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro the local governors in practice usually received their orders directly from Lisbon and dealt with their own problems with little reference to their nominal superior at Bahia. In the absence of any effective control from outside, they tended to be corrupt and oppressive, not only directing the civil administration and exercising much judicial authority, but even monopolizing for their personal benefit the most lucrative branches of commerce. Often, however, their authority was defied by the lawless and turbulent colonists or by the local clergy, with whom they had many bitter disputes. The Crown never supported its representatives in Brazil with any adequate force of regular troops, and the undisciplined local militia might take either side when dissensions arose. Many instances have already been noted where efforts to enforce unpopular measures, like the laws for the protection of the Indians, had to be abandoned because of local resistance.

Governor Thomé de Souza, when he went to Brazil in 1549, was accompanied by a *provedor mór*, or superintendent of finances, and an *ouvidor geral*, or chief judge. The departments headed by these two officers continued to be the most important branches of the colonial administration, with the exception perhaps of the military establishment. The principal revenues of the Crown were the customs duties, the product of certain royal monopolies such as the trade in brazil-wood, the royal fifth on metals and precious stones, and the tithes, which were paid to the civil authorities as they were in the Spanish colonies, although the proceeds were supposedly destined for the support of the Church. Though the actual collection of the taxes was usually farmed out to contractors, leading to many abuses, the burden of taxation seems never to have been intolerable. The heirs of the original donatories were entitled to receive certain dues from the colonists, even after they had been deprived of all political authority, but these privileges were gradually extinguished by purchase or confiscation in the eighteenth century.

The administration of justice was one of the weakest points of the colonial administration. Only minor offenses and disputes were tried by municipal judges named by the local authorities or by *ouvidores*,

sent out from Lisbon. Even the *ouvidor geral*, for a long time the highest judicial authority in the colony, did not have final jurisdiction in civil suits when the amount involved exceeded about \$300, and he could not inflict the death penalty or other severe punishment except on persons of the lowest rank. All important cases must therefore go to Lisbon for trial, an arrangement which involved intolerable inconvenience and caused many crimes to go unpunished. An effort to remedy this situation was made in 1588, when a newly appointed governor embarked for Brazil with several judges who were to establish a court of more ample jurisdiction, but their galleon failed to reach Bahia, apparently simply because of poor seamanship, and returned to Lisbon more than a year later. A *Relação*, or high court of justice, was finally set up in Bahia in 1609, but it was abolished in 1626 to save money for the war against the Dutch and was not reestablished until 1652. It seems to have been a doubtful blessing even to the people of Bahia, for many lawyers came to Brazil with it and litigation greatly increased. The inhabitants of some of the other captaincies found it less convenient to have important cases tried in Bahia than in Portugal, where many of the richer colonists had agents and business connections.

Official corruption and inefficiency were at least as prevalent in colonial Brazil as in the Spanish possessions. The governors and other officials were in fact apparently permitted to augment their salary by private business ventures until 1673, when a royal order forbade them to engage in trade, to establish monopolies for their own profit, or to bid for tax collection contracts. There were many frauds in connection with the royal revenue and the judges were notoriously venal. Many officials were also ignorant and incompetent, for the general level of education among the upper classes and the standards in the public service in Portugal were far inferior to those in Spain. The very weakness of the governmental organization, however, was perhaps a benefit, for local initiative was given freer play than in most of the Spanish colonies.

Theoretically natives of the colony were eligible to any office, and a royal order issued late in the seventeenth century, which was perhaps not much observed in practice, provided that they be given preference in making appointments to positions in Brazil. The more

lucrative and important posts, however, usually went to Portuguese who had influence at court, and others, especially in the courts of justice, required a training at the University of Coimbra, which few Brazilians could obtain. Offices were filled by royal appointment rather than by sale, and it was sometimes difficult, at least during the first century of the colonial period, to persuade or compel Portuguese officials to accept posts in Brazil.

Each city with its surrounding territory had its own *Senado da Camara*, or municipal council. In most cases *vereadores*, or aldermen, were chosen theoretically either by the principal inhabitants or by their own predecessors. In practice the elections were frequently controlled by the governors, and after 1696 the members of the council were simply appointed in some of the most important cities. Nevertheless, the *Senado da Camara*, usually composed of influential native landowners, was a very important branch of the government, especially during the first two centuries of the colonial period. From motives of economy, the Crown entrusted to these bodies many functions which might more appropriately have been performed by royal officials, and in the absence of any institution like the *audiencia* of the Spanish colonies they alone provided any stability or continuity of policy in the administrative organization. Their influence was increased by the fact that the governors and other representatives of the Crown usually served only for three years and were consequently dependent upon the councilors for advice and information. When there was a vacancy in the governor's office, the *Senado da Camara* often chose a temporary incumbent or itself assumed control. In many cases it disputed or defied the governor's authority even to the point of open rebellion, and *procuradores*, or representatives of the towns, were frequently sent to Lisbon to petition the king for legislation desired by the colonists or to complain of the conduct of obnoxious officials.

#### THE CHURCH

The Church was less influential than in Spanish America. It was equally subject to the royal authority, for the king, in his capacity of Grand Master of the Order of Christ, had full control of the pa-

tronage, but the Portuguese monarchs from the beginning showed less concern for the spiritual welfare of their colonies. Many suspected heretics were sent to Brazil as settlers, and little serious effort was made to exclude even non-Catholic foreigners from residence and trade until the Dutch wars aroused a somewhat more intolerant spirit. Backsliding "new Christians" were occasionally sent to Portugal for trial, but no council of the Inquisition was established in Brazil. Perhaps because the wars against the Moors ended earlier in Portugal than in Castile, neither officials nor colonists had the fierce crusading spirit which animated the Spanish conquistadores, and the great majority regarded the Indian as a potential slave rather than as a soul to be rescued.

The Jesuits, as we have seen, had a different attitude. They were ardent missionaries and they frequently had the support of the Crown if not of the local officials in their attempt to protect the natives. There were thousands of these in the mission villages, where they were little more than kindly treated slaves, and the fathers frequently took the lead in making war on heathen tribes to increase the number of their neophytes. The order became the richest and most powerful branch of the Church, but its conflicts with the settlers over the Indian question diminished its spiritual influence and caused several popular outbreaks like those in Maranhão which have already been described.

Some of the other religious orders also had large plantations and other property, but the Church as a whole was poor. Even the principal bishops had revenues that seem insignificant compared with those of prelates in the Spanish colonies, and the salaries paid by the government to the parish priests were too small to be attractive to men of ability or high social position. Nevertheless, religious observances and the celebration of church festivals occupied much of the colonists' time, and such education as their children received was obtained from the Jesuits or other members of the clergy. There were already sixty-two churches and three monasteries in the Bahia district in 1581.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Southey, *History of Brazil*, Vol. I, p. 318.

## COMMERCIAL POLICY

Portugal's commercial policy, like that of other colonial powers in the same period, was directed chiefly toward increasing the government's revenues and obtaining benefits for privileged interests in the mother country. Royal monopolies controlled the trade in brazilwood and to a less extent the trade in tobacco. The cultivation of grapes, olives, and mulberries, which might have competed with industries in the mother country, was forbidden, and all sugar must be sent to Portugal to be refined. The making of salt, which could easily be obtained by evaporating sea water, was prohibited in 1690 for the benefit of a contractor who was given the exclusive privilege of exporting that commodity from Portugal to Brazil. There were many other vexatious regulations and restrictions of similar character, and even those adopted for the purpose of stimulating production in the colony were too often harmful rather than helpful. Fortunately for the Brazilians such legislation was frequently not enforced.

In some respects, however, Portuguese policy was at first comparatively liberal. Before 1649, any Portuguese ship was free to go to Brazilian ports, and even foreigners were permitted to engage in commerce and agriculture until after the union with Spain in 1580, though they were subject to taxes and restrictions from which the Portuguese traders were exempt. Dutch firms carried on much trade with Pernambuco and had factories and plantations in São Vicente and São Paulo. These connections were broken off when the Spanish kings enforced a more exclusive system, and the result was an increase of smuggling and piracy which finally made it necessary for the Portuguese government, like the Spanish, to adopt a convoy system.

We have already seen how the *Companhia Geral do Commercio do Brasil* was established in 1649 for the double purpose of protecting trade and aiding in the expulsion of the Dutch. The Company's capital was secured partly by promising that the goods of "new Christians" who subscribed to its stock would thereafter be exempt from seizure by the Portuguese Inquisition. It undertook to send two fleets to America yearly, each of not less than eighteen well-armed ships, and these were to have a monopoly of the transportation of goods between Portugal and Brazil. It also enjoyed at the beginning a monop-

oly for the sale in the colony of the most important staple imports—codfish, wheat flour, oil, and wine—but this was discontinued a few years later in response to loud complaints from the colonists. The Company rendered a useful service in its first years, but its privileges soon made it unpopular. It came more and more under the control of the royal government, and was dissolved in 1720. The fleet system, however, was continued. The Maranhão Company, also mentioned previously, was no more successful. It was badly managed and continued to be extremely unpopular after the suppression of Beckman's revolt.

The effort to exclude other powers from Brazilian trade broke down after the separation from Spain, because Portugal's weakness enabled the Dutch and the English governments to compel her to grant their subjects important commercial privileges. These concessions, however, were gradually made worthless by a systematic discrimination against foreign traders, and in the early part of the eighteenth century Brazil was as effectively closed to non-Portuguese commerce as were the Spanish possessions. The Dutch were no longer strong enough to exact special treatment, and England, which had by this time become Portugal's ally and protector, had less need to trade directly with Brazil because the Methuen Treaty of 1703 gave her virtual control of the commerce of the mother country itself. Goods and even ships that came to Brazil were made in England and sent out for the account of English merchants, and a large part of the colony's exports went to pay for them.

#### FOREIGN AGGRESSION AND INTERNAL DISORDER, 1700-1750

It was only the protection afforded by the British alliance which enabled Portugal to hold what was left of her once great colonial empire. She was by this time one of the weakest of the European kingdoms. The revenues that she received from Brazil were far less than they might have been if the newly discovered mines had been more efficiently administered, and little or none of this income was spent to promote the welfare of Brazil or even to defend the colony against foreign enemies. The result of this neglect was evident during the



War of the Spanish Succession, when French expeditions twice attacked Rio de Janeiro. The first one, in 1710, was driven off by the inhabitants after several public buildings had been burned, but the second a year later took and sacked the town.

The colonial government's incompetence was also manifested by events that occurred at about the same time in Pernambuco. Olinda, the capital of this province and the home of the more important native families, had been built by Duarte Coelho on high ground at some distance from the place where ships customarily anchored, and many merchants had therefore established themselves at Recife, the "reef," which was more convenient to the port. Though this settlement had grown rapidly during and after the Dutch wars, it remained a part of the municipality of Olinda and its inhabitants, most of them Portuguese immigrants, were excluded from any share in the local government. The *Mascates*, or peddlers, as the Brazilians derisively called these newcomers, had therefore persuaded the Crown in 1710 to make Recife a separate city. This led to violent quarrels. When the governor attempted to arrest some of the more obstreperous native leaders, the people of Olinda expelled him from the province, and both sides took up arms. There was a year of savage fighting before a new governor restored order by promising amnesty to both parties. Recife, generally called Pernambuco by English-speaking people, continued to grow in importance, and has now far out-stripped its one-time rival.

#### THE REFORMS OF THE MARQUIS OF POMBAL

Between 1750 and 1777, the decline of Portugal was temporarily arrested under the vigorous administration of the Marquis of Pombal, the great minister of King José I. In the colonial sphere the most important change was the unification of Brazil, including Maranhão, under a viceroy who had real authority over the provincial governors. If this measure had not been adopted, there might well be several nations of Portuguese origin in America today instead of one. The capital of the colony was moved in 1763 to Rio de Janeiro which was by that time the chief city and the port through which the product of the gold and diamond mines reached the outside world. The adminis-

tration of the finances and of justice were improved, and official corruption was to some extent reduced. Pombal also promoted efficiency by ending the practice of appointing governors and other officials for terms of only three years, a limitation that had often deprived the Crown of the services of competent men just when they were becoming most useful.

The Marquis was less successful in his commercial policy. In an effort to retain for Portugal part of the profits that British merchants were making from the colonial trade, he created two privileged companies, one in Pará and Maranhão and the other in Pernambuco and Parahyba. The former seems to have encouraged the economic development of the northern provinces, but the Pernambuco Company was oppressive and unpopular, and both were promptly dissolved when Pombal fell from power in 1777. On the other hand, the abolition of the fleet system in 1765 was a long step toward a greater freedom of trade. Another step that benefited the colonies was the final extinction, by purchase or confiscation, of the proprietary rights of the sixteenth-century donatories.

The Indians were legally freed from all forms of tutelage in Maranhão in 1755 and in the rest of Brazil in 1758. This reform was directed especially against the Jesuits, who had incurred Pombal's enmity when their converts in Paraguay had forcibly resisted the execution of the treaty concluded in 1750 by which Portugal was to have received the mission territory east of the Uruguay River. The dissolution of the Brazilian missions made the feud still more bitter, and in 1759 Pombal persuaded the King to banish the Jesuits altogether, both from Portugal and from her colonies. This action was followed by similar measures against the Jesuits in Spain and other European countries. The Indians from this time on theoretically enjoyed the same rights as the Crown's other subjects, but the change in their legal status by no means ended their exploitation at the hands of the creoles. Early in the nineteenth century, in fact, after the royal family had come to Brazil, a decree was issued permitting the practical enslavement for a term of years of Indians who revolted against the Portuguese authorities. This opened the door for widespread abuses, especially as many of the Indians hitherto leading a peaceful life in the

Jesuit missions had reverted to savagery and had occasionally committed depredations against the Portuguese settlements. The number of Indians in Brazil, however, was by this time insignificant as compared with the other elements in the population, and during the nineteenth century the aboriginal stock almost disappeared in the more settled parts of the country.

#### AT THE END OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD

As the end of the colonial period approached, Brazil was one of the most valuable of the European colonial possessions. The gold mines had lost much of their importance, but sugar was again a profitable crop, especially after a slave revolt destroyed the rich plantations of French Saint Domingue. There were probably between three and three and a half million inhabitants, of whom two-fifths were Negro slaves. Rio de Janeiro, with considerably over one hundred thousand people, was second only to Mexico City among the cities of the western hemisphere. Intellectually, however, Brazil was still more backward than the Spanish American possessions, for there was not a single printing press in the country and the narrow and bigoted policy of the home government made the importation of any but religious books almost impossible. For nearly a century, since a policy of rigid exclusion had succeeded to the comparative liberality of earlier times, the colonists had had little contact with foreigners. In the mines and on the sugar plantations the most primitive methods and techniques were still practised, and there were few of the inhabitants who had any conception of the material advances that had been made during the past century in other parts of the world.

An increasing number of the richer Brazilians, however, were going abroad to study at Coimbra and other European centers of learning, and some of them came home with new ideas and points of view. There were signs of an intellectual awakening like that which was taking place at Mexico City and Bogotá, and several Brazilians achieved distinction as writers or scientists during the latter part of the eighteenth century. Especially notable was the appearance at Ouro Preto, the capital of the mining district, of a group of young poets,

some of whom, like Claudio Manoel da Costa, Gonzaga, and Alvarenga Peixoto, were "counted among the most illustrious of the Portuguese tongue."<sup>1</sup>

Several of the Minas poets were involved in the famous conspiracy of 1789. This was a definite movement for independence, inspired partly by French revolutionary ideas and the example of the British North American colonies, and partly by an attempt to collect a large amount of back royalties at a time when the mining community was suffering severely from the decreased productiveness of their properties. The little group of theorists who headed the movement were able to obtain some support in Ouro Preto, but their plans were betrayed to the authorities before they were ready for action and the whole movement came to nothing. The principal leader, a young army officer best known by his nickname of Tiradentes, was executed and several of the other participants were exiled to Africa.

The Minas conspiracy, unimportant in itself, was new evidence of the same spirit which had earlier found expression in Beckman's revolt and the war against the *Mascates* in Pernambuco. The Brazilians, with their long tradition of resistance to despotic authority and with the spirit of self-confidence which they had never lost since the time when they expelled the Dutch from their territory, had much the same dislike of officials and immigrants from the mother country as the Spanish colonists. The course of events in the first years of the nineteenth century might well have been similar to that at Buenos Aires or Caracas had it not been for the flight of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil in 1807-8.

#### THE PORTUGUESE COURT AT RIO DE JANEIRO

The royal family, with many of the nobility of the court, escaped from Lisbon when Napoleon's troops overran Portugal in 1807, and set sail for Brazil under convoy of British warships. They landed at Bahia in January, 1808, and at Rio de Janeiro a few weeks later. Their arrival made the former colony the center of the Portuguese empire, and the Brazilians soon began to enjoy the advantages of their new

<sup>1</sup> M. Oliveira Lima, *Formation Historique de la Nationalité Brésilienne*, p. 123.

position. The ports were opened to the trade of all friendly nations; military and medical schools and a national bank were established at Rio de Janeiro, a newspaper was published, and the royal library of 60,000 volumes was thrown open to the public. Many foreigners began to visit the country, especially when several French artists and scientists were invited by the Prince Regent to make their home there after the fall of Napoleon. As commerce increased, goods of foreign manufacture replaced the home-made articles which even the wealthier inhabitants had hitherto been compelled to use. The lion's share of the new trade went to British merchants, who were granted tariff preferences in a treaty signed in 1810.

The Prince Regent, who became King João VI on the death of his insane mother in 1816, remained in Brazil with his court until 1821. While he was present there could be little question of a movement for independence. The movement came when he returned to Portugal, but it was led by his son and resulted in the establishment not of a republic but of an empire.

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## Chapter VII

### THE INDEPENDENCE OF SPANISH AMERICA

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#### CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION

At the end of the eighteenth century it was evident to thoughtful observers that Spain would find it difficult as time went on to maintain her hold on the American colonies. She had held them thus far not so much by her own strength as by their traditional loyalty—a loyalty fostered by the isolation imposed by geographical and legal barriers to communication with the outside world, by the vast authority of the Church, and by the influence of the great merchants and landowners whose privileges depended upon the maintenance of the existing regime. These conservative forces were still powerful, but the changes that had occurred under the Bourbon kings had caused them to lose some of their importance.

For one thing, the colonists had more contact with the outside world after the abolition of the fleet system and the relaxation of restrictions on trade between the colonies and Spain. As travel became less difficult and less costly, some of the wealthier creoles were able to go abroad, and a few foreigners, including a small number of scientists and men of letters, began to come to America. There soon ensued a notable intellectual movement, confined, however, to a relatively few centers. In the universities, the study of the modern philosophers took the place of the old dogmatic system based on Aristotle, and the students were encouraged to think for themselves as they would not hitherto have dreamed of doing.<sup>1</sup> There was a new and lively interest in the natural sciences and other subjects hitherto excluded from the

<sup>1</sup> For the best account of conditions in the universities see Lanning, *Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies*.

curricula of the educational institutions, and a new enthusiasm for literary pursuits which found expression in the publication of newspapers like the *Mercurio Peruano* of Lima and the *Papel Periódico* of Bogotá.

However zealously the authorities and the Inquisition might endeavor to restrict this activity to scientific and literary channels, it was impossible to prevent people from thinking about political questions also. The creoles who travelled abroad came into contact with the revolutionary ideas prevalent in the outside world, and some of them brought back books such as the works of Rousseau and the French encyclopedists which they circulated secretly among their friends. Among those most active in spreading radical propaganda in this way were José Antonio Rojas, a member of a wealthy Chilean family, and Antonio Nariño of Bogotá, who suffered a long imprisonment for printing and circulating a few copies of a translation of *The Rights of Man*. Forbidden books stimulated the imagination all the more because those found in possession of them were severely punished.

Foreign revolutionary philosophies were embraced by only a small minority within the upper class, but there was much discontent among all sections of the population. Each class had its own grievances. The Indians were still poverty stricken and exploited, despite the abolition of the *encomienda* and the *mita* at the end of the eighteenth century. The *mestizos* and mulattoes were subject to legal discriminations which were humiliating, if not very oppressive in practice. Even the creole aristocracy, with its wealth and privileges, was becoming dissatisfied as increased knowledge of other countries made the colonists more aware of the short-comings of the Spanish regime. So long as trade was restricted to the ports of the mother country they still had no adequate markets for their products. The reforms in the political administration had not eliminated misgovernment and corruption, and taxation was if anything more burdensome than before because the establishment of a more effective governmental organization had been followed by efforts to obtain greater revenues for the royal treasury.

The chief cause of discontent was the hatred of the creoles for the peninsular Spaniards. As we saw in Chapter IV, the *peninsulares* held

practically all official positions except in the municipal governments, and often played a prominent part even in these. They monopolized the more lucrative positions in the Church, while the poorly paid parish priests were generally creoles. Even in commerce they had a distinct advantage over the less energetic and less thrifty natives. Alexander von Humboldt, the most distinguished foreigner who studied conditions in the colonies, wrote at the beginning of the nineteenth century: <sup>1</sup>

The most wretched European, without breeding and without intellectual culture, thinks himself superior to the whites born in the new continent; he knows that, with the aid of his compatriots and favored by the luck quite common in countries where fortunes are made as rapidly as they are lost, he can one day reach positions to which access is almost forbidden to the natives, even those distinguished by their talents, their learning, and their moral qualities.

Little wonder that the creoles felt they were being exploited by an alien ruling class, and that even those who were sentimentally loyal to the King of Spain were eager to oust the King's local representatives and replace them by natives when the opportunity offered.

#### REVOLTS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Small uprisings and disturbances occurred in various parts of the colonies from time to time throughout the colonial period. Most of them had a purely local significance, but in the latter part of the eighteenth century there was a series of revolts and conspiracies which showed the existence of widespread discontent. In 1765, for example, the populace of Quito, angered by the establishment of a liquor monopoly, drove all *peninsulares* from the city and order was restored only by concessions to the insurgents and by the arrival of a strong Spanish garrison. In 1776-77 the imposition of new taxes in New Granada, Peru, and Chile caused riots in several places and gave rise to a rebellious spirit which soon found a more dangerous expression in Peru and New Granada.

In Peru the spectacle of disorders among the upper class was one of the causes of the great Indian uprising that began in 1780. Its leader was José Gabriel Condorcanqui, the hereditary chief of a village near

<sup>1</sup> *Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la Nouvelle-Espagne*, Vol. II, pp. 2-3.





Cuzco, who had been officially recognized as the heir of the Inca royal family and who, unlike many *caciques*, had for years endeavored to obtain fairer treatment for his people. The *mita* and the forced sales of goods by the *corregidores* still caused much hardship to the Indians, and it was against these that the revolt was specifically directed. Assuming the name Tupac Amaru, Condorcanqui raised a large army which killed creole landowners and destroyed property in much of Upper Peru. He himself was captured and executed in 1781, but his followers continued the struggle for two years more and there was a frightful loss of life on both sides before the movement was suppressed. It was not entirely fruitless, for some of the worst abuses against the Indians, including the *mita*, were done away with after peace was restored.

Of quite a different type was the revolt of the *Comuneros* in New Granada in 1781. In several towns of that province the creoles expressed their resentment against the new taxes by seizing control and organizing local governments which they called *comunidades*. After some initial successes against the viceroy's troops, the insurgents proclaimed the independence of the colony and took steps to organize a republic. A number of Indians under the leadership of a descendent of one of the Chibcha royal houses joined the movement, while another group, in the province of Pamplona, announced their allegiance to Tupac Amaru. Peace was restored after a few months through the mediation of the clergy, but not until after the *audiencia* had agreed to abolish the fiscal monopolies and to reduce or discontinue certain taxes. This agreement was repudiated after the rebels had disbanded and the royal officials had received reinforcements.

These revolts and others of less importance showed the creoles their own strength and made evident the government's weakness and inefficiency. Furthermore, the bad faith and cruelty with which the rebels were often treated after they had been persuaded to lay down their arms left more bitter feeling among those already dissatisfied. The Spanish officials became more and more alarmed by seditious agitation and by the spread of revolutionary ideas. The great majority of the people in the colonies were still loyal to the King, but in many places small groups began to dream of independence or actually to conspire for the overthrow of the Spanish regime. Their enthusiasm increased

after the successful revolt in British North America and still more after the French Revolution, for both of these events touched the imagination of thinking people throughout Spanish America. "Since the Peace of Versailles," wrote von Humboldt, "and especially since the year 1789, one often hears a person say proudly 'I am not a Spaniard at all, I am an American,' words which conceal a longstanding resentment."<sup>1</sup>

## MIRANDA

Of all the "precursors" of Spanish American independence, Francisco de Miranda is the most famous. Born at Caracas in 1756, Miranda had entered the Spanish military service as a captain at the age of sixteen, and took part in operations against England in Florida and the Bahamas during the American revolution. In 1782 he was accused of smuggling and other offenses while acting as aide to the Governor of Cuba, and fled from the island when a military court was about to render a verdict against him. Thereafter he travelled in the United States, where he met Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox, and in many parts of Europe. From 1790 on he devoted himself to an effort to bring about the independence of Spanish America through the intervention of one or more foreign powers. He could not obtain support for his project either in the United States or in France, though it seemed to receive favorable consideration for a time from the revolutionary government at Paris. After serving with some distinction as a brigadier general in the French army but later, though for no fault of his own, falling under suspicion and suffering imprisonment, he went to England in 1798.

The British government apparently gave him a small pension, but it was not ready openly to support his plans in America. It perhaps aided him secretly in organizing the expedition of 200 men with which he sailed from New York in February, 1806, and Admiral Cochrane, a British officer who was later to become a prominent figure in the war for independence, helped him when he reached the West Indies. Miranda occupied the town of Coro in Venezuela but he was soon forced to withdraw for lack of local support. There was much discontent in the colony, where ninety persons had been punished by

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 3.

death or imprisonment or exile after the discovery of a conspiracy headed by Manuel Gual and José María España in 1797, but the mass of the people were not ready to revolt and were still less willing to accept British in place of Spanish domination.

Miranda returned to London, where he met with another terrific disappointment. In 1808, after Napoleon had apparently conquered Spain, the British government decided to send an expedition to prevent the French from obtaining control of the colonies. An army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington, was almost ready to sail when the revolt of the Spanish people against the French occupation caused the force to be sent to their aid instead. Miranda was heartbroken, but he continued to work for Latin American independence.

#### THE BRITISH IN THE RIVER PLATE, 1806-1807

In the meantime, in 1806, the British Admiral Sir Home Popham, who had been interested in Miranda's schemes, decided on his own initiative to make an attack on the Spanish possessions in the River Plate. Crossing the Atlantic from the Cape of Good Hope, which he had just conquered from the Dutch, he landed 1,600 men under General Beresford at Buenos Aires. The Viceroy Sobremonte fled to Córdoba, but a force of creoles from Montevideo, commanded by Santiago Liniers, defeated the invaders and forced Beresford to surrender.

Popham was thus forced to withdraw, but the inhabitants of Buenos Aires realized that the British would undoubtedly make some attempt to avenge his defeat. In the expectation of a new attack, they convened a *cabildo abierto*, a large meeting of the city's principal inhabitants which the municipal authorities were traditionally empowered to convoke in time of emergency. This institution was to be used frequently in all parts of the colonies during the next five years. In the viceroy's absence, the *cabildo abierto* made plans for the colony's defense. Liniers, though he was of French birth and had hitherto held only a minor position in the Spanish navy, was elected commander-in-chief, and a force of creole militia was hastily organized. A part of this was the legion of *patricios* under Cornelio Saavedra, which was later to play an important rôle in the movement for independence.

The *audiencia* took over the civil administration, and the viceroy, when he returned to the city, was sent to defend Montevideo. He failed to hold this post when a much stronger British force arrived in February, 1807, but when the invaders moved on Buenos Aires in June, Liniers and the creoles put up a desperate fight. The poor management of General Whitelocke, the British commander, placed his army in so dangerous a situation that he was compelled to surrender, thus ending the British invasion. The viceroy was now deposed by another *cabildo abierto* and Liniers took his place.

These events dealt a fatal blow to Spain's authority in the River Plate. After the inhabitants of Buenos Aires had successfully defended themselves without help from the mother country against so formidable an enemy, and especially after they had once been permitted to take the conduct of affairs into their own hands, the restoration of the old autocratic regime was out of the question. The creoles had acquired a confidence in themselves and a sense of their own power which was again to find expression in the events of 1810. Even the restrictions on trade, which had been broken down while the British occupied Montevideo, were never completely reestablished, and the desire for a continued enjoyment of the benefits of free commerce was one of the causes of the later revolutionary movement.

#### T H E F R E N C H O C C U P A T I O N O F S P A I N

It was the occupation of Spain by French troops in 1808 which finally brought on the war for independence. When Napoleon forced Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII to abdicate so that Joseph Bonaparte might be placed on the throne at Madrid, the Spanish people rose in revolt and established *juntas*, or local governing committees, in all parts of the kingdom. In the latter part of 1808 a central *junta* assumed the direction of this movement in the name of Ferdinand. The Spanish patriots caused the enemy much embarrassment by local guerrilla operations, but they could not stop the advance of the better armed and better trained French troops, and at the beginning of 1810 the invaders controlled nearly all of the peninsula.

Though the colonists sympathized with the Spanish patriots, the disaster which had overtaken the home government could not but

weaken the position of its representatives in America. They could expect no effective support from the peninsula, and the quarrels between different branches of the administration, always a source of trouble, became more acute when there was no one to settle them. A suspicion that some of the officials, like many of their colleagues at home, were disposed to recognize Joseph Bonaparte's authority, made matters worse. In such a situation, the creoles' desire for a greater participation in public affairs inevitably found expression. Many natives of the colonies felt that they had as much right as the people of Spain to set up *juntas* to exercise authority in the name of the captive King, and demands that they be permitted to do so were strongly supported by the radicals who secretly desired complete independence. On the other hand, the majority of the officials and peninsular Spaniards, and usually the more conservative part of the creole aristocracy, opposed any departure from the *status quo*.

There were disturbances in several colonies in 1808 and 1809 that foreshadowed the beginning of more serious revolts. In 1808 the Viceroy of Mexico, hoping to increase his popularity, agreed at the request of the *ayuntamiento* at the capital to give that body, with its creole membership, a share in the general government. This infuriated the *audiencia* and the peninsular Spaniards. The plan failed when the reactionaries kidnapped the viceroy and removed him from office, but the affair left an aftermath of bitterness between the two parties. In Upper Peru, the *cabildo* of Charcas, with the support of the other judges, deposed the president of the *audiencia* in May, 1809, and invited other municipalities to join it in establishing *juntas* to govern in the name of King Ferdinand. La Paz responded to the appeal, but the movement was suppressed in both cities by forces from Lima and Buenos Aires and those implicated were punished with great cruelty. A similar affair occurred at Quito, where conspirators deposed the President and set up a *junta* which exercised authority until it was suppressed by loyal troops from Guayaquil. In the River Plate it was the ultra-royalist Governor of Montevideo, Francisco Xavier de Elío, who organized a *junta* in 1808 to oppose the Viceroy Liniers, whom he distrusted both because the latter was a Frenchman by birth and because of the circumstances under which he had come into power. Three months later, the pro-Spanish party at Buenos Aires

attempted to overthrow Liniers, but was defeated by the creole militia. These events intensified the already existing hostility between the people of Montevideo and Buenos Aires, but both recognized the authority of a new viceroy appointed by the central *junta* in Spain, who arrived in July, 1809.

#### THE REVOLTS OF 1810 IN SOUTH AMERICA

In January, 1810, Ferdinand's cause seemed hopeless. Napoleon's forces had overrun almost all of Spain and the patriot *junta* had been forced to flee to Cadiz, where it transferred what authority it still exercised to a "Council of Regency," named by itself. Many of those who had been most loyal to the monarchy began to feel that the colonies must now choose between French domination and independence, and both Spaniards and creoles realized that the supporters of the old regime in America could expect no further support from Spain. Those who wished to establish a new order had the opportunity for which they had been waiting.

The people of Venezuela were the first to act. In April, 1810, when reports of the apparently complete defeat of the Spanish patriots reached Caracas, some of the creole leaders persuaded the Captain General to call a *cabildo abierto* to decide what should be done. This body voted not to recognize the authority of the new Spanish regency, because it had been named without consulting the colonies and was in no position to defend them. The Captain General was forced to resign, and a creole *junta* took charge in the name of Ferdinand VII. Similar *juntas* were soon set up in other important Venezuelan towns.

At Buenos Aires a *cabildo abierto* was convened when the news from Spain arrived early in May. It was decided that the viceroy should be replaced by a *junta* to be named by the *ayuntamiento*. When the latter appointed two Spaniards and two creoles, with the former viceroy as President, there was an outburst of indignation, and a popular demonstration on May 25 forced the municipal authorities to appoint a new *junta* composed almost exclusively of creoles. The militia, and especially the legion of *patricios*, played an active part in these events, and Saavedra became the President of the new *junta*.

The example of Caracas and Buenos Aires was soon followed in other provinces. In New Granada there had been much political agitation since the preceding year, when Antonio de Nariño and several other radicals had been imprisoned for plotting to attack troops on their way to suppress the uprising at Quito. The Governor of Cartagena had been forced to relinquish a part of his authority to the *cabildo* in May, and disturbances had occurred in various other towns. In July riots at Bogotá, growing out of an exchange of insults between some creoles and a Spanish shopkeeper, compelled the viceroy to convene a *cabildo abierto* which named a *junta* like those of Caracas and Buenos Aires. The viceroy was at first made president of this body, but within a few days he was removed from office and forced to leave the country. By the end of the year nearly all of the other towns in New Granada had formed local *juntas*.

In Chile, the acting governor, García de Carrasco, had already made himself unpopular by many tactless and arbitrary actions, and he further aroused public opinion in July, 1810, by ordering the arrest and deportation of three influential creoles accused of plotting against the Spanish regime. After tumultuous demonstrations in Santiago, the *audiencia* persuaded the governor to resign in favor of the Count de la Conquista, an aged creole noble. The *audiencia*, which had been at odds with Carrasco, hoped that this would placate the populace without further weakening the prestige of the Spanish regime, but the new governor fell more and more under the influence of the creole party. Matters came to a head when it was known that Elío, the Governor of Montevideo, had been transferred to Chile. An aroused populace forced the governor to summon a *cabildo abierto*, and when this met on September 18 it set up a *junta* which at once entered into close relations with that at Buenos Aires.

By the latter part of 1810 the creoles had thus taken matters in their own hands in many of the more important South American provinces. Their actions made it clear that they did not intend that the old regime should ever return. In nearly every case the *juntas* in the chief cities invited other municipalities to send representatives to discuss a new form of government, and congresses met in response to these invitations in Venezuela, New Granada, and Chile. What the native leaders ostensibly contemplated was the creation of autonomous states under



creole control but still nominally subject to the king; but many of them were already planning to seek complete independence, and republican ideas were gradually gaining ground among the people.

The *Junta Central* in Spain and the Regency which succeeded it did what they could to maintain their authority in the colonies and to placate the dissatisfied element there by concessions. In January, 1809, in recognition of expressions of sympathy and substantial financial aid from America, the *Junta* formally declared that the colonies were integral parts of the monarchy and invited each viceroyalty and captain-generalcy to send a delegate to be one of its own members. A year later, provision was made for colonial representation in the new Spanish *cortes*, or parliament. In both cases, however, the procedure prescribed would in practice have left the choice of representatives to the royal officials and the number of delegates would have been small compared with those allotted to the Spanish provinces. The creoles thus felt that their claim to equality had received little recognition. Since the colonies legally belonged to the Crown rather than to the Spanish nation, there were many who questioned the authority of a *junta* organized by the Spanish people without effective colonial representation, and the feeling of insubordination grew stronger when the *Junta Central* was succeeded by the Regency. Colonial resentment increased after May, 1810, when an earlier decree of the Regency authorizing free trade between American ports and foreign countries was hastily revoked because of opposition from the merchants of Cadiz. A few months later, the *Cortes* granted the colonists complete political equality with Spaniards and provided that they should be represented in future *cortes* in the same way as the people of the peninsula, but this action came too late. Even if it had come earlier, it would have meant little to the colonists so long as the government in Spain continued to support the royal authorities in America in maintaining a political regime dominated by officials from the mother country.

The struggle that was beginning in America, however, was not so much a contest between the colonies and Spain as a civil war in the colonies themselves. Besides the relatively small though influential groups of peninsular Spaniards, there were powerful elements among the creoles who opposed the revolutionary movement because their

own material welfare was bound up with the maintenance of the existing regime. Landowners, dependent upon cheap, more or less compulsory labor, were alarmed by the efforts of the radicals to win support from the lower classes. The aristocracy in general saw that it would be difficult to maintain its privileges without outside help, and the creole leaders had to weigh the advantage of throwing off Spanish control against the possibility that they themselves would be supplanted by the *mestizo* military chiefs who began to rise to prominence as the revolt got under way. There were, too, many who had moral scruples against rebellion. Though a number of priests were leaders among the revolutionists, the majority of the higher clergy were peninsular Spaniards, and the Church as an institution threw its vast influence into the scales on the loyalist side. Rebellion, in the minds of a large proportion of the faithful of all classes, was a crime against God as well as against the King.

It was the strength of these loyalist elements which made the struggle so long and uncertain. Except for one brief period after the Bourbon restoration, the supporters of the old regime got relatively little help from Spain. The armed forces in the colonies at the outbreak of the war were composed largely of creole militia, and the royalist commanders continued to recruit men locally throughout the struggle. There were many districts both in the north and in the south that refused to join the revolutionary movement, at least in its earlier stages, and Peru, which had been the center of Spanish power and special privilege in South America, was a royalist stronghold until the end of the war for independence.

#### THE TWO PERIODS OF THE WAR

The story of the war in South America falls into two periods. During the first, the creole regimes in Venezuela, New Granada, Buenos Aires, and Chile were simply struggling for existence, weakened by rivalries among their leaders, and unable to win any decisive victories over the royalists. Many places even in those provinces, and nearly all of the territory now included in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador remained under Spanish control. This phase of the contest ended with the reinstatement of the Bourbons at Madrid and the restoration of Span-

ish authority everywhere except in the River Plate. The second began in 1817 when San Martín crossed the Andes to liberate Chile. Soon after this exploit Bolívar began to reorganize the scattered bands of revolutionists in the Orinoco Valley and to win victories in New Granada and Venezuela. Working independently and coming into contact with one another only when their objective had been almost accomplished, these two great leaders advanced from the south and from the north until the war was finally won in the highlands of Peru.

#### THE WAR IN THE NORTH, 1810-1816

Soon after its creation, the *junta* at Caracas sent three commissioners to London to ask recognition and aid from the British government. One of these was Andrés Bello, who was later to become one of the most famous writers and publicists of Spanish America. Another was Simón de Bolívar, a wealthy young creole, who had travelled extensively in Europe during the years just before 1810 and had there become imbued with revolutionary ideas. The commissioners failed in their purpose, but while in London they met Francisco de Miranda and established contact with the influential group whom he had already interested in the patriot cause. Miranda returned to Venezuela at the end of 1810, and at once became prominent in the congress that met a few months later to consider the adoption of a new form of government. With Bolívar he worked zealously for the abandonment of any pretense of loyalty to Ferdinand VII and for a complete separation from Spain, and his efforts were crowned with success when the Congress voted a declaration of independence on July 5, 1811. In December of the same year a constitution was adopted and Venezuela became a federal republic.

The new government was weakened by rivalries between the patriot leaders and the indifference or hostility of a large portion of the inhabitants, and its fate was sealed when a destructive earthquake occurred on March 26, 1812. The priests told the populace that the disaster was a punishment inflicted upon them by Providence for their rebellion. Many abandoned the patriot cause, and Domingo de Monteverde, a Spanish naval officer who had entered the province earlier in the same month with a force of 500 men, made rapid progress

against the republican army under Miranda. On July 25, the latter entered into a capitulation which restored Spanish authority in return for a promise that the lives and property of the Venezuelans would be respected. The shameless violation of this agreement, after the rebels had laid down their arms, led other leaders in the revolutionary party to believe that they had been betrayed, and when Miranda was about to leave the country he was seized by Bolívar and his associates and turned over to the royalists. The great precursor of independence died in a Spanish prison four years later. Bolívar, who was permitted to leave Venezuela under a passport from Monteverde, went to Cartagena to offer his assistance to the revolutionists there.

Cartagena had declared itself an independent republic in November, 1811, and several other provinces in New Granada had followed its example. Unfortunately local jealousies made it impossible to set up a central government, and the forces of the various towns were fighting among themselves as often as against the royalists who still held Santa Marta in the north and Popayán in the south. When Bolívar arrived at Cartagena, he was given command of a force with which he carried on successful minor operations against the royalists in the Magdalena Valley. Meanwhile the revolted provinces reached an agreement that made some measure of joint action possible, and Antonio Nariño, the President of Cundinamarca, undertook a campaign against Popayán while Bolívar attempted the reconquest of Venezuela. Nariño's campaign, successful at first, ended when he fell by accident into the hands of the enemy in May, 1814. Bolívar was hardly more successful. He overran Venezuela in 1813 and regained control of Caracas, where he was given the title of "Liberator" which was henceforth to be his proudest possession; but a year later he was driven out of the province in June by an army that a Spanish adventurer named Boves recruited among the half-savage plainsmen of the Orinoco Valley. During this campaign the leaders on both sides resorted to the ruthless brutality which thenceforth characterized the war in all parts of South America. Bolívar proclaimed a "war to the death," threatening to kill all Spaniards even though they remained neutral, and in February, 1814, he ordered the summary execution of more than 800 prisoners in retaliation for the barbarous cruelties perpetrated by Boves against native patriots.

By this time the overthrow of Napoleon had restored Ferdinand VII to his throne and the Spanish government was in a position to come to the royalists' assistance. In 1815 a force of somewhat more than 10,000 men sailed from Cadiz under the command of General Pablo Morillo. Cartagena was taken after a three months' siege, and the occupation of all New Granada followed. Many of the creole leaders were put to death, and the reconquered towns were treated with a harshness that did nothing to strengthen their loyalty. The revolution in the north collapsed. Bolívar fled to the West Indies, but a few of the other leaders escaped with small bands of followers into the *llanos* east of the Andes, where they continued to carry on guerrilla operations.

#### FAILURE OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHILE

The regime set up by the creole leaders in Chile also had a brief and troubled existence. When the first congress met in July, 1811, its members divided into conservative and radical factions. The conservatives were at first dominant, but in September a young military officer named José Miguel Carrera seized power and reorganized the congress with a radical majority. Later in the same year, Carrera assumed dictatorial powers. He had by this time alienated even the other leaders of his own group, though most of them came to his support when the Viceroy of Peru sent Spanish officers to recruit an army in the still loyal island of Chiloé early in 1813. These royalist forces occupied much of south central Chile during the next twelve months, but the fighting was indecisive and the Treaty of Lircay, in May, 1814, provided for the withdrawal of the Spanish troops in return for the Chileans' promise to continue to recognize the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII.

This agreement was unsatisfactory to both sides. Carrera, who had been captured by the Spaniards during the war, returned to Santiago to protest against it, and again seized control by a military *coup*. A counter-revolution was organized by Bernardo O'Higgins, another leader of the more radical wing of the patriot party. Civil war had already begun when it was learned that the Viceroy of Peru also had disapproved the treaty and had sent a new army to Chile. O'Higgins

at once placed himself under Carrera's orders, but the patriot forces were completely defeated at Rancagua on October 2, 1814. The two leaders, with some three thousand men, escaped across the Andes to Mendoza, where they were given a friendly reception by Governor José de San Martín.

#### THE CREOLE REGIME AT BUENOS AIRES

The River Plate region was thus the only important part of Spanish America in 1816 that had not been reconquered by the royalists. While the patriot movement was rising and falling in the north, a series of weak governments had been struggling for existence at Buenos Aires. The creole leaders had quarreled among themselves, and the people of the provinces were bitterly jealous of the capital and distrustful of attempts to establish a centralized administration there. There was little disposition to return to the old regime, but there was an increasing discouragement over the possibility of making a success of independence under republican institutions.

A large part of the upper class favored the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. As early as 1808 there had been one faction that supported the aspirations of Carlota Joaquina, the sister of Ferdinand VII. This unprincipled and ambitious woman had come to Rio de Janeiro in 1808 with her husband, the Prince Regent of Portugal, and for some years carried on intrigues with creole leaders in the River Plate and Chile. Several persons were executed after the discovery of a plot in her behalf at Buenos Aires in 1812. After the Bourbon restoration made the outlook for the patriot cause seem almost hopeless, a more serious effort was made to compromise with the royalists by placing a Spanish prince on the throne, but failed because of King Ferdinand's opposition.

The creole government had meanwhile been struggling to establish its control over the territory that had been ruled by the Viceroy of Buenos Aires before the revolution. The *junta* set up in May, 1810, at once sent hastily improvised armies to occupy the interior provinces where its authority was not recognized. One of these forces took Córdoba, where the principal loyalist commanders, among them the former Viceroy Liniers, were put to death. It then proceeded to Up-

per Peru and defeated a Spanish army at Suipacha in October, 1810. Again executions for which there was no excuse under the laws of war were ordered by the *junta* as part of a deliberate policy of terrorism, and war without quarter became the practice in southern South America as well as in the north.

The patriot army extended its control as far as Lake Titicaca, but in June, 1811, it was surprised and routed at Huaqui and the Spaniards resumed possession of Upper Peru. The royalists then attempted to take the offensive, but Manuel Belgrano turned them back by victories at Tucumán in September, 1812, and at Salta in February, 1813. Belgrano again attempted to invade Upper Peru, without success, and a third failure to drive the Spaniards out of the mining region in 1815 made it clear that there was little hope of an advance in this direction.

Efforts to obtain control of Paraguay also failed. The people of Asunción, like the people of Córdoba, refused to recognize the authority of the first *junta*, and repulsed an army under Belgrano when he entered their territory. Their attitude, however, was inspired more by dislike of Buenos Aires than by loyalty to Spain, and in 1811, they quietly removed the royal authorities and set up an independent government of their own.

Operations against the royalists in the *Banda Oriental*, as modern Uruguay was then called, were more successful. Early in 1811 an army from Buenos Aires, aided by local forces under José Artigas, laid siege to Montevideo. Hostilities were suspended by mutual agreement when Portuguese troops entered the province from the north, but renewed after British diplomatic pressure persuaded the Prince Regent at Rio de Janeiro to sign an armistice with Buenos Aires in May, 1812. Montevideo surrendered in June, 1814, after a long siege. The capture of this city was important because it deprived the royalists of their last stronghold in the River Plate region. If it had remained in Spanish hands it is very possible that the forces which some months later reconquered New Granada might have been sent against Buenos Aires instead.

While the siege of Montevideo was in progress, a constituent assembly had been convened at Buenos Aires to decide on a definitive form of government. Artigas, who had a great following among the country people of the *Banda Oriental*, dominated the choice of dele-

gates from that region and sent them to Buenos Aires with instructions to advocate a federal republic with complete autonomy for the provinces, a proposal highly obnoxious to the group which controlled the government in the capital. His representatives were denied seats in the assembly, and this so angered Artigas that he refused to participate further in the joint military operations. Early in 1815 he defeated the forces of Buenos Aires and forced them to withdraw from the *Banda Oriental*. This was the beginning of a struggle between "unitarians" and "federalists" which was to cause much bloodshed in the River Plate during the next half century. Artigas was supported by other provinces, and Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, Corrientes, and Córdoba, as well as the *Banda Oriental*, were soon united in a loose federation under local chieftains who recognized his leadership.

Artigas might have become the ruler of the whole River Plate region had it not been for the Portuguese, who again invaded the *Banda Oriental* in 1816 and finally conquered the province after four years of fighting. This was the end of Artigas' career, as his lieutenants in the other provinces turned against him in defeat and forced him to beg asylum from Francia, the ruler of Paraguay.

While Artigas was fighting the Portuguese, the provinces that recognized the authority of the government at Buenos Aires had sent delegates to a congress which met at Tucumán in northwestern Argentina in 1816. A formal declaration of independence was adopted, and efforts were made to establish a stronger government. Many of the delegates desired a constitutional monarchy. Belgrano proposed the creation of an Inca dynasty, which might be expected to attract the support of the Indians of Peru, and this fantastic plan was seriously discussed. Negotiations were also resumed in Europe, and various candidates, including the future King Louis Philippe of France and Ferdinand VII's nephew the Prince of Lucca, were considered. The efforts to set up a monarchy were to continue, despite popular opposition in Argentina, until the unitarian government was overthrown by the federalists in 1820.

Pending a decision on a definitive form of government, the Congress at Tucumán elected Juan Martín de Pueyrredón Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the River Plate. For the time being the



new administration seemed stronger than any of its predecessors, though the federalist-controlled provinces still opposed it. Its inauguration made possible the renewal of the war against Spain at a time when continued inaction might well have meant the complete defeat of the patriot cause.

#### SAN MARTÍN AND THE LIBERATION OF CHILE

The renewal of the war was in large part the result of the efforts of one determined leader. José de San Martín was born in 1778 in one of the old Paraguay missions, where his father was in command of a Spanish garrison. The family returned to Spain while José was still very young, and the boy entered the royal army at the age of eleven. Twenty-two years later, after serving with distinction in Africa and in Europe, he had reached the rank of lieutenant colonel. Early in 1812 he arrived in Buenos Aires to offer his services to the revolutionary government. He was at once given a commission in the army and soon began to play an influential part in political as well as military affairs. Early in 1813 he distinguished himself by winning a battle at San Lorenzo which drove the royalists out of the littoral provinces. For a short time in 1814, after the failure of the second invasion of Upper Peru, he was made commander-in-chief of the forces in the north, but he soon asked to be relieved of this duty and a few months later obtained the governorship of the province of Cuyo, at the foot of the Andes in western Argentina. He seems already to have had in mind the idea of securing the independence of South America by expelling the Spanish forces from Chile and then making an attack on Peru by sea. For two years he quietly matured his plans and trained his troops, and when his friend Pueyrredón became head of the government he obtained more effective help from the central authorities.

San Martín's passage of the Andes, in January, 1817, is one of the great exploits of military history. The transportation of an army with its supplies and artillery over difficult passes more than two miles above sea-level was in itself a notable feat, made possible only by the care and thoroughness with which the Commander-in-Chief made his preparations and the skill with which he deceived the enemy as to

his intentions. Within a month he was able to unite his forces in the western valleys, and on February 12 he defeated the royalists at Chacabuco and forced them to evacuate Santiago. The Chileans received him with enthusiasm, for the stupidly repressive policy of the royal officials since 1814 had alienated many who had formerly opposed the patriot cause. After San Martín declined its invitation to assume charge of the government, a *cabildo abierto* at Santiago elected Bernardo O'Higgins as supreme director, and on February 12, 1818, the independence of Chile was formally proclaimed. The viceroy at Lima sent a new army under General Osorio to reconquer the province, but San Martín destroyed this force in the battle of Maipú on April 5, 1818. Thereafter small bands of royalists held out in the south, especially in the Island of Chiloé, but the Spanish forces were not again in a position to threaten central Chile.

#### SAN MARTÍN IN PERU

The expedition against Peru, San Martín's next objective, would only be possible if the patriots obtained control of the sea. O'Higgins' government therefore set out to create a fleet. Several foreign ships, invited to go to Chile by the patriots' agents abroad, were purchased and put into service under British and North American officers. Among the latter was Captain Charles Whiting Wooster, who had served with distinction in the United States navy, and who now played an active part in operations that broke the royalist blockade of Valparaíso and finally gave the patriots control of the sea on the South American west coast. At the end of 1818 the fleet was placed under the command of Thomas Alexander, Lord Cochrane, a brilliant officer who had been discharged from the British navy after quarreling with his superiors and being convicted, perhaps unjustly, of financial irregularities. It was not until two years later that preparations for the expedition northward were completed.

By this time renewed civil war in the River Plate had cut San Martín off from any hope of assistance from Buenos Aires, especially as he refused to obey orders to return to support the government there in its losing struggle against the federalists. On the other

hand, he still commanded the loyalty of his own Army of the Andes, and he had the warm cooperation of the Chilean government under O'Higgins. The prospect for success was made brighter by the fact that a Spanish army which was about to embark for America mutinied at Cadiz in January, 1820, taking the lead in a revolution that compelled Ferdinand to reestablish the liberal constitution of 1812. There seemed to be some ground to hope that the new regime in Spain might be willing to accept the independence of the revolted colonies, and it was clear at any rate that the royalist authorities were not likely to receive effective help from Spain for the time being.

Escorted by Cochrane's fleet, San Martín sailed from Valparaíso in August, 1820, with somewhat more than four thousand Argentine and Chilean troops. When he landed at Pisco, south of Lima, he found that the viceroy had been instructed by the new Spanish government to endeavor to reach an agreement with him, and an armistice was arranged pending negotiations. The viceroy proposed that the colonists accept the relatively favorable status which the Spanish constitution would have given them, but San Martín insisted on independence, though he was apparently willing to consider the establishment of an American constitutional monarchy under a Spanish prince. The negotiations consequently broke down. They were renewed some months later, after the Viceroy Pezuela had been removed from office by a revolt among his own officers and General La Serna had been chosen in his place, but again they failed. Meanwhile there were minor military operations and San Martín occupied points on the coast north of Lima. In July, 1821, La Serna abandoned the capital and marched inland, permitting the invaders to occupy the city without resistance. San Martín proclaimed the independence of Peru on July 28, and assumed dictatorial powers as "Protector" of the new state a few days later. His undertaking had thus far met with success, but the strong royalist forces in the highlands and the pro-Spanish feeling of a large part of the people of the province were still formidable obstacles to its complete achievement. With the forces at his disposal he was in no position to carry the war to a conclusion, and he was compelled to mark time for some months while the now triumphant patriot forces under Bolívar advanced from the north.

BOLÍVAR'S OPERATIONS IN VENEZUELA,  
1816-1819

Though the royal authority had been reestablished in the more settled parts of Venezuela after Bolívar's defeat in 1814, a few small bands kept up a guerrilla warfare in the plains of the Orinoco Valley, cooperating with the New Granadan patriots under Santander who had escaped into the sparsely inhabited *llanos* farther west after the reconquest of Bogotá. Bolívar himself had taken refuge in the West Indies, where he persistently endeavored to obtain help for the revolutionary cause. With the aid of President Pétion of Haiti, the little state that had freed itself from French rule twelve years before, he led an expedition to the Venezuelan coast in 1816, but dissensions among his followers and their inability to resist the stronger Spanish forces made the venture a failure. He returned to Haiti, where Pétion again gave him much needed assistance, and the end of 1816 found him back in Venezuela, now the recognized leader of the insurgent bands in that province.

During the next two years, while San Martín was freeing Chile from Spanish control, the revolution in Venezuela made little progress. Jealousy and open insubordination among his lieutenants made Bolívar's task very difficult, and he was compelled at last to shoot Manuel Piar, who had been one of the ablest and most daring of the patriot leaders. Spanish forces that attempted to invade the Orinoco Valley were repulsed, but Bolívar's troops were not strong enough to carry the war into the more populous mountain regions. After a serious defeat at La Puerta in March, 1818, the whole movement seemed certain to end in failure, but Bolívar refused to be discouraged. His army was gradually increasing as the people of the plains rallied to his standard. These wild, ignorant *llaneros* had made up the bulk of the armies that had driven Bolívar from Venezuela in 1814, but they had been alienated from the royalist cause by tactless treatment after Morillo arrived with his Spanish army, and many of them had become revolutionists. Under the leadership of the daring and popular José Páez, they became a formidable cavalry force. At the same time, Bolívar obtained welcome reinforcements from another

source. His agents abroad persuaded several hundred British and other foreigners to enlist in his army, and these played an important part in all of his subsequent campaigns. The Liberator's position was further strengthened when the Congress, which he convened at Angostura in February, 1819, confirmed his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and made him President of the Republic of Venezuela. Meanwhile guerrilla warfare against the Spaniards had continued, and Bolívar was planning a daring new move that was to change the whole situation.

#### THE LIBERATION OF NEW GRANADA, VENEZUELA, AND ECUADOR

In June, 1819, in the midst of the rainy season, the Liberator made what seemed an almost impossible march into the upper Orinoco Valley to join the New Granadan patriots under Santander. The combined force then crossed the eastern range of the Andes to emerge on the plateau north of Bogotá. Only a daring and resourceful strategist could have conceived such a manoeuvre, and only a commander with Bolívar's qualities of leadership could have executed it. Its success was startling. Though the ill-clad and poorly equipped patriots had suffered terrifically from the cold and from the labor of marching through almost trackless country, they surprised and completely defeated a far superior Spanish force in the battle of Boyacá on August 7, and the victory gave Bolívar control of the most important part of New Granada. With a new base of operations and a new source of recruits and supplies, he was in a far better position to confront the main royalist army in Venezuela.

For the time being the Liberator did not follow up his advantage. Dissensions in the congress at Angostura, where his enemies had obtained the upper hand, compelled him to make the long and dangerous journey back to the provisional capital to restore his authority. Early in 1820, the news of the Spanish revolution arrived and the royalist commander made overtures for a treaty of peace. He offered to leave the patriot leaders in actual control of the provinces that had been liberated provided that the sovereignty of Spain be recognized, but Bolívar, like San Martín, insisted on complete independence, and

hostilities were resumed even before the expiration of the six months armistice which had been agreed upon.

Bolívar now marched eastward through the highlands from New Granada into Venezuela. On June 24, 1821, he won the second of the decisive victories of the war in the north at Carabobo. This practically freed Venezuela from Spanish rule, although Puerto Cabello, the last royalist stronghold in northern South America, was not captured until November, 1823.

The battles of Boyacá and Carabobo made the Republic of Colombia a reality. The existence of this new state, whose territory was to comprise New Granada, Venezuela, and the as yet unconquered Presidency of Quito, had been proclaimed by the Congress at Angostura in December, 1819, and Bolívar had been elected its first president. After the battle of Carabobo another congress met at Cúcuta to confirm Bolívar's election and draw up a federal constitution. Bogotá soon afterward became the capital, and Colombia took its place among the family of nations when its government was recognized by the United States in 1822 and by Great Britain in 1824.

With Spanish resistance broken in New Granada and Venezuela, Bolívar was free to turn his attention southward. Early in 1821 he had sent Antonio José de Sucre by sea to Guayaquil, where the creoles had set up an independent government in the previous October. Sucre's attempt to push into the interior ended in a costly failure, and Bolívar marched overland to his assistance. He was delayed for some months by the stubborn resistance of the inhabitants of Pasto, who had remained loyal to Spain since the beginning of the revolution, and in the meantime, on May 24, 1822, Sucre destroyed the Spanish forces in the region of Quito at the battle of Pichincha. The Department of the Equator, "El Ecuador," thus became in fact as well as in name a part of Colombia. A few months before, on November 28, 1821, the inhabitants of Panama had thrown off their allegiance to Spain and adhered to the Colombian federation. With the loss of the Isthmus, it became more difficult than before for Spain to send reinforcements to the royalist commanders still in the field.

## THE GUAYAQUIL CONFERENCE

Peru and Upper Peru were now the only important regions still occupied by Spanish armies. San Martín had made little further progress after his occupation of Lima, and his situation was far from encouraging. Many of the people of Lima were still opposed to the revolution, and the military dictatorship which he had been obliged to establish was unpopular. It was impossible to expect large reinforcements from Argentina or Chile. There was much discontent among his own troops, and a quarrel with Lord Cochrane deprived him of the assistance of the Chilean squadron. A serious illness in November, 1821, added to his difficulties. Under the circumstances, he did not feel able to move against the Spaniards in the interior. The latter, as he wrote Bolívar in 1822, had no less than 19,000 veteran troops, whereas the patriot forces could not put more than 8,500 men, mostly raw recruits, in the field at one time.

San Martín hoped to obtain from Bolívar the help which he needed to bring the war to an end. Though he believed that Guayaquil should belong to Peru, he nevertheless sent troops under General Santa Cruz to assist Sucre in the campaign that led to the battle of Pichincha, and he responded cordially to a letter from Bolívar offering support for a campaign in Peru. On July 26 and 27 of the same year the two leaders met in their famous conference at Guayaquil.

What took place was never fully revealed. San Martín apparently urged that a large Colombian army be sent to Peru and offered to place himself under Bolívar's orders. Bolívar seems to have evaded a direct reply. His motives can only be guessed at. He was probably unwilling to share the glory of freeing Peru with another leader and skeptical of the possibility of whole-hearted cooperation. Furthermore, he disagreed emphatically with San Martín's expressed belief that Peru should become a constitutional monarchy under a European prince, and he perhaps felt that differences of opinion on this subject would lead to future trouble. There was no open break, but San Martín evidently left the conference convinced that Bolívar would not furnish the aid indispensable to the final liberation of Peru under any plan of joint action. With an unselfish patriotism that has few parallels in history, he decided to withdraw from the scene altogether,

and when a constituent assembly met at Lima in September he resigned his authority as Protector and left the country.

San Martín went to Chile and thence to Argentina, but in both countries he found that recent political changes had left him with few friends and no influence. Practically penniless, he sailed for Europe in 1824. Five years later he came back to Buenos Aires but met with so unpleasant a reception that he immediately returned to Europe. He died in obscurity at Boulogne in 1850, and it was not until some years later that his great services to the cause of independence began to be recognized by his compatriots.

#### THE LAST STAGE OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AMERICA

Matters went badly in Peru after San Martín's departure. The constituent assembly entrusted the executive power to a weak *junta*, but in February, 1823, after the defeat of an expedition sent against the royalists, a military uprising forced the appointment of Colonel José de la Riva Agüero as President of the Republic. Soon afterward Bolívar responded to an appeal for help by sending Sucre with a strong force to assist the Peruvian army, but internal dissensions continued. An army which Santa Cruz led into Upper Peru in May was almost completely destroyed. Even after Bolívar himself arrived at Callao on September 1 and was given dictatorial powers, the situation did not improve. The Liberator, prostrated by illness, found it difficult to maintain his authority because many people in Lima, and many officers in the Peruvian army, felt that Colombian military rule was hardly less objectionable than that of Spain. The Argentine troops that San Martín had left behind were also dissatisfied, and when they mutinied and permitted the royalists to reoccupy the fortress at Callao in February, 1824, Bolívar had to evacuate Lima and retire to Trujillo.

Within the year, however, the war ended in a complete victory for the patriot forces. Bolívar obtained reinforcements which enabled him to take the offensive. His enemies meanwhile had been weakened by the defection of General Olañeta in Upper Peru, who revolted against the Viceroy La Serna, an appointee of the liberal party, when it was



learned that the absolutists had been restored to power in Spain. After Bolívar won an important victory at Junín on August 6, the royalists evacuated Lima. Sucre then took command of the army in the highlands, and on December 9, 1824, won the final great battle of the war at Ayacucho. The viceroy was taken prisoner and the remainder of the Spanish army capitulated. Olañeta attempted to hold out for a short time in Upper Peru, but was abandoned by his troops and killed. Callao, which was still held by the royalists, surrendered on January 22, 1826, after a siege in which the defenders endured ghastly sufferings. Spain had definitely lost South America, although the mother country did not recognize the independence of her former colonies until many years later.

#### THE INDEPENDENCE OF MEXICO

New Spain was too far away to be directly affected by the war in South America and events there took a different course because the adherents of the established order were more powerful. Mexico City, like Lima, was naturally a royalist stronghold. The military and administrative organization centering around the viceregal court, the creole nobility, the privileged merchants, and above all the hierarchy of the Church were formidable obstacles to the realization of the creoles' aspiration to self-rule. The conservatives were thus able to hold in check, if not to suppress, the revolutionary movement that began in 1810 until they themselves concluded after the liberal revolution in Spain that independence was preferable to a continued connection with the mother country.

The hero of the independence movement in Mexico was Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, a priest in the small village of Dolores near Querétaro. Hidalgo had already been in trouble with the Inquisition and the Spanish authorities because of his advanced ideas, and had associated with other revolutionary leaders who had been encouraged, like their contemporaries in South America, by the recent events in Spain. On September 16, 1810, he raised the standard of revolt, professing allegiance to Ferdinand VII, but demanding creole supremacy and the abolition of Indian tributes and caste distinctions. The *Grito de Dolores*, the "Cry of Dolores," met with an immediate response

among the country people roundabout, and Hidalgo soon commanded a great mob of Indians and *mestizos*, with whose aid he took the provincial capital of Guanajuato. His success, however, was short-lived. Handicapped by incapable leadership and lack of organization, the rebels were no match for the less numerous but better disciplined loyal troops. They were easily defeated early in 1811, and Hidalgo was put to death.

A few scattered bands remained in the field and continued the struggle. They could only engage in guerrilla warfare and were hampered by lack of unified leadership, but they kept alive the spirit of revolt. For a time in 1812 and 1813, the prospect for independence seemed to improve. The proclamation of the Spanish constitution of 1812, with its provisions granting freedom to the press, encouraged revolutionary agitation and made the situation of the royal authorities much more difficult. The revolutionists obtained control of much of the region south and west of the capital, and on November 6, 1813, a patriot congress at Chilpancingo issued a formal declaration of independence. Soon afterward the tide turned. José María Morelos, the most prominent of the revolutionary leaders, was captured and executed in 1815, and in the following year Viceroy Apodaca began a vigorous campaign which almost ended the insurrection. Vicente Guerrero and his small band were practically the only rebels remaining in the field by the beginning of 1818.

With the Spanish revolution of 1820 the situation again changed. The Mexican conservatives saw the home government controlled by people whose ideas were almost as odious as those of the creole insurgents. The radical *cortes*, which a mutinous army compelled Ferdinand VII to convoke, adopted a series of measures which were especially obnoxious to the Church. The Inquisition was abolished, tithes were suppressed, and much ecclesiastical property was sequestrated. Many of the higher clergy felt that independence would be a lesser evil than the execution of such a program, and some of the most prominent officials of the Church entered into a conspiracy to separate the viceroyalty from Spain.

Their chief instrument was Agustín de Iturbide, a creole officer who had some time before retired from the army under a cloud but who now asked and obtained permission to lead a force against Guer-

rero. Instead of fighting, Iturbide entered into negotiations with the revolutionists, and on February 24, 1821; he met Guerrero at Iguala and signed an agreement under which their forces were to cooperate to bring about independence. The "Plan of Iguala" provided that Mexico should become a constitutional empire ruled either by Ferdinand VII or by some Spanish prince chosen by the Mexican *cortes*. The signers pledged themselves to establish complete independence, to maintain the Catholic Church and the privileges of the clergy, and to bring about the equality of all races before the law. These promises, skilfully designed to attract support from all parties, caused the agreement to be called the "Plan of the Three Guarantees."

The viceroy, who had perhaps had some connection with the clerical plot, took no very active measures against Iturbide, though he refused an invitation to become head of the *junta* which was to rule the country until the new emperor arrived. Because of his vacillation, the faction in the government which opposed independence compelled him to resign in July, but in the meantime more and more of the troops went over to the "Army of the Three Guarantees." When a new viceroy, Juan O'Donojú, arrived at the end of July, the restoration of Spanish authority was clearly impossible; and the Treaty of Córdoba, signed by O'Donojú and Iturbide on August 24, 1821, accepted the chief provisions of the Plan of Iguala. It also provided for the withdrawal of such Spanish forces as remained in Mexico, leaving control in the hands of the creole militia, who already formed the greater part of the army. O'Donojú died soon after taking office as a member of the regency which assumed control of the government. The Crown's repudiation of his actions ended whatever hopes the revolutionary leaders may have entertained of placing a Bourbon prince on the throne, but Mexico had become independent. The story of subsequent events—the meeting of the Mexican congress, the proclamation of Iturbide as Emperor in May, 1822, and the overthrow of his government a year later—will be dealt with in another chapter.

## CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES

The loss of South America and Mexico of course affected Spain's position elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. The five provinces of Central America had remained fairly tranquil until 1821, but it was impossible for Spain to hold them after Mexico and Panama became independent. Even the Spanish officials and the higher clergy realized this, and they joined with the creole leaders at Guatemala on September 15, 1821, in a formal declaration of independence. The Captain General himself became the head of the new government, but he met with opposition in the outlying provinces, and early in 1822 he and his conservative supporters brought about the annexation of all Central America to Iturbide's Mexican Empire. This connection soon ceased, and the Federal Republic of Central America was set up in 1823.

The people of Spanish Santo Domingo also revolted in 1821. They attempted to join the Republic of Colombia, but their territory was immediately overrun by troops from Haiti, where revolted slaves had thrown off French rule and set up an independent republic as early as 1804.

With the loss of Santo Domingo and the cession of the Floridas to the United States, nothing remained of Spain's great American empire but Cuba and Puerto Rico. Both of these islands had enjoyed unprecedented prosperity since the destruction of the plantations in French Saint Domingue had made sugar production profitable in other tropical regions, and each had received many immigrants from Spain in the first years of the century. Probably for these reasons there was less enthusiasm for independence among their people than in the colonies on the mainland, and these two West Indian possessions remained in Spanish hands until nearly the end of the nineteenth century.

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## *Chapter VIII*

### THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEW REPUBLICS

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Though the last important Spanish forces in South America had been defeated at the battle of Ayacucho, the future of the new republics was still obscure. Few of them had governments that offered any great promise of permanence or stability, and it was by no means certain that they would be left to work out their internal problems without having to confront an attack from abroad. They were attempting to establish republican institutions at a time when reaction and autocracy were dominant in the Old World and when Spain might well hope for assistance from other European powers in reducing them to subjection. If they were to achieve the purposes for which the revolution had been fought, this danger of foreign intervention must be averted and the equally difficult problem of achieving internal stability must be solved.

#### FOREIGN INTEREST IN THE REVOLUTION

Fortunately the danger from abroad proved less serious than it appeared. The Spanish American revolutionists had friends as well as enemies in foreign countries. Believers in political liberty were enthusiastic over the establishment of a new group of free republics, and mercantile and shipping interests were eager to share in their trade. Other nations had an exaggerated idea of the wealth of Spanish America and high hopes for the opening of great markets there, once the restrictions of the Spanish colonial system had been broken down. From 1810 on British, North American, and French vessels appeared in increasing numbers at ports under patriot control, and the creoles had an opportunity to exchange their products for foreign goods

under conditions more favorable than any they had hitherto known. The result was a rapid change in customs and standards of living even during the period of the war.

Great Britain, which played the leading rôle in this development, sent not only goods but capital to the new republics. British financial interests had furnished money and arms to the republican armies during the war. After their independence was assured, Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Buenos Aires, and Chile were able to float government loans in the London market, and much money was subscribed for stock in companies formed to take over mines abandoned by Spanish interests. Many of these ventures were wild speculations, and most of them resulted disastrously, but they laid the foundations for a British financial ascendancy in Latin America which was to last until the twentieth century. They were also a guarantee that the new nations would have British support against any effort to deprive them of their independence.

The United States was interested in Latin American trade, but still more interested in the success of the revolution for political reasons. The natural sympathy for colonists striving for their independence was increased by the desire to be rid of a neighbor whose presence was likely to drag the United States into the complications of European politics. The government at Washington had sent agents on several occasions to maintain informal relations with the revolutionists, and after 1817 Henry Clay, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, ardently advocated the formal recognition of the new republics. The Monroe administration delayed action, chiefly because it desired first to obtain Spain's ratification of the treaty for the cession of Florida, but in 1822 the way was clear and Manuel Torres was formally received as the *chargé d'affaires* of Colombia. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the other republics followed.

#### THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Great Britain and the United States were thus opposed to any foreign intervention on behalf of Spain. On the other hand the principal powers of continental Europe were opposed on principle to revolu-

tion and to democratic ideas and had discussed projects for intervention at several European international congresses. In 1823, when the liberal regime in Spain was destroyed by a French army acting as the agent of the alliance, the danger of similar action in Spanish America seemed to increase. Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, suggested to the American Minister in London that the two governments unite in a declaration against any foreign interference in Spanish America, but President Monroe and his advisers considered it preferable that the United States should act alone.

In a discussion with Russia of the latter's territorial claims in Alaska, the United States had already laid down the principle that the American continents were "henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." In his message to Congress on December 2, 1823, Monroe set forth more fully the doctrine which was thenceforth to be associated with his name. The political system of the powers of the Holy Alliance, he said, was essentially different from that of America, and the United States would "consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." The United States would not interfere with any existing European colony, but it would view as an unfriendly act any European intervention to oppress or control the destiny of the American republics whose independence it had recognized.

We now know that such danger as there was of European intervention had probably disappeared before this message was read. None of the powers of the Holy Alliance was really prepared to send forces to America. The French government, which had intervened in Spain, would have been glad to see republicanism destroyed in the new states but at the same time wished to maintain trade relations with them, and it had been actively interested in the project for the establishment of European monarchies because that would have achieved both purposes.<sup>1</sup> In October, 1823, in response to a British inquiry, it had disclaimed any intent to interfere between Spain and her former colonies. After this there was little danger that any other power would act. The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine was nevertheless an

<sup>1</sup> See Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826*, pp. 105 ff

event of the greatest importance, for it became and has continued to be the basis for the policy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

#### BOLÍVAR AND THE PANAMA CONFERENCE

It was well that events abroad dissipated the danger of foreign intervention, for the efforts of the Spanish Americans to combine in the face of a common peril met with little success. Bolívar, the dominant figure in South America, clearly perceived the need for some form of confederation against external attack, and Colombia had entered into treaties of alliance with most of the other revolutionary governments while the war was still in progress. In December, 1824, just before the battle of Ayacucho, Bolívar proposed to the other governments that a congress be held at Panama to make his idea a reality. Since his purpose was not only to bring about a close alliance between the former Spanish colonies, but also to find means to assure respect for the principles recently set forth by President Monroe, invitations to attend were extended to the United States, Great Britain, and Brazil. By June, 1826, representatives from Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Central America, and Great Britain, as well as an unofficial delegate from Holland, had gathered on the Isthmus. The governments of Buenos Aires and Paraguay declined the invitation. Brazil accepted but did not attend, and Chile, Bolivia, and the United States were delayed in appointing delegates. At Washington, the question of attendance had been the subject of a long factional dispute in Congress. When representatives were finally appointed, one of them died en route and the other did not go to Panama, though he later went to Mexico in the hope of attending the proposed second conference there.

The Congress at Panama accomplished little, because national jealousies made any real union impracticable. The Spanish American delegates signed treaties providing for a confederation, for future congresses, and for joint military action under certain conditions, but these were never ratified by any of the states except Colombia. Because of the unhealthy climate at Panama, the Congress adjourned after a few months with the intention of reconvening at Tacubaya



near Mexico City, but this second meeting never took place. Bolívar was bitterly disappointed, but the failure of his plan for a new international order in the Western Hemisphere was a small matter compared with the other disappointments that he was to suffer during the next five years.

#### THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLICS AND THE CONSTITUCIÓN VITALICIA

The Liberator was still the President of Great Colombia, though he had left the administration of affairs there in the hands of the Vice-President, Santander. He was also exercising dictatorial powers in Peru, while Sucre, his most trusted lieutenant, controlled Upper Peru, which was soon to become the Republic of Bolivia. The area where his leadership was accepted included by far the greater part of the wealth and population of Spanish South America, for Argentina and Chile were undeveloped and as yet relatively unimportant countries. He was at the height of his power and prestige, and the future of the newly liberated republics seemed to rest in his hands. In his efforts to establish the new governments on a firm basis, however, he faced obstacles which no one man could possibly overcome—obstacles which he himself saw more clearly than most of his contemporaries. Political inexperience, local jealousies, and personal ambitions, of which his own was not the least, were to make the last years of his life an anti-climax and a failure.

Bolívar had given much thought to the internal political problems of the new republics, and his conception of the form of government that they should adopt was embodied in the famous constitution which he drew up for Bolivia in 1826. This provided for a life president, responsible to no other authority, and empowered to name his own successor. The authority of this uncrowned monarch was to be restricted by making the vice-president the responsible head of the administration, subject to impeachment by the congress and the supreme court. It was further limited by making the judiciary completely independent and by establishing a complicated procedure for the appointment of local officials, though no provision was made for any real local self-government. The legislative power was divided

between three chambers: the tribunes, serving four years, the senators, serving eight years, and the censors, elected for life. Each had the exclusive right to initiate laws on certain subjects, and the approval of two chambers sufficed to make a law effective. The congress was largely self-perpetuating, since the chambers filled vacancies in their own membership from lists of three candidates presented by the electors. These were persons chosen every four years by the votes of those citizens who could read and write. Though there were detailed provisions for the exercise of the right of ecclesiastical patronage by the government, non-Catholics, according to Bolívar's draft, were to have freedom of worship. This provision was too advanced for the members of the Bolivian constituent assembly, who insisted upon the inclusion of a provision forbidding the public exercise of any but the Catholic religion.

With all its cumbersome and obviously unworkable features this so-called *constitución vitalicia* in some respects more nearly responded to the realities of the political situation of Latin America in 1826 than did the constitutions modeled upon that of the United States which several other countries adopted. It at least recognized that the people of the new republics were not yet ready for democratic institutions, and that only a strong, permanent executive could give stability to their governments. The regime that it sought to establish would have been fully as representative as the military autocracies that flourished instead in the Bolivarian republics during the next half century. Its chief weakness lay in the fact that it was so obviously designed to perpetuate the Liberator's personal power.

The constitution was adopted in Bolivia in November, 1826. Sucre, who had been ruling there since the end of the war, was persuaded by the inhabitants to become the Republic's first President, but he consented to serve only for two years because he was anxious to return to the fiancée whom he had left at Quito. About the same time a similar constitution was adopted by a plebiscite in Peru, and Bolívar was proclaimed President for life. The Liberator's project for a great "confederation of the Andes," with himself at its head, seemed near attainment.

Disillusionment came almost immediately. There was already much opposition in Lima, where the military chiefs were less devoted to





Bolívar than his compatriots in Great Colombia who had served with him throughout the war. The Peruvians were offended by the creation of a separate state in Bolivia, which they regarded as a part of their own territory, and they had little desire to be ruled by a man whom they regarded as a foreigner. Dissensions in Colombia had forced the Liberator to return to that country in September, 1826, and thereafter the malcontents became more active. Santa Cruz, who had been left in charge at Lima, went forward loyally with the adoption of the *constitución vitalicia* and the presidential election, but the growing resistance of other leaders soon forced him to set the constitution aside and convoke an assembly to frame another. When this body set up a new government under General La Mar in July, 1827, Bolívar made no effort to reassert his authority.

The trouble in Colombia had arisen from a quarrel between General Páez, who had a great following in Venezuela, and the acting President Santander. Bolívar was able to restore order, but even his own compatriots were less enthusiastic in their loyalty than they had been. Though he resumed control of the Colombian government, popular opposition prevented the adoption of the *constitución vitalicia*, and he was compelled to resort to a dictatorship to keep himself in power. The unhappy story of the Liberator's last three years—the expulsion of Sucre from Bolivia in 1828, the ensuing war between Colombia and Peru, and finally the break-up of Great Colombia itself—will be told in later chapters.

#### THE PERIOD OF ANARCHY

When Bolívar died on his way into exile in 1830, there were many who shared the profound discouragement about the future of the new nations which he expressed in his last days. Throughout the former Spanish colonies, the picture was much the same. Mexico, the wealthiest and most populous of all, was gradually sinking into a state of military anarchy after the overthrow of Iturbide's improvised empire and the adoption of a republican constitution. The Central Americans had been no more successful in their attempt to set up a federal republic. In the River Plate region, civil strife had been almost continuous even during the war with Spain. The hostility of the provinces

to Buenos Aires had prevented the establishment of a national government in Argentina, and Uruguay had become an independent state only after a costly war between the Argentine provinces and Brazil. Chile, on the other side of the Andes, had passed through a period of turmoil, and had hardly yet begun to settle down under the autocratic regime of Portales. Chile enjoyed relative peace after 1830, but in nearly all of the other countries disorder and misrule continued for a generation or more to retard internal progress and to invite foreign intervention. The establishment of orderly political institutions was the great problem that the Latin American states must solve if they were to take their place among the progressive communities of the modern world.

#### OBSTACLES TO POLITICAL STABILITY SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

In most parts of Spanish America the victorious revolutionists set up republican governments, modeled more or less closely upon that of the United States. They hardly realized the difficulty of making such governments work in countries where subject races, exploited and oppressed by the descendents of their conquerors, formed the great mass of the population. The revolution had made little change for the better in the situation of the Indians. The *encomienda* and the *mita* had disappeared, but debt-slavery and lack of land of his own kept the rural laborer dependent upon the creole proprietors. The Negroes also were still in bondage in most of the countries where they formed any large proportion of the working class, and they were not fully emancipated in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru until after the middle of the nineteenth century. The *mestizos*, though their condition had probably improved during the revolution, were still for the most part poor and extremely ignorant. Wealth, education, and social position were virtually the monopoly of the creole aristocracy, still predominantly Spanish in descent though many successful soldiers of humble origin and mixed blood joined its ranks during and after the war. It was this class, generally speaking, which dominated political affairs in the new republics. Its power and its relations to other social groups varied somewhat from country to

country. Conditions in Peru, for example, were very different from those in regions where the Indian population was less numerous, and these differences were to become more important as time went on. But there was no Spanish American republic in the first years of independence where anything like political or social democracy could be said to exist.

#### INEXPERIENCE IN SELF-GOVERNMENT

If the ruling classes had had more political experience, they might perhaps have succeeded in establishing workable representative governments. As it was, the obstacles that confronted them were far more formidable than those that had faced their North American neighbors. The inhabitants of the former British colonies had back of them some centuries of practice in local and provincial self-government. The natives of the Spanish colonies had no such training. One of the effects of the colonial system had been to prevent the growth of any spirit of local initiative and to engender a lack of self-confidence. After the revolution there were very few persons who had even a limited experience in public administration, because the creoles had been excluded from any participation in the autocratic regime imposed upon them by the mother country. Even the municipal councils, where they could hold office, had in no sense been democratic institutions, for the members in nearly every case either bought their positions or were chosen by the outgoing *regidores*. The *cabildos* played an important rôle in the early days of the movement for independence, when without them all organized government might have disappeared, but their aristocratic traditions made them suspect to the patriot military leaders and most of them were soon dissolved or re-organized. Practically all of the machinery of organized government had thus been swept away.

Some of the worst traditions of the old regime unfortunately survived. The Spanish officials, though subject to elaborate if ineffective supervision in matters in which the Crown was interested, were often arbitrary and greedy tyrants in their dealings with the people under them. Their example, since it represented the only form of government that the colonists knew, was naturally followed by many of

their creole successors, despite the efforts of men like Bolívar, San Martín, and Sucre to enforce higher standards of conduct. The whole community had been demoralized by the brutal cruelty of the war, and military chieftains who had been accustomed to oppress and rob friends and enemies alike on the pretext of military necessity continued after peace was restored to look upon public office chiefly as an opportunity for personal profit.

It was difficult under such conditions to operate a complicated system of government taken over from people of a different race and temperament. The creoles could hardly grasp the concept of a president and congress and judiciary, each acting independently in its own sphere, and when authority was further divided between federal and state officials the situation became well-nigh hopeless. There was no accumulated experience or body of precedents to aid in settling disputes about jurisdiction, and few of the political leaders had the forbearance and the spirit of cooperation which such a situation demanded. Furthermore, inexperienced theorists had made some of the new constitutions still more unworkable by the addition of clumsy provisions which enabled a small minority to block the election of a president or to paralyze the legislature. There was no way to settle the disputes that arose in such cases, or which constantly occurred between different branches of the government, except by a resort to force.

#### IMPOSSIBILITY OF HOLDING ELECTIONS

It was virtually impossible to hold real elections. The upper classes alone were given the franchise under most of the early constitutions, but even they hardly knew how to exercise their civic rights. Often they were given no opportunity to do so, for elections were either dispensed with or made a mere farce by military leaders who had fought their way to power and had no intention of relinquishing their authority. Even when the government made a more or less sincere attempt to hold a real election, the result was unsatisfactory. Disputes arose over the qualifications of voters, the counting of the ballots, and the frauds committed by both sides. Since there were no impartial courts to decide such matters, these quarrels led to violence



and it was only natural that the intervention of the authorities to restore order should usually benefit the friends of the government. If higher officials honestly attempted to assure fair play, as many of them did, they could not control their subordinates, who had no desire to lose their positions by permitting the party to be defeated. In short, it was impossible for the Spanish Americans to learn overnight to use democratic procedures which had been developed elsewhere as the result of centuries of practice and under conditions far more favorable to success.

It soon became the general practice for the party in power to control the electoral process so completely that the opposition ordinarily had no hope of winning. Persons not friendly to the government were excluded from the polls by force, whereas its supporters voted as often as they chose. The majority of the upper class and the great mass of the people took no part in what had become a mere form. If necessary, the ballots were fraudulently counted, or the result arbitrarily changed by the president or the congress. The victory of the official candidate came to be regarded as a matter of course, and the only way by which the party in power could be ousted was by revolution. Frequently the opposition did not attempt to contest the election at all.

#### MILITARY DOMINANCE: THE CAUDILLO

With military force the final arbiter, both in disputes between different branches of the government and in the elections, the leaders of the army became the real rulers of the country. Presidents were set up and deposed and congresses were intimidated or dissolved by barracks revolutions. The losing party, if strong enough, sought to nullify the action of the troops at the capital by taking up arms in other parts of the country. *Golpes de cuartel*, as the barracks revolutions were called, and general civil wars were the two ways in which changes of government were normally brought about during the first half century of independence.

The men who thus came into power were rarely fitted by character or training to cope with the problems which confronted the new governments. In Mexico and Peru the army officers were mostly creoles who had served in the Spanish militia and thus had at least some tech-

nical military training, but in the other countries many of them were men of mixed race who had risen from the ranks during the revolution through qualities which had little relation to their ability as statesmen. In general, they formed a powerful privileged caste, subject to trial only by military courts, and drawing at least a portion of their pay even when not on active service. Except in very rare instances, it was the officers alone who directed the army's political activities. A part of the enlisted men were professional soldiers, but the great majority of the rank and file were ignorant Indians or *mestizos*, ill-paid and ill-treated, who had been recruited by force and were serving only because they did not know how to escape. The standing armies were usually small and always inefficient, but they were influential in time of peace because they were the only organized military force.

When civil war came, improvised forces were hastily recruited by both parties. It was here that the *caudillo* played a leading rôle. The *caudillo* was a leader, a man who could command the personal loyalty of a sufficiently large group of friends and followers to make him an important military or political figure. He represented the inclination to exalt personal leadership which has always been a trait of the Spanish character. He might be either a professional soldier, popular among the subordinate officers or the rank and file of the army, or a landowner backed by the tenants and laborers on his own and neighboring estates, or even a politician whose eloquence or other gifts procured him a following. In the earlier period he was usually a hero of the war for independence. Almost always, whether a professional soldier or not, he held high military rank. If his influence was confined to one locality or to one small group, he was usually himself a follower of some more powerful *caudillo* to whom he was bound by ties of friendship and the expectation of favors to be received. His interest in politics, in most cases, was primarily a selfish one—to obtain power and the perquisites of power. Though almost always an ardent member of one of the great political parties, it was not uncommon to find him shifting his allegiance from one camp to another when such action seemed likely to be profitable.

With revolution a normal and almost a necessary part of the political system, governments tended to regard any opposition as an incite-

ment to disorder. For their own protection they imprisoned or exiled leaders whom they regarded as dangerous and kept lesser opponents under constant surveillance. At the first indication of trouble, the government would proclaim a "state of siege," which suspended the citizens' constitutional rights and permitted arbitrary arrests. The lot of members of the party not in power was a hard one. They were the first victims when forced loans were needed for military purposes, and they were persecuted in a great variety of other ways, partly from mere hatred and partly with the deliberate purpose of diminishing their political influence. Political murders, with or without some pretense of following legal forms, were not uncommon. Such treatment often made revolution, with all its dangers, preferable to continued submission, and the result was a vicious circle of revolt to escape from oppression and oppression to prevent revolt.

#### POLITICAL PARTIES

The military chieftains who ruled most of the Latin American countries in the period after the war for independence were usually allied with and supported by civilian political leaders who regarded them as a dangerous but indispensable instrument for maintaining their own party in power. The civil wars often seemed on the surface to be mere contests for offices and spoils, but they could not have assumed such proportions as they did had it not been for controversies over really important social and political issues which divided the ruling class, and to some extent the other classes also, into hostile factions.

Whether these parties called themselves conservatives and liberals, or centralists and federalists, the differences between them were much the same from one country to another. In one camp were many of the landowners and the higher clergy, with their followers among the lower classes, who clung to the surviving features of the colonial social organization, defended the prerogatives of the Church, and distrusted democratic institutions. This group naturally included most of the ex-loyalists, and it was especially strong in cities that had formerly been centers of Spanish power. Primarily interested in the maintenance of the existing order, it often supported military leaders

of humble origin, like Iturbide and Santa Anna in Mexico, Páez in Venezuela, and Flores in Ecuador, when their dictatorships seemed to offer the best means of preserving peace. Opposed to the conservatives were the advocates of more advanced ideas, including many merchants and professional men, often of mixed blood, who resented the creole aristocracy's claims to social and political preeminence. Since the Church was on the other side, the liberals were anticlerical. They also advocated a federal form of government in many countries because they could thus capitalize upon the jealousy of the provinces toward the capital. The position of the Church and the question of centralization or decentralization in government thus became the two great issues in the political struggles of the first half century of independence.

#### THE CHURCH

Catholicism was still the state religion and in most of the republics at least no other sect was officially tolerated. It is true that the Church had suffered much during the war for independence. Most of the higher clergy had been loyalists and the majority of the bishops had either abandoned or been expelled from their dioceses. Without them the clergy was leaderless, and their number rapidly decreased because it was impossible to consecrate new priests. Within a few years, however, this condition had been corrected. Though the Papacy long refused to recognize any of the new republican governments, or to admit their claim to the right of patronage, ways were found to fill the vacant sees and appoint new priests.

The Church still dominated the minds and consciences of the masses of the people and controlled many aspects of their personal lives as it had during the colonial period. It was thus an invaluable ally of the conservative party. It still virtually monopolized education, though not very successful efforts were made in several countries to establish state schools. The prerogatives of the clergy, with their special courts and exemptions from taxation, had been little affected by the change in government. Priests continued to hold important official positions as they had in colonial days. It was inevitable that the Church should be an object of attack by leaders imbued with nineteenth-cen-

tury liberal ideas, especially as its wealth was always a temptation to governments which were chronically in financial straits. Its attempt to defend itself by supporting the conservative party intensified the liberals' anticlericalism. On the other hand, the liberals' determination to confiscate ecclesiastical property, to abolish the *fueros* or special privileges of the clergy, and to bring education, marriage, and burial under lay control, seemed sacrilegious to the more devout portion of the community. Conflicts over questions of this sort, where irreconcilable and tenaciously held personal convictions were involved, were particularly bitter, and sometimes appalling in their consequences.

#### LOCALISMO

The question of federalism likewise aroused violent animosities, because it had its origin in the spirit of *localismo*, or narrow local patriotism, which is one of the outstanding characteristics of the Spanish race. In each country, the inhabitants of the provinces were jealous of the metropolis and predisposed to revolt against any administration functioning there. Their insistent demands for local self-rule led to experiments in decentralization which merely reduced the national government to impotence without establishing tranquillity, for in each state the smaller towns were also jealous of the local capital and often further divided among themselves by inherited feuds. In many places party divisions became a matter of locality rather than of principle, and a town would be predominantly conservative or liberal simply because a neighboring town adhered to the opposite faction. Geographical conditions played a large part in keeping the spirit of *localismo* alive, as they did in Spain, for mountain ranges and tropical jungle were formidable obstacles to any national unity.

#### LACK OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

Geographical obstacles to travel and to the transport of goods were in fact one of the major problems of the new states. Foreign and coast-wise shipping were hampered by the fact that the South and Central American area contains few good natural ports. Communication between one section and another in individual countries was made dif-

ficult by the ranges of the Andes in the west and by the great expanse of uninhabited pampa in the River Plate region. Except in a very few places, there were no roads but rough pack trails, and a journey from the national capital to the important provincial cities required several days or even weeks. A revolution could get well under way before the government heard of it, and the transport of troops to restore order was a slow and dangerous business.

The lack of means of communication also contributed to the economic backwardness which was one of the causes of political instability. Mines and plantations could not be developed when their products could not reach a market. Trade was carried on under difficulties, and standards of living remained low. Even the creole landowners had relatively little to lose by internal disorder, because the theft of a year's crop of corn or the loss of some of the cattle from their carelessly managed ranches was only a temporary misfortune. As a class, they were more interested in politics than in productive enterprises, for they lived in the cities and eagerly sought official positions. The increasingly numerous *mestizos* had equally little interest in the maintenance of stable government. A revolution might mean starvation or death in battle, but on the other hand it offered a welcome change from the monotony and hardship of daily life and an opportunity for plunder and excitement. Ignorant and excitable, these people of mixed blood were easily stirred up by political agitators and formed the majority of those who served voluntarily in the revolutionary armies. The Indians, who served involuntarily, had little to say about the question one way or the other.

#### EFFECTS OF CIVIL WARS

In the chapters that follow a great many civil wars will be mentioned and passed over in one or two brief sentences. It would be impossible to describe each one in detail, but the reader will have but an inadequate picture of the history of Latin America if he does not realize what each of these internal struggles meant to the country where it occurred. Aside from the loss of life, often out of all proportion to the number of troops engaged, there was much suffering among non-combatants. The armies lived off the country, killing

cattle and seizing other food wherever they went, and agriculture and industry were paralyzed because able-bodied men who did not join in the fighting went into hiding to avoid recruiting parties. With the roads unsafe for travel, internal trade ceased and imports and exports, upon which the government revenues depended, fell off. The regular forces on both sides looted and committed other outrages, especially in districts where the people were not in sympathy with them, and irregular guerrillas, many of them mere bandits, terrorized regions outside of the zone of major operations. Too often the country found itself at the mercy of the worst elements in the population, under the irresponsible authority of men whose only claim to importance was their ability to command an ignorant and cruel soldiery. After a war, the general demoralization and the hatreds engendered by political executions and other atrocities made it difficult to establish real peace even when one party won a decisive victory.

Internal disorders frequently embroiled the Latin American states in dangerous international controversies. Europeans and North Americans as well as natives suffered personal injuries and losses of property, and the aftermath of every civil war was a flood of damage claims. Though these were frequently of doubtful validity and usually grossly exaggerated, they were energetically supported by foreign governments. In many cases settlements were effected by agreement or arbitration, but in others continued disorder and financial mismanagement made payment almost impossible. Then foreign powers sent warships, blockaded ports, or even landed troops to force compliance with their demands. Such interventions involved serious dangers, for they might easily lead to a more permanent occupation as one did in Mexico in 1862.

Each of the Spanish American republics in the first years of independence faced the problems that have just been described. Some were more successful than others in dealing with them, and one of the objects of the chapters that follow will be to show why this was: how some were able to become prosperous and progressive nations while others have been less fortunate. A history of Latin America must specially emphasize political development because the establishment of stable government was the first requisite for economic and social progress. Without internal peace it was impossible to attract

the foreign capital necessary for road and railroad building, or to develop natural resources, or to free a part of the revenues of the government for popular education and public-health work. At the same time, stability itself was a result of economic and social progress, and was much more easily attained in countries where rich natural resources were available or where the racial make-up of the population facilitated the improvement of the situation of the masses of the people. Each republic had its peculiar problems and in the course of the nineteenth century what had been one colonial empire developed into a group of separate nations, each with its own traditions and its own individuality.

After the breakdown of Bolívar's Confederation of the Andes, the portions of Spanish South America that had been richest and most populous in colonial times sank into a state of military anarchy and commercial stagnation which deprived them of much of their relative importance. The countries that had comprised the viceroyalties of Peru and New Granada made less progress during the nineteenth century than Argentina and Chile. Their large Indian populations made it much more difficult to establish stable governments based on republican institutions, and geographical conditions handicapped them both in solving internal problems and in developing their trade with foreign countries. The southern republics also passed through many vicissitudes, but the problems that they faced were on the whole less formidable.



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## Chapter IX

### THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

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#### ARGENTINA IN 1810

The territory of Argentina, more than a third the size of that of the continental United States, stretches some 2,300 miles from the tropics in the north to a latitude corresponding to that of Labrador in the south. Except for the Andean foothills in the west and northwest, it is one great unbroken plain. Much of it is unattractive as a home for human beings. The Gran Chaco is a tropical jungle, and much of the west is an arid desert. The vast reaches of Patagonia are of some value for sheep-raising, but they can hardly support any large population. The region which has made Argentina what it is is the *pampa*, the fertile, well-watered central area some six hundred miles square, where the agricultural products of the temperate zone can be produced and where an equable climate permits cattle to graze throughout the year. It is here, north, south, and west of Buenos Aires, that the greater part of the Republic's population is concentrated.

This region attracted few settlers during the colonial period. There was little market for agricultural and pastoral products in Europe, and the primitive and intractable Indians were poor material for the sort of exploitation which had enriched the *encomenderos* and the religious orders in Peru and Mexico. Until the last quarter of the eighteenth century it was cut off from the rest of the world by the restrictions of the Spanish commercial system, though the effects of these restrictions were lessened by smuggling. In other ways too, it had been neglected by the Spanish government. This situation was just beginning to change in the generation before independence. Buenos Aires in 1776 became the capital of a viceroyalty that included

modern Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia, as well as the present territory of Argentina, and thenceforth grew rapidly in population and importance. Its trade received a fresh impetus when many British merchants arrived in the River Plate in the wake of Admiral Popham's squadron in 1806 and remained, with the permission of the local authorities, after the invasion was repulsed. In 1810 the city was thought to have 45,000 inhabitants, but it was still an ill-paved, dirty town, with few decent houses and an inadequate supply of food and water. Even as a seaport, it left much to be desired, for vessels had to anchor several miles out and goods and passengers were carried ashore part of the way in lighters and the rest in high-wheeled carts.

The provincial towns were described by an English traveller a few years later as mere secluded villages. The more important of them were hundreds of miles from Buenos Aires, in the western part of the country near the foothills of the Andes and in the far northwest on the road to Upper Peru. Outside of these settlements, the same traveller wrote: "although a few individuals are either scattered along the path, which traverses these vast plains, or are living together in small groups, yet the general state of the country is the same as it has been since the first year of its creation."<sup>1</sup>

#### GAUCHOS AND INDIANS

These scattered country people, the *gauchos* of the pampas, were an important part of the population. Around each settlement were great unfenced *estancias*, or ranches, where the half-wild cattle were from time to time captured and slaughtered for their hides and tallow. It was the *gauchos* who did this work and gave the herds the small amount of care which they received. Living in crudely built, one-room huts furnished with bullocks' skulls in place of chairs, and subsisting mainly on meat and water, these Argentine cowboys were a lawless lot, much given to personal violence and without great respect for property rights. The majority of them, perhaps, had never visited a town. The isolation in which they lived precluded any influence of church or school, but foreign travellers invariably admired their never failing courtesy and hospitality, their reckless courage, and

<sup>1</sup> Head, *Notes on the Pampas*, p. 16.





their marvelous horsemanship. A large proportion of them were of mixed blood, for there was a strong Indian strain among the Argentine people in 1810 and there was also a not inconsiderable number of Negroes.

Even this scattered population occupied only a relatively small part of modern Argentina. The area of settlement was confined to the vicinity of the towns, and in the central pampa it extended only a scant two days' horseback journey south of Buenos Aires and a much shorter distance north of Santa Fe. Beyond, the land was still held by the Indians, some of them living a comparatively civilized life in settled villages and maintaining generally friendly relations with their white neighbors, while others were predatory nomads. Driving with them large herds of horses, which served not only for remounts but for food, the hostile tribes often travelled hundreds of miles to raid small settlements or *estancias*. The Araucanians from southern Chile were especially active in stealing cattle for sale in the Spanish settlements on the western side of the Andes. Indian depredations grew much worse during the political disorders of the first years of independence, when the authorities were unable to maintain adequate forces along the frontier; and some of the tribes hitherto friendly took up arms because the increased demand for hides for export led the white ranchers to encroach on their land. In the province of Santa Fe their raids were so frequent and so destructive that many formerly prosperous districts were almost completely depopulated.

#### OBSTACLES TO UNITY

Travellers between one town and another were thus continually exposed to attacks by Indians or other robbers. The great distances and the lack of improved roads also discouraged intercourse and trade between the different settlements. Heavier goods were transported across the pampas in carts drawn by several yoke of oxen which usually required seven weeks or more to reach Mendoza from Buenos Aires. Persons with little baggage, however, could make the same journey in a few days, travelling at a break-neck gallop, mounted or in a springless carriage, with frequent changes of horses. Wayfarers slept under the stars or in a comfortless, vermin-infested post-hut,

and depended for food on cattle lassoed along the road. The owners apparently made no objection to the killing of these animals if they themselves were able afterwards to recover the hides, the only part that had a market value.

To weld the scattered Argentine provinces into a united nation was clearly a difficult task. Aside from difficulties of intercommunication, there were other factors which complicated the task of setting up a stable central government. The viceroyalty of La Plata had been a political rather than an economic unit. Mendoza and the other western provinces still maintained closer relations with Chile, whence their original settlers had come, than with Buenos Aires, and the northern provinces had their chief contact with the outside world through Lima. The people of each district were jealous and distrustful of those of other districts, and especially of the creole leaders at Buenos Aires. The spirit of *localismo*, which caused bloodshed in so many parts of Latin America during the first half of the nineteenth century, was intensified in Argentina by real differences in interests and points of view. The anticlerical policy of the early governments at Buenos Aires seemed outrageous to interior communities like Jujuy, where an American adventurer serving as a colonel in the revolutionary army was imprisoned for three months for inadvertently failing to fall on his knees as the Eucharist was carried through the streets,<sup>1</sup> and the provincial towns resented the fact that the merchants at Buenos Aires controlled all of their trade with the outside world and levied a profit on their exports and imports.

#### INTERNAL POLITICS, 1810-1816

We have seen how the *junta* set up by the revolutionists in 1810 failed in its attempt to make its authority respected in several outlying provinces of the former viceroyalty. Upper Peru, after the defeat of three expeditions sent between 1810 and 1815 to assist the revolutionists there, remained under Spanish control until the territory was occupied by Sucre in 1825. Paraguay became independent under a government of its own a few months after its inhabitants repulsed Belgrano's expedition in 1811. The *Banda Oriental* fell under the con-

<sup>1</sup> King, *Twenty-Four Years in the Argentine Republic* (New York edition), pp. 50 ff.

trol first of Artigas and then of Brazil. Even in the territories that continued to maintain some political connection with Buenos Aires the prestige and authority of the central government rapidly declined.

The government itself passed through many vicissitudes. The patriot *junta* established after the May revolution was enlarged in December, 1810, by the incorporation of deputies from the provinces and thus acquired more claim to be recognized as representative of the nation as a whole; but its membership was now too large for the effective conduct of business. Disputes within its ranks lessened its prestige. Cornelio Saavedra, commander of the aristocratic *legión de patricios* and president of the *junta*, quarreled with Mariano Moreno, its brilliant and enthusiastic secretary, and Moreno resigned after unsuccessfully opposing the enlargement of the *junta* in December. He died soon afterward while en route to Europe on a diplomatic mission. In April, 1811, several members of his faction were expelled from the *junta* after a military demonstration staged by the *Saavedristas*. In June the Argentine forces in Upper Peru were defeated at Huaqui and Saavedra himself was exiled. In September the *junta* transferred much of its authority to an executive committee of three members. A representative assembly was convened, but almost immediately dissolved when it attempted to assume supreme authority. In October, 1812, a new triumvirate was placed in office by a military revolt in which two of the principal leaders were San Martín and Carlos de Alvear, who had recently arrived from Europe to offer their services to the cause of independence.

The second triumvirate ordered the election of a general constituent assembly, which met in 1813 with delegates from most of the interior provinces. This body failed to adopt a constitution, or even to make any specific declaration of independence from Spain, but it adopted a series of measures which definitely terminated the colonial regime in Argentina, abolishing the use of the royal coat of arms and the invocation of the sovereign's name in official acts, suppressing entails and titles of nobility, and putting an end, legally at least, to forced labor by the Indians. Furthermore, all persons brought into the country or born there in the future were declared free, although the existing Negro slaves, of whom there were a considerable number, were not emancipated. The work of the assembly was to a great extent

dominated by Alvear and his associates, and in January, 1814, Alvear's uncle, Gervasio Posadas, was elected to the newly created position of "Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the River Plate."

It was this assembly which refused to admit the delegates sent by José Artigas and caused that leader to withdraw from the operations against Montevideo. The great *caudillo* of the *Banda Oriental* thus became the leader of a strong element in the provinces which opposed the dominance of Buenos Aires and demanded "federalism" or local self-government. We have already seen how he gained control of much of the River Plate region, only to be driven into exile after his defeat by the Portuguese, and how his former lieutenants remained in control of the "littoral" provinces—Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, and Corrientes—after his overthrow. The struggle that he had begun was to keep Argentina involved in almost continuous civil war for several years.

The "unitarians," who stood for a centralized government dominated by the conservative element and in particular by the aristocracy at Buenos Aires, continued to exercise a precarious and constantly decreasing authority in the capital and in a number of interior provinces. They were weakened by factional quarrels, and in April, 1815, Alvear, who succeeded Posadas as Director, was overthrown by a revolt at Buenos Aires. General Rondeau, the commander of the army in Upper Peru, was elected in his place. As the new chief executive could not return immediately to Buenos Aires, a provisional director was appointed but he was soon ousted by a new uprising. War with the federalists also broke out afresh.

#### THE CONGRESS OF TUCUMÁN

It was under these circumstances that a national congress representing the provinces that recognized the authority of the regime at Buenos Aires met early in 1816. The Congress had been convened at Tucumán in the hope of diminishing provincial jealousy of the capital. It faced a discouraging prospect. Since the restoration of the Bourbons in Spain the revolutionary movement had been suppressed in all other parts of America, and Rondeau's defeat at Sipe Sipe had just put an end to the third attempt which Argentine forces had made



since 1810 to invade the royalist stronghold in Upper Peru. The reconquest of northern Argentina was prevented only by the heroic resistance of Martín Guemes, Governor of Salta, who organized a strong force of *gauchos* which held the frontier until the tide turned in favor of the patriots. San Martín, who was to turn the tide, was still quietly recruiting and training the "Army of the Andes" at Mendoza, and few would have predicted the successes which this force was to obtain within the next twelve months. The danger from Spain, and the almost equally alarming internal situation, led the congress to consider the monarchist schemes that have already been discussed in Chapter VII, and caused its leaders to acquiesce in, or perhaps even to encourage, the Portuguese attack on Artigas in the *Banda Oriental*. At the same time, by adopting a formal declaration of independence on July 9, 1816, the delegates made it clear that they had no intention of submitting to a restoration of the colonial regime.

In the preceding May the Congress had elected Juan Martín de Pueyrredón Supreme Director of the United Provinces for a three-year term. Pueyrredón did a great service to the cause of Spanish American independence by his support of San Martín, but the victories which the Argentine forces won on the other side of the Andes did not suffice to maintain the new regime's prestige at home. The Congress lost favor in the provinces when it moved from Tucumán to Buenos Aires in 1817, and its monarchical projects and its inaction in the face of the Portuguese invasion of Uruguay aroused opposition even in the capital. The littoral provinces remained under the control of Artigas and his allies, and local *caudillos* in other districts showed less and less respect for the Director's authority. When the Congress adopted the constitution of 1819, providing for a centralized form of government, the provincial leaders became more hostile. Pueyrredón, thoroughly discouraged, refused to accept a second term when his first expired, and in 1820 Rondeau, his successor, was overwhelmed by the federalists in the battle of Cepeda.

#### THE MONTONERAS

For several years Argentina had no central government at all. The chief federalist leaders, after Artigas' defeat by the Portuguese, were

Estanislao López, the *caudillo* of Santa Fe, and Francisco Ramírez of Entre Ríos. These two soon engaged in a war between themselves, and when this ended with the death of Ramírez, López was content to entrench himself in Santa Fe where he ruled for twenty years (1818-38). Other provinces fell under the control of local *caudillos* who were constantly embroiled in struggles against enemies at home or leaders in neighboring districts.

Frequently the new rulers of the country were the cruel and ignorant leaders of the *montoneras*, undisciplined hordes of *gaucho* cavalry which had begun to commit depredations on the pampas in the first years of independence. These bands owed their rise in part at least to economic changes which were making the *gauchos'* lot harder and which were eventually to compel them to give up altogether their wild free life on the plains. With the advent of freer trade, the increased demand for hides and salt beef for export made the landowners less willing to have their cattle killed indiscriminately, so that the one food upon which the country people depended was becoming more difficult to obtain. This tended to force the *gauchos* into more regular work for the great landowners, and their dependence was increased by need for protection against the more and more frequent raids of the wild Indians. With their intense love of personal freedom, many preferred to join the first leader who promised a chance for excitement and plunder in a military campaign. Though they were found in the armies on both sides, the sympathies of the majority were with the federalists against Buenos Aires, and it was they who contributed most to the overthrow of the unitarians in 1820. The men whom they brought into power were sometimes professional soldiers like Artigas or landowners like Estanislao López, but more often savage and ignorant barbarians like themselves. The most famous chieftain of the latter type was Facundo Quiroga who for many years maintained a reign of terror in La Rioja and several neighboring provinces.

#### BUENOS AIRES, 1820-1824

Buenos Aires, after the federalist triumph, passed through a short period of extreme disorder. López and other leaders of the victorious

party constantly interfered in the city's internal affairs, and there were nine changes of government within as many months. Finally, in September, 1820, Martín Rodríguez became governor of the province, and a powerful landowner named Juan Manuel de Rosas, who had his own private *gaucho* army, helped the new administration to restore tranquility. López' interference ended when Rosas personally furnished 25,000 head of cattle for delivery to Santa Fe as the price of peace. This was the first appearance on the political scene of the man who was later to become one of the most famous of Argentina's rulers. As the result of his intervention, Buenos Aires enjoyed several years of relative tranquility during a period when chaotic conditions ruled in the other provinces.

The outstanding personage of Rodríguez' administration was Bernardino Rivadavia, who had just returned to the country after eight years in Europe. As minister of state, Rivadavia put into effect a whole series of reforms in the civil government and the courts, and in the economic and ecclesiastical institutions of the province. A university was founded at Buenos Aires, and an effort was made to improve the system of primary instruction. Foreign commerce increased rapidly, and the government's growing prestige abroad was evidenced by the fact that it was able to obtain a \$3,000,000 loan in England for port works and for the improvement of the city water supply. Buenos Aires somewhat presumptuously assumed the right during this period to represent the nation as a whole in dealing with foreign countries, and it was with the provincial government that the United States entered into diplomatic relations when it recognized Argentina's independence in 1822.

#### EFFORTS TO RESTORE THE UNION

Despite the strength of the centrifugal tendencies, a desire for national unity persisted. The provinces realized the need for cooperation for mutual defense, and the commercial dependence of the other regions upon Buenos Aires made it impossible for them to remain entirely independent. There had been an abortive attempt to convene a national congress when peace was established between Buenos Aires and Santa Fe in 1820. In 1822 these provinces had joined

with Entre Ríos and Corrientes in the "quadrilateral treaty" providing for mutual aid in case of aggression from Brazil. Toward the end of Rodríguez' term, Rivadavia persuaded him to send missions to the other provinces urging them to join in a new effort to establish a national government, and in December, 1824, after Rodríguez had been succeeded as governor by General Las Heras, a general constituent assembly met at Buenos Aires with delegates from all of the provinces. This congress decided that the provinces should continue to manage their own affairs pending the adoption of a constitution, but in February, 1826, it created a national executive and elected Rivadavia President of the United Provinces in order to conduct more effectively the war that had just begun with Brazil.

#### THE WAR WITH BRAZIL

It will be remembered that the Portuguese had conquered the *Banda Oriental* between 1816 and 1820. The territory continued to form a province of Brazil after that country became independent, and many of its leaders took refuge in Buenos Aires. In April, 1825, a small band of these, the famous Thirty-Three, crossed the river and started an insurrection, and a few months later an assembly meeting in the territory which they controlled voted to reunite the province with Argentina. When the Congress at Buenos Aires approved their action, Brazil declared war. A hastily organized Argentine squadron under Admiral Brown, an Irish soldier of fortune, defeated the Brazilian fleet in the River Plate, and land forces from Buenos Aires, with smaller contingents from other provinces, won an important victory at Ituzaingó in February, 1827.

The effect of these successes was nullified by renewed quarrels between the federalists and the unitarians. The latter, led by Rivadavia, controlled the Congress, and the constitution which the delegates adopted on July 19, 1826, represented their views and was consequently unacceptable to the provinces. Local *caudillos* like Quiroga and Bustos, the ruler of Córdoba, turned against the new central government, and even at Buenos Aires the feeling against Rivadavia was strong, because the Congress at his suggestion had passed a law separating the capital city from the province of the same name and creat-

ing a separate federal district. Confronted by such grave difficulties at home, Rivadavia accepted British mediation to bring about peace with Brazil. When the Argentine representative signed a treaty recognizing the *Banda Oriental* as Brazilian territory the unpopularity of the government increased, even though Rivadavia repudiated the agreement and prepared to continue the war. In July, 1827, the President resigned. His successor, Vicente López, stayed in office only long enough to dissolve the congress and restore to the provinces the control of their own affairs.

Manuel Dorrego, who became Governor of Buenos Aires Province, resumed peace negotiations with Brazil. Again the British government intervened and thanks to its diplomatic pressure the Emperor Dom Pedro I was induced to agree to the creation in the *Banda Oriental* of the independent Republic of Uruguay. The treaty, signed September 5, 1828, was ratified by an Argentine congress meeting at Santa Fe. This body had been convened to pave the way for the organization of a new national government, but it had accomplished little along this line when its work was cut short by a fresh outbreak of civil war.

#### THE ADVENT OF ROSAS

Dorrego's election brought Buenos Aires, like most of the other provinces, under federalist control, but the new governor was in office only a few months before he was overthrown by General Lavalle, returning with troops which had been fighting against Brazil. When Dorrego was hastily put to death without even a trial, his friend Juan Manuel de Rosas started a counter-revolution with active assistance from federalist leaders in other provinces. Lavalle, defeated, retired to Uruguay, but José María Paz, another veteran of the Brazilian war, carried on the struggle in the interior, overthrowing Governor Bustos at Córdoba and twice defeating the redoubtable Quiroga in pitched battles. Several of the western provinces had again been brought under unitarian control when Paz was accidentally captured by a small band of federalists in May, 1831. This ended the war. The federalist *caudillos* resumed their sway in the provinces, and no further attempt was made for the time being to establish a national government.

Rosas, meanwhile, had been in power as governor at Buenos Aires since December, 1829. The new governor was a rich landowner and business man, well educated and of an aristocratic family. He had by choice spent much of his life among the *gauchos* and Indians of the frontier, adopting their ways and winning their enthusiastic admiration by his strength and courage and his brilliant horsemanship. The well-disciplined and devoted army which he maintained on his vast estates in the southern part of Buenos Aires Province had played a part occasionally in the civil wars of the preceding ten years, but had been occupied chiefly in defending his own property and that of his neighbors against the raids of hostile Indians. Even among these savages, however, he had many devoted friends, and the unitarians frequently accused him of encouraging these allies to make raids on districts where his political leadership was not accepted.

Rosas was an able administrator, and the people of Buenos Aires enjoyed a welcome period of tranquility during the three years of his first term in office. In 1832 the legislature begged him to continue, but he refused. Instead he organized a campaign against the Indians south and west of the city, opening a new stretch of the pampa to white settlement, and still further increasing his own prestige. Meanwhile, his followers created serious disturbances in the capital, compelling two governors in succession to resign, and in 1834 the legislature again besought him to accept the governorship. He refused several times, but in March, 1835, he finally consented after insisting upon the holding of a plebiscite in which the voters granted him unlimited dictatorial power.

#### ROSAS' DICTATORSHIP

During the next seventeen years Rosas was the real ruler of Argentina. Legally he was merely Governor of Buenos Aires Province, but his preponderant military power and financial resources enabled him to impose governors of his own choice in many other provinces. Potential rivals in the federalist party were soon disposed of. The most dangerous of these were Quiroga, who dominated most of the western provinces, and López of Santa Fe, whose lieutenants, the Reynafé brothers, controlled Córdoba. In 1835 Quiroga was mur-

dered while passing through Córdoba on a mission that Rosas had persuaded him to undertake. There was more than a suspicion that Rosas had instigated this act, but whatever the truth of the matter, he made it the pretext for overthrowing the Reynafés and putting two of them to death. Córdoba thus fell under the control of one of Rosas' own followers, and López' influence was so greatly impaired that he was thenceforth little more than a lieutenant of Rosas.

Several of the Argentine provinces had entered into an offensive and defensive alliance and created a shadowy sort of national government under the Federal Pact of 1831, and all of them now conferred upon Rosas the responsibility for representing them in dealings with other nations. Otherwise they were still theoretically independent, but in fact Argentina became unified under Rosas as it had not been under any preceding government. Buenos Aires came more and more to be the political and commercial capital, and a national point of view took the place of the intense provincialism of the earlier period. Rosas' lieutenants were brutal petty despots, but they suppressed banditry and made the roads safe for travel. Comparative security encouraged agriculture and stock-raising, and foreign capital rapidly increased.

Rosas came to power partly because of his prestige and popularity among the common people, and partly because the property owners and merchants of Buenos Aires, after the heavy losses that they had suffered from civil strife, were glad to accept a ruler who promised to maintain order. He apparently enjoyed strong support from both of these classes throughout his long tenure of office. At the same time he had many enemies, and in dealing with these his regime was an intolerant and sanguinary dictatorship. The official motto "Long live the Argentine Confederation; death to the savage unitarians," appeared in all public documents. A great number of citizens were executed for participating in revolutionary conspiracies, and many others were killed or mistreated merely because they fell under suspicion. An unofficial band of cutthroats, called the *Mazorca*, and an extensive spy system helped to maintain a demoralizing reign of terror. Opponents who escaped by flight lost all of their property and it was alleged that many were compelled to leave the country by threats and mistreatment simply to make possible the confiscation of

their estates. Rosas' system was perhaps no more atrocious than many others which have flourished in the Western Hemisphere, but it attracted much attention abroad and gave him an unenviable distinction as the classical example of Latin American tyranny.

Almost from the time when he took office, Rosas was embroiled in conflicts with other governments. In 1837-38, he was at war with Santa Cruz, the ruler of Bolivia and Peru, and a little later he was involved in desultory hostilities with Paraguay, which was beginning under the elder López to emerge from its long isolation. Much more important was his intervention in Uruguay. Rivera, the first president of that republic, had angered Rosas by granting asylum to a number of Argentine political exiles, and in 1836 when Rivera revolted against his successor, Oribe, Rosas came to the latter's support. This was the beginning of a long struggle which was soon complicated by a conflict with France.

#### THE FRANCO-BRITISH INTERVENTION

For several years there had been a dispute with France over a law requiring all foreigners in Buenos Aires to serve in the provincial militia. More recently there had been trouble over pecuniary claims. Rosas had arrogantly refused to settle these questions, and in 1838 the French government, partly for internal political reasons, decided to take a more aggressive course. It first established a blockade of Buenos Aires. When this produced no result pressure was applied in the shape of aid to Rosas' enemies. Oribe was driven out of Montevideo and a joint French-Uruguayan expedition seized Martín García Island, which commanded river navigation on the Paraná. The trade of Buenos Aires was severely affected, but Rosas refused to yield. French efforts to overthrow him by supporting a unitarian revolution were a miserable failure and merely resulted in wholesale killings of persons suspected of disaffection in Buenos Aires. By 1840, political developments at home and in the Near East made the French government ready to withdraw from an adventure which was clearly unprofitable, and a treaty was signed under which the French claims were to be arbitrated and the blockade withdrawn.

Rosas promptly violated one provision of this treaty by renewing



his aid to Oribe. This involved him in fresh trouble with France and also with the British government, which objected to the protracted civil war in Uruguay because of its effect on foreign commercial interests. In 1845 both powers blockaded Buenos Aires and landed forces to assist Rivera in the defense of Montevideo. An Argentine squadron under Admiral Brown was captured, and a British expedition was sent up the Paraná River to aid the unitarians who had obtained control of Corrientes and, if possible, to open up trade with Paraguay. Despite all this activity the joint intervention was ineffective. Rosas was defiant and his successful resistance to two great foreign powers increased his prestige in Argentina. Pressure from the numerous British merchants in Argentina and renewed friction between England and France made the British government reluctant to continue the blockade indefinitely, and in spite of Rosas' rejection of all conciliatory proposals it withdrew its forces in July, 1847. France was compelled to do likewise a year later.

#### THE FALL OF ROSAS

Before Oribe could take the beleaguered city of Montevideo, the *riveristas* found new allies whose help was more effective than that of the European navies. The powerful governor of Entre Ríos, Justo José de Urquiza, had been restive for some time and had protested in vain against Rosas' commercial policy which hurt the trade of the other provinces, and he had quarreled with the governor of Santa Fe, who was completely under Rosas' influence. When he prepared for an open break, he was supported by the government of Brazil, which wished to prevent the Argentine dictator's imminent triumph in Uruguay. In 1851 he declared that the Province of Entre Ríos had withdrawn the authority conferred on Rosas under the Federal Pact of 1831 and led an army into Uruguay.

Oribe was quickly compelled to come to terms with the defense government at Montevideo, and contingents from Uruguay and Brazil, with a number of exiles from Buenos Aires, joined the force with which Urquiza marched against Rosas. When the dictator's troops were defeated at Monte Caseros on February 3, 1852, the whole regime collapsed. Rosas resigned and fled with his daughter

Manuela to England, where he lived in poverty until his death twenty-five years later.

#### THE CONSTITUTION OF 1853

Urquiza, as a matter of course, became the new ruler of Argentina. The provincial government that he set up at Buenos Aires under Dr Vicente López y Planes joined with Entre Ríos, Corrientes, and Santa Fe in conferring upon him the direction of foreign affairs, and on May 31, 1852, a meeting attended by all the provincial governors signed the agreement of San Nicolás, which gave him the control of all military forces and authorized him to make use of a portion of the customs receipts at Buenos Aires pending the holding of a constitutional convention.

This convention met a few months later at Santa Fe, and the constitution that it adopted on May 1, 1853, is still in force. In doing their work, the delegates followed rather closely proposals made in a book which the distinguished Argentine jurist, J B Alberdi, had just published under the title *Bases and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic*. Alberdi, after examining the reasons for the failure to establish political stability under earlier Argentine constitutions, had reached the conclusion that what the country needed was a federal form of government in which the central authorities would have sufficient power to maintain order and national unity without suffocating the local desire for autonomy in the provinces—a form of government, in short, very similar to that of the United States. The constitution went into effect at once in all the provinces except Buenos Aires and on March 5, 1854, General Urquiza was inaugurated as President of the Republic.

#### THE SEPARATION AND REUNION OF BUENOS AIRES, 1852-1862

The Province of Buenos Aires held aloof from the new government Urquiza, after his long association with Rosas, had few friends among the former political exiles who now controlled affairs at the former capital, and who feared that the ruler of Entre Ríos would simply establish a new dictatorship in place of the old. This group

included several notable figures: the future Presidents Mitre and Sarmiento, Valentín Alsina, who had carried on an effective newspaper campaign against Rosas at Montevideo, and Dalmacio Vélez Sársfield, later the author of the Argentine civil code. Neither they nor the faction that had formerly supported Rosas had any desire to submit to a ruler from another province, and they were soon in open revolt against Urquiza's leadership. In June, 1852, the Buenos Aires legislature forced the new provincial governor to resign and refused to approve the agreement of San Nicolás. Urquiza dissolved the legislature and installed a regime under his own control, but this was overthrown on September 11 by a revolutionary movement under Valentín Alsina. A new effort to reduce the city to obedience failed when the foreign officer who commanded Urquiza's squadron was induced by bribery to betray him. Buenos Aires did not send delegates to the constitutional convention and the spirit of separatism became stronger when it was learned that that body had passed a law providing that the city should be separated from the province and placed under direct control of the federal government. The law did not go into effect because Buenos Aires did not ratify the constitution.

For nine years, the Argentine Republic, with its capital at Paraná in Entre Ríos, and the Province of Buenos Aires were separate independent states. Both made notable progress during this period. Much attention was devoted to education, and foreign trade increased. One of Urquiza's most important acts was the signature of treaties in 1853 with Great Britain, France, and the United States by which the Paraná and Uruguay Rivers were opened to international commerce. It is in the 1850's that the great influx of immigrants, which was soon to transform the nation's social and economic life, may be said to have begun. Several thousand British arrived to take up sheep raising, and agricultural colonies were established by Swiss and other Europeans in Santa Fe and Entre Ríos. The introduction of wheat growing in these colonies was one of the important events in Argentina's economic history.

It was nevertheless impossible for the two states to continue indefinitely as separate political units. Though Urquiza gave up the attempt to control Buenos Aires, and friendly relations were temporarily established, new causes of conflict soon appeared. In 1856 the govern-

ment at Paraná imposed discriminatory duties on foreign goods transhipped at Buenos Aires, hoping in this way to increase foreign trade at Rosario. Three years later Urquiza's enemy Alsina, who had recently become Governor of Buenos Aires, decreed retaliatory measures. This led to war, and on October 23, 1859, Urquiza defeated the Buenos Aires army under General Mitre at Cepeda. Soon afterward a friendly agreement was reached by which Buenos Aires entered the Federation on the understanding that certain changes be made in the constitution. The capital remained for the time being at Paraná.

A new conflict occurred when the federal congress refused to admit delegates from Buenos Aires on the ground that they had not been elected under the federal constitution. The *Porteños*, as the people of the seaport were called, decided to secede from the federation and both sides prepared for war. Urquiza, who had been succeeded as President in March, 1860, by Santiago Derqui, took command of the federal army. Hostility that soon developed between him and Derqui was a help to the *Porteños*, and at the battle of Pavón, on September 17, 1861, he was defeated by Bartolomé Mitre, the new Governor of Buenos Aires. The latter now assumed provisional control of the federal government, and in October, 1862, he was elected President of the Republic for a six-year term.

#### THE PRESIDENCY OF MITRE

Mitre was perhaps the greatest of a group of able presidents under whose leadership Argentina made rapid progress during the last half of the nineteenth century. Though only forty-one at the time of his election, he had already had a notable career. For several years, beginning when he was barely seventeen, he had taken part in the defense of Montevideo against Rosas. Later he had fought in civil wars in Bolivia and directed newspapers there and in Chile, returning to Argentina in time to command an artillery force at Monte Caseros. Thereafter he became the most influential leader of the party that upheld the autonomy of Buenos Aires against Urquiza and the Confederation. He had nevertheless welcomed national unity on terms which seemed to safeguard the interests of Buenos Aires, and it was under his presidency that the union was established on a firm and

lasting basis. He was not only a statesman and soldier but a prolific poet, a journalist, and an historian. *La Nación* of Buenos Aires, which he founded, is today one of the world's great newspapers, and his books on San Martín and Belgrano are still indispensable to students of South American history.

As President, Mitre was compelled to deal with several difficult problems. One of them was a dispute over the location of the federal capital. Mitre proposed that the entire province of Buenos Aires become a federal district under the central government's direct control, but this was violently opposed by the provincial legislature, and as a compromise the national government was finally permitted to reside temporarily in Buenos Aires without interfering with the autonomy of the provincial government. Another problem was the maintenance of order. There were troublesome minor revolutionary movements in the interior, and in 1863-64, *montoneras* under a chief named Peñaloza, but commonly called "El Chaco," terrorized a great area in the north and west. It was only gradually that the more distant provinces felt the full effect of the establishment of a strong national government. Urquiza, despite the fact that he had been Mitre's chief political opponent, continued as Governor of Entre Ríos until he was killed by one of his own subordinates in 1870.

The most serious test of the new government's stability was the war with Paraguay, between 1865 and 1870, which will be described more fully in Chapter XI. Argentina was drawn into this conflict when Francisco Solano López' troops marched through Corrientes to attack Brazil, and Mitre himself took command of the allied Argentine-Brazilian-Uruguayan armies. As the war dragged on with few successes to offset the great expense and the heavy allied losses, there was much discontent and the President had to suppress two small revolts in the interior. In 1869 he turned over the conduct of the Paraguayan operations to the Brazilian Marshal Caxias and returned to Buenos Aires for the final months of his presidential term.

#### SARMIENTO AND AVELLANEDA

With the election of 1868, the control of the government passed out of the hands of the *Porteño* group. Mitre did not attempt to im-

pose a candidate of his own, and an epidemic of cholera which drove many people from the capital made it difficult for the leaders at Buenos Aires to oppose successfully the candidate supported by the governors of several other provinces. The new President was Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who, like Mitre, had spent much of his life abroad as a political exile. Sarmiento's greatest achievement was in the field of public instruction. He had himself taught school for several years at different stages of his career and had had charge of public instruction in Buenos Aires during the period when the province was an independent state. During the last years of Mitre's administration he had been Minister at Washington, where he had devoted much time to a study of the educational institutions which he regarded as the basis of North American prosperity. He became a friend and admirer of Horace Mann and was much influenced by the latter's ideas. As President, he undertook a comprehensive reform of the whole Argentine educational system, and as a first step founded several normal schools and engaged a group of teachers from the United States to work in them.

Though Sarmiento had lived for some years at the national capital he was a native of San Juan, and he owed his election to a combination of the other provinces against Buenos Aires. The *Porteños* had little participation in his administration, and the "Córdoba League," as the provincial party was called, was in a position to control the next presidential election in 1874. Sarmiento himself attempted to maintain a scrupulous neutrality, but he could not prevent the use of oppression and fraud by his subordinates, and Nicolás Avellaneda of Tucumán defeated Mitre, who was again the *Porteño* candidate. Mitre revolted, but the uprising was suppressed after a short campaign. The very lenient treatment accorded to the vanquished party was in marked contrast to the bloody scenes which had characterized unsuccessful revolts in the preceding generation.

Avellaneda had been Sarmiento's minister of public instruction and he continued the educational work of his predecessor as well as the other enlightened policies which were steadily increasing the prestige of the federal government at home and abroad. The most important accomplishment of his administration was the conquest of the rich pampa south and west of Buenos Aires, hitherto held by wild Indians

whose raids made life and property unsafe even in the near vicinity of the white settlements. General Roca, the minister of war, led troops into this territory in 1878-79 and systematically exterminated the savages. His operations opened up a vast tract of fertile land for stock-raising and agriculture. Unfortunately most of the land was sold in large tracts to speculators or influential politicians instead of being made available to the immigrants who were now arriving in ever-greater numbers from Europe.

#### THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT

The status of the national capital, still unsettled, was a constant danger to the Republic's tranquility. The Province of Buenos Aires was far wealthier and more populous than any of the others and its people bitterly resented being deprived of the controlling voice in national affairs which they had had in the first years of national union. The attempt to have federal and provincial authorities live side by side in the same city led to much friction, and there was always the possibility that an uprising in the capital might overthrow an administration controlled by political groups from other parts of the Republic. To strengthen the federal government's position, the leaders of the Córdoba group revived the proposal to convert the city of Buenos Aires into a federal district, a suggestion which infuriated the *Porteños*. It became the chief issue in the presidential campaign of 1880, in which General Roca, with the support of all of the provinces except Buenos Aires and Corrientes, was the official candidate.

Since the latter's victory was a foregone conclusion unless the *Porteños* resorted to force, Governor Tejedor of Buenos Aires, who was the opposing candidate, began to recruit and drill troops. Open warfare began in June, 1880. The federal government withdrew to Belgrano, in the suburbs, but after a sharp conflict its forces compelled the leaders in the city to surrender. The municipality of Buenos Aires was now separated from the province and made a federal district, in which only the central government exercised any authority. The province later set up a new capital at La Plata, but although it continued to be one of the most important sections of the Republic, it could no longer hope, after its dismemberment, to dominate the

nation's political affairs. A political issue which had caused trouble from the first years of independence thus virtually disappeared.

#### THE BEGINNING OF MODERN ARGENTINA

Roca's administration saw the beginning of an astonishingly rapid economic development which was to continue during the next generation. In 1880 Argentina was a backward country as compared with some of its South American neighbors. There was more security for life and property than there had been twenty years earlier, but travellers still compared the Republic unfavorably in this respect with Brazil. Though the central government's authority had increased, affairs in many of the provinces were dominated by irresponsible *caudillos* or unprogressive land-owning oligarchies. There was not even a national currency, so that a person going from one province to another must change his money as though he were entering a foreign country. In the interior, local disturbances, as well as the more important national civil wars, had made some sections poorer if anything than before 1810. Even in more prosperous regions little land was under cultivation and cattle were raised mainly for their hides and to make *tasaño* or jerked beef.

The changes that were to create modern Argentina were already at work. Most important was the transformation of the live-stock industry in response to the rapidly increasing European demand for meat products. The establishment of a more stable government had given the landowners a greater sense of security and they had begun as early as 1870 to import fine cattle from abroad and to make great changes in the administration of the *estancias*.<sup>1</sup>

Water was provided for the flocks and herds, ranges fenced, breeding regulated, pure-bred stock introduced by the thousands, measures taken to control the ravages of the tick, slaughtering and chilling plants constructed and, most significant of all, alfalfa ranges established on almost every estancia.

After Roca exterminated the Pampas Indians in 1878-79, the area available for cattle-raising had been greatly increased and Patagonia had been made safer for white occupation, so that sheep-herding de-

<sup>1</sup> Jones, *South America*, p. 312.



veloped there on a large scale. The introduction of refrigerator ships in 1877 opened up new possibilities. Frozen beef, and later chilled beef took the place of *tasaño*, and sheep were raised for their meat as well as for their wool.

A substantial beginning had also been made in railroad construction. Starting in 1863, the North American promoter William Wheelwright built a line from Rosario to Córdoba with British capital, and this was later extended to Tucumán. There were shorter lines elsewhere, especially in the Province of Buenos Aires, so that the country had a total of 1,500 miles of railway in 1880. The promoters were in most cases given grants of land along the right of way, much of which they sold in small holdings to foreign immigrants. The newcomers devoted themselves mainly to tilling the soil, an occupation always uncongenial to the *gaucho*; and about 1880 the Republic began, for the first time, to export wheat instead of importing it for local consumption.

Progress was much more rapid after 1880. Roca greatly strengthened the power of the central government by a firm but at the same time conciliatory policy. In the six years of his administration railway mileage more than doubled, the tonnage of ships calling at Argentine ports increased threefold, and immigration, encouraged by peaceful conditions and reports of the country's prosperity, reached figures hitherto unknown. Land values went up rapidly and many of the *estancieros* found themselves tremendously wealthy. The Province of Buenos Aires, which occupied the more fertile portion of the pampa and which had successfully asserted a claim to the best part of lands recently conquered from the Indians, profited far more by this development than did the interior provinces.

#### JUÁREZ CELMÁN AND THE REVOLT OF 1890

This phenomenal prosperity continued into the first years of the term of Dr. Miguel Juárez Celmán, who succeeded Roca in 1886, but it was soon followed by a reaction. Reckless speculation had created unsound business conditions and the policy of the government, under the new administration, made matters worse. The new President was a brother-in-law of Roca, but the latter's influence was soon super-

seded by that of provincial politicians of the Córdoba League, many of whom were incompetent and corrupt. There was an orgy of graft and extravagance, made possible partly by borrowing abroad and partly by large issues of unsecured paper money, and when business conditions began to grow worse the Republic's credit was seriously affected. The financial crisis soon brought on political troubles.

The Córdoba group were naturally unpopular in Buenos Aires, and the administration's opponents were encouraged by support from foreign commercial and financial interests, which were by this time very powerful in Argentina. A political party called the *Unión Cívica*, organized by the leaders in the capital to combat the government, gained more and more adherents despite active persecution by the police. In July, 1890, it joined with a part of the army in a revolt at Buenos Aires and there were two days of fighting in the city streets. The movement was suppressed, but the government was so shaken that Juárez Celmán was compelled to resign in favor of Vice-President Carlos Pellegrini. During the two years that ensued before another election, the country passed through a severe commercial crisis, which might have been still more serious had it not been for Pellegrini's efforts to reform the government's finances and preserve its credit.

#### THE UNIÓN CÍVICA RADICAL

During the movement against Juárez Celmán, a new political element had come into prominence. The membership of the *Unión Cívica* included not only members of the old *Porteño* party and other conservative citizens who desired simply to put an end to the corrupt practices of the group in power, but also a number of more radical leaders who sought to take the government entirely out of the hands of the aristocratic groups which had hitherto controlled political life. The chief of these was Leandro N. Alem, an ardent democrat who had a strong following among the populace of Buenos Aires. Alem led the revolt in 1890, when the more moderate members of the *Unión Cívica* wished to confine the party's activity to peaceful protests. In the following year he parted company with these moderate elements and continued his agitation for far-reaching political reforms as the

head of the *Unión Cívica Radical*. The "radical" party was thenceforth a powerful factor in Argentine politics.

Argentina was still far from being a democracy. As in other Latin American countries, elections were regularly controlled by the party in power through the use of force or fraud, and each president since the time of Sarmiento had dictated the choice of his successor as a matter of course. The ignorance and indifference of the common people made it easy to exclude them from any share in the country's political life, especially during a period when general prosperity inclined all classes to accept the established order rather than risk the destructive effects of civil war. At the same time, the economic progress of the last years of the nineteenth century had brought into existence forces which made impossible the indefinite continuance of the old political regime. As the immigrants from Italy and Spain became assimilated, their children, who were loyal Argentines, added an intelligent and politically conscious element to the electorate. They and the native middle class which was arising in the larger cities, were beginning to demand a larger share in the nation's political life. The old political groups still dominated the government through their control of the electoral machinery, but the agitation for a change became more and more insistent.

With the emergence of the question of electoral reform as the great issue in Argentine politics, the old party divisions coming down from the days of "federalists" and "unitarians" lost much of their significance. The provinces were no longer serious rivals of the central government. Railroad construction, which had brought all of the inhabited portions of the republic within easy reach of the capital, had unified the country economically and socially. It was easy to send troops promptly to any area where disaffection appeared. Though the provisions of the Argentine constitution regarding the central government's right to interfere in the internal affairs of the provinces were essentially similar to those of the constitution of the United States, they were applied in practice in a very different spirit, and the federal authorities repeatedly intervened in local affairs simply to remove administrations that were politically obnoxious to them and that were in a position, through their control of elections, to cause embarrassment to the party in power at Buenos Aires. The influence

of the central government was also increased by its greatly superior financial resources which enabled it to carry out local public works of all sorts in places where the local authorities were too poor to undertake them.

#### POLITICAL EVENTS, 1892-1910

A new alignment was evident in the presidential campaign of 1892. Mitre and Roca, who had long been political rivals, joined with President Pellegrini to bring about the election of Luis Sáenz Peña. The "acuerdo," as this coalition was called, was violently opposed by the radicals, but the government declared martial law and arrested Alem and his more prominent followers. The new President, a former justice of the Supreme Court with little political experience, found his task a hard one. The economic depression had severely affected the country and there was much discontent. A radical revolt in 1893 was suppressed by the army under the leadership of Roca, but in January, 1895, continued political difficulties led Sáenz Peña to resign. Vice-President José Evaristo Uriburu, who succeeded him, was more successful, partly because business conditions were gradually improving. His administration had the support of Roca and Mitre, and Roca himself became the candidate of the dominant group and was elected to the presidency for a second term in 1898.

Roca owed his election partly to a desire to have a strong military leader at the head of the government to deal with the acute boundary controversy which had developed between Argentina and Chile. In 1881 the two republics, with the aid of the United States, had reached an agreement providing that the island of Tierra del Fuego should be divided between them and that the boundary line north of the 52nd parallel should run "where the highest peaks of the Andes divide the watershed." When a commission attempted to lay down the line on the ground a new dispute arose because it was found that the watershed lay some miles east of the highest peaks. In 1898 the two countries were on the verge of war, but a peaceful agreement was effected during Roca's administration. The boundary in the north, in the *Puno de Atacama*, was fixed in 1899 by an arbitral commission headed by W. I. Buchanan, the American Minister at Buenos Aires, and the rest

of the line was adjusted three years later, after another period of acute tension, by the arbitration of the King of England. In 1904 the establishment of a lasting peace between the two countries was signalized by the erection of the great statue of the Christ of the Andes in the Uspallata Pass. In the meantime another boundary dispute, with Brazil over the eastern part of the Misiones Territory, had been settled by another arbitral award handed down by President Grover Cleveland in 1895.

Manuel Quintana, the administration candidate, was elected to follow Roca as President in 1904, but died in 1906 and was succeeded by the Vice-President, José Figueroa Alcorta. The country's prosperity continued, but political conditions were somewhat more disturbed than while Roca's firm hand guided the ship of state. Both the radicals and other political factions endeavored to embarrass the government and Figueroa Alcorta found it necessary to disperse a hostile congress by force early in 1908—an affair which demonstrated the difference between the working of republican institutions in Argentina and in the United States. He also intervened in several provinces to strengthen the federal administration's political control. At the same time, in an effort to reach an understanding with the radicals, he held a number of conferences with Hipólito Irigoyen, who had become the leader of that party after Alem committed suicide in 1896.

The radicals had never ceased their violent agitation for changes in electoral practices that would assure the free exercise of the suffrage. Though they were one of the strongest political groups, they consistently refused to present candidates in the elections. From time to time they had staged revolts. These were easily suppressed because the general public was little inclined to tolerate disturbances that would interfere with the country's rapidly increasing prosperity, but it was becoming increasingly evident that something must soon be done to meet the radicals' demands.

#### ELECTORAL REFORM

Electoral reform was accomplished in the administration of Roque Sáenz Peña, who succeeded Figueroa Alcorta in 1910. The new president was an idealist who had already had a romantic career. As a youth

he had served as a volunteer in the Peruvian army during the war against Chile. In 1892 he had been a candidate for the presidency, but had withdrawn when his own father was nominated by the *acuerdo*. He had had a distinguished record of public service in other positions at home and abroad, and his experience in other countries had helped to convince him of the necessity to create real democratic institutions in Argentina. In the full knowledge that the change would end the domination of his own class, he pushed through the congress the great electoral law of 1912, which established for the first time the secret ballot and effectively provided for freedom of the suffrage. All citizens were to be allowed to vote, and minorities were given proportional representation.

Progressive electoral laws have often been enacted in Latin American countries without actually changing the character of the electoral process because neither the authorities nor the people were prepared to make democratic institutions a reality. In Argentina, the reform of 1912 came in response to a widespread and insistent demand and the new law was enforced by a president who sincerely wished to make its provisions effective. In the congressional elections of 1912, more than 640,000 citizens cast votes. The radical party participated, and several of its candidates were successful. The significance of the change was not diminished by the fact that the democratic ideal was still far from attainment that bribery to some extent took the place of coercion as a means of obtaining votes, and that more than a third of the voters were still illiterate.

Sáenz Peña, who had been ill for some time, died in August, 1914, and was succeeded by Vice-President Victorino de la Plaza, whose main concern during his short term of office was the economic dislocation caused by the European war. The sudden falling off in foreign trade and in the government's revenues caused grave difficulties for a time, but by 1916 sales of meat and wheat to the allies had brought about a new period of great prosperity.

#### HIPÓLITO IRIGOYEN

In the presidential election of 1916, the radical party, with Hipólito Irigoyen as its candidate, was victorious by a narrow margin. It was

the first time that a majority of the popular vote had taken the control of the government from the party in power. The overturn brought into office a new group of men who had little experience either in administrative positions or in congress. Many of the radical leaders were members of old and distinguished families, but the rank and file represented the middle class which had hitherto been excluded from political life. Irigoyen himself was a remarkable character. He had been active in politics for more than forty years, and for the past twenty-five had carried on a constant agitation, sometimes violent, sometimes peaceful, for more democratic methods of government. He had made some money in cattle-raising, and when he held public office, in his earlier years as a teacher in the state schools and later as President, he is said to have given all of his salary to charity. Though he almost never made a speech he had a tremendous following among the common people. When elected President he is said to have ridden to his inauguration in a street car, and he continued to live in a modest flat, always accessible to the humblest visitors.

The radical party, despite its name, did not attempt to make any great changes, though some progressive labor legislation was adopted. Irigoyen kept the conduct of affairs in his own hands even more than his predecessors had. His ministers enjoyed little or no authority, and such autonomous government as there was in the provinces was undermined by intervention to place the radical party in control of their affairs. The chief event of the administration was the European war, when Argentina remained strictly neutral and profited greatly from the high prices commanded by her products.

Marcelo de Alvear, another leader of the radical party, was elected to succeed Irigoyen in 1922. The country continued at peace, but the new President was much embarrassed, especially in his relations with Congress, by a split in his own party growing out of his attempt to assert his independence of Irigoyen's leadership. The ex-President's unconditional adherents, known as the *personalistas*, were overwhelmingly in the majority, and when Irigoyen announced his candidacy for a second term in 1928 he was easily elected, without making a personal campaign and in spite of the unfriendliness of the administration in office.

## THE REVOLUTION OF 1930

By this time the radical chieftain was an old man, and defects as an administrator which had already been evident during his first term made his second period in office a dismal failure. Though it was no longer possible for him to attend personally to every detail, he still refused to delegate authority, and government business of every kind was paralyzed. Important offices remained unfilled, and the mercantile community suffered from the treasury's failure to pay bills. The advent of the world depression, which greatly reduced exports, intensified discontent in all classes of the community. The result was the revolution of September 6, 1930, when the military forces, with the support of many civilian political leaders, removed the President from office and proclaimed a provisional government under General José Uriburu. Irigoyen was arrested and remained in confinement for more than a year.

The impossible situation that existed in the last days of Irigoyen's administration had enabled the conservative groups to regain power almost without bloodshed, but events showed that it had not appreciably diminished the popular strength of the radical party. In April, 1931, the *personalistas* won a provincial election in Buenos Aires. This caused the government to postpone national elections for several months and to intervene meanwhile in twelve of the fourteen provinces to place its own adherents in control. A small radical revolt in Corrientes in July afforded an excuse for exiling Alvear, now reconciled with the *personalistas* and recognized as their leader. The radicals made another mistake in September when they nominated Alvear for the presidency. He was clearly ineligible, because the constitution prohibited the reelection of an ex-president until six years had elapsed after the end of his term, and the government declared the nomination void. When the national election was held in November, there was a spirited contest between other political groups, but the radicals did not participate.

## POLITICAL EVENTS, 1932-1942

The victor, who was inaugurated as President in February, 1932, was Agustín Justo, formerly an *antipersonalista* radical and at one



time a cabinet minister under Alvear. The outlook for the new administration was unpromising. The depression was at its worst and the radicals, confident that they had the support of a majority of the people, were uncompromising in their opposition. Their conspiracies and revolts made it necessary to keep the country under a state of siege during much of 1933 and 1934. Even the aged Irigoyen was re-arrested but was released after two months, a very ill man. When he died in July, 1933, there was a tremendous popular demonstration which showed that the events of his last administration had not lessened the people's affection for him. The radicals were still clearly the strongest of the political parties, but they refused until 1935 to take part in national elections.

Under Justo's courageous and able leadership the situation gradually improved. The government's finances were reorganized and Argentina was one of the very few Latin American countries that continued service on its foreign debts. The maintenance of Argentina's credit made possible refunding operations which saved the Republic many millions of dollars. Exports gradually increased, and by 1935 the country was again fairly prosperous. Tension between the political parties continued, but it was no longer so grave a danger to public order, even though a radical victory in the congressional elections of 1936 deprived the government of its majority in congress.

Roberto Ortiz was the official candidate in the presidential election of 1937, and he defeated Alvear, again the *personalista* candidate, after a hot campaign. There were many reports of fraud and intimidation, but no serious trouble. The new President was a successful lawyer and business man who, as an *antipersonalista* radical, had served in the cabinet during Alvear's administration and had more recently been Minister of Finance under Justo. Shortly after his inauguration in February, 1938, a new election gave a majority in the Congress to the coalition of *antipersonalistas* and conservatives which supported him. Two years later, however, this coalition broke up. Ortiz alienated the conservatives by removing "national democratic," or conservative, governors in two provinces on the ground that they had been fraudulently elected. At the same time he unified the greater part of the radical party behind him, and his position seemed strengthened by radical gains in the congressional election of 1940.

The situation changed again early in 1941 when a serious illness forced Ortiz to turn over the government, temporarily at least, to Vice-President Ramón Castillo, a national democrat. The radicals accused the new administration of improper intervention in several provincial elections, and for some time prevented action on all matters pending in Congress. The political tension was increased by uncertainty about Ortiz' eventual return to the presidency and by differences of opinion about Argentine policy in the world war. Though Castillo announced after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that Argentina would not treat the United States as a belligerent under her neutrality laws, it was alleged that he was less friendly to the democracies than the majority of his fellow-countrymen, and several incidents in December, 1941, and January, 1942, tended to support this belief. Nevertheless, as we shall see in a later chapter,<sup>1</sup> his government at the Rio conference agreed with the other governments of the continent upon several measures designed to be helpful to the United States.

#### CONTEMPORARY ARGENTINA

Argentina today is in some respects the most important of the Latin American republics. The country is the world's greatest exporter of beef, corn, and flax, and one of the greatest exporters of wheat, and the high per capita trade gives it a commercial importance out of all proportion to its population. Its population of 13,000,000 is less than that of Brazil or Mexico, but the general level of education and well-being is far higher than in those countries. Government reports state that over 90 per cent of the children of elementary-school age are enrolled in schools, and a high standard has been established in the educational institutions of all grades. Except in the west and northwest, the people are overwhelmingly of European descent.

Much of the Republic's rapid progress has been owing to foreign immigration. It is estimated that 3,500,000 people came to Argentina to remain there between 1810 and 1930, and they and their descendants now form a very large part of the population. In 1937 nearly 20 per cent of the population were of foreign birth. Italians and

<sup>1</sup> Chapter XXVIII.

Spaniards, both readily assimilable, have always formed by far the greater part of the new arrivals. Immigration practically ceased after 1930 with the advent of the world depression, but it now shows signs of revival.

As in other countries, there are problems still to be solved. Many of the immigrants have congregated in the larger cities where they live in crowded and unsanitary tenements. Those who have gone into the rural districts have become laborers or tenant farmers rather than landowners, for the wealthy Argentine families have been very reluctant to break up their great estates, even when they could not themselves utilize the land to best advantage. Extremist agitation has thus flourished among the foreign population and at present is perhaps a greater danger to public order than strife between the native political parties. The rise of extreme nationalism in the countries from which the immigrants come has introduced another disturbing element, though it is offset by a strong spirit of Argentine nationalism which makes it unlikely that any alien ideological or political propaganda will be tolerated.

There are a number of reasons why Argentina has made greater progress than many of the other Latin American nations. The fertility and the equable climate of the pampas, which have made so much of her territory ideal for cattle-raising and agriculture; the ease with which railroads and roads could be built between the chief centers of population, and the homogeneity of the people, which left her free from many of the most difficult social and political problems that confronted several of her neighbors, have all played their part. With these factors must be mentioned another: the outstanding ability of the statesmen who have guided affairs at each important turning-point in the Republic's history. Rosas, with all his faults, contributed much to the nation's unification; Mitre, Sarmiento, and Roca made the central government powerful and respected, Irigoyen brought it close to the people. Other presidents, generally speaking, have been competent men surrounded by good advisers. The influence of a series of able leaders has contributed much to the governmental stability which has been a cause as well as a result of economic prosperity.

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## Chapter X

### URUGUAY

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#### THE BANDA ORIENTAL BEFORE 1810

The *Banda Oriental*, the gently rolling country east of the River Uruguay, was the last important region of South America to be occupied by settlers of European descent. Until late in the colonial period it was held by the war-like, semi-nomadic Charruas, a people very similar to the tribes of the Argentine pampas and like them inveterate enemies of the white man. Expeditions from the Spanish settlements around Buenos Aires frequently hunted wild cattle there in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the first European settlement was Colonia, which the Portuguese established in 1680 as a base for the smuggling trade. Montevideo was founded in 1726 by the Governor of Buenos Aires, as an outpost to prevent further penetration from Brazil. As late as 1751 the town had less than 1,000 inhabitants, but the presence of a fort and garrison made it possible for colonists to settle in the country roundabout and the interior was gradually occupied by creole cattle ranchers and their half-wild *gaucho* employees. The Indians were pushed back and finally exterminated, leaving little trace of their blood in the people who took their place. After the Portuguese were expelled from Colonia in 1777, the entire region came under the control of Spain. It was a part of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, and its history both before and after independence was much influenced by the course of events on the other side of the River Plate.

The *Orientales*, as we have seen, played a leading part in the recapture of Buenos Aires from the British in 1806. In the following year Montevideo and other points along the coast were occupied for

seven months by Sir Samuel Auchmuty's forces. Several hundred English merchants followed close on the heels of the army, and *La Estrella del Sur*, a newspaper issued by the invaders as a vehicle for propaganda against Spain, spread ideas which profoundly influenced the thought of the hitherto isolated creole community. Nevertheless Montevideo later became the chief center of resistance to independence in the River Plate region. Spanish influence was strong there because it was still primarily a military post, and localistic jealousy also made the natives less ready to accept the leadership of Buenos Aires.

## ARTIGAS

The revolutionary spirit was stronger in other parts of the *Banda Oriental*, where the movement for independence was led by José Artigas, the great national hero of Uruguay. Artigas had served for many years as captain in a cavalry force organized by the Spanish authorities to maintain a semblance of order among the turbulent people of the interior, and had taken a distinguished part in the resistance to the British invasion. After the revolution in Buenos Aires he offered his services to the patriot *junta*, and when Belgrano marched against the Spanish force at Montevideo in the following year Artigas preceded him, recruiting forces among the *gauchos* and bandits of the interior and winning a victory at Las Piedras which opened the way to Montevideo.

Before the city could be taken, the invasion of the *Banda Oriental* by troops from Brazil caused the royalists and the patriots to suspend hostilities in the face of an enemy more bitterly hated by both. The Argentine army was withdrawn, and Artigas retreated to Ayuí, on the west bank of the Uruguay River, taking with him, by persuasion or by force, almost the whole population of the districts where his leadership was recognized. For several months his followers and their families lived in a temporary camp with trees and oxcarts as their only shelter—an episode which showed both the spirit of the people and the remarkable hold which their leader had on them. They followed Artigas back into the *Banda Oriental* after British diplomatic intervention had persuaded the Portuguese to withdraw,

and by the end of 1812 they were again cooperating with forces from Buenos Aires against the loyalists. After the combined armies defeated the Spanish forces at El Cerrito, they laid siege to Montevideo.

The events that followed the break between Artigas and the Buenos Aires *junta*, the subsequent war between unitarians and federalists throughout the River Plate region, and the establishment of Artigas' control over much of what is now the Argentine Republic, have been described in Chapter VII. The new Portuguese invasion of the *Banda Oriental* in 1816 made the struggle a three-cornered one, and Artigas was defeated by the Portuguese at Tacuarembó in January, 1820, at the very time when other federalist leaders were winning decisive successes against the unitarians. After this battle many of his Uruguayan supporters went over to the Portuguese. Even his allies in the littoral provinces turned against him, and Artigas took refuge in Paraguay, where he lived as a simple farmer until his death in 1850. The *Banda Oriental* became a province of Portugal, and after 1822 of the new Empire of Brazil.

#### INDEPENDENCE

The *Orientales* were little disposed to submit to foreign rule, and there was an immediate response when thirty-three Uruguayan exiles crossed the River Plate from Argentina and raised the standard of revolt in 1825. Fructuoso Rivera, a former lieutenant of Artigas, who had held an important command under the Brazilian regime, joined the movement, and the invaders soon controlled enough territory to convene a representative assembly. This voted for a union with the Argentine Federation and chose Juan Antonio Lavalleja as Governor of the Province. Its appeal for help met with a prompt response from the constituent congress at Buenos Aires. The war that ensued and its termination through the mediation of the British government have already been described. In the treaty of peace, in 1828, both Argentina and Brazil agreed to relinquish control over the *Banda Oriental* and to respect its independence.

The total population of the new "República Oriental del Uruguay" was probably less than 75,000, of whom about one-fifth lived in

Montevideo. The cattle which were the country's only wealth had been greatly reduced by long years of warfare, and the only exports were small quantities of hides and jerked beef. Few of the citizens had even the rudiments of an education. Darwin, in 1832, found that the people of Colonia were proud of their representatives in congress because all could at least sign their names, and he tells of falling in with a mail carrier whose route included several of the more important towns of the Republic but whose whole load consisted of two letters.<sup>1</sup> The establishment of a stable government, based on the republican constitution that the representatives of the people adopted in 1830, would clearly be a difficult task.

#### BLANCOS AND COLORADOS

Trouble began with the choice of the first president. Rivera, who was inspector general of the army, had defied Lavalleja's authority even during the war with Brazil. When the time arrived to choose a new governor in Lavalleja's place, the assembly sought to avoid further friction by appointing General Rondeau, but he found his situation intolerable and resigned. Lavalleja was then named to serve until the new constitution should come into force, but Rivera, through the army, was able to control the election of the congress. Since it was this body which chose the chief executive, he became Uruguay's first president in 1830.

Rivera suppressed several armed uprisings and conspiracies headed by Lavalleja, and was able to remain in office during his four-year term. In 1835 he passed on the presidency to his associate Manuel Oribe, but he retained control of the army and continued to dominate public affairs. The friction that arose from this arrangement led to an open break in the following year, and in the civil war that ensued Oribe was supported by Lavalleja and also by the Argentine dictator Rosas, who was angered because Rivera had given asylum to exiles from Buenos Aires. Rivera, on the other hand, made common cause with the Argentine unitarians. It was in this conflict that the contending factions adopted the colors which were thenceforth to distinguish the two historic political parties of Uruguay: Oribe's fol-

<sup>1</sup> Darwin, *Voyage of the Beagle* (Everyman's edition), pp. 136-37.

lowers became the *blancos*, or whites, and Rivera's the *colorados*, or reds. The *colorados*, after some reverses, got the upper hand during 1838, and Rivera again became President.

#### THE FRANCO-BRITISH INTERVENTION AND THE 'GREAT WAR'

In the last stages of the revolution, Rivera had been aided by the French naval forces blockading Buenos Aires, and his position, like that of Rosas' unitarian enemies, grew more difficult when these forces were withdrawn from the River Plate in 1840. The *blancos* soon resumed the struggle, with Rosas' help. After some years of fighting, partly in Uruguay and partly in the Argentine littoral provinces, the *colorado* army was destroyed at Arroyo Grande in Entre Ríos in 1842. This left the way open for Oribe, with Rosas' help, to march into Uruguay and occupy most of the territory of the Republic.

The *colorados* still held Montevideo, and they continued to hold it during a nine years' siege which is one of the famous events of Uruguay's history. As the struggle went on it became one between the people of the country districts and those of the capital, rather than a mere contest for power between Oribe and Rivera. Rivera in fact was finally removed from command and sent into exile in 1846 after repeated failures to renew the war in the interior. His departure made little difference, and the townspeople continued to hold out stubbornly against Oribe and his Argentine allies. Foreign residents were especially active in the defense, for there had been a wave of French, Italian, and Spanish immigration in the six or seven years immediately preceding the siege, and a large part of the capital's population was by this time of foreign extraction. Much of the fighting, on the *colorado* side, was done by a legion of 3,000 French Basques and by a smaller contingent of Italians under Giuseppe Garibaldi, who was later to become a national hero in his own country.

It was the help of the Anglo-French squadrons blockading Buenos Aires which made the city's prolonged resistance possible. The foreign naval forces, though their operations were intermittent and often ineffective, prevented the Argentine fleet from shutting off



communications by sea and discouraged attacks from the land side. The situation changed when the intervening governments tired of their unsuccessful efforts to bring Rosas to terms and abandoned the blockade. In 1849 the defending forces at Montevideo were compelled to agree to an armistice, arranged through the mediation of the French admiral, which was virtually a surrender. Before this agreement could be fully carried out, however, Urquiza revolted against Rosas in Entre Ríos and Brazil intervened in the conflict. When Urquiza invaded Uruguay, the greater part of Oribe's troops deserted and the *blanco* leader agreed on October 8, 1851, to a settlement by which both parties were to be represented in a new Uruguayan congress and a citizen acceptable to both was to become president. A general amnesty was declared and the debts contracted by Oribe's government were recognized. In 1852, a small force of Uruguayan troops joined the allied army which defeated Rosas at Monte Caseros.

Montevideo had suffered less from the long siege than might have been expected. Within the city the inhabitants continued their normal social life and the theaters were open and well patronized. The investing army made few assaults in force, and there were long periods when active military operations virtually ceased. Communication by land with the interior was by no means entirely cut off, and the Anglo-French squadrons gave the city free access to the sea. During the blockade of Buenos Aires, in fact, Montevideo became the commercial center of the River Plate, and its merchants enjoyed unusual prosperity. But for the rest of the nation, the "Great War," as it is called in Uruguay, had been a calamity. Farmers and cattle-raisers suffered much from military operations and from banditry, and the products of regions controlled by Oribe could not be shipped out through the Anglo-French blockade. For more than ten years no funds had been available for education or public works. More serious still were some of the after effects: the predominance of military leaders in the Republic's affairs and the hatreds engendered during the struggle. For many years internal strife and governmental weakness continued to expose the country to foreign interference which made it more difficult for the Uruguayan people to work out their own problems.

## BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE INTERVENTION

In the treaties of alliance under which the two governments had joined in the war against Rosas, Brazil had promised to give the new regime at Montevideo both financial and military support. The Imperial government had also taken advantage of the situation to arrange a boundary settlement favorable to Brazil's claims, and a dispute over the ratification of this agreement led to the overthrow in 1853 of President Giró, who had been elected in the preceding year by an almost unanimous vote of the bipartisan congress. Colonel Venancio Flores, a *colorado*, became President, but in 1855 he was overthrown by a revolt of his own party and in the following year a *blanco* administration came into power under Gabriel Antonio Pereyra. These changes occurred in spite of the presence of a Brazilian army of 4,000 men which had been sent to maintain order in Uruguay, and there was a strong suspicion that they were brought about by Brazilian intrigues.

Pereyra survived his term of office, despite a revolt which received assistance from Buenos Aires, and was succeeded in 1860 by another *blanco*, Bernardo P. Berro. In 1863, Flores and other *colorado* leaders invaded the country with the support of the government in Argentina, which was grateful to them for their services in the *Porteño* military forces in the wars that ended with Mitre's rise to power. They were also aided by Brazil, which was displeased with the treatment of its subjects by the *blanco* government, and after the civil war had lasted some months, a Brazilian army and fleet were sent to aid the revolutionists. At this point Francisco Solano López, the ruler of Paraguay, decided to intervene on behalf of the *blancos*. Argentina's refusal to permit the passage of troops across her territory prevented him from giving effective help, and the *blancos* were compelled in February, 1865, to agree to a settlement that made Flores Provisional President. Meanwhile López had attacked both Argentina and Brazil, and during the next four years Uruguay was involved as an ally of these countries in the Paraguayan war.

At Montevideo, Flores exercised dictatorial powers for three years, and then attempted to have himself elected constitutional president, in spite of strong opposition from his own party as well as from the

*blancos*. His forces suppressed attempted revolts in Montevideo and the provinces, but he was assassinated on February 19, 1868, and the Minister of War, General Lorenzo Batlle, became President. Plots and military mutinies within the *colorado* ranks continued, and in 1870 there was a *blanco* revolt under Timoteo Aparicio. This civil war lasted until 1872, when peace was established through the mediation of Argentina by a compact which gave the revolutionists control of the police in four departments of the Republic and \$500,000 in cash.

#### POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS

This arrangement set the precedent for a series of deals in which offices and money were used to placate the *blancos* and dissuade them from revolt. The *blancos*, since the "Great War," were preeminently the rural party, and the great landowners who led them were less disposed to object to the control of the national government by the politicians in Montevideo if they themselves were permitted to rule their own districts. Such compromises were less costly than armed conflict, and they tended gradually to allay the enmity between the two parties and to make possible the establishment of a more stable government. For a generation to come political disputes were settled by force rather than by the ballot, but revolutions became less frequent and less destructive.

This improvement in political conditions was in part the result of social and economic changes somewhat similar to those which were taking place in Argentina. As in that country, the *gauchos*, who had made up the armies led by *caudillos* like Rivera and Lavalleja, were gradually disappearing as the increasing European demand for meat and other pastoral products led property owners to abandon the old careless methods of stock-raising. The character of the population was changing in other ways also, for 170,000 foreigners entered the country between 1861 and 1874.<sup>1</sup> The total population, which had fallen from an estimated 200,000 in 1840 to 132,000 in 1852, had

<sup>1</sup> These figures are from Acevedo, *Manual de Historia Uruguaya*, p. 146. It is impossible to ascertain the net increase from immigration because the number of foreigners who returned to Europe during the same period is not known.

grown to 420,000 in 1872, with a quarter of the total in the city of Montevideo. Foreign commerce had developed proportionately. The great Liebig plant for the preparation of preserved meats and meat extract had been established at Fray Bentos in 1861, and the first railroad had been begun in 1867. Landowners and merchants, as in Argentina, were becoming more interested in developing their properties and businesses than in politics, and consequently less tolerant of revolutionary disturbances. The governments that ruled Uruguay during the next twenty years were more dictatorial in their methods than their predecessors had been, and there was less rather than more freedom of the press and of political activity, but the relative absence of disorder made it possible for the country to continue this material progress and paved the way for the later development of democratic institutions.

#### “THE ERA OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS”

One of Uruguay's most eminent historians characterizes the political change which took place at this time as the end of the age of the *caudillos* and the beginning of the era of the “professional soldiers.”<sup>1</sup> With the improvement in weapons and military techniques, the standing army had become more and more powerful and those who controlled it had a distinct advantage in any conflict with old-style political leaders at the head of improvised forces recruited among their friends and partisans. The first of the “professional soldiers” was Colonel Lorenzo Latorre who became the real ruler of the country in 1875, when the army overthrew Batlle's successor, Dr. José Ellauri. Latorre at first permitted the Congress to elect Pedro Varela as President, but he frankly assumed power as dictator in 1876 when Varela attempted to throw off his tutelage.

Latorre maintained order and did something to correct the hitherto chaotic condition of the government's finances. The most important accomplishment of his administration was the reform of the educational system, under the leadership of José Pedro Varela. Uruguay, like her neighbors, had been backward in this respect, for the average attendance in the public schools in 1877 was only about

<sup>1</sup> Acevedo, *op cit.*, p. 125.

12,000.<sup>1</sup> The increase in the number of schools and students, and even more the improvement in the quality of instruction, were important factors in the transformation of the Republic from a backward community, torn by continual factional strife, into a prosperous and progressive nation. Latorre's regime in fact saw a marked increase of interest in intellectual activities of all sorts, for his repression of political activity tended to divert the energies of the former ruling class into other lines. Latorre was nevertheless able to remain in power only by a reign of terror. His chief opponents were openly murdered or simply disappeared, and their less important followers were imprisoned. In 1880, discouraged by popular opposition and signs of disaffection in the army, and finding himself in financial difficulties despite his careful management of the national treasury, he resigned. He was "disillusioned," he stated in a manifesto, "to the point of thinking that ours is an ungovernable country."

The control of the government passed into the hands of Colonel Máximo Santos, the Minister of War, although the new ruler did not have himself elected President until 1882. Santos was as dictatorial as his predecessor and his arbitrary treatment of private individuals caused several revolutionary movements within the country and brought on serious complications with foreign governments. He was finally compelled in 1886 to offer the opposition leaders participation in his cabinet and, soon afterward, to resign, as his predecessor had done. Again the Minister of War, this time General Máximo Tajes, took over the direction of affairs and was elected President.

#### POLITICAL EVENTS, 1886-1903

Latorre and Santos had been supported by the *colorado* military leaders and also by some of the *blanco* chieftains, who still controlled the four departments given to them under the peace agreement of 1872. Other influential groups in both parties had opposed their regimes. Tajes sought the cooperation of these dissatisfied elements, and at the same time diminished the political influence of the army by disbanding some of the regiments which had been most prone to engage in conspiracies and revolts. His tactful policy made possible

<sup>1</sup> Acevedo, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

a period of peace which lasted through the term of Dr. Herrera y Obes, who was the *colorado* official candidate in 1890. The choice of a civilian marked the end of "the era of professional soldiers."

Another *colorado*, Juan Idiarte Borda, was elected President in 1894. In 1897 the "nationalists," as the *blancos* now called themselves, revolted, and during this civil war Idiarte Borda was assassinated. Peace was restored when the revolutionists were promised the control of six departments—nearly a third of the country—and were given a cash payment of \$200,000 for the "expenses of pacification."

The agreement also provided for a thoroughgoing reform in the electoral laws. Hitherto opponents of the government had hardly even attempted to vote. The dictatorships of Latorre and Santos had done away with the limited freedom of speech and of the press which had formerly existed, and their successors, though less dictatorial, had shown no disposition to give opposition candidates any opportunity to win at the polls. The new law provided for control of the voting by representatives of both parties and assured minority representation in congress. Thenceforth elections tended more and more to take the place of civil war as a means of settling political disputes, even though the elimination of fraud and coercion proved to be a difficult matter and the inherent advantages enjoyed by the party in power through its control of the police and the office-holders still constituted an obstacle to the success of an opposition candidate.

#### BATLLE Y ORDÓÑEZ

Cuestas, who took charge of the government after Idiarte Borda's death, was constitutional President from 1899 until 1903, when he was succeeded by José Batlle y Ordóñez, the principal chief of the *colorado* party. Batlle dominated Uruguayan political life for several years. He was President from 1903 to 1907 and from 1911 to 1915, and his close political associate Claudio Willman served the intervening term. His influence was also great in the administration of Feliciano Viera, who was elected in 1915.

During the period of Batlle's leadership great changes took place in the Republic's political and economic life. In his first term there occurred the last of the long series of destructive civil wars that had

begun with the revolt against Spain. The *blancos*, alleging that the President had violated the agreement signed in 1897, revolted in 1904. When the outbreak was suppressed, after several months of fighting and much loss of life, the rebel leaders were granted a general amnesty, a payment of \$100,000 and a promise of electoral and constitutional reform, but the nationalists were deprived of the control which they had hitherto exercised in a large part of the Republic's territory. The position of the central government was thus greatly strengthened. After 1904 its stability was not again seriously threatened by general revolts of the old type, and the small uprisings that occurred from time to time were easily put down because they received little popular support. The incentive to revolt became less after the turn of the century because elections were better conducted and the lot of the opposition party improved in other respects. For a considerable period the press enjoyed almost complete freedom and opponents of the government were not exiled or imprisoned for political activity.

Batlle's most notable achievement was his ambitious program of social and economic reform. As one of the earliest advocates of the economic nationalism that has now become a powerful force in Latin America, he sought to break down the power of foreign capital in Uruguay and to improve the lot of the native laborer, fearlessly proposing a series of measures which seemed more radical in the early 1900's than they would today. The Bank of the Republic, established by the government in 1896, was reorganized and greatly expanded its operations, and in 1912 the government bought control of the Mortgage Bank of Uruguay. Through these two institutions the government sought to encourage small savings, provided rural credit, encouraged construction, and helped small farmers, steadily extending its control over the Republic's financial and economic life as time went on. In 1911 the government set up a State Insurance Bank to compete with foreign companies and gradually to take over a monopoly of certain lines of insurance, and in 1912 the production of electric light and power was made a state monopoly. Batlle also attempted to create a national system of railways and highways to diminish the power of the foreign-owned lines, but in this he was less successful.

In the field of labor legislation Batlle's proposals met with more

opposition. An eight-hour day, with a forty-eight-hour week, was made compulsory in all industrial establishments in 1915, but the law was difficult to enforce. Further reforms were blocked for the time being by conservative opposition to the growing influence of the Montevideo labor unions, but after the end of Batlle's second term, and while his influence was still powerful, old-age and retirement pensions, compulsory workmen's compensation insurance, and minimum wages for rural laborers were established.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE CONSTITUTION OF 1917

Meanwhile there had been much discussion of proposals for constitutional reform. Many leaders in both parties wished to see a decrease in the autocratic power of the president and a fairer opportunity for all political groups to participate in public affairs. There had been much controversy, however, as to the character of the changes which should be made. Batlle advocated the establishment of a "collegiate executive" of nine citizens to take the place of the president. The nationalists wished to retain a president but to make the cabinet responsible to congress under a parliamentary form of government. On the other hand a strong faction among the *colorados*, who later came to be known as the *riveristas*, opposed any radical change in the existing system. When elections were held for the constitutional convention of 1917, the nationalists won more seats than the *batllistas*, and the dissident *colorados* held the balance of power.

The result was a compromise. The Republic continued to have a president, who had control over foreign affairs, national defense, and the maintenance of order, but the other duties of the executive—the preparation of the budget, the direction of education, public works, public-health activities, and other administrative functions—were entrusted to a popularly elected National Council of Administration. This was composed of nine members, each serving for six years, and one of the three members chosen biennially was always to be an adherent of the minority party. The president was elected by direct vote of the people, rather than by the congress as under the earlier constitution. The principle of proportional representation was applied

<sup>1</sup> S. Hanson, *Utopia in Uruguay*, is the best account of these economic and social reforms.



in the congress and in the local elective bodies as well as in the National Council of Administration. The secret ballot was introduced, voting became compulsory, and the government was decentralized to some extent by providing for popularly elected local assemblies and administrative councils.

This constitution was in force from 1919 to 1933. Dr. Baltasar Brum, who had achieved much prestige as Foreign Minister under President Viera, succeeded the latter in 1919, and was followed by José Serrato (1923-27) and Juan Campisteguy (1927-31). Uruguay, like Argentina and Chile, seemed during this period definitely to have passed beyond the era of revolutionary disturbances. Though the *batllista* wing of the still divided *colorado* party continued to control the administration by a very small margin of votes, the elections were conducted under conditions that gave little real cause for complaint and the number of citizens voting increased from 46,000 in 1905 to 318,000 in 1930. The opposition always had a substantial representation in the administrative council and in the congress. The government's various business enterprises were on the whole well managed, and their number increased. A national meat-packing plant was established in 1928 in an effort to assure better prices to producers of livestock, and a government corporation called the *Ancap*, set up in 1931, took over the monopoly of the manufacture and sale of alcohol and went into competition with private companies in the sale of petroleum products.

#### THE REVOLUTION OF 1933

The divided authority created by the constitution of 1917 proved a handicap to effective governmental action when the world depression caused suffering and discontent in Uruguay as it did in other countries. President Gabriel Terra, who was elected in 1931 as the *batllista* candidate, quarreled with the National Council of Administration and obtained support from the *riveristas* and a portion of the nationalists in a movement to abolish it. On March 31, 1933, after the Council and the Congress refused to approve certain measures that the President had taken on the preceding day, both bodies were dissolved by force and Terra assumed dictatorial power.

A convention that met a year later framed a new constitution abolishing the administrative council, but making the president's cabinet to some extent responsible to congress and retaining the principle of proportional representation in that body. The same convention elected Terra as President for a new four-year term. Though the conservative property-owning classes had more influence in the new regime than they had enjoyed while the *batllistas* were in power, Terra did not abandon his predecessors' social and economic reforms. If anything the government moved farther in the direction of state socialism during his administration. On the other hand, his political policy was more repressive than any which Uruguay had known since the beginning of the century. The publication of opposition newspapers was prohibited and individual liberty was restricted in other respects, especially after the suppression of a small revolt in 1935.

Political unrest became less evident, however, as the country gradually recovered from the depression, and the presidential election of 1938 was held under fairly normal conditions. The unusually large popular vote of 357,000 was rather evenly divided between three candidates, two of them *colorados* and the third a nationalist, and the victory, under the constitution, went to the leading *colorado*, General Alfredo Baldomir. His inauguration was regarded as the beginning of a new period of democratic government.

#### RECENT EVENTS

The second World War caused political complications in Uruguay as it did in Argentina. In May, 1940, the government discovered that Germans in the Republic were plotting to seize military control. It took prompt measures to maintain order, and received effective support in the form of military supplies from Brazil. The United States rushed two cruisers to Montevideo during the crisis, and a few months later it was reported that plans were on foot to construct naval and air bases in Uruguayan territory with North American assistance. This aroused violent criticism from the Herrera wing of the old *blanco* or nationalist party, and their attitude, combined with less open opposition from Argentina, apparently defeated the project for the time being. The Baldomir government, however, maintained

its friendly attitude toward the democracies, and in the summer of 1941 took the lead in proposing to the other nations of the Western Hemisphere that an American power which might become involved in a war with a non-American power should not be treated as a belligerent. This principle was generally adopted by the countries which did not themselves declare war on the Axis, after the Japanese attack on the United States.

Despite her small area and population, Uruguay's strategic location and the volume of her foreign trade make her one of the more important of the Latin American nations. Her people are almost wholly of European descent, and nearly all of her territory is productive land. Her potentialities, however, have thus far been only partially developed. Relatively little of the land has been brought under cultivation, and sheep- and cattle-raising have continued to be the chief industries. Wages in the rural areas are still very low, and in many other respects these districts have lagged behind Montevideo, which dominates the country's political and economic life. The social legislation of recent years has primarily benefited the urban worker, and the better conditions of life in the capital have caused a continual drift of population from country to city. At present the capital has more than a third of the total population of the Republic. The correction of these conditions—the development of agriculture and the improvement of the lot of the country dweller—is Uruguay's great problem today.

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## Chapter XI

### PARAGUAY

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#### PARAGUAY BEFORE 1810

The survivors of Mendoza's ill-fated expedition to the River Plate, who established themselves at Asunción in 1541, found the Guaraní of the interior more civilized and less intractable than the fierce Indians of the pampas. The Paraguayan tribes lived in settled villages, practicing agriculture in a crude way as a supplement to hunting and fishing, but they had no government beyond that of the *caciques* and village councils in each small community. They were easily conquered and most of those on the east bank of the Paraguay, in the immediate vicinity of Asunción, were apportioned among the settlers in *encomiendas*. They were apparently less cruelly exploited than the Indians in many other parts of the continent, for there were relatively few Spaniards and there were no mines or other enterprises in which the intensive use of forced labor could be made profitable. They consequently survived the Conquest so that their descendants, with some infusion of white blood, continued to form the great majority of the colony's inhabitants. Even the upper class was largely of mixed origin because few women came to Asunción from Spain, and Guaraní, rather than Spanish, is generally spoken in rural Paraguay today.

It required more than two weeks for a hardy traveller, on horseback, to reach Asunción from Buenos Aires, which was itself an out-of-the-way place during the greater part of the colonial period. Sailing vessels, the only means of transporting goods, required three months for the voyage upstream on the Paraná and Paraguay Rivers. Economic development was retarded by the competition of the Jesuit

missions to the southeast and by internal commotions, for which popular hatred of the Jesuits was at least partly responsible. Until 1779, when coined money is said to have been first introduced by the tobacco monopoly, all trade was by barter and even postage was paid in *yerba mate*, cotton, or tobacco.<sup>1</sup> *Yerba mate*, or Paraguay tea, which was consumed in great quantities in the other River Plate provinces, was the chief export during the colonial period.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population was probably between 100,000 and 200,000, and Asunción, with perhaps 10,000 inhabitants, was little more than a large village. Such few schools as existed were of the most elementary sort, and there were said to be only two natives of the country who had had the advantage of an education outside of Paraguay. The colony had consequently been almost untouched by the intellectual revival which had changed the outlook of the creoles in many other parts of Spanish America in the latter part of the eighteenth century, or by the revolutionary propaganda that had been one of its consequences.

#### INDEPENDENCE

There was thus little enthusiasm in Paraguay when the creoles at Buenos Aires overthrew the viceregal government in May, 1810. An assembly of the principal inhabitants of Asunción, convened by the governor, decided to recognize the authority of the regency at Cadiz rather than that of the *Porteño junta*; and traditional dislike of Buenos Aires made it easy to raise an army to repulse Belgrano when he attempted to invade Paraguay some months later. There was nevertheless little real sentiment of loyalty to Spain. Belgrano, who remained in the country for a time after his capitulation, made friends with the creole officers who commanded the Paraguayan troops, and through his efforts a revolutionary party rapidly grew up. In May, 1811, a military revolt forced the governor to transfer power to a *junta* composed of himself, another Spanish officer, and the influential creole Dr. Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia. A month later the governor's intrigues with emissaries of the Portuguese Princess Carlota

<sup>1</sup> Félix de Azara, *Geografía Física y Esférica de las Provincias del Paraguay y Misiones Guaraníes*, p. 431.

caused a second uprising by which he and the pro-Spanish *cabildo* were deprived of all authority, and a congress met to appoint a new *junta* of five, including Francia and Fulgencio Yegros, one of the commanders of the troops that had defeated Belgrano. There was by this time a growing sentiment for union with Buenos Aires, but Francia, who from the first assumed the leadership in the new government, astutely blocked all efforts to bring it about. In October, 1811, the representatives of the *Porteño junta* signed a treaty virtually recognizing Paraguay's independence.

#### FRANCIA

Francia is said to have been the son of a Spanish army officer and a creole lady of distinguished family.<sup>1</sup> In his youth he had studied theology at the University of Córdoba, which was the chief center of learning in eastern South America. After his return to Asunción he practiced law and eagerly read such philosophical and scientific books as he was able to obtain. Since he was at the time almost the only native Paraguayan who had had more than the most rudimentary education, his reputation for learning gave him a tremendous prestige among his fellow-countrymen, and he further increased his influence by his conspicuous honesty and by the fearlessness and disinterestedness with which he maintained the rights of poor and friendless litigants in his practice of law. He had held various positions in the municipal government at Asunción. Unsociable and with little personal charm or capacity for friendship, he was nevertheless a shrewd politician in a community where politics was a new and untried art.

The full extent of Francia's influence became evident when differences of opinion with the other members led him to resign from the new *junta*. His defection deprived the government of much of its prestige and, after a year of steadily increasing political tension, he agreed to resume his membership in November, 1812, on condition that one-half of the army be placed under his orders. Thence-

<sup>1</sup> For a review of the evidence on this point, about which there have been many conflicting statements, see Blas Garay, *La Revolución de la Independencia del Paraguay* (Madrid, 1897), Appendix B.

forth, the control of affairs passed more and more into his hands. A new congress, composed like its predecessors of members invited by the government rather than elected by the voters, met in 1813. The deputies, 1,000 in number, showed more desire to return promptly to their villages than to discuss affairs of state, and without loss of time they approved a constitution drafted by Francia and adopted a formal declaration of independence.

The constitution provided for two consuls, elected for a one-year term. These were to take turns of four months as nominal head of the government, but each was to have personal control of half of the army throughout the year. Francia and Yegros were elected to these positions, and Francia took pains to make sure that it would be his turn to rule when the time to choose new consuls arrived. He was thus able to have himself made dictator for a five-year term when the congress met in October, 1814, and another congress, in 1816, made him dictator for life. From that time until his death "El Supremo," as he required his people to call him, exercised an unquestioned and unlimited authority, with no concessions even to the forms of republican government. No elections were held, no congress met; no one was permitted to question or even to discuss the ruler's actions.

Of what happened in Paraguay during this period of a quarter century, astonishingly little is known. Francia himself seems to have left almost no official records, and his countrymen, even under the rule of his immediate successors, were not permitted to put in writing anything which might be of value to the future historian. Little information transpired to neighboring countries. Determined to keep Paraguay from being contaminated by the anarchy that reigned in the other River Plate provinces, the dictator cut off almost all intercourse with the outside world. Efforts of other governments to establish diplomatic relations were rebuffed and representatives of foreign powers were rarely if ever permitted to visit Asunción. Ordinary travellers were equally suspect. A group of British and other foreigners who had been held in Paraguay for varying periods were rescued by diplomatic intervention in 1825, and M. Bonpland, a French naturalist who had been kidnapped while experimenting with the cultivation of *yerba mate* in the near-by Argentine province of Corrientes, was finally released after being compelled to live for nine

years in a small Paraguayan village, but almost no one else was permitted to enter or leave the interior of the Republic.

Some imports were of course necessary, if only to supply the government's troops with munitions. Foreign vessels were therefore occasionally permitted to come as far as Pilar, the first port on the Paraguay River, and merchants from Brazil were encouraged to visit Itapua, now called Encarnación, on the Paraná. Much of the trade was carried on for the account of the government itself and the rest under its close supervision. The amount was always small, for conditions along the lower Paraná, where local *caudillos* were likely to confiscate any ship passing the ports under their control, would in any event have discouraged traffic on the river. The Paraguayans were therefore compelled to develop local manufactures, though of a very crude sort, and to increase greatly their production of foodstuffs, while Brazilian *mate* to a great extent took the place of their product in the Buenos Aires market.

In his conduct of the government, Francia took no advice and had no collaborators. He himself decided every detail of policy and closely supervised every branch of official activity. The clergy were made completely subservient to his authority when the Spanish bishop was replaced by a vicar general named by the dictator. No one ventured to criticize. Unfortunate citizens who were even suspected of disaffection were imprisoned without a hearing, and a number of potential opponents, including most of the leaders who had been prominent in the revolutionary movement before 1814, were put to death. Although Francia was not a particularly bloodthirsty ruler, compared with some of his contemporaries, his gloomy and unapproachable seclusion and the calculated cruelty by which he sought to inspire terror made his regime seem more despotic than those of other rulers who caused an infinitely greater amount of human suffering. Paraguay was at least governed with comparative efficiency and complete honesty, for the dictator had no interest in money for himself and severely punished graft among his subordinates. The country as a whole enjoyed peace and a primitive plenty at a time when neighboring regions were being laid waste by civil war.



## CARLOS ANTONIO LÓPEZ

Francia maintained his amazing ascendancy over the minds and bodies of the Paraguayans until his death at an advanced age on September 20, 1840. As there was no provision for the choice of his successor, the commanders of the troops at Asunción joined with the *cabildo* in establishing a military *junta* to govern the country pending the election of a congress. A successful military revolt, executed by a sergeant with only seventy-five men, placed another *junta* in power four months later, but this in turn gave way, in 1841, to a regime headed by Second Lieutenant Mariano Roque Alonso, as Commander-in-Chief, and a civilian named Carlos Antonio López, as Secretary. The Congress, which met soon afterwards to set up a permanent government, elected Alonso and López as Consuls for three years, providing that they should exercise their authority jointly. It also specified that López, who was to have the larger salary, should be especially charged with the conduct of the non-military branches of the administration.

López, a self-trained lawyer, was one of the few educated Paraguayans who had not incurred Francia's suspicious enmity. He had prudently remained in obscurity until 1840, but when the dictator died he soon acquired an ascendancy over the ignorant and politically inexperienced military leaders who attempted to take over the control of affairs. He easily compelled Alonso to fall in with his plans, and a congress that met in February, 1844, submissively approved the recommendation of the two consuls that a president be chosen and elected López to the position. The new constitution showed that even the theory of representative government was little understood in Paraguay, for the chief executive, serving for ten years, was to be subject to no control except that which might be exercised by congresses meeting at five-year intervals.

Paraguay nevertheless made some progress under Carlos Antonio López' leadership. The system of taxation and the judiciary were reorganized, and the first newspaper, a government organ, began publication in 1845. The country gradually emerged from the isolation that Francia had imposed. Rosas, who still professed to regard Paraguay as a rebellious member of the Argentine Confederation, for

some years obstructed intercourse with the outside world by way of the Paraná, but after his fall the river was opened to commerce. In 1853 Paraguay was formally recognized by the United States and several European powers. Foreign trade gradually increased, though it was still subject to burdensome restrictions and the most important products, like *yerba mate*, lumber, and hides, were controlled by government monopolies. Regular steamship service was established between Asunción and Buenos Aires and the construction of a railway line was begun at Asunción.

Closer contact with the outside world had its disadvantages as well as its advantages. Disputes over the treatment accorded some of the foreigners who began to visit the country led to several unpleasant diplomatic incidents in which France, England, or the United States compelled the government to accede to demands for reparation. One of the most serious of these occurred when Paraguayan forts fired on the U.S.S. *Water Witch* in 1855 and killed several members of her crew, but a worse conflict was averted in this case through the intervention of President Urquiza of Argentina.

In his internal political administration López showed somewhat more respect for constitutional forms than Francia had shown, and was a little less cruel in his treatment of suspected enemies, but he permitted no more freedom of political discussion. All persons of any standing in the community were subject to a constant and humiliating surveillance, and no one openly opposed the President's evident intention to remain in power during the rest of his life and to secure the succession for his son Francisco. The latter was constitutionally ineligible, both because of his youth and because he was an officer in the army, but changes in the fundamental law eliminated these difficulties and even gave the President the right secretly to designate the person to take office in case of his death. The younger López thus took over the government when his father died in 1862, and a hand-picked Congress, overawed by a display of military force, promptly confirmed him in his position.

## FRANCISCO SOLANO LÓPEZ

Francisco Solano López had been brought up in the enjoyment of irresponsible power. The old President had been notoriously slow to check the lawless and licentious conduct of his sons, and Francisco, as the oldest, had been trained from early youth to regard himself as the future ruler of Paraguay. His chief ambition, apparently, was to achieve fame as a soldier. When only nineteen he had been given nominal command of an army during the intermittent conflict with Rosas. Seven years later, while in Europe as his father's Minister Plenipotentiary, he had visited the allied camps in the Crimea and had come home fired with the idea of making Paraguay a great military power. He had also brought with him an Irish mistress, Madame Lynch, to whose influence the Paraguayans later attributed some of his most reckless acts. Partly at least because of his insistence, much of the nation's resources had been devoted to building up the army and accumulating stores of war supplies, and skilled foreign workmen had been employed in the construction of an iron foundry, a powder factory, and an arsenal to make the country partly self-sufficient in the production of munitions. The standing army was larger in 1862 than that of any of the neighboring countries. There was some justification for these preparations in the fact that Paraguay had had boundary disputes and conflicts over other matters with both Brazil and Argentina, but there is little reason to suppose that war with those countries would have occurred if Francisco López had not deliberately provoked it.

## THE PARAGUAYAN WAR

When Argentina and Brazil helped Venancio Flores in his revolt against the *blanco* government in Uruguay in 1863, and especially when Brazil actually sent troops into the *Banda Oriental*, López made strong protests against what he regarded as a threat to the balance of power in the River Plate. On November 12, 1864, he declared war on Brazil. Since the wild and trackless country along the frontier between that country and Paraguay was unsuitable for military operations, he demanded permission to send troops across the Argentine

territory of Misiones, but this, like a similar request from Brazil, was refused. López then attacked Argentina and invaded the province of Corrientes with a large force.

López seems to have hoped for aid from Governor Urquiza of Entre Ríos, whose party had so recently been defeated at Pavón, and to have hoped that a slave revolt would occur when his forces entered Brazil. In both cases his expectations were disappointed, and it was soon clear that his folly and ignorance had involved his people in a hopeless struggle against a group of enemies so superior in manpower and resources that even his better-trained army gave him only a passing advantage. Argentina, Brazil, and the *colorado* government of Uruguay signed a treaty of alliance against him in May, 1865. In September their forces captured a Paraguayan army that had crossed Misiones and invaded Rio Grande do Sul, and seven months later they were ready to invade Paraguay itself.

During the next two years the allies made little progress. Their fleet, under the Brazilian Admiral Tamandaré, had won an overwhelming naval superiority on the Paraguay River by its victory at Riachuelo in June, 1865, but neither it nor the land forces commanded by President Mitre were able to force their way past the strong Paraguayan forts at Humaitá. Long delays were caused by indecision and inefficiency and by a revolt led by Urquiza, which compelled Mitre to return for a time to Buenos Aires. Uruguay's help became negligible after General Flores was assassinated. The Paraguayan forces, however, were weakened by many months of desperate fighting, and in 1868, after the allied fleet had forced its way past Humaitá, López was compelled to withdraw to new positions farther up the river. These also were taken after a hard struggle, and on December 31 the allies occupied Asunción. There was another long delay before the new allied commander, the Brazilian Emperor's son-in-law the Count d'Eu, was ready to pursue López still farther north. By this time the Paraguayans could offer little resistance. López fled into the forests of the north, where he fell into the hands of the Brazilians on March 1, 1870, and was killed as he resisted capture. Madame Lynch, who had remained with him to the end, returned to Europe.

The results of the war were appalling. The Paraguayan people had fought with desperate bravery to repel the foreign invaders, and

nearly every male in the country, including young boys and old men, had stayed with the colors to the bitter end. Many thousands had been killed in battle, and a far greater number had died of disease or starvation. Out of a population of probably somewhat over half a million in 1865, only 221,079 were counted by the census in 1871, and all but 28,746 of these were women and children. Agriculture had been neglected, and nearly all of the cattle had been killed for food. The better class of people had suffered even more severely than the peasants, for López had treated the leading families of Asunción with insane cruelty during the first years of the war, and had executed hundreds of people, including his own brothers and brothers-in-law and a number of foreigners, on suspicion of conspiracy against his government. Many others, including the wives and families of those who had incurred his displeasure, died from torture or harsh treatment.

#### THE PERIOD OF RECOVERY

In 1869, when it was clear that the war was nearly over, the allied commander at Asunción permitted a *junta* of three Paraguayans to set up a provisional civil administration and call together a constitutional convention. A liberal republican government was established, on paper, and Cirilo Rivarola was elected President of the Republic. Lack of real power, desperate poverty, and the occupation of the country until 1876 by Brazilian troops made the new administration's position difficult. Both Brazil and Argentina demanded large war indemnities and proceeded to settle in their own favor long-standing boundary disputes, so that Paraguay lost a considerable area in the north to Brazil and the territory of Misiones, where the Jesuits had once had their principal missions, to Argentina. Argentina also claimed a large part of what is now the Paraguayan Chaco, but the ownership of this area was submitted to arbitration and an award handed down by President Hayes at Washington in 1878 was in the main favorable to Paraguay.

Though it was impossible to hold real elections, and the government relied for support on the police and the small, poorly trained army, no postwar president was able to establish a powerful, despotic

regime like that of Francia and the two López. Rivarola, after a conflict with the Congress, was forced to resign in 1871. Juan Bautista Gill, elected in 1874, was assassinated by personal enemies in the third year of his term, and the next constitutional president, Cándido Bareiro, was forced to resign in 1880 under pressure from the military leaders. The most influential of these was General Bernardino Caballero, the founder of the *colorado* party which had assumed power at the end of the war. This *caudillo* became Provisional President in 1880 and was elected constitutional President for a four-year term in 1882. He continued to be powerful during the administrations of Patricio Escobar (1886-90) and Juan Gualberto González (1890-94), and toward the end of the latter's term he again overthrew the government and placed his associate, Juan Bautista Eguzquiza, in the presidency. The latter served until 1898 and was succeeded by Emilio Aceval. As the time for a new election approached, Caballero and Escobar again staged a military *coup*, overthrew Aceval, and placed Colonel Juan A. Ecurra in the presidency.

These frequent palace revolutions had relatively little effect on the tranquility of the country as a whole. The factions that struggled for power were composed of relatively small groups of politicians and army officers, without any substantial following among the masses of the people. There were thus no general civil wars to delay the slow and painful process of recovery to which the surviving Paraguayans were courageously addressing themselves. Though few men had come back from the war, the women cultivated the fields and internal commerce slowly revived. Foreigners began to invest capital in stock-raising and the exploitation of forest products like *yerba mate* and *quebracho*, and a considerable influx of Italians and other Europeans helped to fill the gaps in the upper class left by López' insensate executions. By the end of the century, though still an isolated, backward country, Paraguay had recovered from the worst effects of the war.

#### POLITICAL EVENTS, 1904-1932

The *colorados*, or republicans, who had been in power since the end of the war, lost control of the government in 1904 when Ecurra

was driven from office by a popular revolt. The advent of their rivals, the liberals, made little apparent difference in political conditions. A succession of presidents held office for periods of a year or two, only to be driven out by dissensions within their own party. In the twenty years from 1904 to 1924 only one chief executive, Eduardo Schaerer (1912-16), succeeded in remaining in office throughout his constitutional term. Dr. Schaerer's administration was notable for the completion of the railroad from Asunción to Encarnación on the Paraná, where it connects by ferry with the Argentine line to Buenos Aires. After 1924 there was a period of relative tranquility during the administrations of Eligio Ayala (1925-28) and José Guggiari (1928-32). Under Guggiari's successor, Eusebio Ayala, internal political events were pushed into the background by another foreign war.

#### THE CHACO WAR

The Gran Chaco, an almost uninhabited region of more than 100,000 square miles west of the Paraguay River, had long been in dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia. Though most of the territory was of no value for agriculture or stock-raising, both countries had stubbornly maintained their claim to it and several efforts to bring them to an agreement, either for arbitration or for a compromise boundary line, had failed. Both had pushed farther and farther into the disputed territory with chains of small forts, until by 1927 these were dangerously near one another. In December, 1928, when the Paraguayans destroyed the Bolivian post at Vanguardia and the Bolivians retaliated by seizing Fort Boquerón, it became clear that war was imminent.

The prompt action of the Pan-American conference on conciliation and arbitration, which happened to be meeting at Washington, delayed the outbreak of hostilities for the time being. Both parties were persuaded to agree to the appointment of a commission of conciliation and inquiry representing five of the American republics and headed by General McCoy of the United States Army, and this group was able to bring about a satisfactory settlement of the Vanguardia incident. It failed, however, to persuade Paraguay and Bolivia


to take any steps toward a settlement of the boundary question itself. In June, 1932, new clashes occurred in the Chaco, and the fighting soon developed into a full-fledged war. Appeals for peace from all of the other American republics and from the President of the Council of the League of Nations went unheeded.

The fighting continued for three years. Bolivia had a larger and better-equipped army, but the hot climate of the Chaco caused terrible suffering among the Indians from the high plateau. Paraguay's untrained and ill-equipped recruits were at least accustomed to the tropical climate and the earlier fighting was in regions far from any Bolivian town but relatively near the settled part of Paraguay. After some initial reverses, therefore, the Paraguayans at the end of 1933 began an offensive that gradually pushed the Bolivians back across the Chaco and almost out of the territory in dispute. In the first months of 1935 they occupied part of the oil-bearing region of eastern Bolivia, but here they were too far from their own bases and were forced back by counter attacks.

Throughout the conflict, the League of Nations and the other American governments had persistently attempted to restore peace. The League, after its proposals for a settlement had been rejected by the belligerents, advised its members to impose an embargo on the shipment of arms to both of them. When Paraguay rejected a further proposal, the League recommended the removal of the embargo so far as it affected Bolivia. Neither move was successful because the belligerents' South American neighbors declined to violate the treaties that guaranteed free passage through their territory. In 1935 the imposition of more effective sanctions on Paraguay was discussed, but the League agreed to withhold action while a group of American powers made a final effort to restore peace.

This effort was successful. Through the good offices of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, the two belligerents signed a truce on June 12, 1935, and a peace conference met at Buenos Aires. During the next three months the armies on both sides were demobilized under the supervision of a military commission representing the neutral powers. Thereafter both belligerents showed the same intransigence that had defeated all previous peace efforts, partly because their governments, confronted with acute eco-





TERRITORY UNDER DISPUTE IN THE CHACO WAR

conomic and political difficulties at home, did not dare to make concessions that might expose them to attacks by their opponents. It was more than three years before a final settlement could be reached.

#### THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONFLICT

The war left Paraguay in possession of the greater part of the Chaco, but at a heavy cost. A substantial proportion of her army had been among the 100,000 men estimated to have been killed on both sides. The maintenance of large forces in the field, and the demoralization inseparable from their demobilization, severely affected production and exports. During the war, the already depreciated paper currency had lost five-sixths of its value, until one United States dollar bought 300 Paraguayan pesos. Living costs had risen rapidly, government salaries were far in arrears, and there was a moratorium on debts.

Under these conditions President Ayala, who had remained in office so long as hostilities were in progress, found his position increasingly difficult, and on February 17, 1936, his government was overthrown by Colonel Rafael Franco, who had been one of the heroes of the war. Franco attempted to assure his position by appealing to the labor element, the university students, and the more radical of the returning soldiery to support a program of extreme economic nationalism and state socialism, but he was unable to maintain harmony among these different groups and his economic experiments met with little success. On August 15, 1937 he was forced to resign, and Félix Paiva, a liberal, became Provisional President with the support of another group of military leaders. Several attempts to stage a counter-revolution were defeated during the next few months.

Early in 1938 the peace negotiations at Buenos Aires seemed to have reached a deadlock, with both sides refusing to make further concessions. It looked for a time as though hostilities might be resumed. At this point, however, General José Félix Estigarribia, the Paraguayan Minister at Washington and the former Commander-in-Chief of the army in the Chaco, flew from Washington to Buenos Aires to assist in bringing about an agreement, and the formal peace treaty was finally signed on July 21. Paraguay held on to most of

the Chaco, but Bolivia was given a port on the upper Paraguay River and also was promised the use of Puerto Casado, in the Paraguayan Chaco, as a free port. With the ratification of the treaty, formal relations between the two countries were restored.

Paiva remained in office until August, 1939, when General Estigarribia, who had been elected as the liberal candidate, was inaugurated as constitutional President. Estigarribia endeavored to end the constant political agitation that had disturbed the country since the end of the war, and to persuade the *colorados*, who had refused since 1931 to participate in elections, to cooperate to this end. At the recent elections, every seat in congress had been filled by a liberal, but in January, 1940, all of the members of both houses resigned. The President established a dictatorial government, with a coalition cabinet, and ordered the drafting of a new constitution, which was ratified by plebiscite in August. Before his policy could be carried further, however, Estigarribia and his wife were killed in an airplane accident on September 7, 1940.

General Higinio Morínigo became Provisional President. There was still no congress and the new chief executive, with the support of a group of young army officers, continued to conduct the government as a dictatorship. Many of Estigarribia's supporters and many other civilian politicians were exiled or confined in a concentration camp and a strict censorship was imposed. There were several small attempted revolts in 1941 but all of them were suppressed.

With approximately a million inhabitants, Paraguay is the least populous of the South American republics. Though the railroad and the airplane have improved communications with the outside world, it is still an isolated and backward country. Only a fraction of its rich territory is under cultivation, and its exports, chiefly meat products, *yerba mate*, cotton, and *quebracho* extract, amount to but a few dollars per capita. In such matters as education and public works, it is far behind some of its more fortunate neighbors. Standards of living are necessarily low, especially among the Indians and *mestizos* who form the vast majority of the country's inhabitants. Peonage, or debt-slavery, is said to be common, but there is no such harsh exploitation of the agricultural laboring class as in the Andean republics and the average Paraguayan tenant farmer seems at least to have enough land

to provide a subsistence for himself and his family. Aside from some of the establishments created by foreign capital, there are relatively few very large plantations, and the upper class in the cities, since 1870 largely of foreign descent, is composed of politicians, professional men, and merchants rather than of great landowners.

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## Chapter XII

### BRAZIL

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The presence of the royal family at Rio de Janeiro averted any serious movement for Brazilian independence during the period when the other South American nations were beginning their revolt against Spain. The people of Brazil were on the whole well satisfied with their new situation. King João, though physically cowardly and easy-going to the point of irresponsibility, had many statesmanlike qualities and his government was enlightened and progressive compared with that under the colonial regime. His popularity was increased by an aggressive foreign policy. While his notoriously unfaithful wife Carlota Joaquina was intriguing to obtain a throne for herself in the revolted Spanish colonies, his own forces occupied French Guiana in the north and the *Banda Oriental* in the south. The former province had to be given up under pressure from the powers at the Congress of Vienna, but the latter, conquered between 1816 and 1820, continued to be a province of Brazil for several years.

The presence of the court, it is true, entailed disadvantages as well as advantages. The Brazilians now had to support not only the royal family but great numbers of the exiled nobility and thousands of Portuguese hangers-on, and the arrogance of the newcomers intensified the already existing hostility between natives and Portuguese. In Rio de Janeiro, pride at being the capital and a lavish distribution of honors and titles did much to offset these causes of irritation, but elsewhere there was some discontent. The most important manifestation of this was an abortive republican movement in Pernambuco, where there had always been a strong spirit of local patriotism, evidenced in colonial times by the resistance to the Dutch and the revolt of 1710. A group of patriots in that province, influenced by the

example of the revolted Spanish colonists, formed a revolutionary society which worked secretly for three years before its discovery by the authorities forced its leaders to take up arms in 1817. The movement met with little support outside of Pernambuco, and many of the landowners within the province lost their enthusiasm when they became alarmed at the radical ideas of some of the rebel leaders. The republicans were defeated and many of them were executed.

#### THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION OF 1820

João became deeply attached to his new home and refused to return to Europe after Napoleon was overthrown. His continued absence, and the commercial stagnation that followed the abolition of the colonial trade monopoly, caused much dissatisfaction in Portugal. At the same time liberal propaganda had affected the army there as it had in Spain. In 1820, after the Spanish revolution, a similar movement took place in Lisbon and Oporto, and rebellious army leaders convoked a Cortes to frame a constitution. Their action inevitably had repercussions in Brazil. The revolutionists had many supporters there, especially among the officers of the "auxiliary division" which had been brought from Europe after the Pernambuco revolt, and on February 26, 1821, a military demonstration forced the King to promise to accept whatever constitution the Cortes might adopt and to appoint a ministry satisfactory to the leaders of the troops.

Many Brazilians at first sympathized with the liberal movement but their enthusiasm diminished as the real aims of the Portuguese revolutionists became apparent. One of the early acts of the Cortes was to publish a manifesto attributing all of the misfortunes of the kingdom to the absence of the court and the opening of Brazilian ports to the commerce of other nations. This became known in Brazil a few days after the demonstration of February 26, and the native leaders' alarm was intensified when the King reluctantly yielded to the pressure of his Portuguese advisers and announced his intention of returning to Lisbon.

On April 20, 1821, apparently hoping to obtain support in reversing this decision, João called a meeting of the parish electors who had

been chosen in Rio de Janeiro as one of the first steps in the complicated process of selecting deputies to the Cortes. The electors not only insisted that the King remain, but also obtained from him a decree promising to put into effect at once a constitution like that of Spain. This document, as several historians have remarked, had probably never been read either by the King or by the electors, but the latter thought that its adoption would forestall the formulation by the Cortes of a constitution containing provisions harmful to Brazil. The King's action had barely been made known, however, when the Portuguese troops brutally attacked and dispersed the electors' meeting, and João was compelled to abrogate his decree. On April 26 he embarked for Portugal. His son, Pedro, who was suspected of having instigated the action of the Portuguese faction because he wished to be left to rule Brazil himself, was made Regent. Before sailing, João told Pedro that Brazil might soon become an independent nation and exhorted him to seize the Crown if this should occur.

#### I N D E P E N D E N C E

João's parting counsel showed a clear perception of the political forces that were at work both in Portugal and in Brazil. The Cortes at Lisbon, obsessed with a desire to restore the old colonial relationship, was as blind to realities as the Spanish Cortes had been ten years before. The situation of the young regent, who at first gave every evidence of a sincere desire to discharge his duties as his father's representative, became steadily more difficult. As early as April, 1821, the Cortes destroyed his authority in the greater part of Brazil by inviting the people of each district to form provincial *juntas* corresponding directly with itself. The refusal of these bodies to remit the public revenues to Rio de Janeiro crippled the treasury, and matters became worse when the incompetently and dishonestly managed national bank was compelled to suspend specie payments. On September 29, the Cortes decreed the abolition of the principal administrative and judicial tribunals that had been established at Rio de Janeiro during the residence of the Court. At the same time, it ordered Pedro himself to return to Portugal, travelling first through England, France,

and Spain "to complete his political education." Later it voted to appoint a governor in each province who should receive his orders directly from Lisbon, and decided to send additional troops to Brazil to enforce these decrees.

In Brazil these proceedings had been watched with increasing indignation. For the first time, political affairs were being discussed freely and publicly, especially in the numerous newspapers that had sprung up since the advent of constitutional government, and the native leaders who were determined to prevent what they called "recolonization," decided that a complete separation from Portugal was the only alternative. Among these were not only the liberals but also many conservatives who distrusted the radicalism of the Cortes and feared that Pedro's leaving Brazil would result in anarchy. The clergy, most of whom were Brazilians, also supported the movement. The desire to obtain the help of these royalist groups, and the feeling that the maintenance of the dynasty offered the only hope of curbing the separatist tendencies that were already manifesting themselves in the provinces, led even those who would have preferred a republican form of government to center their efforts on persuading the prince to take the lead in making Brazil independent. They were encouraged to hope for success because Pedro, like many of the radical leaders, was a mason.

The Portuguese party, on the other hand, was still strong. Several thousand nobles and merchants had left since the King's departure, but the troops of the "auxiliary division" were still stationed at Rio de Janeiro and Bahia. A part of the well-disciplined army trained by British officers during the peninsular war, these forces had an influence out of all proportion to their numerical strength. At Bahia, the commander, supported by the Portuguese merchants resident in the city, openly refused to recognize Pedro's authority. At Rio de Janeiro a demonstration staged by the garrison in June, 1821, compelled Pedro to swear allegiance to the constitutional regime in Portugal and to dismiss his chief minister, who had aroused the officers' distrust.

The advocates of independence nevertheless soon gained the upper hand. When the Cortes ordered Pedro to return to Europe the provincial *junta* of São Paulo presented an eloquent memorial urging



him to defy the Cortes, and another of like tenor bearing 8,000 signatures was laid before the Prince by the president of the municipal council of Rio de Janeiro. Impressed by this evidence of popular support, Pedro publicly declared on January 9, 1822, that he would remain in Brazil. The Portuguese troops were intimidated by the resolute attitude of a great concourse of townspeople and were finally prevailed upon to embark for Portugal after receiving their pay for three months in advance. A few weeks later, when a Portuguese fleet came to carry Pedro back to Lisbon, it was not permitted to enter the harbor until the commander had agreed to comply in every way with Pedro's wishes.

Meanwhile, a new ministry was appointed at Rio de Janeiro and José Bonifacio de Andrada, the president of the provincial *junta* at São Paulo, became Pedro's chief adviser. José Bonifacio was perhaps the most notable Brazilian of his time. Born at Santos in 1763, he had attended the University of Coimbra and had travelled in several European countries studying mineralogy and metallurgy with the great authorities of the day. He afterward held important official positions at Lisbon and fought at the head of a group of students against the French when they invaded Portugal in 1807. In 1819, he returned to Brazil. With the aid of his two very able brothers, Martim Francisco and Antonio Carlos, he soon became the chief political leader in São Paulo. He was now to play a leading rôle in the political affairs of Brazil during one of the critical periods of the country's history.

Pedro's refusal to obey the Cortes' command to leave Brazil made a final break only a question of time. Though his authority was respected only in the southern provinces—Rio de Janeiro, Minas Geraes, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul—and none of the others responded when the new ministry convened a council of *procuradores*, or representatives of the people, in February, 1822, he nevertheless assumed the title of Perpetual Protector and Defender of Brazil on May 13, and, on June 3, issued a call for a constituent and legislative assembly. On September 7, 1822, while Pedro was visiting the Province of São Paulo, he received dispatches which convinced him that the moment for a final decision had arrived. Drawing his sword, he dramatically cried "Independence or Death"—the *Grito de Ypiranga* which has ever since been commemorated as the Brazilian declara-

tion of independence. His action was enthusiastically acclaimed in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and on October 12 Pedro was solemnly proclaimed constitutional Emperor of Brazil. Portuguese residents were given the alternative of accepting the new regime or leaving the country.

Under the energetic leadership of José Bonifacio, the new imperial government rapidly extended its control over the provinces still in the hands of the Portuguese. Lord Cochrane, who had left Peru after his quarrel with San Martín, was employed to organize a navy, and other officers and seamen were brought out from England under contract. In July, 1823, forces sent by land and sea forced the Portuguese to evacuate Bahia, and by September the provinces north of Cape San Roque, which had been in a state of near anarchy since 1820, submitted to Cochrane's fleet. The Portuguese commander at Montevideo soon afterward surrendered. The Cortes was no longer in a position to support its adherents, for it had itself been swept away by a counter revolution.

#### THE REIGN OF PEDRO I

The Andrada cabinet was less successful in dealing with internal questions. José Bonifacio was tactless and arbitrary in his treatment of political opponents, and was even accused of using his position to persecute personal enemies. His attacks on the freedom of the press, and the establishment of an extensive system of political espionage, increased his unpopularity. Even the masonic lodges, in which the Andradas had hitherto been prominent, were closed when their members ventured to criticize the government's actions. The Emperor, who was himself perhaps somewhat jealous of his minister's great prestige and authority, was finally persuaded to dismiss him in July, 1823. The Andradas at once aligned themselves with the liberal opposition in the Constituent Assembly. This body, which had been in session since April, had already shown a disposition to oppose Pedro's views, and its antagonism to the Crown now became more evident. On November 12 Pedro dissolved it by armed force and deported the three Andrada brothers to France.

Pedro now entrusted the task of framing the constitution to a

commission of ten members named by himself. The new code, which was to remain in force until the advent of the Republic in 1889, guaranteed personal liberty and freedom of the press, and abolished all privileges of rank and caste. There was to be a chamber of deputies elected for four years, and a senate chosen by the Emperor from lists submitted by the electoral colleges and holding office for life. A measure of self-government was granted to the provinces and municipalities. On the whole the constitution was a liberal one by comparison with those of other monarchical states and also by comparison with that which had been under consideration by the recently disbanded Assembly. It was formally sworn to by the Emperor on March 25, 1824, after it had been submitted to the municipal councils throughout the country for approval.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly provoked a new revolution in Pernambuco where the liberals, who had actually seized control several months before, proclaimed the establishment of a republic called the "Confederation of the Equator." This was to have included all northern Brazil, but the movement received little support in the neighboring provinces. A reaction soon occurred in Pernambuco itself, and after Pedro's forces occupied Recife, with the aid of Cochrane's fleet, other places that had revolted were soon reduced. This campaign marked the end of Cochrane's career in South America. He had already had a dispute with his employers over the disposition of prizes taken in his earlier operations, and he now proceeded to settle his account with the Imperial government by seizing Maranhão, where he took about \$100,000 from the custom-house, and then sailed away to England on one of Pedro's vessels.

The revolt of the Spanish-speaking inhabitants of the *Banda Oriental*, which began in April, 1825, was a more serious affair. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, it involved Brazil in a war with Argentina which dragged on for three years before it was finally ended by British mediation. The conflict reflected little credit on the incompetently led imperial army and navy. Aside from the permanent loss of the Cisplatine province, its chief result so far as Brazil was concerned was the impoverishment of the treasury and a decrease in the prestige of the imperial government.

The outcome of the war was one of a number of factors which by

1828 had destroyed Pedro's one-time popularity. The chief cause of discontent was the feeling that his government had never been truly Brazilian. The Emperor was still surrounded by Portuguese advisers and army officers, who had remained in Brazil from personal loyalty or from other motives, and the few natives whom he took into his confidence were for the most part conservatives and ultra-royalist members of the newly created nobility who had little political following. There had been much criticism of an agreement negotiated through British mediation in 1825 by which Pedro assumed part of the Portuguese debt in return for the mother country's recognition of Brazil's independence, and the Brazilians had disliked his preoccupation with efforts to have his daughter Maria de la Gloria recognized as Queen of Portugal after João's death in 1826. To make matters worse, Pedro's personal conduct was undignified to the point of vulgarity. Even the far from puritanical Brazilians were shocked by his unfeeling treatment of his wife and the influence which his mistress, the Marchioness of Santos, was permitted to exercise in public affairs. All of these matters were discussed passionately and often scurrilously in the newspapers, for the government had by this time relaxed its restrictions on the press. By far the most important of the opposition papers was the *Aurora Fluminense*, founded in 1827 by Evaristo Ferreira da Veiga, who from this time was one of the chief figures in the liberal movement.

Despite the constitution, Pedro continued to rule almost as though he were an absolute monarch. The first meeting of the legislative chambers had been delayed on various pretexts until 1826, and though regular sessions had been held since that time the views of the people's representatives had received little consideration. The deputies were at first too much in awe of the imperial authority to assert their prerogatives effectively, but they grew bolder as the government's difficulties increased and the majority was openly critical and unfriendly in the sessions of 1827, 1828, and 1829.

When the term of the first deputies expired and a new Chamber met in May, 1830, it was clear that a crisis was at hand. The technique of controlled elections by which majorities favorable to the government were obtained in later times had not yet been developed, and the greater part of the new members were frankly hostile to the Em-

peror and his advisers. Though Pedro showed a willingness to compromise, his concessions merely encouraged his adversaries, and the news of the July revolution in Paris helped to arouse the liberals' enthusiasm. When a radical Italian journalist named Badaró was murdered at São Paulo in November, supposedly by an order of the imperial judge, there was an outburst of popular indignation. Pedro's position grew more difficult in the months that followed, and his Portuguese adherents simply made matters worse when they showed their loyalty by building bonfires and illuminating their houses because their demonstrations provoked rioting which inflamed public opinion to the danger point. Pedro made a belated effort to placate public opinion by appointing a cabinet of native Brazilians, and then in April, 1831, committed the final error of replacing these ministers by members of his own immediate circle. A mob at once gathered to demand that the former cabinet be reinstated, and many of the troops whose officers had been won over by the radical leaders joined in the movement. Pedro at first flatly refused to yield, but on the early morning of April 7 he suddenly signed an abdication in favor of his five-year-old son, Pedro de Alcantara, and named José Bonifacio de Andrada as his children's guardian. Immediately afterward he embarked for Europe on a British warship. Those members of the parliament who happened to be in the capital elected a regency of three members to rule in the name of the new Emperor during his minority.

#### THE REGENCY

The government was now for the first time in the hands of native Brazilians, and the leaders who assumed control found their task a difficult one. Political inexperience, local jealousies, and the tradition of corrupt and despotic administration made it hard to establish a regime that could maintain order in the name of the new Emperor until he became of age. The inhabitants of the Empire were scattered over an area far greater than that of any of the other South American countries, and there were several provincial cities that were almost as populous and wealthy as the capital itself. The people were perhaps even less prepared for constitutional government than their Spanish-speaking neighbors. Few even among the upper classes had

more than the barest rudiments of an education. Half of the population were Negroes, for the most part slaves, and a large proportion of the other half were persons of mixed blood who had until very recently been treated by the law as an inferior caste, subject to various political and social restrictions. In the larger cities, the visits of foreigners and the increase of commercial contacts with the outside world were already modifying colonial customs and points of view, but in the country the change was less apparent. The owners of the great plantations were often petty despots. Not only their own slaves but also the free people of the neighborhood looked to them for support and protection, and it was from among them that the government usually appointed the *capitão mór*, who was its representative in each rural district. It was this class which exercised the preponderant influence in political affairs in the nation as a whole.

The nine years that followed the revolution of 1831 were a period of factional strife at Rio de Janeiro and disorder at times approaching anarchy in the provinces. The Regency was supported by the moderate liberals, and especially by Evaristo da Veiga's "Society for the Defense of Liberty and National Independence," which organized behind the government the native commercial and landholding interests. It was opposed on the one hand by the *exaltados*, or radical federalists and republicans, and on the other by the still powerful Portuguese element allied with many conservative Brazilians, like José Bonifácio de Andrada, who sought the restoration of Pedro I. Both of these groups made repeated attempts to overthrow the new regime. Revolts at the capital were suppressed by the firm hand of Father Feijó, who was Minister of Justice during the first year of the Regency and who became sole Regent, superseding the commission of three in 1835, but disorders in the provinces were less easily dealt with. There was much strife between ambitious local military leaders in Pernambuco, Pará, and Maranhão, where local separatist spirit made the maintenance of the central government's authority difficult. The federalists were somewhat placated in 1834 by a constitutional amendment permitting the election of provincial legislative assemblies, but this did not prevent the outbreak of one of the worst local civil wars in Brazil's history, the "Guerra dos Farrapos," in Rio Grande do Sul, which began in 1835.

Feijó's inflexible disposition and somewhat radical ideas alienated many of the moderate liberals, and the new conservative party, which was organized under the lead of Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos, attracted the support of most of Pedro I's partisans after the ex-Emperor died in 1834. The liberals who continued to support the Regent were joined by many of the *exaltados*, but these had lost much of their following as the public grew tired of continued political disorder. The government's inability to restore peace in the provinces, and especially in Rio Grande do Sul, made Feijó's position more and more untenable, and when his opponents obtained a parliamentary majority in 1837 he quietly turned over the Regency to the conservative leader Araujo Lima.

The new government was hardly more successful than its predecessor. The war continued in the south, while fresh revolts occurred at Bahia and Maranhão. Araujo Lima's reactionary policy, and especially the restriction of the limited autonomy granted to the provinces in 1834, increased the feeling of discontent, and early in 1840 the liberal leaders began a campaign to have the fourteen-year-old Emperor declared old enough to rule. Their immediate purpose was to do away with the conservative regency, but they were supported by many influential people who hoped that the factional struggle for control of the government would lose its violent character when the nation had a ruler independent of either political party. Under the leadership of the two surviving Andradas, for José Bonifacio had died in 1838, the movement soon had the support of a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The Regent at first temporized, and then attempted, on July 22, to adjourn the Parliament. This was the signal for an open though bloodless revolt. The two Chambers met in defiance of the Regent's order, obtained the Emperor's consent, and formally proclaimed him of age to rule in his own name.

#### THE REIGN OF PEDRO II

Under the new Emperor, Brazil was to enjoy nearly half a century of internal peace and rapid material progress. Despite his youth, Pedro II soon showed a surprising capacity to give the country precisely the kind of government that its political and social develop-

ment seemed to demand. Educated by conscientious tutors under a strict regime that left him little opportunity for contact with the court influences which had shaped his father's character, he grew up to be serious minded, irreproachable in his private life, and indefatigable in the performance of what he considered his duty. He was keenly interested in art, science, and literature, well-informed though not profound or brilliant, an able and intelligent ruler if not a great statesman. His subjects loved him for his simplicity and his democratic ways even when they regarded his weaknesses with tolerant amusement or criticized his official acts with all the freedom permitted by an extremely broad-minded and tolerant policy toward the press.

Though the new regime was warmly welcomed by the great majority of the people, it was several years before the political disturbances inherited from the Regency were suppressed. Factional rivalry was still virulent. The Andradas, who had formed a ministry after their victory in 1840, soon disagreed with the Emperor, and when a new conservative cabinet dissolved the liberal-controlled Chamber of Deputies revolts broke out in São Paulo and Minas Geraes. They were suppressed by General Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva, later known as the Duke of Caxias, and in 1845, by a succession of military victories followed by the promise of a general armistice, Caxias also ended the ten-year war in Rio Grande do Sul.

At the capital, the liberals returned to power in 1844, but were again forced to give way to the conservatives in 1848. This was the occasion for the last serious disturbance of Dom Pedro's reign, the "*praeira*" revolt in Pernambuco. The liberal officials in that province had made political rivalries more acute than usual during their recent tenure of power by openly encouraging a campaign of terrorism against resident Portuguese merchants, and they now attempted to prevent the conservatives from assuming control of local affairs. The revolt was suppressed after a few months of fighting. A newly established coastwise steamship service which carried troops rapidly to any disaffected area greatly facilitated the task of restoring order.

The Emperor had by this time begun to exercise the great personal influence which kept party strife within bounds during the remainder of his reign. The establishment of peace was the easier be-



cause there were no really important differences in political aims between the liberals and the conservatives and neither group had a very large popular following. For several years in the 1850's affairs were conducted by "cabinets of conciliation" representing both parties. Later Pedro usually called upon one group or the other to assume the responsibility of administration, but such changes meant little more than a change in personnel and involved no disturbance of public order. The Emperor was the real head of the government, making the most important decisions and carefully supervising his ministers' work. It was he rather than the voters who decided which party should be in power. The ministers were drawn from the group that had a majority in the Chamber, but it was a simple matter to dissolve this body and obtain a new one with a majority favorable to the other party when the Emperor felt that the time for a political change had arrived. Elections were no more free than in other South American countries, but Dom Pedro endeavored to rule in harmony with public opinion, and his government perhaps approached the ideal of a constitutional monarchy as nearly as the political education of the Brazilians permitted. His influence and his untiring attention to the work of administration made the government more efficient and less corrupt than its predecessors, at least so far as the higher officials were concerned, and the Senate, whose members were carefully selected by the Emperor from lists presented by the provincial electors, became a highly respected body, though an exceedingly conservative one. Among the lower ranks of office holders the bad practices inherited from the colonial period seem to have persisted to a greater degree.

The most troublesome question that confronted the Empire after the establishment of internal peace was the continued existence of the African slave trade. In 1826 Pedro I had been compelled by pressure from Great Britain and as a condition for the recognition of Brazilian independence to agree by treaty to stop this traffic. It had consequently been made illegal in 1830, but North American and Portuguese vessels had nevertheless continued to import many thousands of Negroes annually with the open connivance of the authorities. Many planters felt that their labor supply could not be maintained if the law were enforced, for the Negro population in Brazil had never

held its own by natural increase. The continued existence of the trade was a constant source of irritation in the relations between Brazil and Great Britain, and in 1845, when Brazil attempted to terminate the treaty of 1826, the British parliament passed the Aberdeen Act, which permitted the condemnation of slave ships by British admiralty courts rather than by the joint commissions which had acted under the treaty. Five years later it authorized its cruisers to seize such ships even in Brazilian territorial waters. After this act of aggression Dom Pedro insisted upon the passage of the Queiroz law of 1850 under which the trade was effectively suppressed.

The result was an increase of white immigration, especially to the southern provinces. Rio de Janeiro, Minas Geraes, and São Paulo were henceforth more important than the older settlements in the north, where the cultivation of sugar, tobacco, and cotton was no longer so profitable as in the first years after independence. Coffee had become the Empire's chief export, and it was in this period that Brazil began to supply more of this commodity to the world's market than all other countries combined. With internal peace and a growing foreign trade both population and national wealth increased rapidly, despite occasional setbacks from world-wide financial depressions and from foreign wars which occupied much of the government's attention in the years between 1850 and 1870.

These wars have been mentioned in earlier chapters. Brazil's intervention in Uruguay, which culminated in the overthrow of Rosas at Monte Caseros in 1852, cost the Empire little in men or money and gave it for the time being a preponderant influence in eastern South America. Another intervention in Uruguay twelve years later, however, brought on the long conflict against López of Paraguay, in which the imperial army lost some 33,000 men and the government spent several hundred million dollars. At its close, in 1870, Brazil was exhausted both morally and economically, but the Emperor's prestige, if somewhat shaken by reverses in the earlier part of the war, was restored by final victory. The confidence that his government inspired both at home and in financial circles abroad made possible a rapid recovery.

## WHY THE EMPIRE FELL

A traveller who visited South America in 1881 was much impressed by the contrast between Brazil and other countries on the east coast of South America. Despite the continued existence of slavery and the mixture of races among its people, the Empire seemed "really civilized," with a government that appeared to be securely established and far better able to maintain order than those of the River Plate republics.<sup>1</sup> To such an observer, the monarchy must have seemed responsible for much of the difference. It would have been difficult to suppose that the Emperor would soon be overthrown, for no contemporary ruler was apparently more beloved by his own people or more highly regarded in foreign countries.

Several factors were nevertheless working to weaken Dom Pedro's position. Many business men were dissatisfied with what they considered his failure to grasp the importance of the new economic problems created by the growth of population and trade, and many political leaders criticised his government as undemocratic and ultra-conservative. Before 1870, a reorganized and more aggressive liberal party began to demand electoral reforms and to work for the abolition of slavery, objectives with which the Emperor had much sympathy but which he did not consider immediately attainable. While opposition was thus growing among the progressive elements, many conservatives were becoming lukewarm, if not hostile. Among these were the more devout Catholics. Dom Pedro was extremely tolerant in religious matters, but at the same time he had firmly maintained the government's authority over the Church. Ecclesiastical questions gave little trouble until after a conflict between some of the clergy and the freemasons—brought on by Pope Pius IX's condemnation of the masonic order—aroused much public excitement in the early 1870's. When the bishops of Pará and Pernambuco ordered the *irmandades*, or lay religious fraternities, to expel all masons from their membership, and sought to force compliance by laying interdicts, the government intervened and the two bishops were finally prosecuted and imprisoned for disobedience in 1874. This caused a great scandal; and

<sup>1</sup> Knight, *Cruise of the Falcon*, p. 333.

the release of the bishops a few months later in response to the pressure of public opinion did not help the Emperor's prestige.

Much more important was the controversy over slavery. This institution had been done away with in nearly all other civilized countries, and there was an increasing agitation for its abolition in Brazil. The movement had first become important at the time of the civil war in the United States. By 1871 it was strong enough to enable the government to force through parliament the Rio Branco law which declared all children born thereafter legally free, though requiring them to work for their mother's owners until the age of twenty-one. This quieted the advocates of emancipation for the time being, but a new and more violent campaign for complete abolition began after 1878 under the leadership of Joaquim Nabuco. In 1884 the provinces of Ceará and Amazonas freed slaves in their territory by local action, and in 1885 the imperial parliament freed all slaves over sixty years of age. Thousands more were emancipated by the voluntary action of their masters so that whereas a quarter or more of the inhabitants of Brazil had been in servitude in 1865, there were less than 700,000 out of a population of some 15,000,000 in 1888. Many of these were becoming extremely unruly, and in São Paulo great numbers simply abandoned the plantations, assisted and protected by emancipation sympathizers. The army refused to help the civil police to round up the fugitives, and discipline on the plantations began to break down completely.

Dom Pedro was opposed to slavery and he suffered keenly from the criticism directed against Brazil in foreign countries, but he had not been inclined to force any sudden and radical solution of the problem because of the economic interests involved. His daughter Isabel was less cautious and more ardent in her zeal for emancipation. In 1888, when the Princess was acting as Regent while her father was making one of his occasional visits to Europe, a bill freeing all slaves was proposed by the Crown and passed by a large majority in both chambers. Since there was no provision for compensation, the owners were deprived at one stroke of property worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The "Golden Law," as the Brazilians in their enthusiasm called the measure, caused a bitter feeling among the landowning class which more than offset its popularity among the masses of the people.

There was thus a growing discontent among the very groups to which the dynasty might normally have looked for support, and a growing feeling that the institutions under which Brazil had enjoyed so long a period of peaceful progress had outlived their usefulness. The desire for a change was increased by the unpopularity of Isabel, who was Dom Pedro's prospective successor, and by the dislike of the Brazilians for her French husband, the Count d'Eu. There were relatively few Brazilians who advocated a revolution during the Emperor's lifetime, for he was still personally popular, but an increasing number looked forward to the establishment of a republic after his death. Since 1870, a small but vociferous republican party had carried on propaganda with little interference from the imperial authorities. This group acquired some importance in São Paulo and Minas Geraes, and Dom Pedro's rapidly failing health encouraged it to intensify its activities. In 1889 the avowed republicans were probably a small minority, but there was a strong desire among the educated classes generally for political reforms of some sort.

#### THE REVOLUTION OF 1889

Though the Emperor was welcomed as affectionately as usual when he returned from Europe, he could not but realize the strength of this feeling. He had said that he would not resist if his people desired to abolish the monarchy, but he sought to avert the threatened revolution by making concessions. The Viscount of Ouro Preto, who became Prime Minister in June, 1889, proposed a series of constitutional changes, among them the granting of autonomy to the provinces, the extension of the suffrage, and the abolition of life tenure in the Senate. His program was defeated in Parliament, and though a new election, controlled by the customary methods, gave the cabinet a majority, the government's position was much weakened.

The immediate cause of the Empire's fall, however, was not civilian discontent but the so-called "military question." For several years there had been increasing evidence of a dangerous spirit of insubordination in the army. Officers had repeatedly violated a regulation prohibiting them from breaking into print on controversial subjects without permission from the minister of war, and the government's

timid and ineffective attempts to restrain them had simply made the officers more arrogant and less inclined to submit to control by the civilian politicians. At the same time much republican propaganda had been spread among the younger officers by the teachings of Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhães, a popular professor in the military school at Rio de Janeiro.

The Ouro Preto Cabinet was no more successful than its predecessors in dealing with this problem. The Prime Minister attempted to placate the army by concessions, but at the same time he aroused the malcontents by giving orders to transfer some of the less reliable regiments into distant provinces and to strengthen the national guard as an offset to the influence of the professional soldiers. This precipitated an open revolt, led by General Deodoro da Fonseca. The conspirators at first planned simply to overthrow the Cabinet without displacing the Emperor, but Benjamin Constant and other radical leaders finally persuaded Deodoro to establish a republic. On November 15, 1889 a portion of the garrison at Rio de Janeiro, led by Deodoro and Constant, seized the national palace and other public buildings. There was almost no bloodshed because the Adjutant General, Floriano Peixoto, refused to obey the Cabinet's order to resist. The Emperor was deposed and sent into exile. A Federal Republic, the United States of Brazil, was proclaimed, and Deodoro became the head of the "provisional government by the army and the navy, in the name of the nation."

#### MILITARY GOVERNMENTS, 1889-1894

The establishment of the republic had been the work of a small fraction of the army with little support or opposition from the mass of the Brazilian people. Though Deodoro's first cabinet included such civilian leaders as Ruy Barbosa and the future president, Campos Salles, his regime was little more than a military dictatorship. The army dominated affairs both at Rio de Janeiro and in the states. Freedom of the press disappeared and elections were controlled by those in power. The provisional government nevertheless addressed itself energetically to the complete reorganization of the national and local administration and carried out a number of important reforms. One

of these was the complete separation of Church and State, effected by a decree issued in January, 1890. A constituent assembly met on November 15 of the same year, under the presidency of Dr. Prudente de Moraes, who had been one of the earliest leaders of the republican party in São Paulo. The constitution which it promulgated three months later was in the main similar to that of the United States, except that the federal government rather than the states was given power to enact criminal, civil, and commercial codes and the states, on the other hand, were permitted to levy taxes on exports. Under its transitory provisions the first president was to be chosen by the assembly itself, and Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca was elected to this office on February 25, receiving 129 votes as against 97 for Dr. Prudente de Moraes.

The relatively large vote against Deodoro was an indication of the growing opposition to his dictatorial regime. He had already broken with his first cabinet in January and the new one, headed by Baron de Lucena, was not popular. The President was an able soldier with a reputation for personal honesty, but he showed little skill in dealing with political questions and it was not very long before dissatisfaction in the assembly, which had now become the first federal Congress, reached a point where everything which the administration proposed was systematically obstructed. The President had no authority under the new constitution to dissolve the Congress but he nevertheless undertook to do so by military force, announcing that he was assuming dictatorial powers to frustrate a plot for the restoration of the monarchy. By this time he had lost nearly all of his former supporters, including even a large part of the army. There was a revolutionary outbreak in Rio Grande do Sul, with lesser disturbances in several of the other provinces, and on November 23, 1891, the navy, under the command of Admiral Custodio de Mello, trained its guns on Rio de Janeiro with a demand that the President resign. Deodoro, too ill to resist, quietly turned over his office to the Vice-President, General Floriano Peixoto.

Though the new chief executive had the army behind him and was able by persuasion or coercion to command the support of a majority in the Congress, his term of office was not a tranquil one. His arbitrary removal of nearly all of the state governors caused several

small scattered uprisings, and a controversy over the question whether he should serve out the whole of Deodoro's unexpired term or hold a new election further hurt his prestige. The mercantile class and the conservative elements generally, including of course the partisans of the monarchy, grew more and more dissatisfied as it became evident that the outcome of the revolt in 1891 had been merely to exchange one military dictatorship for another. The navy, officered by men from the aristocratic classes and jealous of the army's preponderance in the government, was especially disaffected, and on September 6, 1893, the entire fleet revolted at Rio de Janeiro under the leadership of Admiral de Mello. For six months the insurgents held possession of the harbor, but they were prevented from bombarding the capital or from blockading the port by the determined attitude of the commanders of several North American and European warships which were in the bay when the revolt began. Admiral de Mello therefore left Rio de Janeiro with a part of his forces to cooperate with a revolutionary movement led by Gumerindo Saraiva in Rio Grande do Sul. The insurgents obtained control of much of southern Brazil, but they failed to follow up their successes with a movement on the capital. Admiral Saldanha da Gama, who had been left in command of the insurgents there, had meanwhile made it known that he favored the reestablishment of the monarchy, and his attitude cost the rebels many supporters even though there was little evidence that the other leaders had the same purpose. In March, 1894, when several new warships purchased abroad by the government arrived off the harbor, the movement collapsed. A large number of those implicated in the revolt were put to death by the federal authorities.

#### REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS, 1894-1914

The presidential election of 1894 was held while the revolt was still in progress, with Prudente de Moraes, the veteran republican leader from São Paulo, as the official and consequently the successful candidate. Peixoto, to his credit, made no attempt to remain in power himself or to perpetuate the control of the army, and the inauguration of an able civilian president gave the republican regime a stability that it had not thus far had. Nevertheless, the new President had



to deal with many troublesome questions. Grave financial problems inherited from his predecessors became all but insoluble as the effects of the world depression of the '90's made themselves felt, and there were several unsuccessful uprisings in the army, which resented its loss of political power. Some of the participants in the recent revolt continued guerrilla warfare in Rio Grande do Sul until August, 1895. In 1896 a group of religious fanatics in the back country of Bahia, led by one Antonio Maciel, generally called Antonio Conselheiro, came into conflict with the authorities and order was not restored until several federal expeditionary forces had been ingloriously defeated and a great amount of money had been wasted. In 1897 a conspiracy to assassinate the President himself, instigated by military officers and rival politicians, resulted in the death of the Minister of War.

In the face of all these difficulties, Prudente de Moraes was able to maintain the prestige and the authority of the federal government and to hand on the presidency at the end of his term in 1898 to Dr. Manoel Ferras de Campos Salles, another of the early republican leaders from São Paulo. The new chief executive's principal accomplishment was the solution of the fiscal problems that had been a source of embarrassment and danger to his predecessors. A refunding loan which he negotiated in London before his inauguration gave the government a much needed respite from interest and amortization payments, and economies and new taxes put the finances on a sound basis for the first time in the Republic's history. His administration was on the whole a tranquil one and when a third Paulista, Dr. Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves, became President in 1902, the worst effects of the depression had passed and commerce and agriculture were again flourishing.

During the next four years Rio de Janeiro was beautified by a costly program of municipal improvements and made a safer place to live by a successful campaign against yellow fever, which had hitherto taken an appalling toll of lives each year. This was directed by a Brazilian physician, Dr. Oswaldo Cruz, who began in 1903, in the face of criticism and ridicule, to apply in Rio de Janeiro the results of the experiments that Walter Reed and his associates had just completed in Habana. During the same period the Baron of Rio Branco began his long and brilliant service as Minister of Foreign

Affairs, in the course of which he settled by arbitration or friendly agreement nearly all of the boundary disputes that were a potential source of trouble between Brazil and other South American republics. Continued prosperity during the administration of Affonso Augusto Moreira Penna, who was elected to the presidency in 1906, made it possible to stabilize the fluctuating and depreciated paper currency which had been a handicap to commerce since the days of the Empire. With the establishment of a conversion office in December, 1906, the milreis was given a fixed value and notes secured by gold were gradually substituted for the old inconvertible paper.

The federal government was controlled by the republican party, which was the only permanently organized political group. This in turn was dominated by a relatively small number of leaders in the larger states, most of them members of the same landowning aristocracy that had supplied the statesmen and politicians of the Empire. The first three civilian presidents, as we have seen, were from São Paulo, which had been the original center of the republican movement and which continued with its large population and wealth to play a leading rôle in federal politics. President Penna, on the other hand, was a native of Minas Geraes, whose leaders usually cooperated with the Paulistas in selecting the official candidate. The smaller states, less advanced politically and economically, had relatively little influence. Their local administrations were dominated by the group in control at the capital and the federal government did not hesitate to intervene in their affairs when such action seemed necessary for political reasons. Elections were no more free than in the days of the Empire.

There were of course many political leaders in the other states who resented this state of affairs and there was much discontent in the army, which had never resigned itself entirely to the loss of the power that it enjoyed before 1894. The opponents of the São Paulo-Minas Geraes combination had their first opportunity to obtain the presidency when Affonso Penna died in 1909. Vice-President Nilo Peçanha, who took his place, had less influence with the other party leaders than his predecessors, and he was compelled by the machinations of Pinheiro Machado, the political boss of Rio Grande do Sul, to accept as his successor an official candidate chosen by a congress-

sional caucus rather than by himself. Marshal Hermes da Fonseca, a nephew of Deodoro and a native of Rio Grande do Sul, was thus nominated. He was victorious at the polls over Ruy Barbosa, who made a vigorous campaign as the candidate of those who opposed a revival of military control.

Hermes da Fonseca's administration was marred by corruption and inefficiency. There were numerous interventions in state affairs to place adherents of the new regime in office, and several small uprisings occurred in the navy and among other discontented groups. Nevertheless railroad building continued on an extensive scale and immigration from Europe increased. The President was succeeded in 1914 by a civilian from Minas Geraes, Wenceslau Braz Pereira Gomes, who was nominated by the same political group but whose election nevertheless signified a return to power of the São Paulo-Minas coalition.

#### C O F F E E , R U B B E R , A N D I M M I G R A T I O N

As in most of the countries of the Western Hemisphere, political events in Brazil in the last years of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth century were of less interest than the economic progress that was rapidly giving the Western Hemisphere a new importance in world affairs. Coffee and rubber were doing for Brazil in these years what meat and grain were doing for Argentina, and a great wave of immigration was having the same effect as in the River Plate countries. The arrival of some three million European laborers, most of them from Italy, Portugal, and Spain, more than offset any bad economic effect from the abolition of slavery, since the newcomers were far more useful, especially on the coffee plantations, than slave labor had been. Like the earlier immigrants, most of them came to São Paulo and the less developed regions farther south.

Coffee was still the most important export, and Brazil was by this time furnishing three-fourths of the total world supply of this commodity. The coffee industry, however, had not been without its vicissitudes. During the last decade of the nineteenth century production had expanded more rapidly than consumption, and prices had consequently fallen. To check the decline, the state of São Paulo pro-

hibited planting of new trees for a period of ten years after 1902. In 1906, with the cooperation of the federal government and with financial help from London and New York bankers, the State undertook the first of a series of experiments in "valorization," buying up a large amount of coffee which was withheld from the market until prices improved. The success of this scheme and of a similar operation during the European war led in 1922 to the adoption of a permanent plan of control which, as we shall see, was to have a less satisfactory outcome.

Rubber, in the first decade of the century, was an almost equally important export. For generations the greater part of the world's supply had been obtained from the wild trees of the Amazon valley, and with the development of the bicycle and the automobile the demand rapidly increased. Many thousands of laborers from the drought-ridden state of Ceará and other near-by districts were employed in gathering it. Manaus, a riverport 1,000 miles from the sea, became a large city. After 1912, however, the plantations of the Far East, with their cheap labor, began to produce great quantities of rubber at prices with which the Brazilian product, gathered under great difficulties from trees scattered through an all but inaccessible tropical jungle, could not compete.

A large amount of sugar, consumed chiefly in Brazil itself, was still raised in Pernambuco, and the cultivation of cacao and tobacco was important in Bahia. These older communities, however, had advanced far less rapidly than those of the south. Their population was still predominantly of Negro blood and their hotter climate made them unattractive to foreign immigrants. They had shared to a relatively small extent in the new railroad mileage that had been built since the fall of the Empire. The south had definitely become the most important section of the Republic. In 1920 the single state of Minas Geraes with 5,800,000 inhabitants was hardly exceeded in population by any South American country except Argentina, São Paulo, with 4,500,000, was still more important from an economic point of view, and Rio Grande do Sul, with its 2,000,000 people and its growing cattle industry, now played a larger part in Brazilian affairs than did Pernambuco.

## POLITICAL EVENTS, 1914-1930

The European war affected Brazil as it did her South American neighbors. When it started, imports and exports fell off sharply and with them the government's revenues. The conversion office was closed and new paper money was issued to meet current expenditures. The export trade, however, soon revived and the inconveniences caused by the dislocation of ocean transport and the shortage of goods were offset by an increased demand for products like cotton and sugar. Since Brazil actually joined the allies as a belligerent in 1917, though without sending any considerable forces to Europe, her government was represented at the Peace Conference and she became one of the first members of the Council of the League of Nations. She left the League in 1926, however, when the other powers refused to make her position in the Council a permanent one.

Ex-President Rodrigues Alves was elected to succeed Wenceslau Braz in 1918, but he died at the beginning of his term and Epitacio da Silva Pessoa of Parahyba, who had distinguished himself as the head of the Brazilian delegation at Versailles, was chosen in his place. The new administration embarked upon an ambitious program of public works, financed in part by foreign borrowing. This involved the government in difficulties when depression followed the brief post-war boom. There was a sharp contest in the election of 1922. Ex-President Nilo Peçanha was the opposition candidate, put forward by the same political-military group that had been in power between 1910 and 1914, and when he was defeated by Arthur da Silva Bernardes, who had the support of the administration, there was some talk of revolution. Small uprisings did occur in the army as the result of a conspiracy headed by Hermes da Fonseca, but they were suppressed before Bernardes' inauguration. A much more serious revolt took place in July, 1924, when a portion of the army seized the city of São Paulo and held it for three weeks before loyal troops were able to gain the upper hand. Other disturbances frequently compelled the government to establish martial law in one region or another during the remainder of Dr. Bernardes' term, but after Dr. Washington Luis Pereira de Souza became President in 1926 coffee prices were

higher, business conditions improved, and the political situation was more tranquil.

#### THE COLLAPSE OF COFFEE VALORIZATION AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1930

Unfortunately the prosperity of the coffee industry was partly factitious. During the post-war depression, the federal government had again attempted to stabilize the market, and in 1922 an Institute for the Permanent Defense of Coffee had been established. Two years later this national organization turned the problem over to a state institute in São Paulo, which worked with the cooperation of similar bodies in other Brazilian states. In order to maintain prices, the amounts exported each month were limited by compelling growers to ship their production to warehouses in the interior, from which it was forwarded to the ports in amounts determined in accordance with the condition of the market. Loans were made to the planters on coffee that had not yet been sold, and production was not restricted. On the contrary it tended to increase because prices were artificially maintained at a high level and direct purchases were made by the coffee institute when the market needed support.

Two very large crops in succession, in 1927-28 and 1928-29, finally brought into being a tremendous oversupply, at a time when increasing tightness in the world's money markets made it difficult to continue the foreign borrowing by which the system of valorization had been maintained. In October, 1929, the world price of coffee suddenly collapsed, bringing ruin to planters and merchants and grievously affecting the government's financial situation. The advent soon afterward of the world depression dissipated all hope for an early recovery.

So grave a catastrophe could not fail to have political consequences, particularly as the whole plan of valorization had been the work of the same group of leaders in São Paulo who controlled the federal administration under Dr. Washington Luis. Discontent in opposition circles became more acute when the President put forward another Paulista, Julio Prestes, as the official candidate in the election of 1930.

This was a violation of the working arrangement by which the dominant political groups in São Paulo and Minas Geraes had maintained their supremacy in federal affairs and had taken turns in presenting candidates for the presidency, and the leaders in Minas Geraes consequently threw their support to Getulio Vargas, the Governor of Rio Grande do Sul. The party in power, however, controlled the administrations and the electoral machinery in nearly all of the other states, and was consequently victorious by a popular vote of 1,089,000 to 735,000.

The losers seemed inclined at first to accept the result peaceably, but their attitude changed when several opposition candidates who had apparently been elected to Congress were counted out by the board that canvassed the returns, and when the federal authorities intervened in Parahyba to set up a state administration controlled by their own partisans. On October 3, 1930, revolts began simultaneously in Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Geraes, and Parahyba. A civil war involving much of the Republic's territory seemed imminent. Before very much fighting had actually occurred, however, a group of military leaders seized control at Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, establishing a provisional *junta* which some days later recognized Getulio Vargas as Provisional President.

The victorious revolutionists undertook to reorganize the Republic's entire political system from top to bottom. All federal, state, and local legislative bodies were dissolved, constitutional guarantees were suspended, and adherents of the new regime were everywhere placed in power with unrestricted authority. The continuance of this state of affairs during 1931 and into 1932 caused much discontent, and even the more prominent leaders of Dr. Vargas' own party began to express their dissatisfaction at the growing power of the young military officers who were serving as interventors in most of the states. In May, 1932, however, the Provisional President announced that elections for a constituent assembly would be held a year later. This somewhat relieved the situation and the people of São Paulo received little help from other states when they made a desperate effort to recover their ascendancy in the federal government by armed revolt in the following July. Fortunately, it was of short duration, for the insurgents sur-

rendered early in October. Though the chief leaders were exiled, the defeated party was treated with a moderation which did much to facilitate a return to normal conditions.

#### THE CONSTITUTION OF 1934

The constituent assembly met in November, 1933, after an election in which the secret ballot was used for the first time in Brazil's history. The administration apparently made an effort to assure freedom and fair play, and opposition parties were well represented, though the majority of the delegates were supporters of the government. The new constitution, promulgated on July 16, 1934, differed in several respects from that of 1891. The right to vote was granted to women as well as men, but the retention of the literacy qualification continued to exclude from the suffrage the large majority of the Republic's inhabitants. A special system of courts was established to control elections. Other innovations were the provision that one-sixth of the members of the federal chamber of deputies should be chosen by associations representing various economic and professional classes, and a section on "the economic and social order" that prohibited child labor and provided for an eight-hour working day, a minimum wage law, and other benefits for labor. The powers of the federal government were somewhat increased, particularly with respect to the control of mines, forests, water power, and education. Several provisions, like those restricting grants of mining and power development concessions to Brazilians or Brazilian companies, and those which practically excluded foreigners from the learned professions, showed a desire to diminish foreign influence. Immigration was restricted by a quota system. This latter provision was directed against the Japanese, who had been arriving recently in considerable numbers.

On the day after the promulgation of the constitution the assembly elected Dr. Vargas as President of the Republic for the term 1934-38. In the months that followed the state governments were reorganized and the constitutional order was generally restored. The political situation, however, continued unsettled. Besides the old factions centering around leaders in the various states, there were two new political groups—the radicals, with alleged communist connec-



tions, and the "integralistas" or fascists. The government found it necessary to take measures against both, and also to deal with insubordination in the army, a part of which was involved in an unsuccessful radical revolt in November, 1935. Nevertheless, there was some improvement in the economic situation and the government resumed partial payments on the foreign debt, which had been in default since 1931.

#### THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1937

The political situation grew still more unsettled as the time for the election of a new president approached. The most prominent candidate was Salles Oliveira, a former governor of São Paulo, but he was not acceptable to Dr. Vargas and his chances were diminished when his most powerful ally, Governor Flores da Cunha of Rio Grande do Sul, was driven from power by a federal intervention. There was some talk of revolt but none occurred, and on November 10, 1937, the President settled the question of the succession by setting aside the constitution of 1934 and proclaiming a new one that extended his own term for a six-year period. The Congress was dissolved, and the executive assumed temporarily the power to enact laws.

The constitution that Dr. Vargas thus put into effect on his own authority contained several unusual provisions. Besides creating a temporary dictatorship to last as long as the President saw fit, it provided that the chief executive should continue to exercise very extensive powers after the passing of the emergency that it was designed to meet. He might legislate on many subjects while the congress is not in session, and was given broad powers of intervention in the affairs of the states. He was also to appoint ten persons to sit with one representative from each state in the Federal Council, the upper house of congress. The lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, was to be chosen by indirect election, under a scheme which minimized the importance of the larger cities and thus increased the probability of government control. The legislative body as a whole had a relatively subordinate position. The president might decree a state of war and suspend the constitution in any part of the country on his own

authority. The budget which he presented was to take effect if not acted upon by the congress within a limited time. The right to introduce bills was in general restricted to the executive, and certain classes of projects so presented must be accepted or rejected without amendment if approved by the Economic Council. The latter is a new body, composed of representatives of the various "branches of production" with advisory powers as well as some participation in legislation. The authority and independence of the state governments was materially diminished. The most striking innovation, perhaps, related to the choice of future presidents. There was to be an electoral college, composed of representatives of the municipal councils, the two houses of congress, and the Economic Council, but if the president did not agree with the choice of this body he might nominate another candidate and submit the two names to the voters in a popular election.

Simultaneously with his political *coup d'état*, President Vargas made an almost equally important and revolutionary change in economic policy. On November 3, 1937, the government had announced the abandonment of its effort to "peg" the price of coffee. For some years Brazil had been endeavoring to persuade other producing countries, and especially Colombia, to assume a part of the burden of coffee control, but her efforts had met with little success. While her rivals were enjoying the benefit of artificially high prices and continually expanding their plantations, Brazil had continued to withhold much of her own production from the market, and since 1931 had actually destroyed a quantity of coffee roughly equal to the amount that the entire world would consume in two years. Though the government did not now abandon its control, it permitted the price to fall and encouraged exports by materially reducing the taxes paid by shippers. Its relative share in the world market at once began to increase.

The authoritarian features of the new constitution created an impression in some quarters abroad that Dr. Vargas' action had been inspired by German and Italian influence. The President, however, emphatically repudiated any connection with the European totalitarian powers. His relations with Germany, in fact, soon became distinctly unfriendly. He actively endeavored to "brazilianize" the large German population in Rio Grande do Sul and near-by states, and he

took action against German Nazi organizations at the Capital when they appeared to be involved in plots organized by the native *integrastas*. The latter were his most active enemies. Many of them were killed and hundreds more arrested when they made a sudden attack on the national palace and other public buildings in May, 1938.

The outbreak of the war in 1939 created new economic problems. The loss of European coffee markets was a severe blow, only partially cushioned by the signature of the Inter-American Coffee Agreement. On the other hand, shipments of many other products to the United States were increased as the war went on, until coffee in 1940 accounted for less than one-third of the total exports. An extensive program of road and railroad building also helped to improve conditions, and a loan was obtained from the United States Export-Import Bank for the erection of a steel mill to utilize the country's rich iron deposits.

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## *Chapter XIII*

### CHILE

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#### CHILE IN 1810

Chile is a narrow, mountainous strip stretching more than 2,500 miles along the west side of the continent between the summits of the Andes and the Pacific. Only the central portion of this territory was occupied by people of European descent at the beginning of the nineteenth century. From La Serena north there was a rainless desert, rich in mineral resources which were almost untouched. South of the Bio Bio River, the fierce Araucanians were yet unconquered. Still farther south there were small Spanish settlements around Valdivia and in Chiloé, but beyond these the heavily wooded, excessively rainy mountains were practically uninhabited. The mass of Chilean people lived in the temperate, well-watered country between these inhospitable regions, and especially in the fertile Central Valley extending from Santiago to Concepción.

The population in 1817 was probably not greatly in excess of half a million. The colony had attracted few Spanish immigrants, for no important mines had been found there, and geographical isolation, as well as the constant Indian wars, had retarded its development. Cattle-raising was still the chief occupation, though some wheat was grown for export to Peru. There were almost no improved roads, and the towns were small and unimportant. In the southern part of the Central Valley farms and settlements were still exposed from time to time to the depredations of the Araucanians.

The Indians north of the Bio Bio, who had been partly civilized by the Incas and lived a more settled life than the wild tribes beyond the river, were more easily conquered by Valdivia and his followers.

The first settlers reduced them to servitude under the *encomienda* system, and added to the supply of native labor from time to time by wars or raids on the frontier. The capture of slaves to work on the plantations, or even for sale in Peru, was in fact the real motive for many of the expeditions against the Araucanians, and one of the reasons for their inveterate hostility toward the Spaniards. The native population, never very numerous as compared with that in Peru or Colombia, was less able to withstand the effects of contact with the white man than the more advanced peoples of those countries, and by 1791, when the last *encomendas* were abolished, few pure-blooded Indians remained north of the Bio Bio. On the other hand, there was a large *mestizo* population whose descendents form the great mass of the Chilean people today.

Most of these *mestizos* were *inquilinos*, or laborers, on the estates of the creole families who owned nearly all of the farming land. These *inquilinos*, though legally free, were completely dependent, economically and politically, upon their employers. They were ill-paid and underfed, but custom and necessity led them to accept their lot as a matter of course. Most of them were personally devoted to their *patrones* and had apparently little desire for a change in the social system. Each *hacendado* ruled like a feudal lord on his own estates, settling disputes and punishing minor crimes without the intervention of the public authorities.

The landowning aristocracy was a compact, class-conscious group, which was to dominate public affairs in Chile for more than a century after independence. Some of its members were descendents of the first settlers; others of more recent arrivals. During the eighteenth century there had been a number of immigrants from the Basque provinces and other parts of northern Spain, and the Republic's historians attribute to this thrifty, industrious element many of the qualities that characterize Chilean society today. However this may be, the landowners seemed to take a more active interest in the management of their properties than in most of the Spanish colonies and until late in the colonial period most of them actually lived on their *haciendas*. Even after they began to move into Santiago and other urban centers during the latter part of the eighteenth century, there was little of the hostility between city and country which helped to

make the early history of the River Plate republics so turbulent. Local jealousies, though by no means absent, were also less important as a political factor because the great estates were concentrated in a relatively small area and the province of Santiago was far more populous and wealthy than the regions to the north and south. Partly for these reasons the country avoided much of the bloodshed and destruction of property which characterized the formative period elsewhere in Latin America, and achieved a stable government earlier than any of its neighbors.

#### O' HIGGINS

There was nevertheless much political strife and some disorder in the first years of independence. Bernardo O'Higgins, who had been installed as *Director Supremo* after San Martín's victory at Chacabuco, remained in power from 1817 until 1823. His chief opponents were the still strong Carrera faction. Juan José and Luis Carrera were executed at Mendoza in 1818 by local authorities friendly to O'Higgins, but José Miguel, the most influential of the three brothers, continued his efforts to overthrow the government until he himself was put to death in Argentina in 1821. The loss of their leaders did not make the other members of the party less unfriendly to the government, and as time went on the Director's popularity with other groups was undermined by opposition to his policies.

O'Higgins had lived in Europe and so realized better than most of his compatriots how backward Chilean society was. He took an active interest in the establishment of new schools and attempted, although with little success because of increasing opposition from the clergy and the aristocracy, to change local institutions and customs that he deemed unsuitable in a democracy. At the same time he governed as a military dictator, sharing his authority only with a Senate of five members appointed by himself. Though there was an increasingly strong demand for a more representative government, no congress was convened until 1822, and when one finally did meet in that year the government dictated the selection of its members and the assembly adopted a constitution that was clearly intended to extend the Director's dictatorship for a further period of ten years. Meanwhile

there was much discontent over the high taxes imposed to meet the cost of the war in Peru, and San Martín's inactivity in that country and his quarrel with Admiral Cochrane further hurt the prestige of his friends in Chile. Late in 1822 the government's own troops at Concepción revolted under the leadership of General Ramón Freire. The military forces in other parts of the country joined the movement and in January, 1823, a *cabildo abierto*, attended by the principal people of Santiago, demanded and obtained the Director's resignation.

#### LIBERALISM AND FEDERALISM

Freire, who was chosen as Supreme Director, was a better soldier than a statesman. Though his popularity, both with the army and the civilian population, made him the chief figure in Chilean politics during the next six years, the very qualities that inspired confidence—his moderation in dealing with political opponents and his freedom from selfish ambition—hampered him in meeting an increasingly difficult situation. The constitution adopted in 1823, which restricted the authority of the executive and placed the real power in the hands of congress, was so obviously unworkable that Freire was soon compelled to suspend it and to assume dictatorial powers with the consent of the congressional leaders themselves. Efforts to frame a new constitution were rendered fruitless by the attitude of the provincial leaders in Concepción and Coquimbo, who withdrew their representatives from the convention that Freire convened and then refused to take part in new elections. Discouraged by their attitude and by increasing opposition in Santiago itself, where the partisans of O'Higgins had triumphed in the election of 1825, the Director convened another congress in 1826, the fourth in three years, and resigned his authority into its hands. The principal achievement of his troubled term of office was the expulsion of the royalists from the Island of Chiloé, where a small Spanish force had maintained itself since the battle of Maipú. The constituent assembly of 1826 was controlled by advocates of "federalism" led by José Miguel Infante. As in Mexico and the River Plate, there were many leaders in Chile who advocated decentralization of governmental authority as a step toward democracy—an idea which was welcomed by many of the great

landowners because they did not wish to be dominated by a strong central government. When the assembly met, Infante and his followers proceeded to put their ideas into execution. Hastily drawn and ill-considered laws divided the Republic into eight provinces and provided for the selection of all of the provincial and local authorities, including the parish priests, by popular election. The only result was factional strife and confusion. Disputes over boundaries, quarrels between rival towns, and the utter inability of the inexperienced local political leaders to cope with the problems which suddenly confronted them, soon discredited the new system of government.

Meanwhile Admiral Blanco Encalada, whom the Congress had elected as Provisional President after Freire's resignation, himself resigned two months later, discouraged by congressional interference, anarchy in the provinces, and the hopeless situation of the federal treasury. Vice-President Elizaguirre, his successor, faced even graver difficulties, for the troops of the Santiago garrison were discontented at the government's inability to pay them regularly and became dangerously insubordinate. A series of military mutinies culminated in January, 1827, in an uprising which forced the Vice-President to resign, and Freire, who still retained his great influence with the soldiery, reluctantly acceded to the congressional leaders' request that he again assume power. He was formally elected to the presidency, but soon resigned in favor of Vice-President Francisco Antonio Pinto.

Pinto was able to bring about the adoption of the constitution of 1828, which restored some of the authority of the central government, but he was beset by financial difficulties, and frequent military mutinies showed that discipline in the army had not improved. Party strife meanwhile became exceedingly violent. The old personal factions, the *O'Higgmistas* and the *Carreristas*, had given place after 1823 to new political groups: the conservatives, popularly known as *pelucones*, and the liberals, or *pipiols*. The latter supported Pinto and were able to bring about his reelection in 1829, but a dispute over the vice-presidency, for which no candidate received a majority, brought on a civil war. The government fell when the conservatives under General Joaquín Prieto defeated its forces on April 17, 1830, at the bloody battle of Lircay.



## PORTALES

The outstanding figure in the regime that now came into power was Diego Portales, a business man who had only recently begun to take an interest in politics. Portales' firm had undertaken in 1824 to provide funds for the service of the government's foreign debt, in return for a lease of the fiscal monopoly of tobacco and certain other commodities, but the venture had been a failure and the settlement of accounts with the treasury had involved him in a series of disputes with the liberal officials. Portales had eventually become the leader of a so-called "monopoly party" which made common cause with the conservatives, and by 1829 he was the recognized leader of the opposition. In the new provisional government he assumed control of practically all branches of the administration. The army was brought under better control by the removal of the officers who were not in sympathy with the dominant party, and its power for mischief was decreased by strengthening the civil militia. Prompt and ruthless punishment of criminals did much to check the banditry which had grown to be an intolerable curse in the country districts. Government expenses were reduced, the customs service was reorganized to produce more revenue, and political disturbances were suppressed with a heavy hand. The freedom of the press which had existed under the liberal regime became a thing of the past.

Refusing to be a candidate himself, Portales was largely responsible for the election of General Prieto as President of the Republic in 1831. Thereafter he devoted himself to his private business for some years, except for a brief period when he served as Governor of Valparaíso. His influence in the administration, however, was hardly less than if he had held office; and the autocratic, highly centralized government which existed in Chile during the next thirty years was the result of his passion for order and his determination to make the authority of the state respected. His political views were reflected in the Constitution of 1833, which was to remain in force for nearly a century. The president, chosen by indirect election for a five-year term, controlled all branches of the administration, and was given broad powers, especially in dealing with political disorder. At the same time the judiciary was strengthened and its independence safe-

guarded. All vestiges of the federal system disappeared, for provincial and local affairs were placed in the hands of agents of the central government, though the municipal councils continued to be elective. Catholicism was made the state religion, and the public exercise of any other was forbidden.

Under the liberal regime a real effort had been made to hold popular elections, though the ignorance and political inexperience of the masses of the people and the dependence of the *inquilinos* on the great landowners made it inevitable that fraud and force should usually dictate the outcome. After 1833, the official candidates were nearly always elected as a matter of course. Literacy and property qualifications restricted the suffrage to an insignificant fraction of the population, and the government's authority and prestige, backed if necessary by the use of force, made successful opposition almost impossible. The government was not, however, a mere military despotism, for legal forms were generally observed and the courts and the congress enjoyed at least a measure of independence. It derived its real strength from the support of the Church and the majority of the aristocracy, who were by this time ready to sacrifice some of their liberty if they could obtain relief from the disturbed conditions which had marked the past six years of political experimentation.

As the end of Prieto's first term approached, a few conservatives who objected to Portales' high-handed methods joined with the liberals in advocating the presidential candidacy of Manuel Renjifo, the Minister of Finance. Portales at once emerged from his retirement, became Minister of War, and proceeded to exercise dictatorial power. Prieto was soon afterward reelected without difficulty. The chief event of his second term was a war with the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation under Santa Cruz.

Relations with Peru, embittered by the growing commercial rivalry between Valparaíso and Callao and by disputes over the repayment of money spent by Chile in assisting Peru to obtain her independence from Spain, had become worse after the union of Peru with Bolivia, which the Chileans regarded as a threat to the balance of power on the west coast. Hostilities began when Santa Cruz openly aided an unsuccessful invasion of Chile by revolutionists under General Freire, and Portales retaliated by sending an expedition to seize the Peruvian

fleet at Callao. A few weeks later, in November, 1836, war was formally declared. Neither the conflict itself nor the repressive policies that Portales adopted to stifle opposition were popular in Chile, and on June 6, 1837, the great minister was murdered by mutinous troops near Valparaíso. His death caused a revulsion of feeling which did much to unite the Chilean people behind their government, and though the first expedition sent to Peru was defeated, a second one, under General Manuel Bulnes, destroyed Santa Cruz' forces at Yungay on January 20, 1839, and put an end to the Confederation.

#### THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF BULNES AND MONTT

General Bulnes' military exploits made him the logical candidate for the presidency in 1841, since Prieto could not constitutionally be reelected. He held office, like his predecessor, for two consecutive five-year terms, and his administration was a period of notable progress, material and intellectual. Copper, coal, and silver mines, including especially the rich silver deposits discovered at Chañarcillo in 1832, were greatly increasing the nation's wealth, and foreign trade continued the rapid development begun when the restrictions of the old Spanish commercial system were removed. Valparaíso, with its state-owned warehouses where goods might be stored pending reshipment to other ports, had become the great entrepôt of the South Pacific, the chief port of call for ships rounding Cape Horn and a base of supplies for North American whalers. Commerce had profited from the establishment of stable government, and Chilean agriculture began a remarkable expansion when the discovery of gold in California opened up a new market for its products. William Wheelwright, the North American who was later to build the first Argentine railroad, took a leading part during the middle decades of the nineteenth century in many important enterprises in Chile. It was owing to his efforts that the first steamship line from Europe to Chile began service in 1840, and that the Republic's first railroad, from the mining center of Copiapó to the port of Caldera, was opened to service in 1851. He was also active in bringing about the construction of the more important line from Valparaíso to Santiago, and in introducing

electric telegraphs, gas lighting, and water-supply systems for the towns.

The Chilean aristocracy had hitherto shown little interest in literary pursuits, or indeed in any but the most rudimentary education, but the first years of Bulnes' administration saw the beginning of an intellectual movement which was soon to have an important effect upon the Republic's political life. The inspiration came from a group of distinguished foreigners, like Andrés Bello, the great Venezuelan, and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the future President of Argentina, who by their writing and their teaching aroused the younger generation of Chileans to an interest in literature and a receptiveness to new ideas. Bello was the first rector of the University of Chile, opened in 1843, and Sarmiento the first director of the normal school established at about the same time in an effort to raise the lamentably low level of instruction in the primary schools. Much was accomplished in this direction, though education continued to be the privilege of the upper and middle classes and more than six-sevenths of the Republic's inhabitants were still unable to read and write in 1854.

A direct result of this intellectual movement was the rise of a new liberal party which sought to make the government less autocratic and more responsive to control by the voters. Inspired by the European revolutions of 1848, this group became especially active toward the close of Bulnes' second term. The *Sociedad de la Igualdad*, organized by Francisco Bilbao, even promoted political demonstrations among the workmen of Santiago. The government resorted to its usual weapons—the declaration of a state of siege, the muzzling of the press, and the deportation of the chief liberal leaders—and when an uprising occurred in Santiago in April, 1851, it was suppressed with a heavy loss of life. After Manuel Montt, the administration candidate, was elected President, his defeated rival General José María de la Cruz led a new revolt. This was not suppressed until 2,000 Chileans had been killed and 1,500 wounded in the desperately fought battle of Loncomilla.

Montt, unlike his predecessors, was neither a professional soldier nor a great landowner. The son of a poor family, he had been educated on a scholarship in the National Institute and had later taught and served as rector there. While still a young man he had attracted

the attention of Portales, who drew him into the government service. In 1840, at the age of thirty-one, he had become Minister of the Interior. His chief interest was in public instruction, and the number of government schools was greatly increased during his two terms as president. Railroad and highway construction was also pushed forward, and the colonization of the region around Valdivia and Osorno, south of the Araucanian country, was encouraged. Many German immigrants settled in this region and their descendents form a substantial part of its population today.

Some phases of Montt's policy were highly objectionable to a portion of the aristocracy. The abolition of the law of primogeniture, by which he hoped to bring about the gradual division of the great entailed estates, was approved by Congress in the face of opposition by many of the landowners, and a conflict with the Church increased his difficulties. The Church, as in other Latin American countries, had clung to the great authority and the special privileges that it had enjoyed in colonial times, but had steadfastly refused to admit that the new republican governments had inherited the control over the ecclesiastical administration which the Popes had granted to the King of Spain. Disputes over the right of patronage had embarrassed each of Montt's predecessors, but the clerical party had recently become more aggressive under the determined and energetic leadership of Archbishop Valdivieso. A particularly violent though in itself unimportant controversy involving the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts occurred in 1856. Thereafter the pro-clerical party began actively to oppose the President, joining forces, strangely enough, with the more radical liberal leaders. The moderate wings of both parties supported the administration.

The chief purpose of the anti-government coalition was to prevent the election of Antonio Varas as Montt's successor. Varas, who was also a former school-teacher and a self-made man, was a lifelong friend of the President, and it had been clear for some time that he would be the official candidate in 1861. The belief that he would continue the authoritarian tradition of Portales in the government, combined with his known anti-clericalism, made him objectionable to liberals and conservatives alike. In 1859, seeing that there was little hope of defeating him at the polls, the coalition resorted to civil war.

Its forces were defeated after a short campaign, but Varas withdrew his candidacy in the interest of harmony and José Joaquín Pérez, an administration Liberal, was elected with the support of all factions.

#### THE BEGINNINGS OF PARTY GOVERNMENT

Pérez's ten years in office were tranquil ones, except for a brief period in 1865-66 when Chile, as an ally of Peru and Bolivia, became involved in an inconclusive war with Spain.<sup>1</sup> During this conflict, Spanish forces blockaded the coast and bombarded Valparaíso, but hostilities soon terminated with the withdrawal of the enemy squadron. There was no internal disorder. As in Argentina, the general prosperity that the country had begun to enjoy led the upper classes to oppose any movement which seemed likely to disturb the peace. Indeed, the character of the Chilean aristocracy itself was changing as a result of the rapid development of commerce and mining, and successful business men were exercising more and more influence in public affairs.

This new element allied itself politically with the more progressive groups in the landowning class, and its influence was one of the factors which gradually brought about a change in the relationship between the government and the aristocracy as a whole. Between 1830 and 1861 real political parties had hardly existed. The government had expected support because it was the government, and had been inclined to regard any opposition as seditious. After 1861, when it became customary for the president to count upon a political group or a combination of political groups for support in the congress, the parties acquired a strength and a permanent organization which they had previously lacked. Pérez, for example, after an unsuccessful attempt to govern with a cabinet representing all shades of opinion, fell back upon the same liberal-conservative coalition that had opposed Montt. Under his successor, Federico Errázuriz Zañartu, the coalition broke up, and the liberals, though by this time divided into several more or less unfriendly factions, were able to carry out some of the reforms that they had been advocating for the past twenty years. A constitutional amendment adopted in 1871, before the end of

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 332-33.

Pérez' term, had prohibited the election of a president for two successive periods, and further amendments now diminished the authority of the executive and increased that of congress, paving the way for the ascendancy that the legislative branch was to exercise at a later date. Laws were enacted assuring freedom to the press, and an effort was made to improve the electoral procedure. The anti-clerical tendencies of the liberal party, which had been held in check so long as its various factions were cooperating with conservative groups for selfish political ends, also found expression. The measures actually adopted, restricting the jurisdiction of the church courts and setting aside portions of the cemeteries for the burial of non-Catholics, did not go very far, but they aroused violent opposition among the clergy and misgiving among the more devout supporters of the government.

Toward the end of Errázuriz' term, and during that of Aníbal Pinto (1876-81) Chile felt severely the effects of the world depression of the '70's. Many mining companies failed, and the service of the foreign debt, greatly increased by new loans contracted during the recent period of prosperity, became an intolerable burden. In 1878 the government was compelled to relieve the banks of their obligation to convert their notes into coin upon demand. Thus began the paper-money regime which was to be a feature of Chile's economy for many years to come.

#### THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC

In the midst of this financial crisis the country became involved in a foreign war. For some time Chilean companies backed by British capital had been working the guano and nitrate deposits along the desert coast of Tarapacá and Atacama, and their activities had led to disputes with Peru and Bolivia, which owned these provinces. The boundary between Chile and Bolivia, like many others in South America, had never been definitely determined. Disputes over the region around Antofagasta had almost led to war in 1865, but a treaty signed in 1866 fixed the boundary at 24° south latitude. The two countries agreed to share the exploitation of guano and mineral deposits between 23° and 25° and to divide the export taxes on products from that area. This treaty was replaced in 1874 by one in which

Chile gave Bolivia full control over the region north of 24°, where the principal nitrate deposits were, in return for Bolivia's promise not to increase taxes on the Chilean producers for a period of twenty-five years. Peru and Bolivia, in the meantime, had entered into a secret alliance in 1873, and in 1875 Peru expropriated the Chilean nitrate properties without any adequate arrangement for compensation. In 1878 the Bolivian government imposed a new tax on the exportation of nitrate from Atacama, and when the Anglo-Chilean Company, which was the chief producer in the region, refused to pay the tax its property was seized by the Bolivian authorities. Chile retaliated by occupying Antofagasta in February, 1879. Two months later Chile declared war against Peru, which had refused to abrogate the alliance of 1873.

The War of the Pacific, which thus began, was to have far-reaching effects on each of the three participants. The outcome might at first have seemed doubtful. The combined population of the allies far exceeded that of Chile, but Chile had a better trained and equipped army, and a navy, increased by recent acquisitions, which was twice as powerful as Peru's. The control of the sea was of the utmost importance because it was exceedingly difficult to move troops along the desert coast of the nitrate region. Land operations thus awaited the outcome of the contest between the two navies. One of Peru's two ironclads was destroyed in the hard-fought battle of Iquique on May 21, 1879, but the other, the *Huáscar*, commanded by Admiral Grau, defied the whole Chilean navy for several months. When it was finally captured on October 8, in the battle of Angamos, a Chilean army went north by sea to occupy Tarapacá. The Peruvian forces in that region, after some fighting, retreated along the base of the Andes to Arica, and on May 26, 1880, the armies of both of the northern allies were defeated in the battle of Tacna. This practically ended Bolivia's participation in the war, and Peru's last hope of checking the Chilean advance vanished when a small force defending the Morro of Arica was destroyed in a surprise attack on June 7. The Chilean navy began a ruthless destruction of towns and plantations along the Peruvian coast, and Callao was blockaded.

Nevertheless, neither Peru nor Bolivia would accede to Chile's demand for the cession of the nitrate provinces when the government of





TERRITORY UNDER DISPUTE IN THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC

the United States attempted to bring the belligerents to an agreement in October, 1880. The Chilean army consequently prepared to move on Lima itself, and early in 1881 General Baquedano occupied the city after a short but violent conflict. Peru was powerless to offer further resistance.

It was more than two years before the Chileans succeeded in organizing a Peruvian government with which they could make peace. The Treaty of Ancón was finally signed on October 20, 1883. Peru gave up Tarapacá and agreed that Chile should occupy the provinces of Tacna and Arica for ten years. After that a plebiscite was to determine their final disposition, and the country which won them was to pay the other \$10,000,000. The failure of the two powers to agree on conditions for holding this plebiscite made the Tacna-Arica question an obstacle to the establishment of good relations between them during the ensuing forty-five years. A truce with Bolivia was signed in 1884, leaving Chile in possession of Antofagasta and the rest of the Bolivian seacoast, but no formal treaty was concluded until 1904.

#### THE RESULTS OF THE WAR

Chile emerged from the war one of the richest and most powerful of the South American republics. Her foreign trade, already large, was tremendously increased. Her new provinces contained great deposits of copper and other minerals as well as nitrate, and the development of their resources, as well as the new market which they offered for agricultural products from the south, made the country more prosperous than ever before. The export taxes on nitrate alone gave the government a large part of its revenue. It was chiefly the mercantile and landowning classes, however, which benefited, for the *inquilino* laborers of the interior continued to work for a bare subsistence. Their wages, paid in depreciating paper money, had increased little while prices were soaring, and the miners and landowners opposed any change in the currency system that enabled them to obtain labor more and more cheaply while they sold their products abroad for gold.

## THE CONQUEST OF ARAUCANIA

Domingo Santa María, another liberal, succeeded President Pinto in 1881. Santa María not only had to conclude the war with Peru but to put down an Indian uprising in the south. The Araucanians had made trouble during the civil wars of 1851 and 1859, when the insurgents enlisted their help, and in 1861 the government had begun a systematic military occupation of their territory. There was a new revolt in 1868, which lasted three years, and another in 1880 after troops were withdrawn from the frontier for service in Peru. At the end of the war, a strong force was sent into the Indians' territory. Several new towns were established and the few Araucanians who remained at the end of the military operations were confined to reservations, where some thousands of them still live.

## CHURCH AND STATE

Another difficult problem had arisen when the death of the venerable Archbishop Valdivieso in 1878 revived the old dispute about the *patronato*. The Pinto administration proposed as his successor a priest of pronounced liberal views, who was opposed by the majority of the Chilean clergy and rejected by the Pope. An apostolic delegate, sent to discuss the matter with Santa María, refused to admit the government's claims and was finally handed his passports. The liberal majority in Congress then passed laws freeing public cemeteries from Church control, making civil marriage compulsory, and providing that the official registry of births, marriages, and deaths should be maintained by the civil authorities rather than by the parish priests. The clergy retaliated by refusing to participate in burials in public cemeteries, and the government forbade burials in places under ecclesiastical control. The conservatives, and the more devout portion of the people generally, supported the Church, and feeling ran so high that civil war seemed for a time a possibility. The chances for a settlement were not apparently improved when José Manuel Balmaceda, the strongly anti-clerical Minister of the Interior, was elected to succeed Santa María in 1886, but fortunately a compromise was reached early in the new President's administration.

## BALMACEDA AND THE CIVIL WAR

Balmaceda, wealthy, handsome, and a brilliant orator, was only forty-five at the time of his election. At first it seemed possible that his administration might be a successful one. Having placated the conservatives by his agreement with the Holy See about the appointment of a new archbishop, he endeavored, for a time with success, to unite the various liberal groups which between them had a large majority in the Congress. The government's revenues were greater than ever before, and the administration was able to carry out an ambitious program of public works. The mutually hostile factions in the liberal party, however, could not long be made to work together, and the President alienated some of them in his effort to retain the support of others. Dissatisfaction increased in 1890 when it began to seem probable that Enrique Salvador Sanfuentes, the Minister of Public Works, had been chosen by Balmaceda as his successor.

Despite a growing public sentiment against improper electoral practices and a number of attempts to improve matters by legislation, the victory of any candidate supported by the president and his cabinet was still a foregone conclusion. Sanfuentes' opponents consequently centered their efforts on obtaining changes in the Cabinet that would deprive him of official support. It had by this time become customary for the president to select his ministers in such a manner as to command the support of a parliamentary majority. Formerly the great prestige of the chief executive had made this a relatively easy matter, but since 1871 the power of congress had been gradually increasing and recently enacted laws forbidding congressmen to hold other official positions had deprived the president of one of his chief means of influencing the parliamentary leaders. It was still an open question whether the executive or the legislative branch would dominate if there were a conflict between them, and it was this question which Balmaceda's opponents now forced to an issue.

Balmaceda denied the right of congress to force him to change his cabinet, but he nevertheless made an effort to restore harmony. Sanfuentes, who had just been appointed Minister of the Interior, withdrew his presidential candidacy. When Congress suspended action

on the tax laws and the budget, which had to be enacted each year, the President gave in further and appointed a neutral cabinet. The tax laws were then passed, but the budget had not yet been approved when friction within the administration led the new ministers to resign. A cabinet made up of Balmaceda's personal followers then took office, and the congress again suspended action on the appropriations. When it adjourned without approving them, Balmaceda, confronted by a situation where there was no legal authorization for any disbursement of government funds, announced that the budget for the preceding year would remain in force.

This frankly unconstitutional procedure precipitated the most costly civil war in Chile's history. On January 7, 1891, a majority of the members of Congress issued a statement declaring the President removed from office. They were supported by the navy, but the army remained loyal to Balmaceda. Again it was the control of the sea which decided the issue, for the insurgents seized the nitrate provinces, where they could not be attacked by land, and used the proceeds of the export taxes to equip an army of their own. In August their forces defeated those of the government in two important battles near Valparaiso, and Balmaceda turned over the executive power to General Baquedano. Three weeks later he committed suicide in the Argentine legation, where he had been given asylum. The war had cost some ten thousand lives and many million of dollars, and both Santiago and Valparaiso had been looted by mobs before the new authorities could restore order.

#### THE BALTIMORE AFFAIR

Several incidents during the revolution led the insurgents to accuse the United States of partiality to Balmaceda. One was the American government's insistence that the steamer *Itata*, which had arrived at Iquique with a supply of arms for the revolution, be returned with her cargo to a North American port because of alleged violations of United States laws. There was a controversy after the war because Mr. Egan, the American Minister, gave asylum to several members of the defeated party. In October, 1891, while this dispute was at its

height, a mob at Valparaiso killed two sailors from the U.S.S. *Baltimore* and injured five others. The ship's commanding officer, Captain Schley, reported that the sailors had given no provocation and that the police of Valparaiso had been in part responsible for what occurred, and the American government promptly demanded reparation. A situation already bad became worse when a cable from the foreign office at Santiago, couched in offensive terms, was made public by the Chilean Minister at Washington. The Chilean government's own investigation convinced it that the American sailors had been at fault and that the Valparaiso police had conducted themselves properly, but it yielded to the demands of the United States when President Harrison asked authority from Congress to use force if necessary to obtain satisfaction. The incident was closed by the payment of an indemnity of \$75,000, but it left an aftermath of bitterness in Chile which long clouded the relations between the two countries.

#### THE ERA OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

The revolution of 1891 ended for the time being the preponderance of the executive in the Chilean government. The president, in fact if not by law, was thenceforth compelled to govern through ministers acceptable to majorities in both houses of congress. He could no longer control elections effectively because the conduct of the voting was entrusted to autonomous, popularly elected communal governments, which also took over much of the authority in purely local affairs which had hitherto been exercised by presidential appointees. Since these bodies were controlled by the great landowners, it was they who in fact selected the members of congress in each locality.

The masses of the people had little more voice in political affairs than before. The great majority were still excluded from the suffrage by literacy qualifications, and there were few members of the laboring class who would have ventured to think of attempting to question the authority of the dominant aristocracy. Under the new system, the use of force and intimidation in elections became less common but bribery increased. So serious did this evil become that instances are recorded where the indignant citizens rose *en masse* and stoned the houses of party leaders when agreements between rival factions made

an electoral contest unnecessary and thus deprived the voters of what they regarded as a normal source of income.<sup>1</sup>

The parliamentary system, as it existed in Chile during the next thirty-five years, was not a success. There were a number of parties, held together chiefly by tradition or personal ties rather than by a common program, and majorities in congress had to be obtained by forming combinations of hostile factions which cooperated only so long as it suited their individual interests and which were prone to desert the government when minor disputes arose. Cabinets thus came and went with a rapidity which made impossible any continuity or real efficiency in administration, and which might have been disastrous had it not been for the stability of the general social structure and the prosperity which the country enjoyed until after the end of the European war.

The civil war and the world crisis of the early '90's were only temporary setbacks to Chile's rapid economic development. By the end of the century, foreign trade was again increasing at a phenomenal rate. The export taxes on nitrate gave the government an ample revenue which made for political stability, though at the same time it encouraged extravagance and corruption. Another source of wealth opened up when the great copper mines of El Teniente and Chuquibambilla, developed by American capital, began production in 1911 and 1915. The laboring classes, however, shared only to a limited degree in this prosperity. The depreciation of the paper currency kept real wages low, and the ruling class showed little interest in social problems which became increasingly serious as the number of workers in mining and industry increased. Strikes and riots, which occurred with some frequency in the larger cities during the first decade of the twentieth century, were put down by military force, though sometimes not until after much property had been destroyed. Discontent among the urban laborers, however, did not seem a particularly serious threat to the stability of the government so long as the great mass of the *inquilinos* in the country districts were not affected.

The president, from 1891 to 1920, was little more than a figurehead. Jorge Montt, who had commanded the navy during the civil war, assumed the office in 1891. He was succeeded in 1896 by Federico

<sup>1</sup> Galdames, *Estudio de la Historia de Chile*, 7th edition, p. 447.

Errázuriz Echáurren, elected by a conservative-liberal coalition after a close contest in which the former partisans of Balmaceda were among the chief supporters of the opposition candidate. The chief event of Errázuriz's administration was the boundary controversy with Argentina, already discussed in Chapter IX. This involved the government in heavy expenditures for military preparations and caused disturbances in the commercial and financial world. Because of these expenditures the paper currency, which had been stabilized by a law enacted in 1895, was again made inconvertible, ostensibly at least as a war measure, but greatly to the satisfaction of the classes that profited by its depreciation. There was a revival of prosperity, culminating in a period of wild speculation, under German Riesco, the next President, who was elected as the candidate of the Liberal Alliance in 1901. In 1906, however, the country suffered one of the worst disasters in its history when an earthquake destroyed most of Valparaíso and much of Santiago with the loss of 3,000 lives in the former city.

The defects of the parliamentary form of government were by this time clearly evident. Seventeen different ministries held office during Riesco's administration<sup>1</sup> while the Congress wasted its time in political squabbles to the exclusion of constructive legislation. When Pedro Montt, the son of the man who had ruled Chile from 1851 to 1861, was elected to the presidency in 1906 as the candidate of the conservatives, the Balmacedistas, and some of the other liberals, his supporters hoped that he would establish a stronger government in which the executive power would regain some of its authority. They were disappointed because the leaders in congress showed no disposition to give up practices that increased their own influence. Montt died in 1910, just as Chile was preparing to celebrate the centenary of independence, and his successor, Ramón Barros Luco, was elected by agreement between the chief political parties.

Neither Barros Luco nor his successor, Juan Luis Sanfuentes, elected after a close contest in 1915, attempted to challenge the supremacy of congress. The chief event of their administrations was the European war, which at first caused a serious dislocation of commerce and industry and then brought a great wave of prosperity, with

<sup>1</sup> Amunátegui, *Historia de Chile*, Vol. II, p. 161.



high prices for nitrate and copper. Chile remained neutral throughout the conflict.

#### POLITICAL CHANGES, 1918-1926

During the whole of the first century of independence Chile's government was dominated by a few hundred landowning families. Under their leadership the Republic had enjoyed a longer period of relatively stable government and good administration than any other in South America and had become richer and more powerful than some of its more populous neighbors. The defects of the parliamentary system had not seriously affected its prosperity and internal tranquility. Nevertheless increasingly influential groups were dissatisfied with the existing political situation. With the development of mining and manufacturing and the growth of large cities, there had arisen a class of merchants, manufacturers, and professional men who had little connection with the old aristocracy. There was also a host of graduates from the free public schools and the universities who could find little opportunity for employment in the already overcrowded professions. Many of these had taken an active part in politics as party workers, and had held positions in the government; but they were hostile as a class to a political system that limited their opportunities for advancement.

The situation was in many ways similar to that which had led to the victory of the radical party in Argentina in 1916, but in Chile it was fraught with more serious implications because the discontent among the laboring class made it seem probable that it would develop into a social, rather than merely a political, revolution. The thousands of laborers who had left the *haciendas* for other employment at the mines or in the cities were a different lot from the docile *m-quilinos*. Their wages were somewhat higher than those of the farm laborers, but they lived in crowded and unsanitary hovels, an easy prey to disease and alcoholism, and there were only a few employers, like the great American copper companies, who showed any interest in improving their condition. The government had done little for them. Radical agitators, native and foreign, thus found a fertile field in which to sow disruptive ideas, and many of the recent strikes had

been accompanied by violence and bloodshed. The laboring class had neither the leaders nor the organization to enable it to assume control of the government, but its vociferous support was an important factor in the victory of the middle class.

The leader of the new movement was Arturo Alessandri, who had been associated with one or another of the old political groups for some years before he was nominated by the Liberal Alliance as candidate for senator from Tarapacá in 1915. In his appeal for the votes of the laborers in the nitrate fields, he advocated labor legislation and social reforms with an eloquence which won him the enthusiastic support of the working class throughout the Republic. When the congressional elections of 1918 brought into the legislative body a large number of new members whose views were similar to his own, he became for a time the head of the cabinet under President Sanfuentes. In 1920 he ran for the presidency, frankly appealing to the middle classes and the labor organizations for support against the aristocracy. Nearly all of the old political groups joined in the *Unión Nacional* to oppose him, with Luis Barroß Borgoño as their candidate. A bitter contest ensued. There was talk of civil war when disputed elections in several districts cast doubt on the final result, but the Congress avoided serious trouble by referring the disputes to a "tribunal of honor" in which the two parties were equally represented. The result was Alessandri's election by a margin of one electoral vote.

Alessandri's party, the Liberal Alliance, obtained control of the Chamber of Deputies, but the conservatives retained a majority in the Senate which forced one cabinet after another to resign during the next three years. Social and political reforms were blocked and there was a long controversy before the Congress ratified the Washington protocol of 1922, by which Chile and Peru agreed to submit the long-standing controversy over Tacna-Arica to arbitration by the President of the United States. Meanwhile increasing artificial nitrate production in foreign countries was threatening the country's chief industry and chief source of public revenue, and many thousands of unemployed laborers from the nitrate fields were crowding into Santiago and Valparaiso. Alessandri's position became constantly more difficult. It should have improved after the Liberal Alliance ob-

tained control of both houses of congress in 1924, but the new legislative body showed itself no more competent to accomplish anything of importance than its predecessor.

A crisis arose in September, 1924, when the new chambers voted that their members should receive salaries. They had hitherto been unpaid, for seats in congress had been an honor for which the aristocracy had been willing to spend large sums, and the fact that the new measure was necessary if men who were not rich were to have an opportunity to serve honorably in the legislature did not seem to justify its taking precedence over more urgent business. The younger officers of the army, whose own pay was two months in arrears, vociferously expressed their disapproval, and on September 4, with at least the passive support of their superiors, their representatives visited the President and compelled him to appoint a new cabinet composed of military leaders. The Congress, intimidated by the threat of force, promptly passed a large number of labor laws and other reforms with little or no discussion. Alessandri found his own position untenable and on September 9 he fled across the Andes to Argentina. A *junta de gobierno* composed of two generals and an admiral assumed control.

These officers and some of the members of their new cabinet had had close associations with the old regime, and their reactionary policy soon brought about disagreements with the younger military men who had been leaders in the revolt. The junior officers were more in sympathy with the political elements that had formerly supported Alessandri and they were disappointed when the *junta* failed to accede to their demand for a thoroughgoing reform of the constitution of 1833. Their distrust of the government was increased when the National Union proclaimed Ladislao Errázuriz as its candidate in the presidential elections to be held in May. On January 23, 1925, a small group of them seized the Moneda, or presidential palace, and installed a new *junta* composed mainly of friends of Alessandri. The ex-President, whose resignation had never been legally accepted by the congress, was invited to return to complete his constitutional term and received a warm reception when he reached Santiago.

During the next few months a new constitution was drawn up and ratified by a plebiscite. Congress lost its power to interfere with the

executive branch of the government. Its members could no longer hold office in the cabinet, and the ministers were made independent of congressional approval. The requirement that tax laws and laws fixing the strength of the military establishment be voted annually was abolished, and the budget was to become effective in the form proposed by the president if the legislature failed to act upon it within a given time. The constitution also provided for the complete separation of Church and State, for the election of the president by direct vote, and for important reforms in the judiciary.

Another important reform was inaugurated when a commission of experts headed by Professor Kemmerer of Princeton University drafted laws reorganizing the Republic's monetary and banking system. The depreciation of the paper currency had long been recognized as one of the chief obstacles to the improvement of living conditions among the lower classes, but the opposition of many of the employers of labor and the inability of successive governments to resist the temptation to resort to the printing press to cover deficits in the budget had defeated all efforts to change the situation. The establishment of the Central Bank, which opened its doors in January, 1926, and the stabilization of the peso at about twelve cents United States currency, were thus measures of the greatest importance, though the financial disaster that overtook the Republic a few years later deprived them for the time being at least of much of their value.

#### IBÁÑEZ

Shortly before the end of Alessandri's constitutional term the presidential aspirations of Colonel Carlos Ibáñez, the Minister of War, provoked a new conflict within the government. Unable to control his powerful subordinate, Alessandri resigned on October 1, 1925, in favor of Vice-President Luis Barros Borgoño. Ibáñez, however, was opposed by the civilian politicians, and he consented to withdraw his candidacy when all important parties agreed to support Emiliano Figueroa Larraín. The latter was elected and took office in December, but his situation was a precarious one. Though he was himself a representative of the traditions of the old regime, he was compelled to govern with the aid of Ibáñez, who was still Minister of War and who

represented the new political and social tendencies which had found expression in Alessandri's victory in 1920. Party strife in Congress and discontent among the people at large weakened his prestige, and his authority in the executive branch of the government itself steadily diminished as Ibáñez became more and more powerful. In April, 1927, a clash between the Cabinet and the President of the Supreme Court, who was the President's own brother, forced Figueroa to withdraw from office, and on May 22 Ibáñez was elected to the presidency by a practically unanimous vote.

The new regime was more nearly a dictatorship than any which had existed in Chile since 1861, but many citizens who were alarmed by the threat of class warfare were willing to support a strong government, even at the cost of political liberty. Such opposition as there was found little opportunity for expression. The press was muzzled, and many of the President's enemies were sent into exile. The Congress itself generally acted in accord with the President's wishes, and in the election of 1930 the official candidates for senator and deputy were returned without opposition as the result of an inter-party agreement.

Ibáñez attempted to carry further the program of social reform that Alessandri had advocated. Advanced labor laws were enacted and an effort was made to break the aristocracy's monopoly of the best farming land by a modest agrarian program. Primary instruction, which had been made obligatory by law in 1920, was extended and improved in quality, so that the number of illiterates over seven years of age decreased from 37 out of each 100 in 1920 to 25 in 1930.<sup>1</sup> At the same time the government financed an ambitious program of public works by loans contracted in the United States and Europe. The inflow of new money, combined with the stabilization of the currency, did much to raise wages and the standard of living among the laboring class, and the general prosperity was one of the chief elements in the government's strength.

#### THE TACNA-ARICA SETTLEMENT

The most notable event of Ibáñez' administration was the final settlement of the Tacna-Arica question, which had embittered Chile's

<sup>1</sup> *Sinopsis Geográfico-Estadística de la República de Chile*, 1933, p. 87.

relations with Peru since the War of the Pacific. The plebiscite that was to have decided the final disposition of these provinces had never been held because the two governments had not been able to agree on the conditions which should govern it. When the question had been submitted to arbitration under the protocol signed at Washington in 1922, the President of the United States had decided that the plebiscite should be held, and had appointed first General Pershing and then General Lassiter as president of a commission to supervise it. These American officers had refused to continue with their task because they felt that the conduct of the Chilean authorities in the two provinces made a fair vote impossible. The plebiscite was abandoned, but an agreement for the division of the territory was reached in 1929 through the mediation of the United States. Chile kept Arica, whereas Peru received Tacna with an indemnity of six million dollars. Friendly relations were thus established between the two republics for the first time in half a century.

#### DEPRESSION AND DISORDER, 1931-1932

As in other countries, the prosperity of the late 1920's rested on an insecure foundation, and the ensuing depression affected Chile with peculiar severity. The government's revenues, derived chiefly from import and export duties, fell off sharply with the decline of foreign trade. The inflow of foreign capital ceased and thousands of men employed on the public works program lost their jobs. Other thousands were thrown out of work at the mines, as nitrate, iodine, and copper, the three commodities which had made up four-fifths of the country's exports, became almost unsalable. The situation of the nitrate industry was especially discouraging because of the competition of synthetic nitrogen. Unimportant before the European war, the extraction of nitrogen from the atmosphere had increased until by 1926 it supplied the major part of the world's requirements and foreign governments were protecting and subsidizing the new industry in an effort to assure an adequate domestic supply for military purposes. Ibáñez, with the aid of North American capital, had endeavored to meet this competition by combining the Chilean producers in one great company and substituting new scientific methods

of treating the ore for the old wasteful and expensive Shanks process; but the *Cosach*, as the new company was called, suffered heavy losses when the depression came.

As conditions grew worse, opposition to the government increased. The movement which overthrew Ibáñez was an emphatic demonstration of popular discontent rather than an armed revolt. It began with agitation and rioting by university students in Santiago in the latter part of July, 1931. Within a day or two the lawyers, engineers, and school-teachers, and even the physicians, had gone on strike, and soon afterward the labor unions, which had hitherto supported the dictator, joined in the general demand for a change. On July 26, Ibáñez resigned in favor of the President of the Senate, who turned over the presidency on the following day to Juan Esteban Montero. Montero in turn withdrew in August when his friends insisted upon his being a candidate in the elections that were to be held in October, and was succeeded by Manuel Trucco.

Montero, with the support of the more conservative political parties, easily defeated Alessandri, who was his principal opponent, but the situation that confronted him when he was inaugurated in December, 1931, was little short of hopeless. Industry and commerce were still paralyzed and the government's finances were completely disorganized. For the first time since the days of Portales, Chile had defaulted on the service of the foreign debt. The gold standard had been abandoned, and the Chilean peso was depreciating until by September, 1932, it was worth less than a sixth of its former value. Unemployment still caused much suffering. Worse still was the breakdown of discipline in the army. After the influential position which they had held under Ibáñez, many of the officers, especially if they held advanced political views, were reluctant to resign themselves to control by a civilian administration representing the old aristocracy.

Disloyalty and insubordination in the army, coupled with the desperate condition of the lower classes, brought on a condition of near anarchy during several months in 1932. Montero was overthrown on June 4 by a group of radical conspirators. The congress was dissolved and a *junta* assumed dictatorial power. One of its members, Dr. Carlos Dávila, disagreed with his colleagues and was forced to resign, but on June 17 he returned to power with a new *junta*, and

soon afterward became Provisional President. On September 13 he was compelled to give way to General Blanche. Each change was effected by a military revolt, usually carried out by only a small number of officers and regarded with apparent indifference by the rest of the armed forces. For a time it appeared that the old ruling classes would be submerged by a social revolution, but the radical leaders lost much of their popular support when it became evident that they could not carry out their extravagant promises. By September there was a strong public sentiment, supported by many leaders in the army, for a return to more normal conditions. It was in response to this sentiment that General Blanche asked the President of the Supreme Court, Abraham Oyanedel, to take office as Provisional President on October 2.

#### ALESSANDRI'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION

The election of a constitutional president took place four weeks later. Though the conservatives nominated a candidate of their own, the majority of the political groups that represented the old ruling class threw their support to Arturo Alessandri in order to defeat the still more radical candidate, Marmaduke Grove. The ex-President was elected, and the right-wing parties obtained a majority in both houses of congress. Alessandri thus took office in December, 1932, under conditions very different from those at the beginning of his first term. Though he retained much of his popularity with the masses, he also had the somewhat unenthusiastic support of the old aristocracy. For some years he openly accepted the backing of the *milicia republicana*, a private army organized by influential civilians in 1932 to oppose the revolutionary activities of the radical elements in the regular army and to protect the established order against the growing danger from the communists and other extremists. He was able to suppress a number of disturbances fomented by the extremists, and conditions became somewhat more stable as the worst effects of the world depression disappeared.

Even with the gradual revival of prosperity, however, grave economic and social problems remained. The nitrate industry had not



recovered. Chile had supplied 55 per cent of the world's nitrogen in 1913, 23 per cent in 1929, 4 per cent in 1933, and only 8 per cent in 1938.<sup>1</sup> Other export industries were not flourishing. The peso recovered only a part of its value and imports still had to be restricted. The rapid growth of local manufacturing only partially offset the effect on local standards of living. Labor suffered especially because wages had not increased as the value of the peso fell. Discontent among the lower classes remained a serious political problem.

Alessandri succeeded in pushing through some measures for the improvement of the condition of the laborers and the *inquilinos*, but his efforts were hampered by conservative opposition. He received more support in measures directed against foreign capital. The *Cosach*, sponsored by North American interests, was dissolved early in his term. The individual nitrate companies resumed operations as separate concerns, but they were compelled to sell their product through a government agency which retained 25 per cent of the profits in lieu of the former export tax. The American-owned Chile Electric Company was compelled to accept an increased measure of government control. A plan of settlement bitterly criticised by foreign interests was forced upon the holders of the Republic's external bonds. These and many similar measures were a response to a widespread feeling of popular hostility to foreign "economic imperialism" which found expression in other Latin American countries as well as Chile during and after the depression.

Political agitation revived as the election of 1938 approached. In 1936 the left-wing parties formed a "popular front," which included not only the communists and socialists but also bourgeois political elements like the radical party, to which Alessandri himself had formerly belonged. This group supported a veteran radical leader, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, as their candidate for the presidency, while the conservative parties put forward Gustavo Ross, a liberal, who had been Alessandri's Minister of Finance. Ex-President Carlos Ibáñez was nominated by the Chilean Nazi party, a group which advocated fascist ideas but disclaimed any connection with European fascism. He with-

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Tariff Commission, *Foreign Trade of Latin America* (1940), Part III, Vol. II, p. 286.

drew his candidacy, however, after a small number of his supporters attempted to seize the government and were captured and slaughtered by the police. The Nazis then supported the popular front.

In the election, held on October 25, 1938, Aguirre Cerda defeated Ross by a popular vote of 220,000 to 213,000. The new President took office in December, pledged to a far-reaching program of social and economic reform. A month later a terrific earthquake, centering in the region of Chillán, killed from 25,000 to 50,000 people and caused property damage estimated at from \$30,000,000 to \$50,000,000, and the government's first task was one of relief and reconstruction. It was still engaged in this task when the outbreak of the European war created new uncertainties for the future. The political situation, especially, became more complicated early in 1941, when the popular front was disrupted by communist attacks on Oscar Schnake, a member of the cabinet and a leader of the socialist party, who had been endeavoring to work out a plan for economic cooperation with the United States. The socialists withdrew from the government but continued to hold the balance of power in congress.

The sudden death of Aguirre Cerda, on November 25, 1941, and the holding of an election to choose his successor, brought about a new alignment of political parties. A coalition of left-wing parties supported the "radical" leader Juan Antonio Ríos, while ex-President Carlos Ibáñez was the conservative candidate. Ríos won by a substantial majority, and was inaugurated in April, 1942.

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## Chapter XIV

### PERU

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#### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CENTRAL ANDEAN REPUBLICS

In Chapter I we spoke of the divergence in political and social development which must result from dissimilarities in climate and in the character of the aboriginal Indian populations of the various countries of Latin America. This divergence is well illustrated by the contrast between the republics of the South Temperate Zone and those of the Central Andes. Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. These countries lie wholly within the tropics. Altitude makes the interior valleys cool and even cold and the Humboldt Current coming from the Antarctic tempers the heat along the coast, but the region does not have the seasonal changes of temperature which seem helpful at least in maintaining the vigor of people of European descent. A large proportion of the people are pure-blooded Indians who live in separate communities and speak *Quechua* or *Aymara* rather than Spanish. In their economic life and social organization the three republics are thus very different from Argentina or Chile.

These differences are reflected in political life. With the great mass of the Indian population debarred by ignorance and economic subjection from any intelligent participation in elections, the development of a stable republican government was harder than in the southern republics. The difficulty was increased by geographical barriers to intercommunication. Precipitous mountain ranges isolate many of the interior valleys, and the coast is a rainless desert except where rivers come down from the Andes to the sea. The eastern slopes of the mountains and the tropical jungles of the Upper Amazon Valley

are largely undeveloped and sparsely inhabited. Everywhere the construction of roads and railways has been costly, and until very recently journeys from one section to another were a matter of many days or even weeks. The spirit of *localismo* inevitably flourished, and sectional jealousies and the ambitions of local *caudillos* were a constant menace to peace and order.

#### FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

There were 1,244,723 inhabitants in what is now Peru according to a census taken in 1795.<sup>1</sup> Lima had been the great center of Spanish power in America earlier in the colonial period, but the establishment of separate viceroyalties in New Granada and the River Plate, the changes in commercial legislation, and the decreasing production of the mines had diminished the relative importance of the city and the province of which it was the capital. The country had nevertheless been the chief stronghold of the loyalists during the war for independence. The creole nobility and other privileged classes had little sympathy for the revolution, and the Indians, though they fought as unwilling conscripts on both sides, were on the whole more inclined to support the royal authority. The patriot party was too weak to win independence without outside help, which came first from Chile and then from Colombia. It lacked effective leadership and popular support when it was compelled to assume the responsibility for organizing a national government.

We have already seen how Bolívar, who was ruling Peru at the end of the war, failed in his attempt to make the Republic a part of his great Confederation of the Andes. The Liberator's authority crumbled when he left the country to deal with Páez' revolt in Venezuela in September, 1826, and General Santa Cruz, his lieutenant, was soon forced by pressure from other military leaders to set aside the *constitución vitalicia* and to convene a constituent assembly. When this met in June, 1827, its leading spirit was the veteran patriot Luna Pizarro, a priest who had been one of the earliest advocates of Peruvian independence but who had opposed both San Martín and Bolívar. Through his influence, General José de la Mar was elected President

<sup>1</sup> Basadre, *Historia de la República del Peru*, p. 13.

of the Republic, while Santa Cruz accepted a diplomatic appointment abroad.

#### MILITARY DOMINANCE, 1827-1835

La Mar was the first of a long series of soldier-presidents. The control of the government after Bolívar's departure naturally fell into the hands of military leaders because years of constant warfare had accustomed all classes to regard armed force as the only basis of authority and because there was no other group sufficiently powerful to dispute their predominance. The creole aristocracy, though still preeminent socially, had never had any political influence and had been discredited by the adherence of most of the great families to the royalist cause. Even the civilian leaders who had participated in the revolution, and who were active in politics as "liberals" after independence, had little popular following. Some of them, like Luna Pizarro, were influential as advisers or aides to the military *caudillos*, but they could not obtain power for themselves. For some forty years after independence, Peru's political life was dominated by the "marshals of Ayacucho"—the group of officers who had risen to prominence during the revolution. Most of them, including Santa Cruz, La Mar, Gamarra, Orbegoso, and Castilla, had served in the Spanish army during the earlier years of the war, but had joined San Martín in 1820-21. They were professional soldiers rather than political leaders, men who represented the brute force of the troops under their command rather than any section of public opinion. It was their rivalries and jealousies, inspired solely by a desire for power, which caused Charles Darwin to observe in 1835 that "no state in South America, since the declaration of independence, has suffered more from anarchy than Peru."<sup>1</sup>

La Mar, when he took office in 1827, had to deal with powerful enemies in other countries as well as Peru. National boundaries in the Andean region were still ill-defined. Bolívar had acquiesced in Peru's withdrawal from his confederation, but his lieutenants held Guayaquil, which was claimed by Peru, and also Bolivia, which many of the

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History of the Various Countries Visited During the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle Around the World* (Everyman's edition), p. 352.

leaders at Lima regarded as a part of their country. War between Peru and Colombia became inevitable when Agustín Gamarra, the military commander at Cuzco, invaded Bolivia on his own initiative in 1828. Sucre's government was overthrown, but the hero of Ayacucho avenged himself by defeating the combined forces of Gamarra and La Mar in Ecuador in February, 1829. After this, Gamarra overthrew La Mar and made himself President of Peru. The war with Colombia ended a few months later, for internal dissensions made it hard for either belligerent to continue.

Gamarra soon faced new trouble in the south. Santa Cruz, who had become President of Bolivia, was intriguing with dissatisfied elements in Peru. Gamarra wished to attack him, but the Peruvian congress refused to declare war and the tension was somewhat relieved by a treaty of peace and commerce signed in 1831 through Chilean mediation. In the meantime, disaffected elements at home were kept in hand only with difficulty and a sensational affair occurred at Lima when General La Fuente, who had been left in control there while the President was in the south, was driven from the country by Gamarra's energetic wife. Small rebellions and conspiracies continued to cause trouble during the next two years.

Gamarra nevertheless completed his constitutional term as President. His government rested on military force, but it was not an absolute dictatorship. Political opponents, though frequently imprisoned or exiled, enjoyed some freedom of expression both in Congress and in the press. Elections were not so effectively controlled by the authorities as they were to be at a later date. In 1833, in fact, the President was unable to bring about the election of General Bermúdez, whom he had chosen as his successor. No candidate received a majority of the popular vote and the constituent assembly, acting under the leadership of Luna Pizarro, chose General Luis José Orbegoso as Provisional President.

Orbegoso was a creole of Spanish descent, more in sympathy with the aims of the civilian liberal group than were *mestizo caudillos* like Gamarra and Santa Cruz. It was hoped that his election would diminish the influence of the army in the government. He had been in office only a few days when the troops at Lima under Gamarra's leadership attempted to depose him and would have done so if the inhabitants

of the city had not rallied to his support. Unfortunately his popularity vanished as it became evident that he was ineffective and incompetent. Early in 1835, the army again revolted under the leadership of Felipe Santiago de Salaverry, a daring young *caudillo* who had earlier led several small uprisings against Gamarra. Orbegoso sought aid from Santa Cruz, and the Bolivian President responded by invading Peru. In the fighting that ensued Salaverry was defeated and put to death by Santa Cruz' order, despite the fact that he had surrendered upon the promise that his life would be spared.

#### SANTA CRUZ' CONFEDERATION

Santa Cruz was now able to realize what had long been his major ambition. Peru was divided into two republics with Orbegoso as President in the north and General Ramón Herrera in the south, and these states were united with Bolivia in a confederation of which Santa Cruz became the "Protector." The new regime was virtually a monarchy, for the ruler was to hold office for life and his position was to be hereditary. The change was not unpopular in Peru, for Santa Cruz' efficient administration in Bolivia had greatly impressed the propertied classes and the Inca blood which he inherited through his mother gave him great prestige among the Indians of both countries. The confederation had been in existence only a few months, however, when it was attacked by foreign enemies from two sides. An army sent by Rosas of Argentina was easily defeated, but the war with Chile, already discussed in Chapter XIII, ended with Santa Cruz' defeat at Yungay in January, 1839. The confederation was dissolved and Gamarra, who had returned with the Chilean army, again became President of Peru.

#### ANARCHY, 1839-1844

The next five years were a period of great disorder. Santa Cruz' adherents were still powerful in Bolivia, and their leader from his exile in Guayaquil endeavored to foment revolts in Peru. When Gamarra attempted to invade Bolivia his army was defeated and he was killed at Ingavi on November 18, 1841. His successor under the constitution was the President of the Council of State, Manuel Menéndez,

who held office long enough to make peace with Bolivia in 1842 but soon afterward found himself helpless in the face of revolts in several sections of the country. A series of short-lived military governments held power for brief intervals at Lima. It was not until July, 1844, that Ramón Castilla, at the head of a movement to restore the constitutional order under Menéndez, emerged as master of the situation.

#### RAMÓN CASTILLA

Castilla, like most of the other Peruvian *caudillos*, was a professional soldier who had received his first training in the Spanish army but had joined San Martín in 1821. He had participated in most of the civil wars since independence, usually as a partisan of Gamarra, and there must have seemed little reason to suppose when he was inaugurated as constitutional President in 1845 that his government would be different from that of other military leaders who had held the same office. His advent to power nevertheless marked a turning-point in the history of the Republic.

During the first quarter century of independence many customs and social institutions of the colonial period had survived, despite political changes and the disintegrating effects of military anarchy. Negro slavery continued to exist, though San Martín and later lawgivers had decreed the freedom of children born since the revolution. The Indians, while no longer subject to the *mita*, paid tribute as in colonial times and continued to be the victims of oppression by military officials and powerful landowners. The colonial aristocracy were impoverished by thirty years of civil war, but they still held their social preeminence and their great entailed estates. Even in manners and dress the people were only just beginning to feel the influence of nineteenth-century Europe. In some respects indeed the country was more backward than in Spanish times. In 1835 Darwin had found Lima "in a wretched state of decay" with nearly unpaved streets heaped everywhere with filth. The municipal governments and the normal machinery of civil government in general had virtually ceased to function while military leaders struggled among themselves for control of the state.



Much of this was to change during the next two decades. Castilla had not only military ability, but a rather tolerant spirit which helped to disarm factional bitterness. After 1845 the country enjoyed several years of relative tranquility. One reason for the new government's strength was the wealth which began to flow in from increased sales of guano to foreign countries. The great deposits of bird manure on the islands along the coast, though used from early times by the Incas, received little attention after the Conquest until an increased demand for fertilizers abroad made it profitable to exploit them. As the best deposits were the property of the nation, the new industry gave the government a tremendously increased income. The foreign debt, in default since the first years of independence, was refunded and it was possible for the first time to undertake the construction of much needed public works. Many great private fortunes were also built up, for contracts for exporting guano were too often granted on terms that were more favorable to the contractor than to the government. At the same time, Wheelwright's new steamship line, starting service about 1840, aided commerce in general and encouraged travel to the United States and Europe.

One result of closer contact with the outside world was a resurgence of the civilian liberal party which now sponsored a number of social and political reforms. As in Chile, the activity of this group was in part a reflection of the European revolutionary movement of 1848. The liberals were defeated at the polls in 1851, when Castilla brought about the election of General José Rufino Echenique as his successor, but they continued to carry on an active propaganda against the new regime, which rapidly lost prestige by its corruption and extravagance. In 1854 they started a revolution with Castilla himself as their leader. The insurgents were victorious after a year of civil war, and Castilla was again inaugurated as constitutional President in 1855.

In 1854, in the midst of the civil war, the liberals persuaded Castilla to issue a decree freeing the Indians from payment of tribute and another abolishing Negro slavery and promising to pay the owners an indemnity of \$300 for each of the 25,000 slaves to be emancipated. A year later a liberal majority in the constitutional convention made one of the few attacks that have been made in Peru upon the privi-

leged position of the Church. The clergy were subjected to the jurisdiction of the civil courts and the tithes and certain other ecclesiastical duties were abolished. Soon afterward, however, the liberals fell out with Castilla, and the party went into opposition when the constitutional convention was disbanded by the army in 1857.

Public order was disturbed anew in 1857 when Vivanco, an old rival of Castilla, revolted at Arequipa and was defeated only after an eight months' siege had caused much suffering among that city's inhabitants. In 1859, a boundary dispute with Ecuador led Peru to send a military expedition to Guayaquil, but the differences between the two governments were adjusted by treaty before bloodshed occurred. Neither of these affairs seriously affected the country's economic life and Castilla's third and final term as president from 1858 to 1862 was generally tranquil.

#### THE WAR WITH SPAIN

Grand Marshal Miguel de San Román was elected without opposition to succeed Castilla in 1862, but he died a few months after his inauguration and the Vice-President, General Juan Antonio Pezet, took his place. Pezet had not been in office long when relations with Spain, already strained by disputes over pecuniary claims and by the Peruvian government's outspoken disapproval of the interventions in Mexico and the Dominican Republic, were made worse by the "Talambo affair." A group of Basque immigrants, who had complained of mistreatment at the hands of the wealthy planters who had brought them to Peru, were brutally attacked by native laborers and no real effort was made to bring the offenders to justice. When a Spanish "Royal Commissioner" was sent to Lima to demand satisfaction, the government refused to deal with him because it considered his title offensive and in April, 1864, a Spanish fleet seized the Chuncha Islands which were the site of some of the richest guano deposits. Pezet, who had no naval forces strong enough to resist this aggression, finally signed a treaty providing for the return of the islands upon payment of an indemnity to Spain. This act of surrender so outraged public opinion that he was overthrown in 1865 by a revolution under General Mariano Ignacio Prado.

Prado's revolt had at least the moral support of Chile, which itself declared war on Spain in September, 1865. In December, Chile and Peru signed an offensive and defensive alliance to which Ecuador and Bolivia later adhered. The war was short and inconclusive. Valparaíso was bombarded in March, 1866, and an attack on Callao on May 2 was repulsed. Soon afterward the invading fleet withdrew from American waters. In 1871 a truce was arranged through the mediation of the United States, and in 1879 a treaty of peace was signed.

After the war internal dissensions again made their appearance. Castilla took up arms in 1867 in support of his brother-in-law, Diez Canseco, who would have been Pezet's constitutional successor, and the revolution finally succeeded although Castilla himself died during the campaign. In 1868, the victorious party installed Colonel José Balta as President.

#### THE CLIMAX OF THE GUANO ERA

The steadily increasing prosperity of the past quarter century reached its climax during Balta's administration. Revenues from guano exports alone furnished nearly three times as much income to the government as all other sources combined, and there seemed no end to the golden stream which they poured into the treasury. They were now used as a basis for large foreign loans to make possible an ambitious program of public works in which several railroads, built under the direction of the American Henry Meiggs, were the most important feature. The inflow of new capital encouraged reckless expenditure and governmental corruption so that even the unprecedented revenues were not sufficient to cover the budget and successive deficits were met by borrowing ahead against guano shipments.

Agricultural production also expanded. The labor problem, which had become acute on the great plantations of the coastal valleys even before slavery was abolished, was partially solved by the importation of Chinese coolies. A law enacted in 1849 had granted subsidies to encourage contractors to bring immigrants to the country, but it had been abrogated in 1853 after some 4,000 foreigners had been imported, most of them under contracts that compelled them to labor for a long term of years at low wages. At the same time the entry of

Chinese, who had formed the majority of those arriving, had been made illegal. This prohibition was raised in 1861, and nearly 85,000 coolies were brought in between that year and 1875 when a treaty with China forbade any but voluntary migration.<sup>1</sup> The material advantages from this traffic were offset by its undesirable features, for the immigrants' condition was hardly better than outright slavery. The descendents of these Oriental laborers constitute a considerable element in the population of the Peruvian coast today.

#### THE RISE OF THE CIVILISTA PARTY

Balta's administration marked the end of a political era. During most of the first half century of independence Peru had been ruled by essentially one group of military men, led first by Gamarra and later by his former lieutenant, Castilla. The efforts of the civilian liberals to obtain control had met with little success, for La Mar and Orbegoso, whom they placed in the presidency, had been unable to dominate the other army chiefs. Castilla, who had worked with them for a few years after 1854, had later turned to the more conservative elements for support, and Prado, despite their help in the nationalistic revolution of 1865, had not given them any important share in his government. The conditions that had made the army preponderant in politics were nevertheless changing with the increasing importance of trade and the development of a new wealthy class among the planters and merchants, and a political movement directed primarily against the continuance of military rule took shape during Balta's administration. The *partido civil*, though it has been described as "a fusion of a plutocratic class with a part of the hereditary nobility"<sup>2</sup> included also many of the old liberals. The reaction of public opinion against the extravagance and financial mismanagement of Balta's administration brought it many adherents, and in 1872 its candidate, Manuel Pardo, was elected to the presidency in spite of the government's opposition. It was the first time that the official candidate had been defeated since 1833.

Balta accepted the result of the popular vote, but Tomás Gutiérrez, the Minister of War, made a desperate effort to keep the army in

<sup>1</sup> Ugarte, *Bosquejo de la historia económica del Perú*, pp. 60-63.

<sup>2</sup> Basadre, *Perú Problema y Posibilidad*, p. 95.

power. Balta was arrested, and soon afterward murdered, while the army chiefs sought to set up a military dictatorship. The people of Lima and Callao, however, revolted as they had in 1834, and the usurper and two of his brothers were barbarously put to death within a few days after their *coup d'état*. Soon afterward Pardo assumed the presidency.

#### FINANCIAL TROUBLES, 1872-1878

Peru's first period of civilian government was not a happy one. Pardo effected some useful reforms, encouraging education, attempting to promote local self-government, and diminishing the importance of the army by establishing a national guard, but he was hopelessly handicapped by financial difficulties. The government's expenditures, increased by the still uncompleted railroad program, were far in excess of its revenues, and the proceeds of the guano sales were by this time entirely mortgaged to foreign bondholders. The collapse that a reckless fiscal policy had made inevitable was hastened by the world depression. In 1875 the banks were compelled to suspend specie payments and the government defaulted on its foreign debt. Meanwhile an increasing spirit of disaffection found expression in several small revolts. Financial and commercial conditions continued to grow worse in the first years of the administration of General Prado, the ex-President, whom the *civilista* party placed in office as Pardo's successor in 1876.

The drop in the price of guano, which was a major element in the country's financial difficulties, was owing in part to competition of nitrate from the Peruvian province of Tarapacá and the Bolivian province of Atacama. The nitrate deposits had been exploited by private companies in several of which Chilean and other foreign capital was invested. These interests had blocked a plan proposed by Pardo in 1873 to establish a sales monopoly in order to protect the guano revenues, and in 1875 the Peruvian government established a monopoly of production and proceeded to expropriate the existing private plants, despite the fact that the state of the treasury made adequate compensation impossible. Matters nevertheless went from bad to worse, and the Republic was bankrupt by 1878.

## THE WAR WITH CHILE

The results of the government's nitrate policy and of the alliance with Bolivia signed in 1873 have been described in Chapter XIII. The War of the Pacific found Peru woefully unprepared. The *civilista* administrations had reduced the army, chiefly for political reasons, and had fallen behind Chile in naval strength. Bolivia could give little or no help. The Chilean advance was held up for some months by Admiral Grau's daring operations at sea, but after the *Huáscar* was sunk the enemy easily overran Tarapacá and prepared to advance northward. In December, 1879, President Prado suddenly embarked for Europe, ostensibly to purchase munitions. Nicolás de Piérola, an audacious political agitator who had been Finance Minister under Balta and had later led several unsuccessful uprisings against the *civilista* regime, seized control of the government but was no more successful than his predecessor in checking the enemy. Tacna and Arica were lost, the effort to end the war through mediation by the United States failed, and Lima itself was occupied by a Chilean army in January, 1881. Piérola withdrew into the interior where he continued for some months to lead an ineffective opposition to the invaders.

At Lima a government headed by Dr. Francisco García Calderón was set up under the protection of the Chilean commander. The new administration, however, persistently refused to accept Chile's demands, partly at least because it hoped for diplomatic support from the United States. After a few months, when the Peruvian generals in the interior had recognized García Calderón's authority and had begun to act in his name, the President was arrested and deported to Chile. The Peruvian leaders kept up their opposition for another year, but at the end of 1882, after Chilean expeditions had dispersed the forces of some of the other chiefs, General Miguel Iglesias assumed the presidency and agreed to the invaders' terms. By the treaty that was signed on October 20, 1883, Peru lost Tarapacá and agreed to a temporary Chilean occupation of Tacna and Arica—a provision which, as we have already seen, was a source of friction for many years. The Chilean army of occupation was withdrawn in 1884, after the treaty had been ratified.

## AFTER THE WAR

Iglesias was opposed by the *civilistas* and the followers of Piérola and by other military chiefs who had refused to surrender to Chile. The most prominent of these was General Andrés Avelino Cáceres, who had fought the Chileans to the last moment and who attempted to seize Lima as soon as they left. He was repulsed in this first attempt but a year later he overthrew Iglesias after several months of hard fighting.

During Cáceres' presidency, from 1886 to 1890, the country began to recover slowly from the demoralization and impoverishment caused by the war. At the end of the conflict the morale of the nation was low and the prospect for the future dark. The Chileans had levied heavy contributions on the people of the occupied districts and had carried off or wantonly destroyed much valuable property. Many of the rich valleys along the coast had been systematically laid waste. The guano deposits which remained to Peru were now of relatively little value, and such income as they still produced was pledged to foreign creditors.

One of the most urgent problems was the reorganization of the public finances. With annual revenues of less than \$6,000,000, hardly a third of what they had been fifteen years earlier, the government could barely meet the most necessary expenses of administration, to say nothing of paying interest on its \$150,000,000 foreign debt. After prolonged negotiations, an arrangement with the Republic's foreign creditors was reached in the Grace contract, signed with a representative of the British bondholders in 1890. The government was relieved of responsibility for its outstanding bonds and in return ceded the state railways to the bondholders for sixty-six years. It further agreed to pay 80,000 pounds sterling annually for thirty-three years and to give the bondholders a right to extract and export a total amount of 3,000,000 tons of guano. The Peruvian Corporation, organized by the creditors, still operates the country's railway system.

In 1890 Nicolás Piérola made a vigorous bid for the presidency at the head of the democratic party, which opposed continued military domination. His campaign was cut short, however, when the government imprisoned him, and the official candidate, Colonel

Remigio Morales Bermúdez, was elected. Morales' administration was dominated by the Cáceres group and was supported also by the *civilistas*. This political combination broke down in 1894 when the *civilistas* opposed Cáceres' candidacy for the next term. Morales died during the campaign and the militarists pushed aside the first Vice-President and installed the second as head of the government. This made it possible for them to reelect Cáceres, but Piérola returned from exile to head a revolution and overthrew the government after three days of savage fighting in the streets of Lima.

#### CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS, 1895-1919

Piérola had been supported in his revolt by the *civilistas* as well as his own democratic party. As President from 1895 to 1899 he gave Peru a stable and efficient government which hastened the processes of recovery. The depreciated and fluctuating currency was stabilized, public works were constructed, and the army was again brought under the government's control. A return of military domination was made more difficult by a law promulgated in 1896 which entrusted the conduct of elections to boards chosen chiefly by the legislative and judicial branches of the government.

Relative freedom in the voting gave an advantage to the *civilista* party, which represented the wealthy classes, because bribery became an important factor as the use of force and intimidation grew less common. Partly for this reason, but more especially because control of the governmental machinery was a still more important factor, the *civilistas* were victorious in the elections of the next twelve years. Their candidate, Eduardo de Romaña, succeeded Piérola in 1899. Notwithstanding the opposition of the *Pierolistas*, who broke with the administration in 1903, another *civilista*, Manuel Candamo, became President in that year. He died after eight months in office and José Pardo was chosen in a hotly contested election to take his place. Pardo, the son of the man who had been President at the beginning of the war with Chile, was an able man who carried out a number of constructive measures and especially attempted to build up the neglected public-school system. At the end of his term, in 1908, Peru had enjoyed thirteen years of practically unbroken peace. It had been an



uneventful period during which commerce and industry prospered just as they were prospering in other South American countries under somewhat similar political conditions.

The next administration marked the beginning of the end of the era of *civilista* control. Augusto B. Leguía, a business man of an old provincial family who had served with distinction as Minister of Finance under Candamo and Pardo, was elected as the official candidate in 1908, but he soon broke with his former associates and established a semidictatorial personal regime. A revolt by Piérola's followers was suppressed in 1909 and vigorous measures were taken against other opposing political leaders. Leguía nevertheless failed when he attempted to have his friend Antero Aspíllaga chosen as his successor in 1912. The elections were unusually disorderly, and when Congress met it annulled them and chose the *Pierolista* candidate, Guillermo Billinghurst, as the new chief executive.

Billinghurst had much popular support at the outset of his administration, but he lost most of this during his first year in office. After a quarrel with Congress and an unfortunate effort to compromise the Tacna-Arica dispute with Chile, he was overthrown in February, 1914, by a group of military leaders working in connivance with the *civilistas*. Colonel Oscar Benavides assumed charge of the government temporarily, and in August, 1915, José Pardo was again inaugurated as constitutional President. The high prices of petroleum, copper, sugar, and cotton during the European war made Peru unusually prosperous in his four years in office. The sympathies of the government were openly on the side of the United States after that country entered the conflict, and Pardo severed diplomatic relations with Germany in October, 1917.

#### THE DICTATORSHIP OF LEGUÍA

At the end of Pardo's second term, the *civilista* party had been in power, except for short intervals, for nearly a quarter century. In recent years, however, its influence had been undermined by much the same sort of economic and social changes that were weakening the political aristocracies of Argentina and Chile. In Peru, the masses of the Indian population still remained completely outside of the na-

tion's political life, but the working people and the lower middle classes in the cities were taking more interest in matters of government, and it was among them that Piérولا's "democratic" party, in opposition since 1903, found many of its supporters. There was also an increasing number of business and professional men who had no family or other connections with the *civilista* group and resented its monopoly of political power, and their importance had increased during the war years when many new fortunes had been created. In 1919 most of these elements opposed to the party in power supported ex-President Leguía, who won the election despite the government's efforts in behalf of its own candidate. Since there was some reason to fear that the Congress might attempt to upset the result when it made the final canvass of the vote, Leguía's followers seized the presidential palace by force and installed their leader in power shortly before the end of Pardo's constitutional term.

This *coup d'état* inaugurated a dictatorship that lasted eleven years. Leguía's popularity, combined with the general prosperity of the 1920's, enabled him to override all opposition. Constitutional changes first extended his term to five years, and then legalized his reelection in 1924 and 1929. His opponents were powerless in the face of his efficient military and police forces and his active secret service. Those who did attempt to revolt received harsh treatment. Aside from his political absolutism, however, Leguía was in many ways an enlightened and progressive ruler. The most important event of his administration was the settlement of the Tacna-Arica controversy which had so long embittered Peru's relations with Chile. At home, something was done to improve the position of the working classes, an educational mission was brought from the United States, and irrigation systems, harbor improvements, and other public works were constructed. Funds were obtained by floating large loans abroad. Unfortunately the inflow of capital and the governmental and private extravagance which it encouraged were followed by the same reaction as in other Latin American countries and the sharp decline in exports after 1929 also caused much hardship.

## SÁNCHEZ CERRO AND THE LETICIA INCIDENT

Leguía, like Irigoyen and Ibáñez, fell in the wave of revolutions that marked the first years of the depression. On August 22, 1930, the military commander at Arequipa, Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, rose in revolt. The attitude of the army chiefs and of public opinion at Lima made resistance impossible, and on August 25 Leguía resigned, to spend the last years of his life in prison. Sánchez Cerro became Provisional President. Six months later widespread popular opposition and discontent among the troops forced him to resign, but he was the victorious candidate in the election held in October, 1931, and in December he became constitutional President.

The new administration faced much opposition and was compelled to suppress revolutionary movements in various parts of the country in 1932-33, but its position at home was probably somewhat strengthened by the conflict with Colombia over the Leticia corridor. This sparsely inhabited area in the upper Amazon valley had been given to Colombia by a treaty between the two countries signed in 1922. The arrangement had been unpopular among the people of the near-by Peruvian territory, and on the night of August 31, 1932, a group of private individuals seized the little village of Leticia and expelled the Colombian officials. The Peruvian government disavowed their action, but later made it clear that it would resist a Colombian force which was sent up the Amazon to reoccupy the territory. There were minor armed clashes in the region in the first months of 1933. The League of Nations, to which both countries belonged, supported Colombia, as did several American powers, but their efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement were thwarted by Sánchez Cerro's unwillingness to withdraw from the position that he had assumed.

The assassination of Sánchez Cerro, on April 30, 1933, made a settlement possible. General Oscar Benavides, who was hastily elected to the presidency, entered into informal negotiations with Colombia and in May accepted a new proposal of the League of Nations. The area in dispute was turned over to an international commission, which governed it for a year and then turned it back to Colombia. The controversy had caused little loss of life but it had involved both

governments in heavy expenses for armament at a time when their financial problems were already acute.

#### POLITICAL AFFAIRS SINCE 1933

Benavides, like his predecessor, was compelled to adopt severe repressive measures against political enemies and to put down several armed revolts. Since the fall of Leguía, the strongest opposition party had been the "*Apra*" (*Asociación Popular Revolucionaria Americana*), a radical group which had been organized originally as an international movement directed primarily against foreign imperialism, political and economic. The *Apra's* founder, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, had been one of the candidates in the presidential election of 1931. He had many adherents in Peru, and an outbreak of his followers in the northern highland region had been suppressed with some difficulty in March, 1933. Thereafter the party was virtually outlawed and its leaders were imprisoned or exiled, but it continued to make trouble.

Haya de la Torre was not permitted to be a candidate in the presidential election of 1936 because the government maintained that he represented an international organization rather than a Peruvian political party. The *apristas* consequently voted for Luis Antonio Eguiguren, another radical opposition leader, and their support enabled him to obtain a majority over the official candidate, Jorge Prado. Before the votes were officially counted, however, a constituent assembly annulled the election and extended Benavides' term for three additional years. A business revival, beginning in 1934 and steadily making headway in the ensuing years, had helped to make the general political situation more tranquil, and there was no effective resistance to the government's high-handed action. A number of *apristas* were nevertheless arrested and held in jail for long periods. Benavides exercised dictatorial powers, since the annulment of the elections had left the country without a congress, and in 1939 constitutional amendments greatly increasing the authority of future presidents were adopted by plebiscite.

Later in the same year Manuel Prado y Ugarteche was chosen as Benavides' successor, in an election in which the *apristas* were again

debarred from participation. As the government's candidate he received 262,000 votes against 76,000 for José Quesada, his opponent. The fact that so few persons went to the polls, in a population of more than 7,000,000, indicates that republican government does not yet rest on a broad basis of popular support and participation.

#### PERU TODAY: THE INDIAN PROBLEM

Peru today is one of the wealthier countries of South America. Petroleum in the desert around Piura, cotton and sugar in the irrigated coastal valleys, and copper from the great mines of Cerro de Pasco have greatly increased the volume of her export trade since the beginning of the century. Even the depression of the 1930's proved but a temporary setback, followed by a rapid recovery. Economically the Republic's future seems bright. Politically, from the standpoint of those interested in the attainment of stable, republican government, the prospect is more uncertain. Democratic methods have not yet supplanted military force as a means of deciding political disputes, and it is difficult to hope that they will do so until there has been a change in the social and economic position of the Indian population.

Though the *encomenda* and the *mita* have long since disappeared, the Indians are still a subject race. Many of them have been attracted by relatively free working conditions and higher wages to the great plantations of the coast, but the great majority still live in the Sierra, where custom and economic necessity hold them in a state not very different from that of their ancestors under the viceroys. The more fertile lands in the highland region are owned by white or *mestizo hacendados*, for whom the Indian tenant must work certain days in the week, either gratuitously or for a small wage, in order to occupy the fields or pastures upon which his own livelihood depends. In many cases Indian families are required as a part of their customary payments to their landlord to furnish a certain number of *pongos*, or household servants, to work either at the plantation itself or at the *hacendado's* city house—an arrangement reminiscent of one of the abuses which the Spanish authorities vainly endeavored to abolish in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The ignorance and poverty

which help to keep the Indian in subjection to his landlord have also exposed him to exploitation at the hands of officials, priests, and private individuals to such an extent that a local expression, *gamonalismo*, has been coined as an all-inclusive term to embrace the manifold forms of extortion that are practiced against him. In one respect, at least, the Indians' situation seems to have become worse since independence, for many of the *ayllus* or village communities which possessed lands under royal grants during the colonial period have lost a part or all of them through fraud or violence in the past century.

In recent years the outlook for the Indian has become a little brighter. Though its efforts have thus far been somewhat ineffective, the government has sought to check the most vicious forms of *gamonalismo* by creating agencies charged especially with the protection of the native race. Public opinion among the upper classes seems to be awakening to the importance of the problem and the *aprista* party especially has advocated measures of social reform. The Indians themselves, moreover, have shown an increasing tendency to assert their rights. It is said that forceful resistance to mistreatment or extortion, leading at times to minor local revolts, has been more common in the past two decades, and individual Indians or communal groups have stubbornly defended their property by litigation in the courts. Many *ayllus* continue to exist, despite the efforts made in the early days of the Republic to force the distribution of their lands among the individual members, and their position has been strengthened by the fact that the constitution of 1920 for the first time legally recognized their existence. There is little doubt that the Indian will some time demand relief from exploitation and a larger participation in the country's political life. Peru's future welfare will depend to a great extent upon the ability of her statesmen to solve the Indian problem by evolution rather than by revolution..

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## Chapter XV

### BOLIVIA

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#### THE BOLIVIAN TABLE-LAND

There are few sections of South America where civilized communities contend with greater geographical and climatic handicaps than in Bolivia. On the map, the Republic's area seems large in proportion to its population, but only a small part of its territory provides a decent living for human beings. The great region east of the Andes, which comprises some two-thirds of the total, is for the most part either tropical jungle or hot, low-lying plains, flooded part of the year and drought-stricken at other times. There are fertile and temperate valleys on the slopes of the mountains, but they afford a relatively small amount of good agricultural land. It is the broad plateau of the interior, 12,000 to 14,000 feet above sea-level and surrounded by far higher snow-covered peaks, which is the home of the great majority of the Bolivian people. Much of this bleak region, too cold or too arid for agriculture, is useful only as pasture for llamas and alpacas. Even the more fertile areas, like the district near Lake Titicaca where the prehistoric city of Tiahuanaco once flourished, can support only such hardy plants as potatoes and quinoa, and crop failures from cold or drought are the rule rather than the exception.

This inhospitable region had a large Indian population before the Conquest, and its mineral wealth made it one of the most valued Spanish possessions during the colonial period. At the time of independence, however, the output of the once fabulously rich silver mines had virtually ceased, and other forms of mineral wealth which have since become important had not been developed. The population, greatly reduced by the cruelties of the *mita*, had been further

diminished after 1809 by fifteen years of particularly cruel civil strife. There were probably somewhat less than 1,000,000 people in the country in 1825.

The majority of these were Indians, either Quechuas like the people of southern Peru or the more sullen and intractable Aymaras. Like their Peruvian neighbors they still spoke only their native dialects and retained many of their primitive customs. Exploited and oppressed by the officials and landowners, undernourished and suffering constantly from the cold, their lot was even harder than that of the natives in other parts of the Andean region. A large but constantly decreasing proportion of them, especially in the more remote and unproductive regions, had been allowed to retain their ancient communal agricultural system, but elsewhere their lands and much of their livestock had passed into the hands of the descendents of the conquistadores and they themselves had become debt-slaves or tenant farmers, obliged by law or custom to work for the benefit of the landowner. Above the Indians in the social scale, but only slightly less ignorant and primitive in their way of living, were the Spanish-speaking *cholos* or *mestizos*. Some of these were farmers, others artisans or small tradesmen in the towns.

Both the Indians and the *cholos* far outnumbered the people of more or less pure Spanish blood. The creole families, scattered in a number of small, isolated towns, were even less fitted than most of their South American neighbors to undertake the responsibility of self-government. Though a few of them had studied at the ancient University of Chuquisaca, their general standard of intellectual attainment was low. The meager revenues from their estates, worked by the Indians under *cholo* overseers with little or no attention on the part of the owners, made it possible for them to live in idleness, but with few comforts and fewer diversions. Only a handful had any conception of conditions beyond the mountains and deserts which cut off the plateau from the outside world. For more than half a century after the war for independence, little or no foreign news appeared in Bolivian newspapers,<sup>1</sup> and travel was discouraged by poverty and lack of roads.

<sup>1</sup> Arguedas, *Historia General de Bolivia*, p. 440.



## FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

Since the provinces of the plateau had been governed from Buenos Aires between 1776 and 1810, and from Lima during the revolution, both the Argentine Confederation and Peru were disposed to claim the territory when Spanish resistance there collapsed after the battle of Ayacucho. When Sucre occupied the country, however, he found a strong local sentiment for independence, and an Assembly which he was persuaded to convene voted in August, 1825, to establish a separate republic bearing the name of Bolívar. The Liberator, though he had at first appeared to oppose the independence movement, accepted the Assembly's invitation to draw up a constitution for the new state. The draft that he submitted was accepted but with one important change: the delegates could not agree with Bolívar's rather liberal views about religion and insisted upon an article prohibiting the public exercise of any but the Roman Catholic cult. The other provisions of the *constitución vitalicia* have been described in Chapter VIII.

Sucre, though he himself urged the selection of a native Bolivian, was chosen President and reluctantly consented to serve for a period of two years. The Venezuelan general had been the real ruler of the country since the end of the war. His tactful leadership had made the orderly establishment of the new Republic possible, and he had already reorganized the administrative and fiscal system. He had also begun to build up a school system, but the effort to implant the educational methods of ancient Sparta, sponsored by Bolívar's old teacher Simón Rodríguez, does not seem to have been a great success.<sup>1</sup> Sucre had remained in Bolivia, however, only from a sense of duty and he was eager to return to Quito to be married. Never ambitious on his own account, he made no attempt to build up a personal regime such as other lieutenants of Bolívar were already organizing in Venezuela and Ecuador.

His position grew more difficult after the collapse of the Liberator's authority in Peru. The new rulers of that country intrigued against him and his own soldiers were becoming homesick and unruly. Some of them mutinied at Chuquisaca in April, 1828, and Sucre was wounded when he attempted, single-handed, to restore order. He

<sup>1</sup> Pinilla, *La Creación de Bolivia*, pp. 269-70.

was thus able to offer little resistance when the Peruvian general Gamarra invaded Bolivia and in July, 1828, he assented to a treaty which required that he should withdraw from the country with his Colombian troops. General Santa Cruz, who was at the time in Chile, was chosen by the Congress as his successor.

#### SANTA CRUZ

Andrés Santa Cruz, who had already figured prominently in events in Peru, was a *mestizo*, claiming descent on his mother's side from the royal family of the Incas. Born on the shore of Lake Titicaca, he had a great following among the Indians on both sides of the Peru-Bolivian frontier. He fought on the Spanish side during the greater part of the war for independence, as did most of the Peruvian generals, but he joined San Martín's army in 1820. Later, as we have already seen, he served under Bolívar, and governed Peru for a short time as the Liberator's lieutenant.

There was much disorder, fomented by Gamarra's intrigues, before Santa Cruz reached Bolivia, and General Velasco, the acting President, was overthrown and then restored by barrack revolts. The hostility of the populace finally forced Gamarra to withdraw his army, and when the President-Elect assumed power in May, 1829, the war between Peru and Colombia had ended for the time being the danger of a new invasion. One of Santa Cruz' first acts was to set aside the Bolivarian constitution. His regime was a hardly disguised dictatorship, but it was nevertheless one of the best governments in Latin America and without question the best government which Bolivia was to have for more than a generation. His able administration and careful financial management won him much support while his sagacious but firm handling of opponents prevented disorder. A large and well-disciplined army further strengthened his hand, and for several years the country enjoyed a good measure of prosperity. We have already seen how this state of affairs impressed the propertied classes in Peru and helped to make possible the union of the two republics under Santa Cruz' control when President Orbegoso requested the Bolivian ruler's intervention in the civil war against Salaverry in 1835.

The Confederation, proclaimed in October, 1836, had a short and troubled existence. Chile declared war against Santa Cruz in December and Argentina in the following May, and though expeditions from both countries were at first repulsed, a second Chilean invasion reinstated Gamarra as President of Peru and defeated the Protector's army at Yungay on January 20, 1839. Even before this battle, Santa Cruz' leadership had been repudiated by his subordinates in Bolivia. He had no alternative but to dissolve the confederation and go into exile.

#### VELASCO AND BALLIVIÁN

General José Miguel de Velasco, who had been Provisional President in 1828-29 and President of the State of Bolivia under the Confederation, became head of the government. Popular, but inept and easy-going, he was soon struggling against revolts fomented by other military leaders. When he was overthrown by partisans of the exiled Santa Cruz, in 1841, Gamarra invaded Bolivia to prevent his old enemy's return to power. The Peruvian President supported a revolution under General José Ballivián, but the latter, once victorious over his opponents, turned against his ally and Gamarra was defeated and killed at the battle of Ingavi.

Under Ballivián the country had six years of relative peace. A new constitution gave the president an eight-year term with practically dictatorial powers. Those who conspired against the government were promptly executed, and Santa Cruz, the chief trouble maker, was finally persuaded to live in Europe on a generous pension. An effort, though not a very effective one, was made to promote road building and education. Not one school had been open in Bolivia in 1841, but some 4,000 pupils, still a pitifully small number, were receiving instruction a few years later.<sup>1</sup> A few foreign scientists and teachers were brought to the country and the first real newspaper was established. The net result of these progressive measures, however, was small, for the country remained almost as isolated and poverty-stricken as before.

<sup>1</sup> Arguedas, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

THE ERA OF MILITARY DESPOTISM,  
1847-1879

Ballivián was overthrown in 1847 by a military mutiny under Colonel Manuel Isidoro Belzu. Velasco again became President, but he had been in office only a few months when Belzu led a new revolt and assumed power himself. Belzu's administration was the first of a series of sanguinary and corrupt despotisms which have few parallels in the history of Latin America. A professional soldier, uneducated and with no conception of the responsibilities attaching to his high office, the new President was typical of the *caudillos* who were to rule Bolivia during the greater part of the next thirty years. Since the overthrow of Sucre, nearly every change of government had been the result of a mutiny in the army and every officer of the higher ranks had come to regard himself as a potential dictator. Personal bravery, lack of scruples, and a readiness to kill an enemy in cold blood were the qualities which seemed to assure success. Civilian leaders, though they held important posts in the cabinet and congress, played a secondary rôle. There were no real political parties, and even the purely personal factions that surrounded each leader were frequently disrupted by jealousy or treachery. The constant interference of Peru and Bolivia in one another's political affairs, whether by armed intervention or by intrigue and bribery, made the establishment of stable government in either country more difficult. Trouble makers, both native and foreign, found a fertile field for their activities in the intense spirit of *localismo*, which made rivalries and antipathies between the different towns more important in the eyes of the ruling class than questions of national concern.

Belzu, himself of humble birth, sought popularity by appealing to class hatred. Mobs were encouraged to sack the properties of his opponents among the upper class, and the *cholos* were encouraged to regard themselves as the new rulers of the country. The President became the idol of the *pueblo*, the turbulent artisans of the towns. He was nevertheless continually beset by conspiracies and revolts, which were not discouraged by the brutal punishment of enemies who fell into his hands. On one occasion he was nearly killed by would-be assassins, and the Council of Ministers, during his convalescence, shot

not only those implicated in the plot but also the President of Congress and other high officials of whom they were jealous for political reasons. In 1855 Belzu wearied of the struggle to remain in power and presented his resignation, informing Congress that "Bolivia has become ungovernable." His son-in-law, Jorge Córdova, a foundling trained in the army, was "elected" to succeed him, but was overthrown in 1857 by José María Linares.

Linares, unlike his predecessors, was a civilian, highly respected for his upright character and his intellectual attainments. He had been acting President for a short time in 1848, and since then had led one revolution after another, sacrificing much of his great fortune in the effort to restore what he believed to be the constitutional order. Once in power, however, he established a dictatorship little less arbitrary and ruthless than those which had gone before. His energetic but often ill-considered attacks on long-standing political and social abuses made many enemies, and he was finally betrayed by two of his own ministers, who seized power by a *coup d'état* and sent him into exile in 1861.

The next president, General José María de Achá, was chosen in an election more nearly free than any which had been held in Bolivia since the time of Sucre. Achá offered cabinet positions to members of all of the larger political factions, and apparently made a real attempt to govern constitutionally, but his tolerant policy seemed merely to encourage intrigue and revolt. Shocking scenes occurred in La Paz, where more than sixty political prisoners, including ex-President Córdova, were massacred to thwart a rumored jail-delivery, and uprisings occurred in several other places. The President, like most of the military *caudillos*, was ignorant and incompetent, but he remained in office until the end of 1864 when his close associate, Mariano Melgarejo, ousted him by a barracks revolt.

Melgarejo was perhaps the most depraved ruler in the history of Latin America. Starting as a common soldier, he had risen to a high position in the army, and consequently in the government, chiefly by his audacity and complete lack of scruples. He established his authority only after a sharp struggle with several other leaders, including Belzu. This *caudillo*, still popular with the *cholo* class, defeated the new government's forces and occupied La Paz, but while Belzu was

celebrating the victory Melgarejo entered the palace with six men, killed Belzu, and overawed the mob that a moment before had been cheering for his rival. Once in power the new President showed a complete contempt for legal restraints and private rights, cruelly suppressing every evidence of discontent and using the public funds for the gratification of his vices and the enrichment of his friends. During his frequent periods of drunkenness he was capable of atrocities that terrified even his unprincipled associates.

Melgarejo was finally overthrown in 1871 by another professional soldier named Agustín Morales. Though hardly less ignorant and dissolute than his predecessor, the new President attempted at first to obtain the support of the better elements, and permitted the restoration of a semblance of constitutional government. When he was killed in a brawl with his own nephew in 1872, a rich merchant, Tomás Frías, became Provisional President and held a free election from which Adolfo Ballivián, the son of the ex-President, emerged as Morales' successor. Under his administration, and under that of Frías, who assumed the presidency shortly before Ballivián's death from illness in 1874, the country had a brief period of civilian government, but the military element regained control when General Hilarión Daza, the Minister of War, overthrew Frías in 1876.

#### THE WAR WITH CHILE

The outbreak of the war with Chile, which came in Daza's administration, found Bolivia completely unprepared. The country's rulers, absorbed in a never-ending, bloody struggle to gain or hold power, had paid little attention to the threatening situation that was developing in the south. There had never been any close connection between the interior and the inaccessible coastal province of Antofagasta, because Arica, in Peru, had been the chief port for such foreign commerce as the Republic had. Ballivián had urged the purchase of arms, but his proposals had been defeated in Congress. The army, though it dominated the country's internal politics, was insignificant compared with that of Chile, and lacked modern weapons and real training. Neither Daza nor his predecessors seemed to have realized this, and they recklessly allowed the quarrel with Chile

over the taxation of foreign companies in the nitrate region to develop into armed conflict.

The story of the war has been told in Chapter XIII. Daza at first took command of the Bolivian army, but his troops revolted in December, 1879, after his treacherous abandonment of his allies in Tarapacá, and an uprising in the interior made General Narciso Campero President of the Republic. In May, 1880, the allied forces under Campero's command were routed at Tacna. So far as Bolivia was concerned the war was over, though Campero endeavored to raise and equip a new force in the interior. The Republic lost the rich nitrate fields of Antofagasta and became a land-locked country, dependent on its neighbors for access to the sea.

#### PROGRESS AFTER THE WAR

Public opinion had been sharply divided over the question of continuing the war or accepting defeat, and the issue gave rise to political parties which for the first time were something more, though not very much more, than mere personal factions. Those who wished to resume the struggle, led by Campero and another war hero, General Camacho, called themselves liberals. Their opponents, though divided into two factions, the "conservatives" and the "democrats," were able to defeat the administration candidate in 1884. Neither obtained a majority of the popular vote, but they combined when Congress met to bring about the election of Gregorio Pacheco, a wealthy miner, as President.

Both economic and political conditions improved after the Chilean war. The country was somewhat more prosperous, thanks to a revival of silver production, and it began to have more intercourse with the outside world, especially after the railroad connecting Oruro with Antofagasta was opened in 1892. The government was definitely more stable. Aniceto Arce, who succeeded Pacheco in 1888, and Mariano Baptista, who became President in 1892, were both highly respected leaders of the conservative party. Though the liberals were discontented, such revolts as occurred were unsuccessful, and the frequent military mutinies of the pre-war period, with the wholesale executions which often followed them, seemed to be a thing of the past. Elec-

tions, however, were controlled by the authorities, and opponents of the government were frequently imprisoned or sent into exile.

Severo Fernández Alonso, another conservative, became President in 1896. He was overthrown three years later when a dispute over the location of the national capital caused an outburst of the still violent spirit of *localismo*. Sucre, the ancient Chuquisaca, was still constitutionally the seat of the government, as it had been in colonial times, but presidents and congresses had usually found it more convenient to carry on the administration from less inaccessible places. Proposals to move the capital had frequently aroused controversy. La Paz had been especially insistent upon its claims as the largest and most important town, and when Congress voted to make Sucre the capital permanently members of both parties in the rival city revolted under the leadership of Colonel José Manuel Pando. Alonso's forces were defeated after several months of fighting, Pando became President, and the government offices were moved to La Paz.

#### LIBERAL ADMINISTRATIONS, 1899-1920

- The liberals were in power from 1899 until 1920, controlling elections by much the same means as their conservative predecessors. After Pando, the progressive and able Ismael Montes was President from 1904 until 1909 and again from 1913 until 1917, after Eliodoro Villazón had served the intervening term. During this time Bolivia enjoyed the longest period of internal peace in her history. Tin production, which became important at the turn of the century, increased until the Republic was producing a quarter of the world's supply, and new copper and lead mines helped to bring about a rapid increase in foreign trade. Railroad construction did much to encourage this economic development, and also to promote internal stability, for the hitherto isolated, mutually hostile provincial towns were brought within easy reach of the capital and their inhabitants began to think of other subjects than local politics. A line from Lake Titicaca to the heights above La Paz, completed in 1903, connected that city with the Peruvian seaport of Mollendo, and other lines were completed in 1913 from La Paz to Arica and from La Paz to Oruro, connecting with the existing railroad to Antofagasta. Branch lines to



Potosí and Cochabamba were also built, but great sections of the Republic still remained without adequate means of transportation.

Railroad building was made possible partly by foreign borrowing, to which Bolivia now resorted for the first time, and partly by payments made to Bolivia in connection with the settlement of outstanding diplomatic questions with Brazil and Chile. A dispute with Brazil over the administration of the rich rubber district of Acre on one of the upper tributaries of the Amazon was settled in 1903 by the cession of the territory to Brazil in return for a cash payment of £ 2,000,000, and in 1904, when a long overdue peace treaty finally replaced the truce which had ended hostilities with Chile in 1884, the Chilean government agreed under one of its provisions to build the railroad from Arica to La Paz.

#### THE 1920'S AND THE DEPRESSION

The liberals did not avoid the disintegrating effects of a long tenure of power, and several of their leaders formed a new opposition group called the republican party. This failed to prevent the election of the administration candidate, José Gutiérrez Guerra, in 1917, but overthrew his government, with the aid of the army and with little bloodshed in 1920. Thereafter an election in which only republicans voted made Bautista Saavedra President for the term 1921-25. In 1925, Dr. Villanueva, the administration candidate, was chosen as President, but he apparently fell out with Saavedra before the inauguration, and the latter persuaded Congress to annul the election. Saavedra apparently intended to retain the control of the government in his own hands, relying upon the army for support, but vigorous opposition within his own party compelled him to consent to the election of Hernando Siles, a rival republican leader, who took office in January, 1926.

During the administrations of Saavedra and Siles, bond issues floated in the United States increased the foreign debt from approximately \$6,000,000 to more than \$60,000,000. Some beneficial results were obtained from this great expenditure, including especially the completion of a connecting link between Bolivia's railway system and that of Argentina; but much of the money seems to have gone for non-

productive purposes, to buy arms and munitions, or simply to meet the chronic deficits in the budget. To obtain the loans the country pledged nearly all of its principal sources of revenue and entrusted the supervision of their collection to a permanent fiscal commission, nominated partly by North American bankers. Some improvement in financial administration resulted from the work of this body and from the recommendations of Professor Kemmerer, who visited Bolivia at the request of the government in 1927, but service charges on the foreign loans, a heavy burden even when the country's products were bringing high prices, could not be met at all when the depression set in. If they had not been suspended, interest payments alone would have exceeded the entire revenue of the government in 1932 and 1933.

The depression, with a sharp drop in the price of tin and other products, was largely responsible for the political crisis that occurred in 1930. Siles' regime had been virtually a dictatorship, for the country had been under martial law during much of his term and congress had not met for two years. The expenditure of money borrowed abroad and the fear of war with Paraguay over the Chaco had strengthened his position, but when he attempted to postpone the election of his successor, revolts occurred throughout the country. The administration was overthrown after a few weeks of fighting. General Kundt, a Prussian officer who had been Siles' chief military adviser, was forced to leave the country, whereas political exiles of all shades of opinion were invited to return. Early in 1931, Daniel Salamanca, a highly respected civilian, was elected President by a republican-liberal coalition. He had not been in office very long when all hope for an early restoration of normal political and economic conditions was dissipated by the outbreak of the war with Paraguay in 1932.

#### BOLIVIA AND THE CHACO CONFLICT<sup>1</sup>

For Bolivia, the Chaco conflict was an unmitigated disaster. Its cost in human life and in money was out of all proportion to the value of the territory in dispute. The Bolivian troops, taken from

<sup>1</sup> For the story of the Chaco War see pp. 257-60

the cold highlands into the low, hot plains where the fighting took place, suffered much more than did their opponents. The drafting of men into the army caused a shortage of labor at home and seriously crippled mining and agriculture, and the maintenance of the army severely strained the country's financial resources. Much of the proceeds of the large foreign loans contracted in the 1920's had been spent on armament, and great sums were borrowed from the mining industry and from private individuals to carry on the struggle. An excessive inflation of the currency caused hardship to all classes.

Recovery was made more difficult by internal dissensions which made trouble even while the war was going on. Salamanca had to contend with a factious opposition in congress, and repeatedly changed his cabinet in an effort to obtain harmony and to placate the popular dissatisfaction caused by military reverses. In November, 1934, when he went to the Chaco and attempted to dismiss the Commander-in-Chief, General Peñaranda, the troops arrested him and the Vice-President, José Luis Tejada Sorzano, seized power at La Paz. By this *coup*, the liberal party, to which Sorzano belonged, prevented the inauguration of Franz Tamayo, a republican who had recently been elected as Salamanca's successor, and the Congress later annulled Tamayo's election and postponed the inauguration of a new president, first until August, 1935, and then until August, 1936.

#### RECENT HISTORY

After the ending of hostilities in June, 1935, economic conditions grew worse rather than better, and popular discontent found expression in the formation of a new radical party, composed largely of students and demobilized soldiers, which opposed a continuance in power of any of the old political groups. Many army officers were also disgusted with the civilian politicians, and on May 17, 1936, some of them combined with the radicals to overthrow Sorzano Tejada by a *coup d'état*. The Chief of the General Staff, Colonel David Toro, became head of the government and announced an intention to set up a socialist regime. His policies did not improve the economic situation, but brought him into conflict with powerful mining and banking interests which helped to cause his overthrow by another *coup*

*d'état* on July 14, 1937. One important event of Toro's short administration was the expropriation of the Bolivian properties of the Standard Oil Company in March, 1937.

German Busch, another army officer, succeeded Toro, and in May, 1938, had himself elected "constitutional" President for a four-year term. He was soon involved like his predecessor in a conflict with the mining industry arising from the government's desperate need for foreign exchange. When his actions showed an apparent intention to have the government take over the mines, the civilian political parties intensified their opposition, and in April, 1939, Busch proclaimed a dictatorship. On August 23 of the same year he committed suicide, or was murdered, and the army chiefs at La Paz installed General Quintanilla, the Commander-in-Chief, as his successor.

The new administration made an effort to restore more normal political conditions. The constitutional order was restored and in March, 1940, General Enrique Peñaranda, who had commanded the army during the war, was elected President. With his inauguration, on April 15, the more conservative elements returned to power. The government expelled the German minister in 1941, after the discovery of a subversive plot in which that official and his military attache were involved, and it has cooperated in other ways in plans for hemisphere defense. Bolivian metal production became an important factor in the United States' armament producing program, especially after the Japanese occupation of the Malayan tin-producing region, and the construction of a new, specially equipped smelter in Texas will make it possible for this country to use much more Bolivian tin than in the past. One potential danger to good relations was removed in February, 1942, when the Bolivian government agreed to pay the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey \$1,500,000 for its expropriated properties.

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## Chapter XVI

### ECUADOR

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Though it was a part of the Viceroyalty of New Granada in the latter part of the colonial period, and a part of Great Colombia until 1830, the people of Ecuador had also had close connections with Peru, and the country's history since independence has been much influenced by its position as a weak state lying between two more powerful neighbors. In many respects the Republic resembles the other Central Andean countries. A large portion of its people are *quechua*-speaking descendents of civilized tribes that formed part of the Inca Empire, occupying a chain of high valleys between the two ranges of the Andes, and living and working under much the same conditions as the highland Indians in Peru. This region lacks the mineral wealth of the mountains farther south, and its inhabitants, though they supply themselves with most of the products needed to maintain a very simple standard of living, contribute little to foreign trade. Most of the country's exports—cacao, ivory nuts, coffee, Panama hats, and gold—come from the coastal plain along the Pacific, which is wider and has a heavier rainfall than in Peru. The coast has a considerable population of mixed Spanish, Negro, and Indian descent, and Guayaquil, the chief seaport, is the Republic's largest city. Steep, jungle-covered mountains make communication between this region and the interior very difficult, and the separation of the country into two sections, with different interests and different points of view—a situation peculiarly conducive to a spirit of *localismo*—has made it difficult to establish a stable, unified government.

## UNION WITH GREAT COLOMBIA

The people of Ecuador had no alternative but to accept a union with Bolívar's Great Colombia after Sucre defeated the Spanish army at Pichincha. Such opposition as there was faded in the face of the Liberator's prestige and popularity, and those who were not content could do nothing against the veteran troops from New Granada and Venezuela which occupied the country. The proud creole families found it distasteful to be ruled by foreign officers, many of them of humble origin and mixed blood, and there were occasional clashes between the soldiery and the populace; but in general the country accepted Colombian rule. In one respect, at least, it profited from the connection, because the people of Quito without outside help could hardly have resisted Peru's claim to Guayaquil, which was the only seaport accessible to them and which was consequently indispensable to their existence as a separate state.

## FLORES AND ROCAFUERTE

The military commander in Ecuador in 1830 was General Juan José Flores, a thirty-year-old Venezuelan who had joined the patriot forces as a common soldier when little more than a child, and had risen to high rank after the war by his courageous and tactful handling of several difficult military assignments. Though of obscure origin and with practically no schooling, he had married into one of the best families of Quito and had made many friends among the creole aristocracy. He thus had some local support to reinforce the power that he enjoyed as leader of a strong army, still composed principally of foreign troops. He was apparently loyal to Bolívar so long as the Liberator retained control at Bogotá, but he lost no time in seizing power for himself when it became apparent that Great Colombia was breaking up. At his instigation, the more prominent citizens of Quito met in May, 1830, to declare Ecuador independent, and some months later a constituent assembly elected him President of the Republic.

Mutinies in the army and a boundary dispute with New Granada caused some trouble for the new regime, and it was not long before

organized political opposition began to appear. In 1833, under the leadership of Colonel Hall, an ardent English liberal who had come to Bolívar during the revolution with a letter from Jeremy Bentham, and who had settled in Quito after serving with distinction in the patriot army, a group of young patriots founded an opposition newspaper called *El Quiteño Libre*. When they began to denounce the government as a foreign military despotism and to criticise its corrupt administration of the finances, Flores suppressed the paper and arrested those connected with it. The "nationalists" promptly revolted, but their military chief, Vicente Rocafuerte, soon fell into the government's hands. Instead of shooting his captive, Flores won his support by promising him the presidency for the next term, and when many of the nationalists refused to accept this arrangement, North American warships prevented the nationalist fleet from interrupting trade by blockading Guayaquil, and the rebels were defeated.

Rocafuerte was President from 1835 until 1839. A wealthy creole of Guayaquil, he had spent much of his life abroad, first in school, then as an American deputy in the Spanish cortes, and later as a diplomatic representative of Mexico in England. His writings on political subjects had won him some distinction, and the nationalist group had eagerly accepted his leadership when he returned to his own country in 1833. His presidency, however, was little more than a continuation of the preceding regime, since Flores remained in command of the army and frequently interfered in political affairs. Though some much-needed reforms were effected and some progress was made in promoting education, the government's energies were chiefly absorbed in maintaining peace. Rocafuerte was arbitrary and even brutal in his treatment of opponents, and when Flores again became President in 1839 there were many who welcomed his return to power.

Those who hoped for an improvement were disappointed. Flores' government in his second term was more corrupt and less efficient than Rocafuerte's and there was still much bitter feeling against him as a foreigner. He ruled without a congress, after quarreling with the legislative body in 1840; and in 1843 he changed the constitution and brought about his own reelection, with increased pow-

ers, for a new term of eight years. This caused a break with Rocafuerte, who had expected to be president himself. Further unpopular actions such as the imposition of a general head tax and the granting of freedom of worship to non-Catholics strengthened the opposition, and when a revolution broke out in Guayaquil on March 6, 1845, the government collapsed. Flores accepted \$20,000 and a pension in return for his agreement to leave Ecuador for two years.

#### INTERNAL DISSENSION AND FOREIGN INTERFERENCE 1845-1860

A constituent assembly elected Vicente Ramón Roca, one of the leaders of the revolt, as President. The new administration was comparatively honest and tolerant, if not very progressive. For a time there was little internal disorder, but the government was much disturbed by Flores' efforts to obtain support in Spain for a counter-revolution. The ex-President seems to have enlisted the aid of Queen Mother María Cristina by holding out hopes of establishing a Spanish prince as ruler at Quito, and he was able to recruit a large force in Europe. The plan collapsed when the South American ministers at London persuaded the British government to seize three ships that were to have carried the expedition to America, but the threat of a Spanish reconquest of Ecuador greatly alarmed the Republic's neighbors and led to the meeting of an American congress at Lima in 1847 to consider plans for mutual defense.

Since no candidate obtained the two-thirds majority of Congress required for election, Vice-President Ascázubi succeeded Roca in 1849. He had been in power but a few months when General José María Urbina led a military revolt which placed the aged Diego Noboa in the presidency. In 1851, Urbina seized power himself. The new ruler, though formerly a protégé of Flores, had taken a prominent part in the "March" revolution of 1845, and called himself a "liberal" as opposed to the "conservatives" who had supported the Flores regime.

These party names had hitherto been little used in Ecuador, and the significance which they now acquired was largely the result of outside influences. We have seen how the European revolutions of



1848 gave rise to radical movements in Chile and Peru. The liberals had come into power in Colombia also in 1849, and relations with that country were strained because Noboa had given asylum to the Jesuits whom the Colombian government had expelled and had even assisted a counter-revolutionary movement in Pasto. A fear that Ecuador would suffer for these acts probably played a part in Urbina's revolt, and the latter, after he became President, forced the Jesuits to leave and adopted a mildly anti-clerical policy in other respects. This aroused the distrust of the conservatives in Peru, who openly aided Flores in organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Ecuador in 1852. The division between liberals and conservatives, which was later to cause so much bloodshed, thus owed its origin in large part to foreign intervention.

Urbina's chief accomplishments were the abolition of Negro slavery, which became effective on March 6, 1854, and the suppression of the tributes that the Indians had been compelled to pay since the beginning of the colonial period. Neither of these reforms were of very great importance, for the number of slaves involved was not large and the position of the Indians remained much what it had been, but they were a manifestation of the liberal ideas which were beginning to take the place of the narrower point of view of the colonial period.

At the end of his term, Urbina had another professional soldier, General Francisco Robles, elected as his successor, but kept the real power in his own hands through the control of the army. The new President, neither able nor popular, was soon involved in difficulties at home and abroad. The most serious was the old boundary dispute with Peru, which became acute when the Ecuadorean government proposed to discharge a portion of its share of the revolutionary debt of Great Colombia by granting lands in the disputed region to some of the bondholders. Peru finally declared war, blockaded Guayaquil, and encouraged discontented leaders in Ecuador to start revolts so that the country was soon in a state of anarchy, and Robles and Urbina were forced to flee. General Franco, the commander at Guayaquil, repudiated the government's authority and made a truce with Peru, but he was unable to control the interior, where Gabriel García Moreno, with the help of Flores, finally obtained control after a series

of brilliant campaigns. The provisional government which these two leaders set up defeated Franco in 1860, and García Moreno became President in 1861.

#### THE DICTATORSHIP OF GARCÍA MORENO

Ecuador had made little progress in the forty years since the battle of Pichincha. A diplomatic representative of the United States in 1845 had "witnessed little else than ignorance, indolence, wretchedness, dishonesty, and misery on the part of the great mass of the people, and selfishness, low cunning, sordid ambition, avarice, and blood-thirsty revenge on that of those who either lead or force the unconscious, unthinking multitude."<sup>1</sup> Though slavery had been abolished in 1854, both Negroes and Indians were working for insignificant wages under a peonage system established by law. They were still exploited and oppressed, as they had been in colonial times, by landowners, priests, and officials. The position of the upper classes had improved little if at all. The cities were declining in population and the public buildings were falling into decay. There was little foreign commerce because Guayaquil was the only port connected with the interior even by a trail passable for pack mules, and this was closed to traffic during six or eight months of each year by the rainy season. The sanguinary struggles between rival military leaders, frequently marked by barbarous cruelty to suspected opponents or prisoners of war, had taken a heavy toll of life and property, and the prospect for establishing peaceful conditions seemed remote when Ecuador's more powerful neighbors were continually fomenting disorder. Many were beginning to feel that a monarchy under a foreign prince might be better than continued anarchy, and García Moreno himself made unsuccessful efforts to make Ecuador a protectorate of France during the civil war in 1859.<sup>2</sup>

A measure of internal peace, however, was established under a heavy-handed dictatorship after García Moreno assumed the presi-

<sup>1</sup> D Smith, Special Agent of the United States, to the Secretary of State, Aug 10, 1845, printed in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs*, 1831-1860, Vol. VI, p. 254

<sup>2</sup> George Frederick Howe, *García Moreno's Efforts to Unite Ecuador and France*, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 16, p. 257.

dency. The new ruler, though he had been the ablest leader of the recent revolt, was not a professional soldier but a lawyer. Since his father was a loyal Spaniard, the family property had been confiscated during the revolution, and García Moreno himself grew up in poverty. A charitable friar took charge of his education, and his intellectual ability, combined with utter fearlessness and indefatigable energy, soon made him one of the leaders of the younger generation. He became active in politics at an early age, first as a "nationalist" against Flores and later as a conservative against Urbina and Robles. For a time, as a political exile, he studied in France. He now came into power with Flores' support, but the old *caudillo* had little influence in his administration. The new President centered all authority in his own hands. Opponents and even peaceful critics were shot or imprisoned without regard to legal forms, and counter-revolutionary movements under Urbina and other liberals were suppressed with ferocious energy. The congress was reduced to obedience when several of its more independent members were sent into exile, and the press was permitted no freedom.

García Moreno dominated Ecuadorean politics for fifteen years. Since the constitution did not permit reelection, he permitted Gerónimo Carrión, the liberal candidate, to become President in 1865 but dictated the appointment of his cabinet and made him little more than a figurehead. In 1867, when Carrión permitted Congress to get out of hand, García Moreno demanded his resignation and installed another liberal, Javier Espinosa, in his place. As the election of 1869 approached, and several presidential candidates appeared, Espinosa attempted to remain neutral and was promptly ousted by the army. A few months later García Moreno again became President under a new constitution which gave him a six-year term, eliminated the prohibition against reelection, and greatly increased his authority.

García Moreno was extremely devout, at least in outward practice, and he consistently used the support of the Church as a means of maintaining his own authority. The masses of the people were still very much under the influence of the priests, despite the increasing demoralization of the clergy and the infiltration of foreign ideas, and even the liberals, during their tenure of power, had not abrogated the constitutional prohibition against the public exercise of other cults.

The power of the Church was now increased, and a concordat, promulgated in 1863, gave the ecclesiastical authorities control over the publication or importation of books and the supervision of all education. At the same time, the President was relentless, though largely unsuccessful, in his effort to eradicate the abuses prevalent among the native clergy.

For all his vengeful cruelty and his religious bigotry, García Moreno was a statesman of vision and constructive ability, honest in his management of public funds, and an indefatigable worker. He gave much attention to the improvement and beautification of the cities of the Republic and also to popular education, entrusting to the Jesuits the direction of the secondary schools and bringing Christian Brothers from France to take charge of primary instruction. The number of children in school increased three-fold, and the quality of the teaching, hitherto grievously neglected, was improved. Equally important, perhaps, was the building of a cart road from Quito to Guayaquil, which revolutionized transportation between the coast and the interior.

#### POLITICAL EVENTS, 1875-1895

García Moreno was assassinated in 1875, shortly after his election for a second six-year term, and Antonio Borrero, a liberal with many friends in the conservative party, was peacefully elected to succeed him. The new President attempted to retain the support of both political parties by a policy of conciliation and compromise, but he lost much prestige among the liberals by his refusal to call a convention to modify the reactionary constitution of 1869. This afforded a pretext for a military revolt under General José Ignacio de Veintemilla, a professional soldier who had once supported and later opposed García Moreno, and who now became President after going through the traditional procedure of overthrowing the government, convening a constituent assembly, and holding a presidential election. There was a return of the old evils of military rule and governmental corruption, and in 1883 the civilian elements of both parties joined forces in a successful revolution. The conservatives assumed control under

José María Plácido Caamaño, who attempted to return to the authoritarian methods of García Moreno and to restore the close alliance with the Church, which had been attacked in its privileges but more alarmed than hurt during the liberal regime. The President's reactionary policy was too much for many members of his own party, and the "progressives," as the more moderate conservatives called themselves, were able to obtain control of the government in the election of 1888. The new President was Antonio Flores, the son of the founder of the Republic and himself for many years a prominent figure in Ecuador's politics. Under his administration the country had four years of tranquility. Private rights and the freedom of the press were respected and an effort was made to introduce greater honesty and efficiency in the government.

Flores' successor, Luis Cordero, another "progressive," showed less ability, and in 1894 he became involved in a noisy scandal. The government of Chile had sold one of its warships, the *Esmeralda*, to Japan for use in the war with China and had attempted to conceal this breach of neutrality by nominally transferring the vessel first to Ecuador. When it became known that Cordero had permitted this misuse of the national flag there was an outburst of indignation, and the liberals seized upon the opportunity to revolt. After some months of fighting, under the leadership of General Eloy Alfaro, the insurgents obtained control of the country.

#### THE ALFARISTA REGIME, 1895-1912

Alfaro, who was to be the chief figure in the Republic's politics during the next fifteen years, was a native of Montecristi, a small town on the coast. He had been active as a conspirator and revolutionist since García Moreno's first administration and had spent several years in exile at Panama, where he had built up a fortune in private business. A close friend of the great Ecuadorean liberal thinker Juan Montalvo, he had a somewhat more definite ideology than many of the earlier leaders, to whom "liberalism" had been little more than a convenient party label. His anticlerical views made him highly objectionable to the more extreme conservatives. The latter were de-

feated, however, when they attempted a counter-revolution with aid from Colombia, and Alfaro's own moderation, combined with the wise policy of Archbishop González Suárez, prevented the issue of Church and State from becoming acute during his first term as President (1897-1901). Nevertheless, the Law of Patronage, enacted in 1899, gave the civil authorities a large measure of control over the Church.

A series of anticlerical measures, including laws authorizing the practice of other cults, permitting civil marriage and divorce, and expropriating much church property, were enacted under Alfaro's successor, General Leonidas Plaza (1901-5), and a new constitution, which contained no provision making Catholicism the state religion, was adopted in 1906. By this time Alfaro was again in power, for he had forcibly ejected Plaza's successor, Lizardo García, within a few months after the latter had taken office. His second term was a period of violent political agitation, and the government adopted harsh measures to suppress conspiracies and incipient revolts. Foreign affairs also were troublesome, and a revival of the boundary dispute threatened for a time to bring on war with Peru. It was nevertheless possible to complete the railroad from Guayaquil to Quito, upon which Alfaro had concentrated much of his energy during his first term. The new line was of the greatest value not only from an economic but from a political standpoint, but the bonds issued to finance it soon went into default, with unfortunate effects upon the country's credit.

Emilio Estrada, "elected, as usual, by the soldiers and public employes"<sup>1</sup> succeeded to the presidency in 1911. Alfaro attempted at the last minute to prevent the new chief executive from taking office, because of the latter's ill health, but he had by this time many enemies even in his own party and a revolt of the troops and populace at Quito sent him into exile. When Estrada died suddenly four months later, Alfaro made a new bid for power, but was captured by troops of the constitutional government led by his old associate General Plaza. In January, 1912, the ex-President was dragged from his prison at Quito and killed by a mob in the streets. A prominent civilian presidential candidate, Julio Andrade, was also murdered shortly afterward.

<sup>1</sup> Reyes, *Historia de la República del Ecuador*, p. 272.

POLITICS AND THE CURRENCY PROBLEM,  
1912-1926

General Plaza again became President. His second administration (1912-16) was disturbed by an uprising of Alfaro's former partisans at Esmeraldas on the coast. New difficulties confronted the government with the outbreak of the European war. Trade and finance were temporarily dislocated, and the government was compelled to relieve the banks of the obligation to redeem their notes. This gave the country a fluctuating paper currency which was to become an important political issue a few years later.

Under President Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno (1916-20) both economic and political conditions rapidly improved. The most important event of his administration was perhaps the sanitation of Guayaquil, where yellow fever, hitherto endemic, was eradicated with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation. The question of Church and State had by this time lost so much of its importance as a political issue that the administration made no effort to influence the selection of a new archbishop when the venerable González Suárez died in 1917.<sup>1</sup>

José Luis Tamayo, President from 1920 to 1924, was a liberal, like his predecessors, but he appointed many conservatives to positions in the administration. He was opposed, on the other hand, by a growing element in his own party, which believed that the banks, and especially the Banco Comercial y Agrícola of Guayaquil, were exercising an undue influence in the country's politics in order to maintain their privilege of issuing irredeemable paper money. The depreciation of the currency had caused much hardship among the laboring classes because prices had risen whereas wages, especially on the plantations of the interior, had remained almost unchanged. In 1922-23 this situation caused riots both at Guayaquil and in the interior, and many lives were lost in restoring order. The left-wing liberals were so strong by 1924 that the government considered it advisable to permit the election of one of their leaders, Dr. Gonzalo Córdoba, as President but only after exacting promises which left him little freedom of action. This did not satisfy the "liberal-radicals," especially as the new chief executive was soon compelled by illness to turn over

<sup>1</sup> Reyes, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

the presidency to Vice-President Guerrero Martínez, and in July, 1925, with the help of younger officers in the army, they ousted Guerrero Martínez by a *golpe de estado*.

After some months of government by a military *junta*, Dr. Isidro Ayora was made Provisional President in 1926. The new administration, on the advice of an American commission headed by Professor Kemmerer, established a central bank with the sole right of note issue and stabilized the currency. The reestablishment of constitutional government was delayed until these and other reforms were effected, and it was not until 1929 that Ayora was formally elected President by a constituent assembly.

#### POLITICAL EVENTS SINCE 1929

The depression caused renewed unrest, and in 1931, faced by impeachment proceedings in Congress, Ayora was forced to resign. During the next four years governments rose and fell with kaleidoscopic rapidity. Disputes with Congress, insubordination in the army, and discontent caused by continued bad economic conditions made it impossible for any president to remain in office more than a few months. Ayora's successor, the radical leader Luis Larrea Alba, was ousted within a few weeks, after a futile attempt to establish a dictatorship, and in October, 1931, Baquerizo Moreno became Provisional President. A general election returned a majority for the wealthy conservative leader Neftalí Bonifaz, but in August, 1932, the Congress declared the President-Elect ineligible because of his alleged Peruvian citizenship. His partisans revolted and were not defeated until after several hundred persons had been killed in several days of fighting at Quito. A new election made the radical Juan de Dios Martínez Mera President. He was removed by impeachment after ten months in office and José María Velasco Ibarra, a moderate liberal elected with conservative support, took office with a coalition cabinet in 1934. He too had trouble with Congress, and when he attempted in 1935 to dissolve that body and hold new elections the army forced him to resign. Antonio Pons, his successor, was likewise forced out after one month, and in September, 1935, the army set up a military dictatorship under Federico Páez.



Páez struggled for two years against opposition from many quarters. Several conservative leaders were imprisoned or exiled, and the religious question was revived as a political issue when the government expelled all foreign priests in order to "nationalize" the Church. Radical elements also gave trouble, and a diastic "social security law" was adopted to check their activities. Military revolts occurred from time to time. In 1937 a constituent assembly finally met to pave the way for a return to constitutional government. Its members had been elected under conditions that gave the opposition parties little chance to participate, but it nevertheless got out of hand, and during the ensuing political crisis the army forced Páez to resign in favor of Alberto Enríquez, the Minister of War.

Enríquez dissolved the assembly and proceeded to promulgate a series of radical economic measures that increased tension between the political parties and alarmed foreign business interests. Among them were the enactment of a minimum wage law, the confiscation of the properties of an American gold-mining company, the arbitrary revision of other concessions and contracts under which business firms were operating, and the reorganization of the Central Bank. In August, 1938, Enríquez, submitted his resignation to a new constituent assembly in which the liberals, conservatives, and socialists were all represented, and Manuel María Borrero, a liberal, became Provisional President. Four months later he was replaced by Aurelio Mosquera Narváez. A constitutional congress was elected, but the choice of a new president was postponed and Dr. Mosquera Narváez remained in office until his death in November, 1939, despite much left-wing agitation. He was succeeded by Andrés F. Córdoba.

In a general election held in January, 1940, the liberal-radical candidate, Dr. Carlos Arroyo del Río, defeated his conservative and independent opponents, and on September 1st he took office as constitutional President.

#### ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS TODAY

Much of the unrest of the past ten years has been caused by dissatisfaction with economic and social conditions. The Republic has had but a small share in the wealth which increasing foreign com-

merce has brought to other South American countries and it has been especially unfortunate in the vicissitudes that have befallen its one important export crop, cacao. Ecuador was for many years the chief source of the world's supply of chocolate, and a steady increase in the output of her plantations from the time of García Moreno until 1916 brought the country a modest prosperity which was reflected in the relative stability of the government during much of the period. Since 1916, however, the *monilia* and witches'-broom diseases have wrought havoc with the crop, and exports in 1938 were only about 40,000,000 pounds as compared with 100,000,000 pounds in the war years. The other products of the coast—tagua nuts (for making buttons) and Panama hats, the best of which come from Ecuador—are relatively less important, and the highland region still supplies little for export. Few American countries have a smaller *per capita* foreign trade at the present time.

The lack of adequate means of transportation between the Coast and the Sierra is still an economic and political handicap and has helped to perpetuate the deep-seated jealousy between the two regions. It is not an accident that so many of the country's revolutions have started in Guayaquil, the coastal metropolis. The building of the railroad between that city and Quito, and more recently the construction of automobile roads, have improved matters to some extent, but the highlands of the interior are still one of the most isolated inhabited portions of South America.

The great social problem, however, is the condition of the Indians. As in Peru and Bolivia, the masses of the native race work on the plantations owned by the dominant white upper class. How little they participate in politics is shown by the fact that only 66,000 votes are said to have been cast, in a population of nearly 3,000,000, in the 1940 presidential election. They are still an oppressed race. The Indian tribute, which provided a large part of the public revenue in colonial and early republican times, was abolished in 1857, but in the same year the civil code legalized a system of *concertaje*, or debt-slavery, which left the worker at the landowners' mercy. This system persisted even after imprisonment for debt was done away with by law in 1918, though its worst features are said to be gradually disappearing at the present time. As late as 1931 it was reported that

the average wage of the free rural laborer was about ten cents and that many of those who were still victims of the peonage system received little or nothing.<sup>1</sup> Such conditions have naturally caused much discontent and Indian uprisings have occurred with some frequency in recent years.

<sup>1</sup> Sáenz, *El Indio Ecuatoriano*, p. 56.

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## *Chapter XVII*

### COLOMBIA

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With more than 8,700,000 inhabitants, Colombia is one of the most populous of the South American republics. It is also one of the richest and most progressive, but it has attained this position only in recent years. Until the first decades of the twentieth century, the development of its natural resources and the growth of trade with the outside world were retarded by geographical obstacles and by long-drawn-out civil wars which periodically took a frightful toll of blood and treasure. The Colombian people's success in overcoming the handicaps of their natural environment and their political heritage, and achieving stable republican government, give their history a special interest.

#### GEOGRAPHY

Few inhabited sections of South America were more completely shut off from the outside world at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Except for the ancient coast towns of Cartagena and Santa Marta, all of the more important cities of New Granada were in the highlands. The Andes at their northern end form three great ranges, one along the west coast, another between the deep valleys of the Cauca and the Magdalena rivers, and the third east of the Magdalena, expanding near that river's headwaters into the plateau of Bogotá and extending as a broad mountain system with high but fertile valleys into Venezuela. The plateau and the neighboring valleys, formerly the home of the Chibchas, are one of the two great centers of population in Colombia today. The other is in the central range and the rich Cauca valley. Until very recently communication between these

two regions was exceedingly difficult. As late as 1842 there was not even a mule trail, and travellers from the west regularly went over the Quindío pass in the central range on the backs of men, a nine days' trip on a dangerous foot path, and then climbed four days more on horseback from the hot and unhealthy Magdalena Valley to Bogotá, 8,563 feet above sea-level. Between the interior and the ports on the north coast, through which passed such commerce as the country had with Europe and North America, all traffic was by small boats on the Magdalena River, since the swamps and forests of the valley made land travel impossible. The rapidity of the voyage depended as it does today upon the depth of water in the river and the boatmen's luck in avoiding snags and sand banks. When General William Henry Harrison went to Colombia as American Minister in 1828 he considered himself fortunate in completing in six weeks the canoe trip from the coast to Honda, where travellers obtained horses for the ascent to Bogotá.<sup>1</sup> Under such conditions there could be little contact with the outside world, and within the Republic the spirit of *localismo* was unusually intense.

#### IMPORTANCE OF IDEAS IN COLOMBIAN POLITICS

Hardly less important than the geographical factor have been more intangible but none the less real traits of national character. To a greater extent than in most Latin American countries political strife has centered around ideas rather than personalities, and conflicts between opposing schools of thought as to forms of government, and more especially as to the relations between Church and State, have been the real cause rather than merely the pretext for civil war. This concern with ideas, on the other hand, has helped to educate the masses of the people to a point where democratic procedures could take the place of revolution as means for settling disputes. It seems to be one expression of an intense individualism which has affected political institutions in other ways, making for an intolerance of any curb on freedom of expression or political action, and on the other hand frequently impairing party cohesion and discipline. It helps

<sup>1</sup> Scruggs, *The Colombian and Venezuelan Republics*, p. 45.

to explain why dictatorships of the ordinary Latin American type have been almost unknown in Colombia.

#### DURING THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

At the beginning of the nineteenth century New Granada proper probably had somewhat more than 1,000,000 people. Except on the coast and in the Cauca valley, where there were many Negro slaves, the great majority were of Indian blood, but the descendents of the Chibchas and other aboriginal tribes had for the most part adopted the language and religion of their conquerors and did not form a separate community as in Peru or Mexico. In the cities, the principal families were of course of Spanish descent, and it was they who dominated the country economically and politically.

We saw in Chapter VII how local jealousies helped to defeat the first movement for independence in New Granada between 1810 and 1816. During the reign of terror after the reconquest, the small bands of patriots who escaped to the *llanos* of the interior cooperated with Bolívar's Venezuelan troops in the Orinoco valley and played an important part in the guerrilla warfare that kept the movement for independence alive during the next three years. When the Liberator crossed the Andes and won the decisive victory of Boyacá in 1819, New Granada was again free. The expulsion of the Spanish authorities left the control of affairs in the hands of the army, and Bolívar was naturally elected to the presidency when the Republic of Colombia was created by the Congress of Angostura in the same year. The new state, often spoken of as Great Colombia, included not only New Granada and Venezuela but also the province of Quito, which was still under Spanish control. Its government was given a more definite organization by a constituent assembly that met at Cúcuta in 1821, and Bolívar was reelected, with Francisco de Paula Santander, the New Granadan revolutionary leader, as Vice-President. It was the Vice-President who administered the government at Bogotá during the next five years while Bolívar was busy in Ecuador and Peru.

Santander had entered the patriot army as a young man at the beginning of the revolution. Though an able and at times a cruel mili-

tary leader, he was a statesman rather than a soldier by temperament. He gave the new Republic an orderly administration with congresses functioning regularly and in relative independence, in marked contrast to the purely military dictatorships in some of the neighboring countries. The machinery of government was reorganized and funds for the prosecution of the war were obtained by floating loans in London, creating a debt which was to cause much embarrassment in future years. In Bogotá, at least, there was general enthusiasm for republican institutions and a civic spirit which found expression in efforts for change along many lines. English ideas and fashions especially became popular and many of the old colonial customs began to disappear.

#### THE BREAK-UP OF GREAT COLOMBIA

Unfortunately this happy state of affairs did not last. Great Colombia was held together only by Bolívar's authority and prestige, and from the beginning the Venezuelans had disliked being ruled by the Vice-President and Congress in New Granada. General Páez, the military commander at Caracas, had joined with other dissatisfied leaders in 1825 in urging Bolívar to supplant the government by a personal dictatorship, but the Liberator had refused to consider their proposal. In the following year, when the Congress ordered Páez to appear before it to answer charges of arbitrary conduct in recruiting troops, the *llanero* leader rebelled against the central government. The quarrel was patched up by Bolívar, who returned from Peru in response to Santander's urgent summons, but Páez retained his position and the prestige of the central government necessarily suffered.

Meanwhile news of Bolívar's plans for the perpetuation of his control over Bolivia and Peru under the *constitución vitalicia* reached Bogotá and a violent conflict of opinion arose between advocates and opponents of a similar arrangement for Colombia. Bolívar himself continued ostensibly to support the constitution of Cúcuta, but several municipalities were encouraged by his friends to demand the establishment of a life-presidency, and there was soon a definite break between the Liberator and Santander, who headed the party

opposing the scheme. Both the President and the Vice-President had been reelected in 1826, and Bolívar personally took over the executive power in 1827.

The next three years were the tragic period of the Liberator's career. His popularity had declined, and a convention which met at Ocaña in 1828 to attempt to devise a more workable constitution than that of 1821 broke up because a majority of the delegates opposed his proposal for a strong centralized government with a president elected for an eight-year term. Bolívar then suspended the constitution of 1821 and assumed dictatorial power in an effort to control the disorders that were breaking out in many of the provinces. On September 25, 1828, he barely escaped being assassinated in his palace by a well-organized group of conspirators, and fourteen participants in the plot were executed. The troops in various sections of the country began to align themselves with one or the other of the two parties. The war with Peru in 1828-29, and revolts in Popayán and Medellín, made the situation worse. So discouraging did the outlook become that the council of ministers endeavored in 1829 to obtain the support of the English and the French governments for a plan by which Bolívar would rule Colombia in his lifetime but would be succeeded by a European prince. Nothing came of this proposal, which was unpopular in Colombia and was apparently opposed by Bolívar himself.

When Bolívar suspended the constitution of Cúcuta in 1828, he issued a call for a new constituent assembly. Before this met in January, 1830, Páez had again placed himself at the head of a separatist movement in Venezuela and his example was soon followed by General Juan José Flores, whom Bolívar had left in command of the troops at Quito. Venezuela and Ecuador thus became independent republics. At Bogotá Bolívar refused to continue in office and the assembly elected Joaquín Mosquera as President and General Domingo Caicedo as Vice-President. It voted an expression of gratitude to Bolívar and granted him a life pension of \$30,000 annually.

The Liberator, ill and discouraged, left Bogotá in May, 1830, intending to go to Europe. At Cartagena he received the sad news of the murder of General Sucre, who had been his most faithful and perhaps his ablest lieutenant. Before he could sail from the coast his



illness became worse, and on December 17, 1830, he died at the *quinta* of San Pedro Alejandrino near Santa Marta.

#### THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF SANTANDER AND MÁRQUEZ

A few months earlier a movement that had as its ostensible purpose the restoration of Bolívar's authority had overthrown the government at Bogotá. General Rafael Urdaneta assumed control with the support of the local garrison, but revolts throughout the country soon ousted this purely military regime and a new Congress was elected. In February, 1832, a constitution for "the Republic of New Granada" was adopted, and in the following month Santander, who had been in exile since 1828, was elected to the presidency.

Despite the opposition of many military men who had supported Bolívar during the troubled period of his dictatorship, the new government was generally popular and the President displayed the same administrative ability that had marked his first term in office. The government's financial difficulties were somewhat relieved by economies and good management, and some improvement was made in the school system. The new Republic seemed to have made a good beginning.

In the presidential election of 1837 no candidate received a majority of the popular vote, and the congress, in accordance with the constitution, decided the question. Santander, though he had not intervened actively in the campaign, was known to favor General José María Obando, but it was the latter's rival, Dr. José Ignacio de Márquez, who was chosen. Márquez had been supported by a fraction of the dominant party that opposed the continuance of military influence in the government and also by many former partisans of Bolívar, and his victory left the political leaders divided into two factions from which later developed the great historic political parties. The followers of Santander and Obando had already begun to call themselves liberals, and the group that now took control of the government later adopted the name of conservatives.

Except for two small and easily suppressed military mutinies,

President Márquez' first two years in office were tranquil. The opposition, led by Santander until his death in 1840, confined itself to constitutional methods. The President concluded an agreement with Venezuela and Ecuador for the apportionment of the old Colombian foreign debt, now increased by many years' unpaid interest, and endeavored to reestablish the country's credit by a partial resumption of payments. The outlook for the future seemed bright, but events soon occurred which showed that local jealousies and party rivalries were stronger than the desire for peace.

The first outbreak of disorder occurred in July, 1839, in the old royalist stronghold of Pasto, when the populace objected to the government's closing four almost deserted monasteries. Soon after this was suppressed, General Obando, the unsuccessful presidential candidate, headed another revolt near Popayán. He too was defeated, but in the meantime several local *caudillos* in other sections started uprisings on their own account. While the bulk of the government's forces were in the south, revolutionists in the interior were prevented from taking Bogotá only by the heroic resistance of the city's inhabitants. Fighting continued all over the country for two years before the rebels were entirely defeated. A wise moderation in the treatment of the vanquished made the results of the war less appalling than they might otherwise have been, but many thousands of lives had been lost in battle and in a smallpox epidemic which swept through the country in the wake of the armies. Crops and live stock had been destroyed and commerce was at a standstill.

#### THE FIRST ERA OF CONSERVATIVE RULE

After the civil war of 1840-42 the dominant political group began to develop the characteristic policies of the conservative party. Under the leadership of General Pedro Alcántara Herrán, who was elected President in 1841 while he was still leading the army in the field, there was a marked reaction from the liberal political philosophy that had prevailed in the time of Santander. A new constitution adopted in 1843 strengthened the authority of the central government at the expense of individual and local liberties, and the freedom of the press was restricted. Closer relations were also established with the

Church. The Jesuits, excluded from the country since the royal edict of 1767, were invited to return, and the clergy were given a larger part in the educational system. In the schools such studies as Roman law and the humanities were substituted for subjects like constitutional law and parliamentary procedure, which were considered dangerous.<sup>1</sup> The changes were for the most part conceived and carried out by Dr. Mariano Ospina, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was the most influential of Herrán's advisers.

Herrán's successor was his old associate, General Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, who was the candidate of the more extreme conservatives, including the army and the Church. During Mosquera's term (1845-49) the liberal party began to recover from the effects of its defeat in 1842, and there was much political agitation in congress and in the press. The Jesuits especially were the target for violent partisan attacks. The hopes of the opposition were raised by the overthrow of the conservative regimes in Ecuador and Venezuela, and also by a split which developed in the government party at home as the time for new elections approached. As in Chile and Peru, public opinion was stirred by the French revolution of 1848, and many of the younger generation enthusiastically espoused the ideals of European radicalism. When the presidential election of 1849 took place, General José Hilario López received a substantial plurality, though not a majority, and the final choice, as usual, fell to Congress. In that body there was a small conservative majority, but violent popular demonstrations in and around the church where congress met so intimidated its members that López was elected after four ballots. The situation was well described by the President of the Chamber, who wrote on his ballot: "I vote for General José Hilario López so that the deputies may not be assassinated."

#### THE LIBERAL REACTION, 1849-1853

The liberal regime embarked on a series of radical reforms which did little to restore harmony. The Jesuits were expelled and a liberal majority in the Congress elected in 1850 adopted other anticlerical measures. When the ecclesiastical authorities protested, the Arch-

<sup>1</sup> Arboleda, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 93.

bishop and two bishops were sent into exile. A less controversial reform was the abolition of Negro slavery, with compensation to the former owners, in 1851. Though emancipation had been going on gradually since the Congress of Cúcuta provided that children born in bondage should be free after reaching the age of eighteen, there were still some 26,000 slaves in the country at the time of the census of 1843.

The government's program intensified the antagonism between the liberals and the clerical-conservative party, and the abolition of the death penalty for political offenses and the establishment of freedom of the press encouraged rather than discouraged disorder. Aroused to a new interest in public affairs by the events of 1848-49, younger elements in both parties organized political societies whose members often engaged in small revolts or sanguinary brawls. Some clubs degenerated into criminal gangs which made life and property unsafe in large sections of the country, and the President's failure to curb the excesses of his own partisans made matters worse. The conservatives revolted in several departments in 1851 but were easily defeated.

The liberals split into two factions before the end of López' administration. Their less radical leaders, including the President and his advisers, objected to provisions for freedom of religion and the press and for universal secret suffrage which the majority in Congress insisted on incorporating in a new constitution adopted in 1853. There was a bitter contest between the two groups in the election of the same year, in which the conservatives abstained from voting. The new President, the veteran *caudillo* José María Obando, was supported by the army and by the *democráticos*, a faction of the party which had many followers among the artisan class. He was opposed by the *gólgotas*, as the more aristocratic but at the same time more radical wing of the party was called. Since the latter controlled Congress, the strife between the two groups, intensified by class hatred, soon made Obando's position intolerable. In April, 1854, the troops at Bogotá seized control and offered to make him dictator, but he declined and a military government was set up under General Melo. This in turn was overthrown after a short but bloody struggle by a coalition of prominent men in both parties, inspired by the repug-

nance to dictatorship that has characterized the Colombians even in the most difficult periods of their history. A bipartisan government was established under Manuel María Mallarino to serve out the remainder of Obando's term, and in 1857 the conservative leader Mariano Ospina, who had received 96,000 votes in the popular election as against 82,000 for his liberal opponent and 32,000 for General Mosquera, became President.

#### THE ADVENT OF FEDERALISM

The wide-spread disorder from which the country had suffered since 1848 had in large part been owing to local jealousies and to the difficulty of administering a centralized government in a country where the various centers of population had such inadequate means of intercommunication. Many leaders in both parties had consequently begun to look on "federalism," an increase in local or regional self-government, as the only solution for the country's political ills. A long step in this direction had been taken in the constitution of 1853, which gave each of the thirty-five provinces the right to elect its own governor and to control its local affairs. Subsequent laws gradually grouped the provinces into states with still greater powers of self-rule, and a new constitution adopted in 1858 provided for a truly federal form of government. These changes did nothing to promote stability. There were continual revolts against the state governments and not infrequently wars between the various states, and the prestige of the central authorities diminished to a point where they were powerless to maintain order.

Matters did not improve under Ospina's administration, which was exclusively conservative in personnel and policy. The general removal of liberal office holders, the return of the Jesuits, and the rather ineffective efforts of the government to increase federal authority in the states, all caused a renewal of partisan agitation, and by 1859 local revolutionary movements had broken out in many parts of the country. Some of these were liberal and some conservative, for they were directed against the party that happened to be in power in each state rather than against the central authorities. In 1860 a country-wide civil war began. Ex-President Mosquera, now

governor of the state of Cauca, quarreled with the conservatives and joined forces with the liberals under General Obando, and the struggle continued until the end of 1862. Mosquera became the leader of the revolution after Obando's death. His army was finally victorious and among his first acts when he entered Bogotá were a series of harsh measures against the Church which showed, and perhaps were intended to show, how completely he had abandoned his former political associates.

#### THE RÍO NEGRO CONSTITUTION

Mosquera had long been known as a brilliant but erratic soldier, unscrupulous, ambitious, and often cruel. Many of the other leaders of the revolution distrusted him, and their fear that he might attempt to remain in power indefinitely colored all of the proceedings of the constituent assembly which met at Río Negro in 1863. He had many partisans among the delegates and it was not possible to prevent his election to the presidency, but his term was made to expire in the following year and it was provided that future presidents should be chosen for two-year periods and should not be eligible for immediate reelection. The desire to curb his authority, as well as the still strong sentiment for federalism, was evident in provisions that still further restricted the powers of the national executive and increased those of the states. The delegates sought to preclude the possibility of a reaction against the federal system by providing that amendments might be adopted only by unanimous vote of the states in the national senate.

Mosquera, with his personal following and his prestige in the army, continued to be powerful and was again elected to the presidency in 1866. In the following year, after a violent quarrel with Congress, he attempted to establish a dictatorship but was overthrown and sent into exile. Thereafter the control of the government was in the hands of the former *gólgotas*, who now called themselves "radicals."

The liberal party remained in power for twenty years after 1863 under the Río Negro constitution. Throughout this time the central government had little prestige or effective authority and it would serve no purpose to enumerate the presidents who were either chosen

legally for the short two-year term or installed provisionally for still shorter periods after successful revolutions. It was a period of continual disorder and at times of virtual anarchy. Civil wars on a national scale were infrequent because subversive movements generally had as their purpose the control of individual states, but more than forty local armed conflicts are said to have occurred during the two decades.<sup>1</sup>

#### COLOMBIAN LITERATURE IN THE FEDERAL PERIOD

Curiously enough it was during this same period, when political conditions were at their worst, that Colombia became one of the chief intellectual centers of South America. Literary pursuits had received little attention during the earlier years of the Republic, but there had been a revival of interest about 1843. Poets like Gregorio Gutiérrez González (1826-1872), José Eusebio Caro (1817-1853), José Joaquín Ortiz (1814-1892), and Julio Aboleda (1817-1862), helped to justify the *Bogotanos'* description of their city as "the Athens of America." Jorge Isaacs (1837-1895), the author of "María," was a famous novelist as well as a poet, and José Cuervo (1844-1911), who passed most of his life in Paris, was one of the greatest of Spanish philologists.

#### THE RISE OF RAFAEL NÚÑEZ

Even more than in other Latin American countries, political parties in Colombia have tended to split into hostile factions after attaining power, and the liberals of the Río Negro regime were no exception. At the time of the presidential election of 1876 there was a sharp contest between the radicals who dominated the administration and the independent liberals led by Rafael Núñez, in which the latter were defeated. The two factions temporarily patched up their differences to present a united front when the conservatives revolted later in the same year, but dissension broke out again after peace was restored. The independent group now attained the ascendancy.

<sup>1</sup> Henao y Arrubla, *Historia de Colombia*, p. 674.

Núñez was elected President for the term 1880-82, and was again elected in 1884. In that year he was supported not only by the independents but by the conservatives, and it was the latter who saved the government from defeat when the radicals rose against it in 1885. The President, who had at first attempted to govern with a cabinet representing all political groups, was compelled thenceforth to rely on his new allies for support, and the suppression of the revolt marked the beginning of a long period of conservative supremacy.

Núñez, a poet, a writer on public affairs, and a statesman of the first rank, dominated Colombian politics until his death in 1894. His policy was on the whole reactionary, for he believed that the abandonment of the unsuccessful experiment in federalism and the establishment of a strong centralized government were indispensable if Colombia was to achieve the economic progress which several of the more stable South American countries were already enjoying. He looked upon the influence of the Church as a powerful factor in preserving order, and consequently reverted to an extremely pro-clerical policy. His political ideas were embodied in the new constitution of 1886, which was drawn up by a "national council of delegates" after the Río Negro code had arbitrarily been set aside. The states became departments under governors appointed and removed by the president, and their separate codes of laws were replaced by national codes. The president was elected for six years instead of two, and was given greatly increased powers. The liberty of the press was restricted. The Church, though left free to manage its own internal affairs, was officially protected and given virtual control over the national school system.

Núñez was elected to the presidency in 1885, and again in 1892, but he actually occupied the office only for a few brief periods. At other times he lived in Cartagena, wielding a controlling influence in political affairs but leaving the work of administration to others. Carlos Holguín, a militant conservative, was the active head of the government from 1888 until 1892. He was succeeded by Miguel Caro, who was elected Vice-President in 1892 and continued as President after Núñez died.



CIVIL WAR AND TERRITORIAL DIS-  
MEMBERMENT, 1895-1903

The disappearance of the leader whose prestige had been its chief support was a blow to the conservative regime. Before the election of 1892 rivalries between the "historic conservatives" and the "nationalists," among whom were the former independent liberals, had badly split the dominant party. Núñez' influence had procured a victory for the latter, but the opposition liberals were encouraged to a new activity by the divisions among their opponents. The fear that this group would resort to arms led the government to close their newspapers and to exile or imprison many of their leaders. When they did revolt early in 1895 they were rapidly defeated by government forces under General Rafael Reyes, but the end of the war did not restore tranquility.

An agreement between the two conservative factions made possible the election of Manuel Sanclemente and José Manuel Marroquín as President and Vice-President in 1898. Sanclemente, who was an old man in bad health, at first permitted Marroquín to assume the presidency. The new chief executive made a real effort to diminish political tension and placate the opposition. "The evils which threaten Colombia, and which already afflict her," he said in his inaugural address, "are not much less serious than the consequences of a foreign invasion."<sup>1</sup> When he proposed a number of concrete reforms, including an improvement in electoral methods and a greater freedom for the press, the nationalists opposed them and prevailed upon Sanclemente to assume power himself. This revived the old feud within the party and weakened the administration, which further lost prestige when Sanclemente's illness compelled him to leave Bogotá for a lower altitude.

The liberals seized on the opportunity to revolt, and in 1899 the Republic was plunged into the longest and most sanguinary civil war in its history. After July, 1900, when the *históricos* removed Sanclemente by a *coup d'état* and installed Marroquín as President, the government gradually got the upper hand, but fighting continued throughout the country until 1902. It has been asserted that 100,000

<sup>1</sup> Henao y Arrubla, *op. cit.*, p. 754.

men were killed in battle,<sup>1</sup> to say nothing of the loss of life from other causes. The revolutionists finally admitted defeat and their leaders signed treaties of peace, but by this time the country's economic life was prostrated and the government was virtually bankrupt. The paper dollar, already depreciated before the war, was worth one cent in gold.

A year later Colombia suffered another calamity. The secession of Panama, to be discussed in more detail in Chapter XXI, was not only a material loss but a blow to the national pride. It intensified the revulsion inspired by the terrific consequences of the recent internal conflict, because thinking people realized that the recurrent civil wars, in which the Isthmus had always been a battle ground, had created the conditions which made foreign intervention there possible.

#### THE BEGINNING OF A NEW POLITICAL ERA

The loss of Panama, in fact, marked a turning point in the Republic's history. the beginning of an era of internal peace which has continued to the present day. As in other Latin American countries, the change was largely the result of economic developments. With the increasing importance of foreign trade, all classes felt the effects of civil war more than in the days when each region was relatively self-sufficient. There was a growing realization that the country was far behind many of its neighbors in commerce and transportation and in the development of its resources, and that there could be little improvement in these respects until foreign capital should be attracted by more stable political conditions.

Party rivalries by no means disappeared, but their bitterness was somewhat alleviated by new political practices adopted by the administration which came into power in 1904. In that year the nationalist conservatives defeated the *históricos* at an election in which the liberals took no part. The new President, General Rafael Reyes, had been absent from the country during the late war and had fewer enemies among the defeated party than most of his associates. He was thus in a position to attempt a policy of conciliation, and one

<sup>1</sup> Henao y Arrubla, *op. cit.*, p. 760.

of his first acts was to name two prominent liberals to his cabinet. When a number of conservative senators and deputies objected to these appointments, he dissolved congress and replaced it by a more amenable "national assembly" chosen by the departmental councils. This extra-legal body proceeded to adopt several important amendments to the constitution, among them a provision for proportional representation in congress and other elective bodies which assured the liberals an opportunity to share in the task of government. The minority was thus encouraged to contest elections instead of devoting its energies to preparing for revolt, and the electoral machinery, though still defective, was gradually improved as the public began to show more interest in exercising its right to vote.

Under Reyes' energetic leadership, the country recovered rapidly from the effects of the war. New roads and railways were built, especially in the highlands and between the plateau of Bogotá and the Magdalena River, and coffee production increased. The currency was reorganized and stabilized. An agreement for the resumption of service on the foreign debt restored the nation's credit and made it possible to obtain loans for public works. The new regime was more nearly a personal dictatorship than any government which Colombia has had, at least in modern times, but it was for some years accepted with comparatively little opposition by a people weary of disorder and civil strife.

The President nevertheless made enemies in both parties. Discontent increased after the National Assembly extended his term to December 31, 1914, and still more after he negotiated the tripartite treaties of 1909, by which Colombia agreed to recognize the independence of Panama in return for concessions from that country and from the United States. Ratification of these agreements was violently opposed and there were vociferous demands that they be submitted to a constitutional congress rather than to the hand-picked National Assembly. In the face of demonstrations in the capital, which showed that public opinion was strongly aroused, Reyes withdrew the treaties and consented to the election of a congress to meet in February, 1910. This concession hurt the government's prestige without placating its opponents, and in June, 1909, Reyes quietly left the

capital and resigned. Many of the laws that he had sponsored were declared void, but a constituent assembly which met in 1910 made permanent the arrangement for minority representation in congress.

#### THE CONSERVATIVE REGIME, 1910-1930

The same assembly elected Carlos Restrepo, a conservative, as President for the term 1910-14. Restrepo was the candidate of the *Unión Republicana*, the bipartisan coalition which had compassed the downfall of Reyes, but this broke up before 1914 and the conservatives again took control. The situation of the opposition party, however, was very different from what it had been a few years before. The liberals had a substantial representation in congress, and under Restrepo and his immediate successors, José Vicente Concha (1914-18) and Marco Fidel Suárez (1918-21), liberals served in the cabinet. There was thus some measure of cooperation between the two parties. At the same time there was more freedom of speech and of the press, and political persecution, at least by order of the higher authorities, was practically unknown. Elections began to approximate a real expression of the wishes of the citizenry, though complaints of high-handed or fraudulent practices in behalf of the official candidates by no means ceased.

Relations with the United States had been clouded since 1903 by the bitter feeling aroused by the Panama affair. The failure of the tripartite treaties of 1909 had if anything made the situation worse, but negotiations between the two governments had continued. A new treaty, in which the United States expressed "sincere regret" for what had happened and promised to pay an indemnity of \$25,000,000, was signed in 1914. Ratification was delayed for several years by opposition in the Senate at Washington to anything in the nature of an apology, and President Suárez, who was more friendly to the United States than his predecessors, finally consented to the elimination of the expression of regret and also rescinded a decree affecting American oil interests in Colombia which had been another obstacle to North American approval. Conservatives as well as liberals violently criticized these concessions, and the political situation became so tense that the President resigned in 1921 in favor

of General Jorge Holguín, the first *designado*. The treaties, without the expression of regret, were nevertheless ratified soon afterward.

The election of 1922 was a real contest, for the liberals, who had not usually presented presidential candidates, united in support of General Benjamín Herrera. They were defeated by 413,000 votes to 256,000, and General Pedro Nel Ospina, the conservative choice, was President from 1922 until 1926. His successor was Dr. Miguel Abadía Méndez. Under these two administrations the general prosperity which the country had enjoyed since the Reyes regime continued. Brazil's coffee valorization policy, by raising world prices, was a great boon to the producers of what was now Colombia's chief crop, and commerce and industry were further stimulated by the inflow of capital from abroad. The treaty indemnity from the United States was paid in annual installments of \$5,000,000 between 1922 and 1926, and much greater sums of new money were obtained by borrowing in New York. Not only the central government but also several departments and municipalities contracted foreign debts for public works and other purposes, and new road and railroad construction was begun in nearly every section of the country.

#### THE ELECTION OF 1930

The inflation that accompanied the spending of such great sums was followed by a collapse when the effects of the world depression began to be felt. Reaction had already set in when it became time to elect a new president in 1930. The conservative regime faced the same situation which caused the overthrow of several other Latin American governments in that year, and the party's chance of success was further diminished by internal feuds. Two factions supported rival candidates for the nomination, and the Archbishop of Bogotá, who usually had a controlling voice in the party's councils, wavered uncertainly between them.

The liberals decided at the last minute to take advantage of the situation. With the support of many conservatives, they nominated Enrique Olaya Herrera, who had served brilliantly as Minister at Washington during the past two administrations, and who now returned to Colombia for a short but effective campaign. Addressing

voters in all parts of the country in person or by radio, Dr. Olaya advocated a program of political and social reform which met with an enthusiastic response. He was elected by a large majority and the forty-five years of conservative rule ended.

#### THE LIBERAL ADMINISTRATIONS, 1930-

The orderly manner in which the liberals were permitted to take over the administration and the moderate policy which they pursued after their victory showed how completely political conditions in Colombia had changed. The constitution of 1886 and even the concordat with the papacy remained in force. There was no serious disturbance of public order, though the economic crisis grew increasingly acute during the first years of the new administration. The effects of the depression were aggravated in 1932 by heavy expenditures on military preparations occasioned by the Leticia controversy with Peru,<sup>1</sup> and the government was compelled to reduce payments on the foreign debt and to float large internal loans. Despite these difficulties, Olaya retained his personal popularity and, thanks in part at least to his able leadership, the country escaped the political vicissitudes that marked the depression period in some of the other republics.

Many conservatives held official positions under the Olaya government, but in 1934 their leaders decided to abstain altogether from the presidential election, in which they would obviously have little chance for success, and not even to take advantage of the constitutional provisions which would have assured them a number of seats in congress. The administration that came into power in that year was thus exclusively liberal and the new President, Alfonso López, had no political obligations to elements outside his own party. Abandoning Olaya's conciliatory policy, he put into effect some of the reforms that liberal leaders had long advocated. Constitutional amendments deprived the Church of its hitherto complete control over public instruction and opened the way to a larger measure of government control over foreign and native business enterprises, and negotiations were begun with the Holy See for changes in the concordat

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter XIV.

in order to make possible the institution of civil marriage, supervision of cemeteries by the government, and other reforms. Efforts were made to expand the public-school system and to provide for much needed public-health work, and 1,000 miles or more of new roads were built. A reform of the tax system, with much increased levies on business and private wealth, helped to provide funds.

Ex-President Olaya was to have been the liberal candidate to succeed López, but his sudden death in 1937 upset the plans of the party leaders and brought on a contest for control between the moderate and radical wings of the party. The latter apparently had the support of the President, but they were defeated in the congressional election of 1937. Eduardo Santos, a prominent newspaper man, became the liberal candidate and was elected without opposition in 1938, taking office as President in August of that year. In 1939 the conservatives decided to participate in the congressional elections for the first time in several years and obtained a substantial minority of the seats in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Their votes in congress were important because the continued division in the liberal party frequently gave them the balance of power.

As the presidential election of 1942 approached, the liberals split over the candidacy of ex-President López, who was opposed by President Santos and the more conservative wing of the party. López obtained a slim majority in a liberal convention held in August, 1941, and some of his more determined opponents nominated Carlos Arango Velez to oppose him. The conservatives also supported Arango, but López won the election, held on May 3, 1942, by a substantial majority.

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## Chapter XVIII

### VENEZUELA

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#### AFTER THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

In Venezuela the eastern chain of the Andes runs parallel to the Caribbean coast only a few miles from the sea. At the beginning of the nineteenth century most of the country's people, like their descendants today, lived in the pleasant valleys of this mountain region where the climate is temperate though not so cool as on the more elevated plateaus of Colombia. A large amount of coffee was produced in the highlands, and there were plantations of cacao and indigo on the lower slopes and in the hot coastal region around Lake Maracaibo. To the south was another region of some economic importance, the *llanos* or plains of the Orinoco valley, alternately parched by the sun or drenched by torrential rains, where half-savage *mestizo* cowboys tended herds belonging to creole families in the highlands. The great area beyond the Orinoco was unoccupied and almost unexplored.

There were probably some 700,000 people in Venezuela at the end of the war for independence. The upper class was composed of creole landowners who lived in one or another of the small isolated upland towns and left the management of their properties to overseers. Few were very wealthy. Among the lower classes the majority were of colored blood, for relatively few Indians had survived in those sections of the country that had been occupied by whites. The work on the farms, especially in the neighborhood of Caracas, was done by Negro slaves, who formed a substantial part of the total population despite the fact that gradual emancipation had been decreed in 1821. Though there had been a considerable commerce with the outside



world, the Venezuelan provinces had never been particularly prosperous. The Spanish authorities had so neglected internal improvements that there were no roads over which even an ox-cart could travel between the chief agricultural regions and the seaports, and travellers reported that there were no wheeled vehicles in the capital itself. There was a shortage of hands on the plantations because the free colored population, constantly augmented by the Spanish practice of liberating slaves as an act of piety, showed a marked aversion to agricultural labor. Intellectually, too, the Venezuelan settlements were relatively backward. Schools were few in number and poor in quality, and there had been no printing press in the country until Miranda brought one with his filibustering expedition of 1806.<sup>1</sup>

During the war for independence, Venezuela had probably suffered more than any other South American country. Twice freed and twice reconquered before the final patriot victory at Carabobo, the people of the highlands had experienced both the horrors of Bolívar's "war to the death" and the brutality of the Spanish reaction. In the *llanos* many years of guerrilla warfare had all but wiped out the cattle industry. A large proportion of the able-bodied men had been compelled to abandon agriculture and stock-raising to take part in the conflict, and several thousand of them had left the country to accompany Bolívar in his campaigns for the liberation of New Granada, Ecuador, and Peru. Many of these did not return at the end of the war, for Venezuelan leaders like Sucre, Flores, and Bolívar himself remained abroad as rulers of other South American countries, relying largely upon their Venezuelan troops for support.

In Venezuela itself the military caste, looking to the public treasury for support and insisting upon the maintenance of its special privileges, dominated the country's political life for many years after independence. Local *caudillos* in each district either exercised power as representatives of the central government or conspired to revolt against it. They were intolerant of civilian control and had little respect for any law save that of force. The parties that they headed were built around personalities and held together chiefly by a desire for office or a thirst for revenge for past persecutions. Questions of principle played a secondary rôle, though certain issues, like that of

<sup>1</sup> González Guzmán, *Historia de Venezuela*, Vol. II, p. 31.

federalism, were sometimes used as a means of winning popular support. Even the problem of Church and State, so productive of strife in Colombia, was of secondary importance in Venezuela because the Church had lost much of its prestige and authority by the end of the war for independence. Such conditions are peculiarly favorable to the growth of dictatorships, and the Republic was ruled throughout the first century of its history by a series of "strong men" who were able to impose their authority on the lesser *caudillos* and the civilian upper class.

#### P Á E Z

The first of these was the *llanero* general, José Antonio Páez, whom Bolívar had left in command of the military forces in Venezuela after the battle of Carabobo. A daring and brilliant soldier, with little education but a great capacity for leadership, Páez maintained his pre-eminence as much by his prestige and popularity as by force. From 1821 until 1829 he ruled Venezuela as Bolívar's lieutenant. His revolt in 1826<sup>1</sup> failed because the Liberator's influence was still too strong, but he came out of the affair with enhanced authority. He encouraged the separatist tendencies which became stronger as Bolívar's popularity declined, and in 1829, when the people of each locality were invited to express their opinion as to changes which should be made in the Colombian constitution, the majority of the towns in Venezuela declared for complete independence under his leadership. Early in 1830, Páez set up a provisional government and summoned a convention to draft a constitution. Secession was accomplished practically without bloodshed because the authorities at Bogotá had neither the power nor the inclination to resist, but there was a rather formidable though unsuccessful revolt in Venezuela itself early in 1831 under the leadership of General José Tadeo Monagas.

This revolt represented various elements of discord which continued to make trouble. One was the jealousy of Páez' military rivals, many of whom remained loyal to Bolívar and opposed the movement for secession. Another was the ever-present jealousy of the provincial towns toward Caracas which found expression in the demand

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 377.

for federalism—the slogan of many revolts in years to come. A third cause of dissension was the opposition of the clergy to the new constitution because it did away with some of the special privileges of the Church and contained no special provisions safeguarding the Catholic faith.

Páez' first term as constitutional President (1831–35) was nevertheless fairly peaceful. The country enjoyed something more like real republican government than it was to know for a century to come. Both congress and the press were relatively independent and elections were actively contested with but little official interference. Páez' successor, Dr. José Vargas, was less fortunate. Vargas was a civilian who had been supported by the richer landowners and merchants in an effort to diminish the power of the military caste, but he soon found himself unable to cope with the responsibilities that he had very unwillingly assumed. Within a few months he had been driven from office by an uprising in the army. Páez, who had retired quietly to his farm, hastily recruited a new force which restored the constitutional order, but the shooting or exiling of several of the rebel leaders left an aftermath of bitterness which boded ill for the future. The government's harsh policy was adopted against Páez' advice, and further friction finally compelled Vargas to resign in 1836. Thereafter, vice-presidents who were more amenable to Páez' influence exercised the executive power until 1839, when Páez himself again became President. He was succeeded in 1843 by his close associate, General Carlos Soublette.

There was by this time a rising opposition to Páez' long-continued predominance. In 1840, Antonio Leocadio Guzmán, formerly one of the *caudillo's* chief advisers, had organized the liberal party to avenge himself for the loss of his position in the government. Hard times helped him to build up a following, and he attracted support from various dissatisfied elements including especially the friends of the still exiled participants in the revolts of 1831 and 1835. Though overwhelmingly defeated in the election of 1842, the liberals became stronger during Soublette's term and the conservatives, or followers of Páez, won the vice-presidential election of 1844 and the presidential election of 1846–47 only by using force and fraud to an extent which had not formerly been necessary. The contest between the

two parties, though almost entirely a matter of personality rather than of principles, aroused a new interest in political affairs, and the landowning aristocracy, hitherto glad to follow Páez' leadership in the interests of peace, divided into hostile factions.

#### THE MONAGAS BROTHERS

In 1846, each party split its vote among several presidential candidates and the final decision, in the absence of a majority, went to Congress. The victor was General José Tadeo Monagas, the chief *caudillo* in the eastern provinces, whom Páez had supported in the final days of the campaign despite the fact that Monagas had once been his most formidable opponent. The new President soon showed that he had no intention of being a mere figurehead like his predecessor, General Soublette. After a few months of cooperation with Páez, he began to eliminate the conservatives from the cabinet and openly turned to the liberals for support. The Congress attempted to impeach him in 1848, but became more subservient after its meeting place was invaded by a mob which killed three of the deputies. Páez led the conservatives in two unsuccessful revolts, but was defeated and allowed to go into exile.

Monagas had his brother, José Gregorio Monagas, elected as President for the period 1851-55, despite opposition from both parties. Serious disturbances resulted, especially in 1853 and 1854, and it was in the hope of diverting attention from the political situation that the President forced through Congress in 1854 a law for the complete abolition of slavery with compensation to the owners. There were still some 13,000 slaves and 27,000 *manumisos*, or persons born of slave mothers and bound to serve their masters until the age of twenty-five. In the same year José Tadeo Monagas was elected to the presidency for a second term. The government had now become a real dictatorship, with elections a mere form and with increasing restrictions on the freedom of the press. In 1857, after making the necessary changes in the constitution, Monagas had himself elected for a new term of six years.

## CIVIL WAR AND FEDERALISM, 1858-1872

A year later the government was overthrown by a revolt of members of both parties. The titular leader, General Julián Castro, was one of Monagas' own military commanders who was promised the presidency because his aid was necessary to success. He had little real following, and his government lasted barely twelve months before the conservative leaders to whom he entrusted the control of the army arrested and imprisoned him. The liberals were already in revolt and until 1863 the two parties waged a bloody struggle for supremacy. The chief leader on the liberal side was General Juan C. Falcón, and the veteran Páez, despite much opposition within his own party, returned from exile to take command of the conservative army. In 1861 Páez proclaimed himself dictator, but a series of liberal victories forced him to agree to a treaty of peace in 1863 by which Falcón assumed the presidency. Páez again went to the United States and died there ten years later at the age of eighty-three.

The liberals at the beginning of the war had proclaimed their adherence to the principle of federalism. With their victory the states were permitted to set up autonomous governments and in 1864 a federal constitution was adopted. The result was as unfortunate as that of the similar experiment in Colombia. There were constant disorders within the states and quarrels between them, as well as less frequent uprisings against the central government. Falcón was popular in his own party and had many likeable qualities, but he was not an able administrator. An intense dislike of official life at Caracas led him to entrust the actual exercise of power to others during the greater part of his presidential term. Under these conditions the government's prestige steadily declined until the President was overthrown by another bipartisan revolt in 1868.

The leader of this "blue" revolution, so-called from the color that its army had adopted, was José Tadeo Monagas, who lived only a few months after its victory. After his death his son José Ruperto Monagas assumed the presidency and attempted to rule with support from the conservatives. The liberals, now called the "yellow" party, soon revolted. In April, 1870, after several months of fighting, they occupied Caracas. The war continued in other sections of the country

for two years more, but the "blues" were finally beaten. After fourteen years of almost continual strife the country was more than ready for a period of peace. It was to enjoy this for the next sixteen years under the rule of Antonio Guzmán Blanco.

#### GUZMÁN BLANCO

Guzmán Blanco, the son of Antonio Leocadio Guzmán, had been Falcón's ablest lieutenant in the five years' war. As acting president during two of the several periods when Falcón withdrew temporarily from office, he had shown marked capacity as an administrator. By 1870 he had become the leader of the liberal party. Within a short time after the "yellow" victory he built up a more absolute power than any former ruler of the Republic had enjoyed. The states, retaining their prerogatives on paper, were ruled in fact by puppets entirely subservient to his will, and all branches of the national government were controlled in the same way. Opposition, or even criticism, was sternly punished. At the same time roads and railroads were built, ports were improved, and the larger cities were modernized and beautified. No earlier ruler had done so much to promote material progress. None, on the other hand, had gone to such lengths of self-glorification. The President caused statues of himself to be erected everywhere, and it was indiscreet to make a speech or publish a book that did not render a tribute of adulation to "The Illustrious American, Regenerator of Venezuela." His administration was efficient, and the situation of the national treasury was far better than under his predecessors; but at the same time the dictator and his relatives accumulated great private fortunes. The country in general benefited from the establishment of peace and order and submitted to his firm rule for many years with relatively little evidence of discontent.

At the beginning of Guzmán Blanco's regime there was a new conflict with the Church. The Archbishop of Caracas had been expelled from the country in 1870 because he made difficulties about celebrating a Te Deum in honor of one of the "yellow" victories. In the years that followed the few remaining convents were closed, the seminary at Caracas was suppressed, civil marriage was authorized,

and the cemeteries were placed under lay control. On one occasion the dictator even threatened to establish a national church independent of Rome, but his attitude became less hostile after the offending archbishop resigned.

After seven years in office, first as provisional and then as constitutional president, Guzmán Blanco brought about the election of his friend Francisco Linares Alcántara as his successor. The dictator himself went to Europe, but Linares' death and a revolt that followed forced him to return and to resume control of the government. He was again President from 1879 until 1884. In 1881 he brought about the adoption of a new constitution, ostensibly modeled on that of Switzerland, that provided that the chief executive should be chosen for a two-year term and should not be eligible for reelection, and after 1884 he spent much of his time in Paris, sending his orders by mail and cable to lieutenants who successively occupied the presidency.

The great popularity which Guzmán Blanco enjoyed in 1870 had vanished by 1888, and Dr. Rojas Paúl, who was elected President by order of the dictator in that year, was enthusiastically supported by public opinion when he began to show an unexpected independence. Guzmán Blanco's wishes were flouted, first by the disapproval of concessions that he had granted in Paris and then by bringing to Venezuela the body of his old enemy, General Páez, for burial in the national pantheon. Other exiles were allowed to return and the press was permitted to discuss political questions. The authorities endeavored for a time to avoid an open break with the dictator, but the populace tumultuously prevented the celebration of his Saint's Day and the anniversaries of his victories, which had hitherto been national holidays, and in October, 1889, his numerous statues were destroyed by simultaneous mob action in all sections of the Republic. Thereafter Guzmán Blanco wisely remained abroad, though he made futile attempts to foment a counter-revolution.

CRESPO'S ADMINISTRATION AND THE  
GUIANA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

Rojas Paúl was succeeded in 1890 by Dr. Andueza Palacio, who was overthrown two years later by General Joaquín Crespo. The latter, a professional soldier from the *llanos*, gave the country a period of comparative peace from 1894 to 1898. His administration was notable chiefly for the sensational controversy over the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. The question was an old one, but it had recently taken on a new importance with the discovery of gold in the disputed territory. The British government had refused to arbitrate it unless a large area was recognized in advance as a part of the Guiana colony. The United States government had intervened in this discussion because it considered that any European occupation of territory legally belonging to Venezuela would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and in July, 1895, Secretary of State Olney demanded an arbitration in a note to the British government which contained his famous statement that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its inter-position." When the British government made a tardy and unsatisfactory reply, President Cleveland proposed to Congress the appointment of a commission to investigate the dispute. He indicated that the United States, after thus satisfying itself as to the rightful boundary, would forcibly resist the occupation by a European power of territory belonging to Venezuela. This arrogant stand might have brought the United States and Great Britain very close to war, but the government at London was preoccupied with more important problems elsewhere and soon agreed to an arbitration with Venezuela. An award handed down in 1899 decided the controversy without granting the extreme demands of either party.

CIPRIANO CASTRO

Crespo peacefully turned over his office to General Ignacio Andrade in 1898, but was killed soon afterward leading the government forces against one of several revolutions which again plunged the country into anarchy. Even when an agreement between the various



military leaders placed General Cipriano Castro in the presidency in 1899, new revolts occurred and it was not until 1903 that something approaching order was established. Castro, an unscrupulous and greedy politician, supported chiefly by the army and by associates who profited from his corrupt financial practices, remained in power as dictator until 1908.

Castro is best remembered for his offensive treatment of foreign powers, which again involved the United States in international complications. Controversies with other nations over debts and claims had embarrassed the Venezuelan government since the days of Páez, and the recent civil wars had caused new injuries to foreign life and property for which Castro arrogantly refused to make compensation. At the end of 1902, therefore, British, German, and Italian naval forces blockaded the Venezuelan coast, seized four gunboats, and bombarded Puerto Cabello. Since the governments concerned had previously assured the United States that no seizure of territory was contemplated, President Roosevelt did not consider it proper to object to their action, but he exerted his good offices to persuade all concerned to agree to an arbitration of claims and the blockade was raised early in 1903. The incident had an important influence, as we shall see later, upon the general Caribbean policy of the United States. Apparently it had less effect on Castro, for new violations of foreign rights kept his administration in hot water in later years.

#### JUAN VICENTE GÓMEZ

Castro's chief aid was Juan Vicente Gómez, who had been one of the ablest military leaders in the civil wars between 1899 and 1903, and had continued to be powerful despite Castro's growing jealousy. Late in 1908, when the President was compelled to go abroad for medical treatment, Gómez was left in charge. He at once made himself master of the situation and the ex-President was defeated when he attempted to return at the head of a filibustering expedition.

During the next twenty-seven years Gómez ruled Venezuela with a heavy hand. He was not president continuously, but he retained command of the army and with it a complete control of the government during the periods when he allowed straw men like Dr. Márquez

Bustillos, from 1914 to 1922, and Dr. Juan Bautista Pérez, from 1929 to 1931, to exercise the executive power. He also dominated the governments of the states, finally amending the constitution so as to give himself the right to appoint their presidents by decree. The methods by which his authority was maintained were those characteristic of tropical American dictatorships. Opponents were treated with severity and often, it is said, with fiendish cruelty. The press was compelled to praise the ruler and his policies, and an elaborate spy system made criticism dangerous. The army, well trained and equipped with modern weapons, prevented resistance by a people who were entirely deprived of firearms. All traces of the old political parties disappeared and revolutionary movements, after the first years, were few and unimportant.

Gómez came from humble stock and had little or no education, but his energy and acumen had made him a prosperous cattle man before his entry into politics. As dictator he showed himself a keen judge of men, and he was able to obtain the cooperation of many of the country's best minds. His administration was consequently fairly efficient and progressive, though lawless and corrupt. Roads were improved, something was done for education, and agriculture was aided by the removal of export taxes and other governmental measures. His handling of the finances, which had been the weakest point of earlier governments, was especially successful. In 1930 the foreign debt was entirely paid off. At the same time, the dictator and many of his relatives grew rich at the expense of the nation.

The prosperity which made these achievements possible resulted only in part from the establishment of peace. High prices for Venezuelan products during the first World War and the amazing growth of the oil industry in subsequent years had helped to increase private wealth and governmental revenues. Petroleum exports, in fact, have made Venezuela for the first time an important factor in the world's economy. The rich deposits around Lake Maracaibo, the chief center of production, began to be exploited immediately after the war, first by Anglo-Dutch and later also by North American companies. Within ten years they had become one of the greatest sources of the world's supply. Other fields in eastern Venezuela have been developed more recently, and today the Republic's production is exceeded only

by the United States and Russia. The rapid increase in the government's revenues and the increased opportunity for labor at relatively high wages both have tended, for the time being, to make for political stability.

#### RECENT GOVERNMENTS

When Gómez died, at the age of eighty, in December, 1935, the cabinet chose General Eleázar López Contreras, the Minister of War, as Provisional President. The new administration, to the surprise of many observers, was able to survive the violent popular reaction that followed the removal of the dictator's iron control. Much of the property of Gómez and his relatives was destroyed or looted by mobs, and sanguinary riots occurred in Caracas, but the removal of several high officials hated for their connection with the Gómez regime prevented more serious outbreaks. The army supported the new order, as did also many influential groups which were primarily interested in the maintenance of peace. The more arbitrary features of Gómez' rule were done away with, and free elections for a new congress promised. Meanwhile the old Congress, hand-picked under the former government, had chosen General López Contreras as constitutional President.

Radical groups gave the new administration some trouble and achieved an unexpected success in the elections for the partial renovation of the congress in 1937. There were a number of strikes and other disturbances during the same year, but these grew less frequent after the government arrested and deported a number of alleged communist leaders. In the election of 1941 the party in power obtained a large majority in the congress. López Contreras, who had decided not to be a candidate to succeed himself or even to take advantage of a suggested interpretation of the constitution that would have prolonged his term by two years, was succeeded in 1941 by General Isaías Medina, a veteran soldier who had until recently been Minister of War.

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## Chapter XIX

MEXICO: 1821-1910

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### NEW SPAIN AT THE END OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD

At the outbreak of the revolution, the Viceroyalty of New Spain was the most important of the American colonies. Its population of six millions was greater than that of New Granada and Peru put together, and had only recently been surpassed by that of the rapidly growing United States. Mexico City, with about 135,000 inhabitants, was probably the largest city of the western world, with public institutions such as the School of Mines, the Academy of Fine Arts, and the Botanical Garden, which had no peers in North or South America. It had always been one of the chief intellectual centers of the continent, and there had been an especially active interest in literature and art and science since the latter part of the eighteenth century. Nowhere else in America was there so much wealth and luxury. The country produced two-thirds of the world's silver, and many great fortunes had been made from mining. Agriculture also flourished, though farm products were raised almost entirely for local consumption.

The chief beneficiaries of this prosperity were the upper class of Spanish descent who comprised hardly more than 15 per cent of the total population. As in other parts of Spanish America, it was they who owned the mines and the best lands. There was an even greater contrast between the condition of the rich and the poor than in most of the other colonies. The *mestizos*, mostly artisans or day-laborers, were set apart from the white aristocracy by caste prejudices and legal disabilities, and the Indians, who probably outnumbered both

of the other groups, were oppressed and exploited by landowners, priests, and officials. The Indians, it is true, were not so badly off as those in the mining regions of South America, for the destructive *mita*, still practiced in Peru, had disappeared in New Spain with the growth of colonies of free laborers around the mines. Their wages, in fact, seem to have compared favorably with those in many parts of Europe, and the great traveller Von Humboldt thought that their situation was on the whole preferable to that of the serfs in Russia and Northern Germany.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless they were still in a state of tutelage, living in separate villages under the often despotic government of officials of their own race, and legally incapable of signing contracts or contracting debts of more than three dollars. Speaking their native dialects and clinging to many of their ancient customs and points of view, the Indians were to have little participation in the country's political life during the first century of independence.

#### SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Mexico thus resembled in many ways the republics of the Central Andes. Its history might have been very similar to theirs had it not been for two factors. The first was the greater influence of the Church and the conservative creole aristocracy, which shared power with the army during the first half century of independence and struggled desperately to maintain their predominance; and the second was the stimulus given to liberal ideas by closer contact with the outside world. These factors helped to produce a long-drawn-out conflict which was something more than a mere struggle for power between rival *caudillos*, and Mexico's civil wars, which were fought over issues of fundamental importance, have a historical significance which is lacking in the confused story of revolts and counter-revolts in some of the other countries.

Separation from Spain had less immediate effect on the power of the Church and the aristocracy in Mexico because it was the Church and aristocracy who actually brought about the country's inde-

<sup>1</sup> Von Humboldt, *Political Essay on New Spain* (New York edition, 1811), Vol. I, p. 134.

pendence. We saw in Chapter VII how the clergy and the conservatives turned against the mother country when the Cortes in Spain adopted reforms that threatened their position in the colonial social system, and how they worked through the young *mestizo* officer Agustín Iturbide to achieve their purposes. For the time being the groups that had been defeated in the war for independence elsewhere in Latin America controlled political affairs in Mexico. Even the peninsular Spaniards, though they had to give up their monopoly of official positions, retained much of their wealth and influence. Many of the *peninsulares* were expelled from the country a little later, but the other privileged classes and especially the clergy played an important part in political affairs during the first half century of independence.

The Church commanded the blind obedience of the lower classes, especially in the towns and cities, and the devotion of a large part of the upper class. The priests were still the intellectual leaders of the community and all education was in their hands. The wealth of the Church gave it a great economic influence. It owned a large amount of land and controlled much more through mortgages, for it had always been the principal banker of the colonies. Separation from Spain in some ways increased its importance. Since it refused to admit that the new American states had inherited the right of patronage, it was no longer amenable to political control. At the same time it jealously maintained its *fueros* or special privileges—its exemption from taxes and the right to have its own courts. It was supported by other groups which had had a favored position under the colonial regime, such as the principal merchants of Mexico City, both Spanish and creole, and the owners of the great entailed estates—groups which looked to the Church as a powerful ally in their struggle to maintain their own social and political preeminence.

On the other side were the same elements that formed the liberal party in other Latin American countries: intellectuals of the upper class who advocated liberal ideas for their own sake; middle-class professional men and small merchants, often of *mestizo* origin; and leaders in other parts of the country who felt that the provinces were being exploited commercially and politically by powerful groups in Mexico City and who were eager to obtain more control over their own







local affairs. At first federalism against centralization was the chief political issue, as it was in so many of the other Spanish American countries during the 1820's. Later, when the federalists and liberals found that the Church was their most formidable opponent, they centered their efforts on destroying that organization's political influence.

#### THE ARMY

The struggle between these political groups is the central theme of Mexico's history, but neither of them ever really controlled the government for any length of time. Conflicts between them have always been decided by the intervention of professional soldiers who were in most cases more interested in obtaining power and the emoluments of office for themselves than in questions of principle. Almost every president of the Republic has been a general.

In the first years of independence the military forces had deteriorated in discipline and efficiency, but they were still better organized than any other group which aspired to power. The officers were for the most part men who had been trained under the Spanish regime, who had participated in the sudden change of front which had made independence possible, and who now helped to set up and then overthrow the imperial government of Iturbide. Conscious of their power, many of them were disposed to seek advancement and personal profit through further adventures of the same sort. Many of them had little interest in the social and political issues that divided the civilian community, but they were always ready to espouse the cause of one party or the other in order to further their own personal ambitions and they were courted and catered to by the civilian leaders. The army, to quote an American diplomat, became "the greatest nuisance, and the most insuperable barrier to the prosperity and progress of Mexico."<sup>1</sup> It consumed an inordinate proportion of the public revenue, despite the fact that the common soldiers—unfortunate Indians recruited by force—received but a small part of their nominal pay; and its *fuero*, or exemption from the jurisdiction of the civil courts, gave its members a privileged position which was frequently abused.

<sup>1</sup> W. Thompson, *Recollections of Mexico*, p. 168.

## THE RISE AND FALL OF ITURBIDE

The army and most of the civilian political groups worked together in the last stage of the movement for independence. Both the conservative supporters of Iturbide and the hitherto unsuccessful revolutionists under Guerrero had agreed on the "Three Guarantees" of the Plan of Iguala: the defense of the Church and its privileges, the maintenance of Mexican independence, and the establishment of racial equality. Though many of the revolutionists were republicans, they had acquiesced in the plan for a constitutional monarchy under a Bourbon prince, which appealed to the conservatives as the surest means of maintaining the integrity of the old regime. By the treaty of Córdoba, signed August 24, 1821, the Viceroy O'Donojú had consented to this arrangement, but it had been agreed that another person might be made emperor of Mexico if no Spanish prince were available. A regency headed by Iturbide and composed chiefly of conservatives assumed charge of the government pending the choice of the new monarch.

When the Cortes in Spain rejected the Treaty of Córdoba and the hope of obtaining a Bourbon prince vanished, it soon became clear that Iturbide had designs on the throne himself. The majority of the constituent assembly, which met in February, 1822, opposed his ambition, for a number of the delegates were republicans and many conservatives who had desired a Bourbon monarchy had no desire to be ruled by a man whom they distrusted and disliked as a social inferior. On the other hand Iturbide had the army behind him and also a great following among the people of Mexico City, and in May a street demonstration by the soldiers and populace, accompanied by forceful measures against some of the more recalcitrant deputies, forced the reluctant assembly to elect him as Emperor.

Agustín I held his throne only a few months. The assembly, which had been intimidated but not cowed, continued to oppose him and in October, 1822, he dissolved it. By this time he had lost much of his popularity even among the soldiers. When Antonio López de Santa Anna raised the standard of revolt at Vera Cruz in December, he was joined not only by many of the old revolutionary leaders like Victoria, Guerrero, and Bravo, but also by a large part of the army.

The Emperor was unable to resist, and abdicated on February 19, 1823. He was permitted to go into exile, but when he attempted to return to Mexico seventeen months later he was captured and shot.

#### THE INAUGURATION OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

The assembly, which had been reconvened by Iturbide in a last-minute effort at conciliation, appointed a triumvirate to exercise the executive power and ordered that a new congress be chosen to formulate a republican constitution. In the election there was a spirited contest between the advocates and the opponents of federalism. The federalists won a majority of the seats, and the new constitution which was proclaimed in October, 1824, provided for a government very similar to that of the United States. On October 10 Guadeloupe Victoria was inaugurated as first President of the Republic and Nicolás Bravo as Vice-President.

The new chief executive, whose real name was Manuel Félix Fernández, had assumed the somewhat fantastic pseudonym by which he is known in history during the war for independence. He had been one of the heroes of the struggle during the dark days before the Plan of Iguala. Extremely popular, honest, and tolerant, though not of outstanding ability, he assumed office under favorable auspices, with a cabinet in which both federalists and centralists were represented. He had, however, to contend with the fundamental divergence of views between the various political factions and the selfish personal ambitions of their leaders. At the beginning of his administration the central government had little authority in the states and rival factions frequently waged civil wars which endangered the stability of the national regime. Commerce and mining had suffered much during the long years of disorder since 1810, and the government's finances were in bad shape. Silver production was only about a quarter of what it had been at the beginning of the century, but it increased somewhat when British interests took over many of the mines during the outburst of enthusiasm for speculation which brought so much new capital into other Spanish American countries after 1825. Matters gradually improved, and Victoria's administration on the whole was

more tranquil than any which Mexico was to have for many years to come. One of its important achievements was the expulsion in November, 1825, of the Spanish garrison which still held the Castle of San Juan de Ulua at Vera Cruz

#### ESCOCESSES AND YORQUINOS

Though the conflicts between monarchists and republicans and between centralists and federalists had left the upper class divided into several hostile factions, there were as yet no well-organized parties. The most active political groups during Victoria's administration were the rival masonic lodges. The Scottish rite masons, or *escoceses*, had probably been established in Mexico as early as 1806 and had received many recruits from the officers of the Spanish forces sent to combat the revolutionists in 1811.<sup>1</sup> They had been prominent in the movement to oust Iturbide. Many of them were centralists in the election of 1823, and the federalists consequently organized the York rite, or *yorquino* lodges, in 1825. In this action they were encouraged and advised by the first American minister to Mexico, the active but not always judicious Joel Poinsett, whose dislike of the rather conservative *escoceses* was intensified by a belief that they were under the influence of his rival the British minister.

Since President Victoria and many of his collaborators were members of the new organization, the older Scottish rite lodges became the center of the conservative opposition, which grew stronger as Victoria's first effort to govern with the aid of all parties proved a failure. Poinsett was violently criticised for his interference in the country's internal politics, and when the conservatives revolted under Vice-President Bravo in 1828 one of their demands was the expulsion of the American minister. The revolt failed, however, and many of the *escoces* leaders were exiled. This destroyed the influence of the Scottish rite lodges, and the *yorquinos*, split into hostile factions, also ceased to be an important political force a year or two later.

<sup>1</sup> Calcott, *Church and State in Mexico*, p. 37.

THE ELECTION OF 1828 AND THE  
REVOLUTION OF 1829

The *yorquinos* split on the question of the presidential succession. Victoria's candidate, Gómez Pedraza, was supported by one faction and by many of the *escoceses*. Vicente Guerrero, who was the grand master of the York rite lodges, was backed by the more radical element, including Poinsett. The hero of the revolution had a great popular following, and there were loud complaints of fraud and official interference when the electoral votes, cast by the state legislatures, gave Gómez Pedraza a small majority. The defeated party promptly obtained the support of Santa Anna and other military leaders in a revolt that gave them control of the government early in 1829. The Republic's electoral machinery had broken down in its first important test, and political parties in Mexico were thenceforth to rely upon force rather than upon the will of the voters as the surest means to attain and hold power.

## SANTA ANNA

The revolt of 1828 again brought into prominence the military leader who was to dominate Mexican politics during the next twenty-five years. Antonio López de Santa Anna, as an officer in the Spanish army, had served with distinction against the revolution until the proclamation of the Plan of Iguala. Thereafter, as we have seen, he had helped to overthrow Iturbide. Crafty and unscrupulous, with few convictions and little administrative ability, he derived his influence from a popularity among the troops which survived misfortunes that would completely have discredited another leader. He enjoyed power, but not the responsibility of exercising it, and he often permitted others to assume the presidency while he retained military control. His political views were flexible. In his earlier years he was usually on the side of the liberals, but he later became the champion of the conservatives and helped to maintain the supremacy of the aristocracy and the Church, when that course seemed more likely to forward his own ambitions.

Santa Anna was responsible for a series of revolts which brought

the country to a condition approaching anarchy in the years following 1829. He soon turned against Guerrero, who proved weak and incompetent, and whose mixed blood and radical views made him disliked by the aristocracy and the Church. The President was compelled to abandon the capital, after some fighting, and the Vice-President, Anastasio Bustamante, took office early in 1830 with conservative support. Guerrero attempted to continue the struggle but was treacherously captured and executed—an act which aroused indignation among the liberals and helped to bring on a new revolt in 1832. Again Santa Anna was the leader, this time supporting Gómez Pedraza, who still claimed that he had been elected as constitutional president in 1828. The latter was installed in office for the few remaining months of the four-year term, and for the new period, starting in 1833, Santa Anna himself was elected, with a liberal vice-president and an overwhelmingly liberal congress.

#### THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST LIBERAL REFORM, 1833-1834

By this time there was a clear-cut division between the two political parties that were to wage a bitter struggle during the next forty years. The conservatives, or centralists, who had been divided and disorganized after the failure of the effort to establish a monarchy, had become more aggressive since 1828, and the Church had also increased its political activity. The Church's power had decreased temporarily after the fall of Iturbide, because disputes over the right of patronage made it impossible to fill the places of the Spanish bishops who left the country or died; but after 1831 Bustamante had made concessions which permitted the filling of the vacant sees and the clergy regained much lost ground. Their growing influence alarmed the liberals or federalists and when the latter came into power in 1833 an attack on the ecclesiastical power was inevitable.

The ardent liberal leader Valentín Gómez Farías was acting President for long periods in the first year of the new administration, while Santa Anna either led the troops against revolting conservatives or enjoyed life at his country estate, and it was during these periods that a series of anti-clerical laws were enacted by the Congress. Indian

missions and their property were brought under government control, the Church was deprived of its monopoly over education; the government ceased to use its authority to compel the payment of tithes or the fulfillment of monastic vows, and the right to exercise the *patronato* was reasserted. Each of these measures was violently opposed by the clergy and the conservatives, who revolted in the summer of 1833 but were defeated after several months of fighting. Santa Anna supported the constitutional regime at this time, but when it became apparent that the liberals had lost the support of public opinion by going too fast and too far he threw in his lot with the forces of reaction. Resuming the presidency in April, 1834, he dissolved the Congress, removed liberal state governors, and arbitrarily abrogated many of the recently enacted laws. Gómez Farías was removed from the vice-presidency and forced to flee the country.

## INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICTS,

1835-1841

A new congress, dominated by the conservatives, met in 1835. The federal form of government was abolished and the constitution of 1824 was replaced by the so-called "Seven Laws" of 1836. These provided that the next president should be elected for an eight-year term, but hedged him about with restrictions which indicated the civilian politicians' distrust of Santa Anna, among them being a provision for a "*poder conservador*" to maintain the equilibrium between the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. The new fundamental law seems to have been entirely satisfactory to no one; but even a much more workable form of government would hardly have received a fair trial in the midst of the internal and external difficulties that beset the Republic during the next few years.

The worst of these was the revolt in Texas. Before the end of the Spanish regime the viceroy had given Moses Austin permission to establish a colony of Roman Catholics in Texas. This grant had been confirmed by Iturbide, and later by the republican government, when Stephen Austin took up the enterprise after his father's death. Similar grants had been made later to other persons, and several thousand North Americans had settled in the region during the 1820's. Their

presence soon became a source of concern, especially in view of the United States government's openly expressed desire to acquire the territory. Efforts to check immigration and to bring the colonists under more effective control by Mexican authorities merely increased the tension between the newcomers and the government, and efforts to prevent Negro slavery, which had been abolished in Mexico by a decree issued by Guerrero in 1829, produced no result. The colonists were especially resentful when Texas was united with Coahuila as one state in 1830, and the continual party strife in the interior naturally tempted them to take matters into their own hands. The story of their revolt in 1835-36 is familiar to students of American history and need not be repeated here. The war ended so far as actual fighting was concerned when Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexican forces, was defeated and made prisoner at San Jacinto in April, 1836. His agreement to withdraw his troops and work for the recognition of Texan independence was repudiated by the government at Mexico City, but the latter was in no position to carry on further military operations.

General Barragán, and after his death Dr. José Justo Corro, had been acting President in Santa Anna's absence. The conservative regime was somewhat strengthened when Mexican independence was recognized in 1837 by Spain and by the Pope, but these diplomatic triumphs could not offset its loss of prestige in the war in Texas. Anastasio Bustamante, who was elected President in 1837, faced a discouraging situation. Internal disorders continued, and the government's finances were in a hopeless state. Complications with a foreign power soon made matters worse.

Many foreigners had been injured in one way or another during the continual strife of the past fifteen years. Their governments had insistently pressed demands for compensation, but with little result, and in 1838 France, becoming impatient, sent a fleet to Vera Cruz and summarily demanded payment of claims amounting to \$600,000. It will be remembered that the French government was at this same time endeavoring to restore its waning prestige at home by aggressive action against Rosas in the River Plate. When Bustamante rejected the demand, Vera Cruz was occupied and other ports were blockaded. This "Pastry War," so called because one of the French claims was



that of a baker whose shop had been sacked, was finally ended through British mediation, when Mexico agreed to pay the sum demanded.

Santa Anna commanded the Mexican forces in their unsuccessful resistance at Vera Cruz. He displayed little ability as a strategist, but a providential wound, which compelled the amputation of one leg, did much to restore his popularity with the army. It was not long before he was again plotting to resume power. For a time he supported Bustamante in suppressing the persistent revolts of the federalists, but in 1841, under the "Plan of Tacubaya" he again seized control of the government. He had by this time definitely aligned himself with the centralist party, and a new constituent assembly was promptly dissolved when it showed federalist tendencies. In its place a hand-picked assembly of notables drew up a new constitution, the *Bases Orgánicas* of 1843, which was no more liberal than the "Seven Laws" but which did away with some of their more impractical features. Santa Anna was elected President in 1844, but he continued, as on other occasions, to spend much time on his country estate while Valentín Canalizo, as acting President, struggled with federalist disaffection and a rising opposition in Congress. The government fell before the end of the year and José Joaquín Herrera was installed as Provisional President. He in turn was overthrown late in 1845 by General Mariano Paredes, who had revolted against Santa Anna in 1844 but now reappeared as the leader of a conservative reaction.

#### THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES

The ostensible purpose of Paredes' revolt was to set up a government that would take an aggressive stand in the impending conflict with the United States. Relations between the two countries, long clouded by Mexican suspicion of American territorial ambitions and made worse by blundering diplomacy and disputes over claims, had been especially strained since the revolt of Texas. Mexico had resented the recognition of Texan independence by the United States in 1837, and a number of unfortunate incidents had increased the hostile feeling on both sides. When Texas was annexed to the United States by joint resolution of Congress in March, 1845, a conflict be-

came all but inevitable, for the Mexican government had announced as early as 1843 that such an act would be regarded as a declaration of war. First Herrera and then Paredes refused to receive an American commissioner sent to attempt a peaceful settlement. In February, 1846, General Zachary Taylor was ordered to move into territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande which, the Mexicans claimed, had never formed a part of Texas. In April hostilities began. The untrained and poorly equipped Mexican troops were defeated in several battles, and before the end of 1846 Taylor occupied much of northern Mexico and other American forces took possession of New Mexico and California.

At the capital the government was weakened by the chronic lack of funds and by continued internal dissension. Paredes soon lost whatever popular support he once had, especially after his chief adviser, the centralist leader Lucas Alamán, openly advocated the establishment of a monarchy. This was an idea that many of the reactionary conservatives had never given up, but the proposal aroused the opposition of all of the republican elements. The controversy that ensued gave Santa Anna the opportunity for which he had been waiting. This time he sought the support of the federalists, though he worked chiefly, as always, through his friends in the army. In 1846 there were uprisings in his favor in different sections of the country, and in August General Salas "pronounced" for him at Mexico City and overthrew the Paredes regime. Santa Anna himself landed at Vera Cruz a few days later. He was allowed to pass through the American blockading squadron because President Polk was given to understand that he would accept American proposals for peace if he were allowed to resume power, but once in Mexico he took command of the army and prepared to resist the invaders. He was no more successful than his predecessor, and in February, 1847, he was defeated by Taylor in the important battle of Buena Vista near Saltillo.

Meanwhile his associates at Mexico City were making efforts to strengthen the national defense. In their desperate need for money they turned their attention to the Church, which had retained much of its wealth while the commercial stagnation and disorder of the past quarter century were causing most of the great private fortunes of an earlier period to dwindle away. In January, 1847, the Congress

authorized the government to raise \$15,000,000 by mortgaging or selling church property, an act which aroused a storm of opposition from the clergy and their supporters. Santa Anna, though elected to the presidency, had characteristically refrained from taking office in order that Gómez Farías, who was again Vice-President, might assume the responsibility for a policy certain to be dangerous politically, and when it became evident that public opinion would not support the government's action, he returned to Mexico City, compromised with the Church for a payment of \$2,000,000, and eliminated Gómez Farías by causing the office of vice-president to be abolished.

Since Taylor's victories in the north had not brought Mexico to terms, another American army under General Winfield Scott landed in March, 1847, at Vera Cruz. By September, after much fighting, it had occupied Mexico City, and on February 2, 1848, representatives of the two nations signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Texas, New Mexico, and California became a part of the United States, which paid \$15,000,000 by way of compensation. In July the American army was withdrawn.

#### POLITICAL EVENTS, 1848-1853

Santa Anna was compelled to relinquish his authority after the loss of Mexico City. First Manuel de la Peña, the president of the supreme court, then General Anaya, and then de la Peña again, occupied the presidency while peace negotiations were going on. In June, 1848, General José Joaquín Herrera became President by election, serving under the federalist constitution of 1824 which Santa Anna had re-established. A moderate liberal, supported by the influential elements that had advocated the conclusion of peace with the United States, Herrera earnestly endeavored to repair the damage wrought by the war. He had assumed office with great reluctance, for the difficulties which he faced seemed well-nigh insuperable. The finances, as usual, were in a bad state, and foreign claims continued to cause trouble. During the war the already weak prestige of the central government in the more remote sections of the country had still further diminished, and the wild Indians in several regions were committing depredations.

dations against towns and *haciendas*. A race war in Yucatan, where the Mayas took up arms against the officials and *hacendados* who had oppressed them since the Spanish conquest, caused heavy losses of life and property for several years. At the same time, both the extreme conservatives led by Paredes and the "*santanistas*" staged unsuccessful revolts. Nevertheless Herrera served out his legal term and passed on the presidency in 1851 to his constitutionally elected successor, General Mariano Arista.

Arista, without his predecessor's ability and prestige, was less fortunate. There were controversies in some of the states over the religious question, which Herrera had kept in the background, and there was much discontent in the army because the number of officers and men had been reduced to save money. Even the liberals gave the administration little support. Revolts and disorders gradually made its position untenable, and in January, 1853, Arista resigned.

#### SANTA ANNA'S LAST ADMINISTRATION AND THE REVOLUTION OF AYUTLA

A few weeks later Santa Anna returned from exile to assume the presidency. With conservative support, he set aside the constitution, dissolved the national congress and the state legislatures, and finally in December, 1853, proclaimed himself dictator for an indefinite term with power to name his own successor. This arrogant assumption of supreme power, climaxed by the unpopular sale to the United States of the Mesilla Valley, "The Gadsden Purchase," soon brought on a reaction. Early in 1854, General Juan Álvarez and Colonel Ignacio Comonfort started a revolt in the State of Guerrero under the Plan of Ayutla, appealing to the liberals for support. Indecisive fighting went on for more than a year until Santa Anna, deserted by many of his followers, decided to take refuge abroad. His flight permitted the insurgents to take over the government without much opposition and marked the end of his active influence in Mexican politics.

#### JUÁREZ AND THE LIBERAL REFORM

The revolution of Ayutla was the first event in a long, sanguinary struggle between the powerful classes which had hitherto dominated

Mexican political life and more democratic elements which now demanded a voice in the government. The great issue concerned the power and the privileges of the Church. These were still practically as great as at the time of independence, for even during the brief periods when the liberals were in control there had been little disposition, after Gómez Farías' one unfortunate experience in 1833-34, to push radical measures of reform. Nevertheless, the Church had been active in politics, partly because it continually had to defend its wealth against needy federal and state governments, and it had naturally been active on the conservative side. It had thus intensified the antagonism of the liberal leaders, who already saw in it the chief obstacle to the attainment of their ambitions.

The army, or at least the privileged caste of professional officers, was also a part of the system which the liberals now attacked. Military power, exercised primarily for the furtherance of its selfish personal ambitions, had clearly been an obstacle to the development of liberal institutions; and in recent years the army had generally, though not always, aligned itself with the conservative party. Since most of its leaders had supported Santa Anna, an administration coming into power on a wave of reaction against the dictator was certain to attempt to curb its privileges and diminish its capacity for mischief.

The intellectual leader of the liberal movement was the full-blooded Indian, Benito Juárez. Born of poor parents in a small Zapotec village near Oajaca, Juárez had entered the service of a white family in that city while still a child and had so aroused the interest of his employer that he was given unusual opportunities to obtain an education. Though at first destined for the priesthood, he had soon left the seminary to take up the study of law, and in 1829, at the age of twenty-three, he had entered local politics as a member of a *yorquino* lodge. From then on he had been an active liberal, first in his own state of Oajaca and then at Mexico City. As the representative of the middle-class element which was challenging the political preeminence of the old creole families, he was to be the chief figure in Mexico's political life during the next quarter century, as Santa Anna had been in the preceding period.

General Juan Álvarez, whom Juárez and his associates installed as Provisional President after the revolutionists entered Mexico City,

was a provincial *caudillo* with few qualifications for his position except honesty of purpose. He was opposed by many of the liberals as well as by the Church and the army, and in December, 1855, he turned over the presidency to Ignacio Comonfort, who was a more moderate liberal and who was considered more friendly to the army.

This change did not signify the abandonment of the liberal program of reform. By the *Ley Juárez*, promulgated in November, 1855, the government had already limited the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and military courts, thus attacking one of the most valued privileges of the Church and the army. In June, 1856, Congress enacted the *Ley Lerdo*, drafted by Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, which required the Church to sell all real estate not actually used for religious purposes to the persons who were renting or leasing it. Other reform measures were the *Ley Iglesias*, adopted in April, 1857, which deprived the Church of its control over cemeteries, and an act which compelled the clergy to perform services gratuitously for impoverished parishioners. Meanwhile the new constitution of 1857 had been drawn up, and the principles of the *Ley Juárez* and the *Ley Lerdo* had been incorporated in it, together with other provisions for which the liberals had contended: a federal form of government, manhood suffrage, and freedom of speech, of teaching, and of the press.

#### THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION AND THE WAR OF REFORM

The Church furiously opposed the whole reform program. Revolts inspired by the clergy at Puebla and elsewhere were suppressed but unrest continued. The Archbishop of Mexico excommunicated all persons taking oath to support the new constitution, and the Pope approved his stand. The liberal party itself was still divided and those who approved the new laws were probably a minority of the nation as a whole. A reaction was almost inevitable. The conservatives had their opportunity when Comonfort quarreled with the majority in the Congress. The President at first accepted the aid of a group of conservative army officers in abolishing the new constitution and assuming dictatorial powers, but was soon afterwards de-

served by his new friends and compelled to leave the country. Félix Zuloaga, the chief of the army, was installed as Provisional President early in 1858, while Juárez, claiming the presidency as Comonfort's constitutional successor, placed himself at the head of a liberal counter-revolt

For the next three years the "War of the Reform" deluged Mexico in blood. Juárez, defeated in the interior north and west of Mexico City, fled by way of the west coast and Panama to Vera Cruz, where he established his capital. Thenceforth the fortunes of war favored first one side and then the other. Zuloaga resigned late in 1858 and was replaced by the brilliant young General Miguel Miramón. After the inexcusable murder of a number of prisoners by the conservative General Márquez in 1859, captured officers were regularly executed by both sides. The bitterness between the two parties increased when Juárez issued decrees confiscating all ecclesiastical property except church buildings, suppressing monasteries, and instituting civil marriage in districts under liberal control. While the conservatives had the sympathy of several European powers, Juárez was supported by the United States, and an attack on Vera Cruz was frustrated in 1860 by the intervention of American warships. By the end of that year the conservatives had been decisively defeated and the liberals had taken possession of Mexico City. A few months later, after an election, Juárez took office as constitutional President. Unfortunately the liberal victory did not restore peace, for conservative leaders continued a guerrilla warfare in the interior.

#### THE FRENCH INTERVENTION

While the Juárez government was still struggling to establish order at home, a new danger appeared from abroad. Military requisitions, destruction of property, forced loans, and outrages against individuals during the long civil war had greatly increased the already large amount of foreign claims, and the treasury was in no position to meet these or even to maintain the service of the bonded debt. When the Congress voted to suspend all debt payments for two years, trouble with the creditor governments became inevitable; and on October 31, 1861, Great Britain, France, and Spain signed an agreement for a joint

intervention to obtain reparation for injuries to their citizens and to compel the fulfillment of Mexico's obligations. The United States was invited to participate but declined.

The three-power treaty ostensibly barred any interference in Mexico's internal political affairs, but it was evident from the first that at least two of the signatories had other purposes in mind than the mere protection of their citizens' financial interests. The Spanish government had openly supported the conservatives during the War of Reform and its ambassador had been summarily expelled from Mexico after the liberal victory. For three years Spain had been toying with the idea of restoring its control in some form over what had once been its richest colony. Napoleon III, on the other hand, had ambitions of his own. Encouraged by the Civil War in the United States, which made North American interference temporarily impossible, he had been intriguing with some of the Mexican conservatives to set up a foreign monarchy under French protection, and Maximilian of Hapsburg, the brother of Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, had already been chosen as its head. These two powers were thus working at cross purposes with each other and with Great Britain, which was interested solely in the collection of financial claims. Although British participation in the intervention was confined to naval action, both France and Spain sent considerable bodies of troops.

A Spanish fleet seized Vera Cruz in December, 1861, and French and British forces arrived soon afterward. Juárez, though making preparations to resist, entered into negotiations for a peaceful settlement and agreed that the allied forces might march inland from the fever-infested coast while the discussions continued. In the ensuing conferences, the French commissioner took a position that made any peaceful settlement impossible. His most indefensible demand, perhaps, was for full payment of the Jecker claim, based on a \$16,800,000 bond issue agreed to by Miramón shortly before his government collapsed. Only a small portion of the proceeds of the loan had ever been paid over by the underwriters, and the French action in espousing the claim was the more scandalous because Jecker himself was a Swiss citizen at the time the loan was made and had only recently acquired French nationality under highly suspicious circumstances. The British and Spanish representatives were unwilling to support



such a demand, and their increasing realization of the divergence of views between the three allies led them to withdraw with their forces, leaving France to continue the intervention alone.

Napoleon's real purpose now became evident. General Juan Almonte, who had been one of the leaders of the group that had sought foreign intervention, was permitted to proclaim himself President of the Republic under the protection of the French troops, and the latter marched inland toward Mexico City, despite their earlier promise to withdraw to the coast if negotiations failed. At Puebla, however, they were defeated with heavy losses by a Mexican army under General Zaragoza, in a battle which made May 5 one of the great anniversaries in Mexican history. The invaders' advance was held up for nearly a year—a delay which in the long run proved fatal to their designs.

Resistance became more difficult after General Forey arrived with thirty thousand fresh troops. Puebla fell after a long siege in May, 1863, and Juárez was compelled to abandon Mexico City, which was occupied by the French in June. A *Junta Superior de Gobierno*, named by the invaders, convoked an "Assembly of Notables" which voted on July 8 to establish an hereditary monarchy and to offer the crown to Maximilian or to some other Catholic prince proposed by Napoleon III. In the meantime a regency headed by Almonte nominally assumed the executive power, though those parts of the country occupied by the invaders were in reality under French military rule. Active operations were carried on against the liberals, and Juárez was forced to withdraw from San Luis Potosí, where he had first established his capital, to Saltillo. Much of the country, however, remained under the control of the republican forces, and even the conservatives were by no means united in their acceptance of the foreign invasion.

#### THE SECOND EMPIRE UNDER MAXIMILIAN

After insisting that the invitation of the Assembly of Notables be ratified by a plebiscite, which of course was a mere farce, Maximilian formally accepted the throne on April 10, 1864. At the same time he signed a convention with Napoleon by which the latter promised

military support during the first years of the new regime, to be paid for by the Mexican treasury, and obtained a loan on exorbitant terms with the aid of English bankers. Encouraged by these arrangements, he and his wife, the Belgian princess Carlota, entered Mexico City on June 12, 1864.

The new Emperor, still in his thirty-second year, was an affable, well-educated prince, who had served as Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian navy and as Governor-General of Lombardy-Venice. In the latter post he had shown a mildly liberal disposition which enhanced his prestige in Europe but made him less rather than better fitted for the all but impossible task which he was now undertaking. In Mexico the more extreme conservatives were already discontented because the French authorities had refused to restore ecclesiastical properties sold under the *Ley Lerdo*, and their enthusiasm for the new monarchy cooled when Maximilian not only refused to restore the Church to the position which it had held before the revolution of Ayutla but attempted to establish a free press and to obtain liberal support by an offer of amnesty. Many of their leaders were also jealous of the continued dominance of French officers in military affairs, and the situation was not improved by the organization of a new imperial force of Austrian and Belgian volunteers. The liberals, on the other hand, showed little interest in Maximilian's efforts to conciliate them, even though some prominent members of the party, to the disgust of their opponents, were given important posts in the new government. Their resistance stiffened when Maximilian changed his policy and ordered that those who opposed the government should be treated as bandits, so that internal strife continued with all the savagery which had marked the war of the reform. It was not long before the imperial regime rested almost entirely upon the support of the French troops and its authority was respected only in those sections of the country which the foreign forces had occupied.

For a time the French armies were generally successful. Juárez was gradually forced back until he was compelled to establish his capital at El Paso on the Texas frontier, and Porfirio Díaz, who had held most of the country south of the capital, surrendered unconditionally at Oajaca in February, 1865. By this time, however, the Civil War in the United States, which had compelled that country to maintain an out-

ward neutrality, was approaching its end, and the government at Washington made it clear that it would not permit the French protectorate to continue. Confronted by the threat of American intervention, Napoleon III decided early in 1866 to withdraw his troops from the adventure within the next two years. Thenceforth the defense of the imperial interests was left more and more to Mexican troops, and the tide of battle turned in favor of the liberals. Maximilian's pleas for continued French aid fell on deaf ears. He was disposed to abdicate, but the extreme conservatives persuaded him to make a final stand with their support and in February, 1867, he went to Querétaro at the head of his army. He was soon besieged there by overwhelming superior liberal forces, but he resisted until the city was taken through the treachery of some of his followers on May 14. A month later he was condemned to death by court-martial. Despite the remonstrances of foreign diplomatic representatives, who vainly urged Juárez to commute the sentence, he was shot with the conservative generals Miramón and Márquez on June 19.

#### THE LIBERALS IN POWER, 1867-1877

The liberal party had won a decisive victory after thirteen years of almost continuous and unprecedentedly savage civil war. The conservatives were not only defeated, but discredited by their connection with the hated foreign intervention. Juárez, who had continued to claim the presidency though his legal term had long since expired, was the hero of the hour, and he was elected for a new four-year term in 1867. The reforms for which he had fought seemed now to be securely established, and he endeavored, with only moderate success, to revive commerce and restore tranquility. The country was by no means at peace, for guerrilla bands were still operating in out of the way sections and rival leaders were fighting for control in several states, but Juárez' own position was not seriously challenged until he again brought about his election as President in 1871.

The principal opposition to Juárez' continuance in power came from Porfirio Díaz, who had escaped from prison after his surrender to the French and had played a distinguished part in the events of the closing months of the war. Díaz had been a candidate for the presi-

dency in 1867, and when he was again unsuccessful in 1871 he led a revolt. He was defeated, but many of his partisans were still under arms when Juárez died suddenly on July 18, 1872, and was succeeded in accord with the constitution by Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, the President of the Supreme Court, who had also been a candidate in the recent election. Díaz accepted the new regime, after some negotiation, and the country was relatively tranquil during the next three years. In 1874 several of the radical anti-ecclesiastical measures promulgated by Juárez during the War of Reform were formally incorporated in the constitution.

#### THE BEGINNING OF THE DÍAZ REGIME

Lerdo, though popular at the beginning of his term, was unable to hold the support of the mutually jealous factions within the liberal party, and when he sought reelection Díaz headed a revolt which proved more successful than his previous attempts. The man who was to dominate Mexican political life during the next thirty-four years assumed the executive power provisionally late in 1876, and became constitutional President in May, 1877. Several revolts by followers of Lerdo de Tejada were suppressed and order was gradually established. At the end of his term, since a man who had made non-re-election his battle cry in two revolutions could hardly be a candidate for reelection himself, Díaz placed his friend General Manuel González at the head of the government. From Díaz' point of view the choice was a good one, for the new President was able to repress opposition but made himself so unpopular by unwise and corrupt financial measures that he could not have opposed Díaz' return to power if he had wished to. The latter assumed the presidency in 1884, to begin the longest unbroken period of personal rule in the history of Spanish America.

Porfirio Díaz was born in Oajaca in 1830. His father, a minor employee in a commercial house, was white or nearly white; his mother half Indian. Despite the family's poverty, the young Díaz received some education, studying at one time for the Church and later for the law. He began his active participation in politics, on the liberal side, during the revolution of Ayutla. Later he served as Governor of

Tehuantepec, which he held for the *juaristas* during the War of Reform, and was one of the outstanding heroes of the struggle against the Empire. A high degree of political astuteness, combined with a ruthless energy and firmness of purpose, made him the perfect type of successful *caudillo*. He owed his long tenure of power partly to these qualities and partly to the rapidly increasing prosperity made possible by the establishment of stable government. As in other Latin American countries, political rivalries became less acute as the bulk of the ruling class turned their attention to new opportunities created by the growth of foreign commerce and the development of the country's natural resources.

#### DÍAZ' POLITICAL METHODS

The conciliation of formerly hostile elements in the ruling class was largely responsible for Díaz' success. Not only the chief leaders of the other factions of the liberal party but many former conservatives, including some who had coöperated with Maximilian, were given important positions in the administration. The Church, still influential despite the disasters which it had suffered, became more friendly to the government when the President showed a willingness to relax the enforcement of the Laws of Reform, and it gradually recovered some of its lost property and much of its importance as a social force. The enmities of former years, already tending to disappear during the comparatively peaceful regimes of Juárez and Lerdo, ceased for the time being to be an important factor in Mexican politics. At the same time it became more profitable and far safer for those who sought official positions or governmental favors to court the all-powerful dictator than to organize revolutions. The execution without trial of nine persons accused of conspiracy at Vera Cruz in 1879 showed that the new President would be pitiless in dealing with armed opposition. Such acts of cruelty might merely have provoked further outbreaks under other circumstances, but they were effective in discouraging disorder in a country where the great majority of thinking people were sick of civil war. Such revolts as occurred were quickly crushed. The disappearance of armed political opposition was followed by the elimination of banditry, long the curse of the Mexican country-

side. A well-trained rural police force, recruited largely from former professional revolutionists and highwaymen, made life and property, at least for the upper classes and foreigners, safer than in many parts of the United States and Europe.

For the first time the government of Mexico became a real personal dictatorship. Hitherto the local *caudillos* who dominated the various states had exercised much independent power, often disregarding the authority of the central government altogether. Though the party in power at the capital naturally sought to assure the control of the state governments by its own partisans, and generally did so by arbitrary measures, it had usually been compelled to compromise with powerful local leaders and to purchase rather than to command their support. It was the state governors who had in practice controlled the electoral machinery—a fact which explains the occurrence of disputed elections in a country where there was never any real freedom of suffrage. Under Díaz this situation changed. The power of local *caudillos* was systematically undermined and finally destroyed, and the state governors became mere subordinates of the president, named and removed at his pleasure. Elections, as in the past, were a mere form so far as the voters were concerned, and the outcome was now dictated from Mexico City. There was thus no longer any possibility of an opposition group in congress, which had hitherto frequently shown some independence. The dictator took pains to see that no other member of his government built up any prestige which might threaten his own power. By promptly relegating to obscurity any lieutenant who became too influential, and by fomenting jealousies and rivalries in his official family, as well as by exiling or terrorizing potential opponents, Díaz made sure that there was no one in Mexico who could successfully aspire to replace him in the government. The press, which had enjoyed some freedom under Juárez and Lerdo, was controlled by a combination of repressive measures and bribery.

The constitutional prohibition, which Díaz had felt compelled to respect in 1880, was modified to permit one reelection in 1888 and completely removed a few years later. Thereafter Díaz was reelected as a matter of course at the end of each successive period. In 1904 the presidential term was extended to six years, and at the same time, as a concession to public opinion, the aging ruler consented to the estab-

lishment of the office of vice-president, though he selected for the position Ramón Corral, who had no popular following or personal prestige. It was clear that he intended to remain in office for life. Though his mental and physical powers were obviously declining after the turn of the century, and the generally friendly attitude of the ruling classes was giving way to indifference or hostility, no real political opposition appeared. The only group which attempted to exercise any political influence were the so-called *científicos*, originally a loose association of young deputies who attempted rather ineffectively to bring about political reforms while outwardly supporting the administration and enjoying many favors at its hands. Their importance as a political factor does not appear to have been great, but one of their leaders, José Limantour, was Minister of Finance for a long period, and in this capacity was largely responsible for the dictatorship's most important achievements.

#### ECONOMIC PROGRESS

The Republic's finances, when Díaz succeeded González in 1884, were in the chaotic condition that had been normal since independence. Expenditures far exceeded receipts, salaries were unpaid, and the foreign debt was in default. By economy and better administration, matters were soon much improved. After Limantour became Minister of Finance in 1893 a series of brilliantly successful financial reforms were carried out. The old burdensome taxes inherited from the Spanish regime, and especially the intolerable internal customs duties, were abolished or modified. The budget showed a surplus, for practically the first time in the country's history, and the currency was placed on a gold basis. Mexico's credit became so well established that it was possible to issue bonds abroad with a coupon rate of 4 per cent—a rate which no other Latin American country had hitherto been able to approach. With the aid of borrowed money the government was able to purchase a controlling interest in the majority of the country's railway lines after 1904.

The general prosperity which made these achievements possible was due partly to the establishment of stable government and partly to a great influx of foreign capital. Mining developed rapidly in re-

sponse to improved processes and increased demand abroad. Mexico was again the world's chief silver producer and was second only to the United States in the production of copper. Railroad building also made remarkable progress, until there were nearly 25,000 kilometers of railways in the Republic in 1911, as compared with 691 kilometers in 1876.<sup>1</sup> Industrial plants of many kinds, most of them it is true leading an artificial existence behind high customs barriers, were established in the principal cities. The country's foreign commerce increased five-fold, and the petroleum industry, just becoming established at the end of the Díaz regime, gave promise of far greater exports in the future. Most of the new undertakings were financed and managed by foreigners, but the benefits of material progress accrued also to many thousands of Mexicans and the Republic appeared to foreign observers to be one of the most fortunate of the American republics when the centenary of the *grito de Dolores* was celebrated in 1910.

#### THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PICTURE

Beneath the surface, however, there was much discontent. The monopoly of public office by Díaz and the clique that surrounded him irritated other people who had political ambitions. A more acute feeling of unrest was growing among the common people. On the great plantations, the Indian and *mestizo* laborers were still subject to a peonage system which had kept their wages practically unchanged for a century while recent increases in prices had depressed their already low standard of living. More and more of the country people had become debt-slaves during the past fifty years because the *haciendas* had been steadily expanding at the expense of the small landholder and the village communities. As in Peru and Bolivia, but probably to an even greater extent, the Indian had been systematically despoiled by those who had wealth or political power. The constitution of 1857, which required the division of village communal holdings as well as the sale of church property, had facilitated this process, and other laws of the Díaz period, providing ostensibly for the surveying of the national domain, had permitted favored indi-

<sup>1</sup> Rabasa, *L'Evolution Historique du Mexique*, p. 165.



viduals to build up vast estates on lands which theoretically belonged to the nation but which in fact were often the property of the Indians. The peasants, whose lot had thus become harder than ever at a time when the rest of the country was enjoying an unheard of prosperity, were consequently ripe for revolt as soon as the dictator's grip should weaken. Their desperate determination to recover their lands made the agrarian question the most pressing political problem in Mexico under the revolutionary governments which followed Díaz.

Since much of the land had passed into the hands of foreigners, discontent among the peasants tended to take on an anti-foreign character. This was also true of the less acute but still active discontent among the laborers in mining and industry. The employer, in most cases a North American or a European, was usually supported by the army and police in dealing with labor agitators or strikes, and he often profited by tariff protection and other special privileges. Díaz sought to encourage the investment of capital as a means of developing the country, but many of his fellow citizens were dismayed to see the control of the Republic's economic life and natural resources pass out of Mexican hands. A change in this situation became another of the chief objectives of the political groups that were soon to come into power.

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## *Chapter XX*

### MEXICO: THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD

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The misery of the landless peasantry, the dislike of foreign economic domination, and an increasing discontent among the new class of industrial laborers found expression after 1910 in a long-drawn-out revolt against all that the Díaz regime stood for: a revolt which at first seemed purposeless and hardly different from earlier struggles for power among ambitious military leaders, but which gradually took on the form of a real social revolution. During the past thirty years the agrarian program, the expropriation of large amounts of foreign property, and the rising power of the labor unions have transformed the Republic's economic life. The revolutionary period is one of the most interesting, not only in Mexico's history but in that of all Latin America, because the problems with which the Mexicans have been attempting to deal exist and urgently demand a solution in many of the other republics of the continent.

#### THE END OF THE DÍAZ REGIME

As Díaz approached the end of his sixth consecutive term in 1910, Mexico appeared to be one of the wealthiest and most tranquil of the American republics. To all outward appearance the President was at the height of his prestige, even though it was obvious that a ruler who was about to celebrate his eightieth birthday could not continue indefinitely at the head of the government. For a generation no important political group had dared to challenge his authority. Discontent, though widespread and, as subsequent events showed, deep-seated and bitter among the poorer classes, had found little chance for expression. There seemed little reason to suppose that the election of 1910

would not be as uneventful and as much a mere matter of form as its predecessors.

That it was not resulted partly from an interview which Díaz himself permitted Mr. Creelman to publish in *Pearson's Magazine* in March, 1908. Mexico, the President said, was now ripe for democracy and he would welcome the establishment of an opposition party and the holding of a free election. This statement, evidently intended only for foreign consumption, caused a sensation in Mexican political circles. After its publication the government could not well prevent an unwontedly free discussion of political affairs in the Mexican press. Few ventured openly to oppose the President's reelection, but a movement was soon under way to make Díaz' prominent supporter, General Bernardo Reyes, vice-president instead of Corral, the official candidate. When Reyes was compelled to withdraw and accept a mission in Europe, many of his supporters joined forces with Francisco Madero, who had the temerity to accept an opposition nomination for the presidency. Though Madero was arrested and later forced to flee to the United States, his campaign, following that of Reyes, afforded an opportunity for violent political agitation, and the President's failure to show his accustomed vigor in suppressing any sign of discontent or resistance did much to hurt his prestige.

Díaz and Corral were duly reelected in July, 1910, but the dictatorship collapsed with astonishing suddenness only a few months later. Madero, from his refuge in Texas, issued a call for a general revolt to begin on November 20. The movement lacked effective organization and leadership but small local rebellions broke out in many parts of the country and it soon became evident that the government was without the will or the power to deal with them. There was surprisingly little real fighting. After the rebels' first important military success, the capture of Ciudad Juárez on the American border in May, 1911, Díaz agreed that he and the Vice-President should resign and that Francisco de la Barra, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, should assume the presidency with a cabinet named by the revolutionists. The old ruler left Mexico a few days later, and in November, after an election, Madero assumed office as constitutional President.

## MADERO AND HUERTA

Madero was a member of a wealthy landowning family in the north of Mexico. He had no previous administrative or military experience. As the man who had dared to become a presidential candidate when the rest of the nation was still in awe of the dictator, he had naturally become the titular head of the revolution, but he had taken little part in actual military operations. Unfortunately he had few qualifications for his new office. Apparently he had no conception of the catastrophic political forces that his revolt had unleashed, though a rather vague promise in his revolutionary program to restore the land to the dispossessed peasantry seems to have brought his movement much support among the lower classes. His administration was little less conservative than that of Díaz, but he lacked completely the political skill and the ruthless energy which had kept his predecessor in power. Partisans of the Díaz regime or dissatisfied leaders in the revolutionary party staged several small revolts in 1912, and the propertied classes were dismayed by the government's inability to restore and maintain order.

It was the standing army, which Madero had inherited almost intact from the Díaz regime, which finally overthrew him. Félix Díaz, the dictator's nephew, and General Bernardo Reyes had been imprisoned in the capital for participating in earlier revolts. On February 9, 1913, they were released by mutinous troops who seized control of several strong points in the city. Reyes was killed in the ensuing fighting, but for ten days Félix Díaz and the forces at the presidential palace carried on an artillery duel in the heart of the capital. The destruction of non-combatant lives and property seemed the more shocking when it later transpired that the commander of Madero's troops, Victoriano Huerta, was in league with the rebels, and was simply awaiting a favorable opportunity to betray those of his comrades who were still loyal. On February 18 Huerta imprisoned Madero and the Vice-President, Pino Suárez. After some discussion, in which members of the diplomatic corps participated, the President and Vice-President reluctantly agreed to resign in return for a promise that they would be permitted to leave the country.

Huerta, with the approval of Congress, at once assumed the presi-

dency. A few days later Madero and Pino Suárez were murdered by the officials who had them in custody. Though this and several other equally brutal acts foreshadowed the character of the new administration, it received support from conservative elements in Mexico and from foreign interests which hoped for a restoration of a strong and efficient government on the Díaz model. Within a few months it had been recognized by all of the principal powers of Europe. It was not, however, recognized by the United States, and in Mexico the administration was soon contending with new armed revolts which again endangered foreign as well as native life and property.

President Wilson had refused to countenance what he considered an inexcusable usurpation of power. Recalling the American Ambassador, who had been openly sympathetic with the Huerta regime, he sent Mr. John Lind as his personal representative to propose the establishment of a constitutional government by means of an election in which Huerta would not be a candidate. Huerta not only rejected this suggestion, but showed his disregard for legality by suspending the constitution, dissolving the congress, and imprisoning several of its members. Wilson thereupon announced that nothing done by the dictator would be regarded as legal, and endeavored to persuade foreign governments to withdraw all diplomatic support from his regime. In February, 1914, the embargo on the shipment of arms to Mexico, which had been imposed in 1912, was lifted in order to help the "constitutionalists" under Venustiano Carranza, who by this time controlled much of the north.

On April 9, 1914, the Tampico incident afforded the occasion for a more effective intervention. A boat's crew from the U.S.S. *Dolphin*, landing for supplies, were arrested by Mexican forces and held for more than an hour before higher officials ordered their release and offered an apology. Huerta himself expressed regret, but when Admiral Mayo peremptorily demanded a salute to the American flag he refused to comply except under conditions which were deemed unacceptable. On April 20 Wilson laid the matter before Congress and asked approval for the use of armed force to compel Huerta to recognize "the rights and dignity of the United States." Before Congress had time to act, however, word arrived that a German steamer was about to land arms for Huerta at Vera Cruz, and on April 21 Ameri-

can forces took control of that port after severe fighting with Mexican troops. Huerta considered this an act of war and dismissed the American chargé d'affaires. Even Carranza, who stood to gain most from the action of the United States, protested and urged that the American forces be withdrawn.

A real war might well have ensued. Fortunately the diplomatic representatives of the "A.B.C. Powers"—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—came forward with an offer of good offices which was promptly accepted. Representatives of the United States and the Huerta regime met with the mediators at Niagara Falls in May, and attempted to work out a plan for the establishment of a government acceptable to all parties, but their efforts were frustrated by the intransigence of the rapidly advancing revolutionists. Carranza, who did not participate officially in the conference, would not even agree to an armistice, and the United States sympathized with him in his insistence that the civil war could be ended only by a constitutionalist victory. Meanwhile the position of Huerta steadily became more desperate, and on July 15, 1914, he resigned in favor of Francisco Carbajal, the President of the Supreme Court. A month later, when the constitutionalist army occupied Mexico City, Carranza formally assumed the "Executive Authority of the Mexican Republic."

#### CARRANZA AND VILLA

The overthrow of Huerta did not end the civil war. Dissensions were already apparent among the successful revolutionists. Carranza was recognized as "First Chief" of the movement, but there were several other leaders who aspired to take his place. The most notable of these was Francisco Villa, who had won several of the principal battles of the revolution.

The twelve months after Huerta's resignation, in fact, were one of the most chaotic periods in Mexico's history. Villa revolted in September, 1914, and joined forces with Emiliano Zapata, who had been carrying on a desperate struggle, independent of the constitutionalist movement, to compel the division of the great landed estates in Morelos. Acting under the influence of these two leaders, a convention of generals meeting at Aguascalientes designated Eulalio Gutiér-

rez as Provisional President, but Carranza refused to give up his own claims and moved to Vera Cruz, which had just been evacuated by the American forces. During the fighting that ensued Mexico City was taken and retaken by the various contending factions. Gutiérrez, quarreling with his former supporters, withdrew into the interior and was succeeded as titular head of the "convention" government by Roque González Garza and then by Lagos Cházaro, but neither exercised any real authority. In the capital, cut off from the outside world and exposed to the arbitrary tyranny of irresponsible military leaders who came and went with the shifting fortunes of war, the large foreign population as well as the natives suffered acutely from misgovernment, food shortage, and disease. Neither Villa nor Zapata nor Carranza seemed willing to attempt to occupy the city in force. In many districts of the interior matters were even worse, and foreign mining and oil interests complained loudly of lack of protection. Nationals of European powers as well as American citizens were mistreated or killed, and it became more and more difficult, in the face of diplomatic pressure and criticism at home, for the United States government to maintain its announced policy of "watchful waiting."

By the middle of 1915 the situation was becoming intolerable, and on June 2 President Wilson publicly called upon the Mexican leaders to come to an agreement, saying that the United States would otherwise be compelled to lend "active moral support" to some leader who could restore order. A month later he invited the ambassadors of the A.B.C. powers and the three senior Latin American ministers at Washington to confer with Secretary of State Bryan in an effort to obtain joint action. After some delay, a meeting was held and the contending factions were urged to agree upon a provisional government which would hold elections at an early date. Villa accepted this proposal but Carranza, whose troops were by this time getting the upper hand, declined. Nevertheless the governments participating in the conference decided in October to recognize Carranza and their example was followed by other powers. The United States imposed an embargo on the shipment of arms to other factions which materially aided the constitutionalist regime in establishing its control over the greater part of Mexico.

Peace did not come at once. Zapata's followers in Morelos did not

lay down their arms until after their leader's death in 1919. Villa, defeated in battle, continued to operate near the American frontier and showed his resentment at the recognition of Carranza by atrocities against Americans and other foreigners. On March 9, 1916, he attacked Columbus, New Mexico, killing sixteen Americans and burning a part of the town. This made further "watchful waiting" impossible, and a force under General Pershing was sent into Mexico to capture him. The expedition did not succeed, largely because Carranza, jealous as always of any North American interference, refused to cooperate. For a time, in fact, he assumed a hostile attitude which threatened to bring on an armed conflict between the two governments, but ultimately an agreement was reached under which Pershing's forces were withdrawn in February, 1917.

#### THE CONSTITUTION OF 1917

By this time the Carranza government had made some progress in restoring order in the interior, and a constitutional convention representing the various factions which supported it had met at Querétaro. The result of this body's labors was the constitution of 1917, which embodied most of the principles that have since inspired the policy of the revolutionary movement. It had become clear by 1917 that the fall of the Díaz regime and subsequent events had aroused hopes and aspirations which must be satisfied before any government could hope to command lasting popular support. Many of the military chieftains were determined to destroy the oppressive features of the old regime, and even those who, like Carranza, were chiefly interested in obtaining power for themselves had made promises of reform which could not be ignored.

The land question was especially urgent. In the general disorder of the past few years, the peasants had seized and divided the large estates in many sections of the country and had fought savagely under leaders like Emiliano Zapata to destroy the power of the landlords in other districts. Madero and several of the later revolutionists had promised agrarian reform, more often perhaps in the hope of attracting followers than from conviction, and Carranza himself, when his cause seemed all but hopeless in 1915 and when he desperately needed



popular support, had issued a decree providing for the restoration of lands unjustly taken from the villages and for the granting of lands to villages which owned none. Article 27 of the new constitution adopted this decree as the basis for a radical program of agrarian reform. It declared null and void the legal proceedings by which many of the villages had been deprived of their communal lands since 1856, and provided that villages which could not establish a legal right to lands should receive them by "dotation." The nation assumed the obligation to divide large estates for this purpose. In general, the article established a new theory of property rights in Mexico and asserted the right of the government to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest might demand.

By Article 27 the Republic also claimed the ownership of all minerals and subsoil deposits—a provision which particularly affected the growing foreign oil industry. Minerals in the Spanish colonies had always belonged to the government, whoever the owner of the surface might be, but in Mexico a series of laws during the Díaz regime had apparently changed this rule with respect to hydrocarbons such as coal and petroleum, and had made it possible to acquire the ownership of subsoil deposits by buying the land under which they lay. The oil companies had acquired most of their properties in this manner. Their interests were consequently jeopardized, and their situation was made still worse by another clause of the same article which provided that foreigners, if they were to own land or obtain concessions for the development of natural resources, must agree to forego the protection of their own governments.

Another important part of the new constitution was Article 123, which contained a long series of provisions, culled from the most advanced legislation of other countries, dealing with labor and social welfare. Among other innovations it authorized the government to establish an eight-hour day, restrictions on the labor of women and children, minimum wages, a right to share in profits, and compensation for accidents and industrial diseases. The laborers' right to organize and to strike was assured, and provision was made for the arbitration of disputes. Peonage was outlawed. In another article the Church was dealt with even more harshly than in the "Laws of Reform." It was forbidden to conduct primary schools; the state legislatures were

authorized to limit the number of priests in each district; and the title to all church property was vested in the nation.

Many portions of the new code were too revolutionary to be enforced immediately. They represented, perhaps, the idealistic aspirations of the more radical members of the convention rather than the views of Carranza and his chief supporters. Nevertheless, they were a promise to the landless peon and the workingman, and the program is one which subsequent governments of Mexico have striven with more or less sincerity to translate into actuality.

At the same time they were a threat to foreign interests and a new disturbing factor in the Republic's already strained relations with the United States. Though President Wilson had perceived more clearly than most foreign statesmen that the revolutionary movement was fundamentally a struggle to establish more tolerable conditions of life for the poorer classes, and had consequently persisted in his policy of non-intervention despite terrific pressure at home and almost intolerable provocation in Mexico, the American government could not be indifferent to provisions that threatened severe injury to legally acquired American property rights. Carranza, both before and after the recognition of his government, had assured the United States that private property of foreigners would be respected, but he soon gave evidence of an intention to apply Article 27 of the new constitution in a way hardly consistent with these pledges. A tax decree issued in February, 1918, which required the oil companies to recognize the Mexican government's ownership of the petroleum in the subsoil, gave rise to a diplomatic controversy which had not been settled when Carranza's government fell.

#### OBREGÓN AND THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION

Carranza's successor was to be elected in the summer of 1920. The most formidable candidate was General Álvaro Obregón, the government's chief military leader and the favorite of the army, but Carranza gave his support to Ignacio Bonillas, the Mexican Ambassador in Washington. Obregón's friends consequently revolted in Sonora in April, 1920, and within a month defections in the army had made

the government's position hopeless. Carranza attempted to withdraw to Vera Cruz, but many of his remaining followers abandoned him and on May 21 he was treacherously assassinated in the mountains near Puebla. Later in the year, after an election, Obregón became President.

The change of government by revolution again raised the question of recognition by foreign powers. The United States, in view of the oil controversy, was not disposed to resume diplomatic relations without some definite assurance of protection to American interests, and Secretary Hughes proposed a treaty which would prevent the confiscatory application of Article 27 of the new constitution. To this Obregón would not agree. Recognition was consequently withheld until 1923, when the chief difficulties between the two governments were adjusted, temporarily at least, by a joint commission which met in Mexico City. It was arranged that all pending claims, including those of American citizens for losses suffered during the disturbances since 1910, should be arbitrated. The United States reluctantly consented to permit its citizens to be paid in bonds instead of cash, within certain limitations, for property taken in connection with the agrarian program which the new administration was beginning to carry out. With respect to the oil controversy, the commissioners achieved a working arrangement rather than an agreement on the fundamental question of the legal ownership of petroleum deposits. The Mexican Supreme Court, in the case of the Texas Company, had decided that Article 27 did not deprive the owner of the surface of his right to the oil in the ground, provided that he had shown by some "positive act" an intent to exploit this oil, and this principle, expanded to apply also to lands which the foreign companies had bought for future use, was finally accepted, though with reservations, by the American government.

Recognition was thus obtained. Its practical value became apparent when Adolfo de la Huerta, formerly a member of Obregón's cabinet but now an opposition candidate for the presidency, started a revolt in the latter part of 1923. The movement was a formidable one, supported by a large part of the army as well as by the still powerful conservative groups, including the clergy and the great landowners, which opposed the revolutionary program. It was soon suppressed,

however, by the energetic action of General Calles, greatly aided by arms purchased from the government of the United States.

#### THE CALLES ADMINISTRATION

Plutarco Elías Calles was the official candidate and consequently the successful candidate for the presidency in 1924. Long a prominent leader in the revolutionary party, and a close personal friend of Obregón, he had shown marked administrative ability as a member of the latter's cabinet. As head of the government he made a real effort to carry out a part of the program of economic and social reform embodied in the 1917 constitution. His predecessors had made little progress in this direction, partly because of internal political difficulties and partly because of the opposition of the United States and other foreign governments. Calles apparently felt strong enough to disregard both of these obstacles. A new land law injected fresh vigor into the agrarian program, and another act limited the right of foreigners to inherit agricultural land. A new petroleum law, which violated the agreement of 1923, revived the controversy with the oil companies. These measures, combined with Mexico's opposition to the policy of the United States in Nicaragua,<sup>1</sup> threatened to bring on a new crisis in the Republic's relations with its northern neighbor.

In this situation Calles was suddenly confronted by a flare-up of the religious question. Up to this time the government had shown little disposition to provoke a new conflict with the Church. A number of minor incidents had kept alive the antagonism between the Catholic hierarchy and the leaders of the revolutionary party, but the anti-clerical articles of the 1917 constitution, like many of its other provisions, had not been implemented by regulatory laws. In January, 1926, however, the bishops of Mexico issued a statement declaring that the Church refused to recognize these articles and would combat them. The government retaliated by a series of decrees and laws putting the constitutional provisions into effect. Catholic schools and convents were closed and all priests were required to register with the government. The Church refused to comply, and a league of

<sup>1</sup> See below p. 504.

Catholic laymen announced a campaign to paralyze the economic life of the nation by restricting purchases to the barest necessities. In many sections of the country small armed bands rose in rebellion, and there was much loss of life before order was restored in July, 1927. The Knights of Columbus and other Catholic organizations in the United States gave the Church much moral support in the conflict, and the *Cristeros*, as the rebels were called, were undoubtedly encouraged by a belief that the numerous controversies between the United States and the Calles government would weaken the latter's position.

Fortunately more friendly relations between the two countries were restored after 1927, when Mr Dwight Morrow was appointed American Ambassador. The most objectionable provision of the petroleum law, the requirement that oil companies apply for fifty-year concessions to confirm their acquired rights, was declared unconstitutional by the Mexican Supreme Court, and an amended law, giving them concessions unlimited as to time, was enacted early in 1928. Administrative regulations which Calles issued soon afterward ended this phase of the oil controversy, and a more conciliatory attitude on both sides facilitated the handling of American claims and other pending questions. Even the religious question became temporarily less acute as the result of a compromise worked out through Mr. Morrow's informal good offices.

#### POLITICAL EVENTS, 1928-1934

Obregón was elected to succeed Calles in 1928, but when he was assassinated by a religious fanatic some months before the end of the presidential term Emilio Portes Gil was installed as Provisional President by Congress. Calles refused to continue in office, but he retained the leadership of the National Revolutionary Party and his influence dominated the government during the next six years. He took command of the army when a group of dissatisfied generals revolted in March, 1929, and quickly suppressed the uprising. Later in the same year he brought about the election of Pascual Ortiz Rubio to serve during the rest of Obregón's unexpired term, which had been fixed at six years by a constitutional amendment. He was apparently dissatis-

fied with the new President's conduct, however, and in September, 1932, Ortiz Rubio was compelled to resign and Abelardo Rodríguez was chosen to succeed him.

In general the policy of the government in this period was more conservative than while Calles was president. The agrarian program was slowed down and there was less of the open hostility to foreign economic interests which had found expression in the oil laws and in labor legislation. This change was due partly, perhaps, to the desire to avoid new complications with other governments, and partly to the fact that many of the revolutionary leaders, as they grew older and acquired greater personal wealth, appeared less interested in social and economic reform. The most troublesome questions which arose were those involving the relations between the government and the Church, and especially the conflict that broke out after a great Catholic celebration at the shrine of the Virgin of Guadeloupe in December, 1931. In the months that followed the federal authorities limited the number of priests in the capital city and the territories to one for every 50,000 people, and many of the states took similar or even more drastic action. Feeling ran especially high after the government amended the constitution in 1934 to require that all education should be "socialistic" in character, and for a time civil war again seemed imminent.

#### THE ELECTION OF CÁRDENAS

An important faction in the revolutionary party opposed the growing conservatism of Calles and his associates, and in 1934 this group was able to persuade the older leaders to put forward Lázaro Cárdenas as the official candidate for the presidency. After his election the new chief executive showed an unexpected independence, and in 1935, when Calles criticized the administration for encouraging a wave of strikes fomented by radical labor elements, Cárdenas reorganized his cabinet, forced changes in the government of several states, and made it clear that he would accept no dictation from the older party leader. Calles went to the United States. He returned to Mexico at the end of 1935, but was forcibly deported a few months later.

## THE AGRARIAN REFORM

Under Cárdenas, the distribution of land was resumed on a large scale. Much had already been accomplished in this direction, especially during the administrations of Calles and Portes Gil, and by the end of 1933 nearly 19,000,000 acres had been definitively allotted to villages containing three quarters of a million heads of families.<sup>1</sup> For the most part this had been accomplished by "dotation," or grants of land from expropriated large estates, rather than by the restitution to the villages of lands unjustly taken. The government theoretically proposed to compensate the original owners of the land thus distributed, but payments had been made in only a few cases, and then usually in agrarian bonds which had little market value. The *ejido*, as the tract granted to each village was called, was usually in part pasture or woodland, for the common use of the inhabitants, and in part crop land which was divided among the heads of families under restrictions designed to prevent them from selling or mortgaging their holdings. The government for a time endeavored to introduce collective farming in the *ejidos* but met with little success.

Obstacles of many sorts had hampered the successful execution of the agrarian program. The examination and disposition of so many thousands of cases was a difficult matter, especially as it was complicated by governmental red tape, friction between federal and state authorities, factional politics, and official corruption. There was tenacious opposition from other conservative groups as well as the landlords, and also from foreign governments which objected to the seizure of their nationals' property without compensation. Even the villages which received land did not always seem to benefit, for the plot given to each family was often too small for its support and the lack of tools and machinery prevented efficient cultivation. The government endeavored to provide capital for the new landowners through the establishment of an agricultural bank and the encouragement of cooperatives, but lack of money and administrative difficulties made its efforts only partly successful.

These obstacles were not overcome by the Cárdenas administra-

<sup>1</sup> Simpson, *The Ejido*, pp. 170-171.

tion, but the government proceeded aggressively to carry on the distribution of land in spite of them. Local conservative opposition, which had often taken the form of violence and intimidation, was discouraged by systematically arming the agrarians to enable them to defend themselves and incidentally to support the administration in case of need. Foreign diplomatic opposition was less effective with the adoption of the "Good Neighbor" policy by the United States, especially as the two governments reached an agreement in 1938 for the eventual compensation of Americans who had lost their land. By 1940 the number of heads of families benefited by the agrarian program was said to have increased to 2,000,000 and the amount of land involved to 70,000,000 acres.<sup>1</sup> The process of distributing the land would seem to have been very nearly completed.

Critics of the agrarian reform assert that it has seriously reduced production and has made the further development of the country's agricultural resources impossible by discouraging the investment of needed foreign capital. They point to many unsatisfactory features in the administration of the village lands, and assert that the peasant, exploited by local politicians and handicapped by lack of capital and knowledge, is little if any better off than he was before. The advocates of the reform, on the other hand, feel that a long step has been taken toward making the hitherto down-trodden peon a happier, more self-respecting citizen. The government is still endeavoring to provide financial help and intelligent direction for the new landowners.

#### EDUCATION

Closely connected with the agrarian reform was an educational program designed to reach all classes of the population but especially to prepare the recently created landowners to make the most of their new opportunities. In thousands of rural communities schools were established to teach not only the children but the adults, and to teach not only the "three R's" but also better agricultural methods and simple trades. This movement began early in the 1920's, under the leadership of José Vasconcelos who was Minister of Public Instruction from 1920 to 1925. An important feature of the government's

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Commerce* (New York), Aug. 27, 1940.



policy was its emphasis on the importance of the Indian, hitherto universally despised and neglected, and its effort to preserve the best elements in the aboriginal culture. The educational program was greatly handicapped by lack of money and lack of trained teachers, as well as by the fact that so large a part of the rural population lived in small, isolated communities speaking a great number of different native languages, but much was nevertheless accomplished.

#### ORGANIZED LABOR

Another feature of Cárdenas' announced program was the improvement of the position of labor. Much had also been accomplished in this direction since 1917. The provisions of the constitution were far too advanced to be given immediate practical effect, but they at least encouraged the workers to organize and served as a program to be carried out by future administrations. Peonage and exploitation by the plantation stores had been checked in most parts of the country, and greater improvement had been made in the position of the industrial workers.

Organized labor was an important factor in politics after the *Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana*, the C.R.O.M., helped Obregón to overthrow Carranza in 1920, and its leader, Luis Morones, was a powerful figure in the Obregón administration. Thereafter many of the benefits promised by the constitution were actually attained. In 1931 a general federal labor law established a system of collective labor contracts, enforceable by boards of conciliation and arbitration, which greatly strengthened the position of the worker as against the employer. The law also provided for the fixing of minimum wages in the various sections of the country, and specific minimum wages were in fact established in the federal district and in many of the states in 1934.

Meanwhile there had been internal dissensions in the labor movement, and the influence of Morones had declined. A more radical group supported Cárdenas for the presidency, and after the formation in 1936 of the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México*, the C.T.M., Vicente Lombardo Toledano was the most powerful of the country's labor leaders. Lombardo Toledano, who had also been a prominent

educator and writer, was a Marxist, though not perhaps a party-line communist, and his ultimate purpose was apparently the substitution of labor management for capitalist control in as many of Mexico's industries as possible. By 1940 he was able to assert that: <sup>1</sup>

. . . the syndicates of the C.T.M., at the present time participate in the operation of many Mexican industries in a variety of ways. They manage the national railways, they have a share in the management of the nationalized petroleum industry, they manage street railways, busses, and other municipal services; and they control many sugar mills, among which are four of the largest, and in a few years the whole production of sugar cane will be in their hands. They have several small textile mills, and they manage the only Mexican ships that are engaged in commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. Organized as cooperatives, they exploit many of the natural resources of the country, including the subsoil.

This state of affairs had been brought about chiefly because the labor unions had effective official support. The National Railways, in which the government had had a majority stock interest since the time of Díaz, were expropriated in 1937 and turned over to the railroad workers' union for operation in 1938. Other less important concerns were expropriated in much the same manner, and in some cases where strikes or other labor trouble made operation of an enterprise unprofitable, the government forbade the closing of the plant and exerted pressure on the owners to surrender it to the workers. Foreign interests suffered especially, because the elimination of foreign economic control was as important a part of the revolutionary policy as the improvement of the condition of the workers. This movement might have gone farther than it did had it not been for the practical difficulties which it encountered. Inefficient management, lack of discipline, and the impossibility of obtaining needed capital for maintenance and improvements made operation by the workers' cooperatives unsatisfactory. The railways, especially, were in a deplorable state by the end of the Cárdenas term, and in 1940 his successor, Ávila Camacho, transferred their administration to the federal Department of Public Works.

<sup>1</sup> Lombardo Toledano in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 208, pp. 52-53 (May, 1940).

## THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE OIL COMPANIES

One of the most important events of the Cárdenas administration was the expropriation of the North American and British oil companies. These still represented one of the largest foreign investments in the Republic, though the production of the Mexican fields was relatively far less important than it once had been. The agreement between President Calles and Ambassador Morrow settled the dispute about subsoil rights, but frequent demands for higher wages and the increasingly aggressive spirit of the labor unions made the situation of the foreign companies more and more difficult. In May, 1937, the workers struck to obtain a large further wage increase and demanded at the same time a measure of participation in the management of the industry. Work was resumed after the dispute was submitted to the Federal Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, but in December that organization handed down an award which the companies considered confiscatory. When they refused to accept it, President Cárdenas on March 18, 1938, issued a decree expropriating the property of all the larger foreign-owned concerns. The administration of the nationalized industry was entrusted to an official organization in which the labor unions had a considerable voice.

Since there was clearly little probability that the government could or would make any adequate payment for the seized properties, the President's action gravely complicated Mexico's relations with foreign countries. It led to the severance of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and created a new and potentially serious controversy with the United States. Apparently at the insistence of the Washington government, Mexican representatives entered into negotiations with the oil companies in an effort to agree on compensation, but except in the case of one firm these ended in a deadlock. Meanwhile the general commercial and financial situation of the country was seriously affected because the fact that the companies formerly operating in Mexico controlled most of the world's tanker tonnage made it difficult to export oil. Production fell off and costs increased under the new management, and conditions in the industry became so unsatisfactory that in 1940 Cárdenas compelled the labor unions to agree to

a revision of wage scales and to the dismissal of unnecessary employees.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND THE ELECTION  
OF 1940

The revolutionary program unquestionably brought Mexico a greater measure of social democracy, but there was less change in political methods and practice. The government's authority still rested more on armed force than on respect for law and for the expressed will of the voters. The National Revolutionary Party, or the Party of the Mexican Revolution, as it has been called in recent years, has installed its candidate in the presidency at each succeeding election by the long-familiar methods, and has frequently been compelled to use the army and police to hold its opponents in check. The group in power has unquestionably enjoyed strong popular support, but there has also been an opposition much stronger than the figures of votes cast at the elections would seem to indicate.

The official candidate for the presidency in 1940 was General Manuel Ávila Camacho, a close associate of President Cárdenas. His chief rival, General Juan Andreu Almazán, was likewise a member of the revolutionary party, but he was supported by many conservatives and by other elements that wished for one reason or another to see a change in administration. The government did not prevent its opponents from carrying on an active campaign, but in the election, on July 7, there were disputes and disturbances and each side claimed the victory. When Congress decided in favor of Ávila Camacho, the opposition talked of revolution. Minor outbreaks occurred but were easily suppressed, and the absence of Almazán, who left the country soon after the election, apparently discouraged his partisans from offering a more serious resistance. The opposition candidate formally withdrew from the contest when it was announced that the United States would send the Vice-President-Elect, Mr. Wallace, to be present as special ambassador at Ávila Camacho's inauguration.

This action by the United States was probably inspired by a desire to avoid an outbreak of disorder which would complicate its efforts to obtain cooperation in plans for hemisphere defense. Despite the

unsettled disputes regarding the oil expropriations and other problems, relations with the Cárdenas administration had on the whole been friendly. The United States Treasury had been aiding Mexico by purchasing large quantities of silver at prices far above the world market, and the two governments had in general been in accord in their policy toward the European war. Even the labor organizations in Mexico, where communist influence was formerly very strong, had taken a strong stand against the axis powers.

#### RECENT RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Under the new administration, relations with the United States became more friendly than they had been for many years. On November 19, 1941, it was announced that the two governments had reached an agreement for the settlement of the controversy over the expropriation of the American oil properties. Mexico deposited \$9,000,000 as a first payment to the former owners, and in April it was announced that experts representing the two governments had fixed the total due the oil companies at \$23,995,991, less an undetermined sum claimed by Mexico from them. Although this arrangement seemed likely to give the oil companies little satisfaction, it did away with the question as a source of friction between the two governments. At the same time, Mexico agreed to pay the United States \$40,000,000, over a period of years, in settlement of other property claims of American citizens, and the United States promised to continue silver purchases, to support Mexican foreign exchange, and to make loans through the Export-Import Bank for highway construction and other economic projects.

In the meantime the two governments have coöperated in plans for mutual defense against outside aggression. Among the most important results of this cooperation were the Mexican government's decree of December, 1941, permitting the use of Mexican territory or Mexican ports by the armed forces of any American republic at war with a non-American power, and the establishment in January of a mixed defense commission.

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## *Chapter XXI*

### PANAMA AND THE CANAL

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#### EARLY INTEREST IN A CANAL

The first proposal for a waterway between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific was made soon after the discovery of the Central American Isthmus. The idea met with little favor in Spain, where the land barrier was looked upon as the best protection of the rich colonies on the South American west coast, but it was revived after independence. Several projects for construction were brought forward during the first half of the nineteenth century. None of these passed the stage of discussion, but after the acquisition of California by the United States the idea took on a new importance. Despite the hardships involved and the appalling death rate from yellow fever and malaria, many travellers went from the eastern seaboard to the gold fields by way of Panama or Nicaragua before the opening of the transcontinental railway, and there was a revived interest in projects for a canal that would avoid the expense and danger of transshipment at the Isthmus. Since the proposed waterway would also open up a new trade route from the Atlantic to the west coast of South America and the Orient, the question who would control it was a matter of concern not only to the United States but to other powers, and especially to the greatest maritime and commercial power, Great Britain.

#### ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY

Rivalries for the control of the various possible canal routes became a major issue in the relations between the United States and Great Britain, and in their relations with several Latin American republics,

long before any actual attempt at construction was made. There were two places where a canal appeared to be feasible: in Panama, where the Isthmus reached its narrowest point, and in Nicaragua, where the San Juan River and the great lake already provided a waterway for small vessels from the Caribbean Sea to a point within a few miles of the Pacific. Both routes were controlled by nations which obviously could not build the proposed waterway with their own capital, and the powers interested in the use of the canal were vitally concerned in seeing that its control by foreign capital did not prejudice their own interests.

At Panama, the United States enjoyed a right of free transit under the treaty of 1846, granted in return for its guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus and of New Granada's sovereignty there. The treaty had been signed at the instance of the New Granadan government, after the latter had vainly attempted to obtain a similar guarantee from one or more European powers. Though not conferring any exclusive privileges, it nevertheless gave assurance that American citizens would not be excluded from the use of any canal built in the region which it covered.

In Nicaragua the situation was more complex. The territory at the mouth of the San Juan River was in dispute between Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Colombia, and was actually controlled, in 1848, by Great Britain. That power had had a foothold in Central America since the seventeenth century, when buccaneers from Jamaica had frequently cut dye-woods on the mainland at times when piracy was unprofitable or too dangerous and had established small settlements which the Spaniards were never able completely to destroy. Belize, or British Honduras, became a British colony after the independence of Central America, and in the 1830's the Mosquitos, a primitive race of mixed Indian and Negro blood living in northeastern Nicaragua and eastern Honduras, were taken under British protection. During the same period the Bay Islands, off the coast of Honduras, were occupied. British policy in Central America became still more aggressive when the Mexican war and the rise of imperialist tendencies in the United States made American efforts to expand in that region seem possible.

In 1848 British forces acting in the name of the Mosquito King seized San Juan del Norte, or Greytown, at the eastern end of the

proposed canal route. This provoked an acute diplomatic conflict between Great Britain and the United States. Since each government was actuated mainly by a fear that the other might gain a position from which it could dominate any canal that might be built, they agreed in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 that neither would "obtain or maintain" any exclusive control over the proposed waterway, and that neither would occupy any part of Central America or seek any special privileges for its nationals in connection with the canal which were not also offered to the people of the other country. The treaty did not at once end the conflict. Disputes arose as to its meaning and Great Britain refused for some years to withdraw from territories that it already held, but gradually the points at issue were settled. British control at San Juan del Norte was given up and the town became the eastern terminus of a transit service operated by an American company for the benefit of travellers to and from California. The Bay Islands, which had been proclaimed a British colony in 1852, were returned to Honduras in 1859, and the Mosquito protectorate was relinquished in 1860, under a treaty with Nicaragua which stipulated that the Indians should govern themselves in a reservation that did not include the territory at the mouth of the San Juan River.

#### THE FRENCH CANAL COMPANY

The first real effort to build a canal began in 1879, with the organization of a French company headed by Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the Suez Canal. The original plan was to have a waterway at sea-level, but it was found that this would involve far more work and far more expense than the engineers had estimated, and a lock canal was decided upon instead. Even so the company's resources, depleted by extravagance and gross mismanagement, were unequal to the task, and the terrific loss of life among its employees from yellow fever and other diseases made the continuance of the work almost impossible. Though a substantial amount of excavation was accomplished, de Lesseps' company failed under scandalous circumstances in 1889, and the new company which took over its rights and property had too little capital to carry on work of any importance.



THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE AND HAY-HERRÁN  
TREATIES

The United States government regarded the French enterprise with little favor, though it had no practical means of implementing President Hayes' statement to Congress in 1880 that "The policy of this country is a canal under American control." An effort to build a canal in Nicaragua, by a company incorporated under an act passed by the United States Congress in 1889, failed because the capital available was exhausted before any large amount of work was accomplished. By 1898 it had become clear that the canal must be built, if at all, by the American government itself. The need for the waterway was impressed upon the American public as never before by the anxious weeks of waiting while the battleship *Oregon* rounded South America to join the rest of the fleet at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.


The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which was an obstacle to exclusive American control, was abrogated by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty signed with Great Britain in 1901. Meanwhile a commission created by Congress had carefully examined both the Nicaragua and the Panama routes and had recommended that the latter be adopted if the French company would sell its rights for \$40,000,000 and if a satisfactory arrangement could be made with Colombia. The Spooner Act of June 28, 1902, authorized the President to undertake the work of construction. With the way thus prepared, the Hay-Herrán Treaty was signed with Colombia in January, 1903. By this, Colombia would have authorized the French company to sell its rights to the United States and would have granted to the United States the use of a zone ten kilometers wide for the construction of a canal. Colombia was to receive \$10,000,000 and in addition an annuity of \$250,000 starting nine years after the ratification of the treaty. The Congress at Bogotá, however, refused to approve this agreement, apparently because it hoped that a delay might enable Colombia to obtain more favorable terms from the French company or from the United States. The result was the independence of Panama.

## THE PANAMA REVOLUTION

The Isthmus of Panama from the beginning had owed such prosperity as it enjoyed to the transit route that crossed its territory. Its importance had declined in the latter part of the colonial period when the galleons no longer came to the great fair at Porto Bello, but had revived somewhat in the days of the gold rush to California. The Panama Railroad, completed by an American company in 1855, was for a time one of the best routes to the west coast of the United States, but the opening of transcontinental lines in the north had again left the Isthmus in a backwater so far as international trade was concerned. Its people had enjoyed another short period of prosperity while the French company was at work, and they had looked forward eagerly to the resumption of construction by the United States.

There was therefore much disappointment when the rejection of the Hay-Herrán Treaty made it seem probable that the American government might again turn its attention to the Nicaraguan route. Well-informed people were not surprised when a group of revolutionists, with the support of the commander of the Colombian garrison, seized control of Panama City on November 3, 1903, and declared the independence of the Republic of Panama. The movement was promoted and financed by Philippe Bunau-Varilla, an engineer connected with the French Canal Company, who had persuaded the revolutionists that they could count on the support of the United States.

There is no evidence that the United States government itself instigated the revolt, but its conduct unquestionably prevented Colombia from suppressing it. Just before the outbreak, the U.S.S. *Nashville* had been sent to Colon. This was not an unusual step, for it will be remembered that the United States under the treaty of 1846 had guaranteed the neutrality of the Isthmus and the maintenance of free transit there. During the civil wars in Colombia, American forces had frequently been landed to protect the transit route. On this occasion, however, the commander of the *Nashville*, under instructions from Washington, prevented a Colombian force from crossing the Isthmus to put down the revolt, and four days later the new government of Panama was formally recognized by the United States. On November





18 a treaty signed at Washington guaranteed the independence of the new Republic and put an end to any possibility of Colombia's restoring her authority over the Isthmus.

The events just described were the subject of much controversy. President Roosevelt's action was defended by the administration at Washington on the ground that the construction of the canal was an urgent necessity, that it was being prevented by the obstructive conduct of Colombia, and that the people of Panama had a right to revolt against an action which "threatened their most vital interests with destruction and the interests of the whole world with grave injury."<sup>1</sup> It was asserted that the course followed by the United States was justified by the provisions of the treaty of 1846, the main purpose of which was the construction of a canal. On the other hand, it was bitterly criticized both in Latin America and the United States, and it seemed difficult to justify in view of the American guarantee of Colombia's sovereignty over the Isthmus. We have already seen how a \$25,000,000 indemnity was finally paid to Colombia in recognition of the injury that she had suffered.

#### THE CANAL TREATY

The treaty of November 18, besides guaranteeing the independence of Panama, provided for the construction of a canal by the United States. Negotiated by M. Bunau-Varilla, who had been appointed the new Republic's minister at Washington, it granted more extensive privileges than Colombia had been willing to concede. The United States was given the perpetual "use, occupation, and control" of a zone ten miles wide, in which it was to have all of the authority which it would possess if it were the sovereign of the territory. It was also given the right to take such additional lands as might be needed for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the canal. The cities of Panama and Colon, at either end of the canal route, were not included in the Zone, but the United States was to have the right to intervene if necessary to maintain public order in them and also to enforce such sanitary measures as might be neces-

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Hay to the Colombian Minister, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1903, p. 302.

sary. Panama, in return, received \$10,000,000, with the promise of an additional payment of \$250,000 annually to begin nine years after the treaty went into effect. The agreement was promptly ratified, and within a few months the United States had begun work on the canal.

The situation of the new Republic of Panama was a peculiar one. Its territory extended some 200 miles on either side of the transit route, but the region to the east was still held by unconquered Indian tribes and that to the west had but a small population and was of little importance. The country's economic and political life centered in two cities, Panama and Colon, which were now entirely surrounded by territory controlled by the United States and were separated only by imaginary lines from the American towns in the Zone. Its prosperity depended almost entirely upon the canal.

On the other hand its cooperation, especially in such matters as sanitation and military defense, was essential to the operation of the canal. Its relations with the United States were bound to be extremely close, and many delicate questions, often involving vital interests of both countries, were certain to arise. The history of Panama as an independent republic is thus to a great extent the history of its relationship to the canal.

#### THE FIRST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC

A *junta* named by the municipality of Panama City took over the government at the time of the revolution. One of its early acts was to call for the election of a national convention which met in January to draw up a constitution. One provision of this authorized the United States to intervene in any part of the Republic if necessary to restore order; another set aside the greater part of the \$10,000,000 received under the canal treaty as a fund to be held for the benefit of posterity. The convention also chose Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero, the leader of the revolution, as President of the Republic. His administration was at first supported by a coalition of the two political parties which Panama had inherited from Colombia, but the liberals soon became dissatisfied and induced the commander of the army to threaten a *coup d'état*. Disorder was only prevented by the intervention of the American Minister, and the army was soon afterward disbanded and

replaced by a civilian police. The influence of the United States also helped to prevent outbreaks when municipal and congressional elections were held in 1906.

#### HEALTH PROBLEMS

The Amador government had to deal with several problems arising from the taking over of the Canal Zone by the United States. One of these was the question of sanitation. The conquest of yellow fever and malaria, which had done so much to defeat the French company, was essential if the canal was to be built and operated. The treaty of 1903 gave the United States a virtually unlimited authority in respect to public-health measures in Panama City and Colon, as well as in the Zone, and early in 1905 the Panaman government turned over the administration of sanitary regulations in the two cities to the Zone authorities. Yellow fever was promptly eradicated. In the years that followed, malaria, a hardly less formidable enemy to human welfare, was also brought under control in the areas near the settlements, and for the first time in its history the Isthmus became a safe place to live. This achievement, largely the work of Dr. William C. Gorgas of the United States army, conferred inestimable benefits on Panama as well as the inhabitants of the Zone. Sanitary work in Panama City and Colon has continued under the control of the Health Officer of the canal down to the present time.

#### THE TAFT AGREEMENT

Another question involving the rights of the United States under the canal treaty was not so easily settled. In June, 1904, President Roosevelt formally opened the Canal Zone to commerce and established customhouses and postoffices there. There was a storm of protest in Panaman mercantile and official circles. The Panaman government took the position, which it has since maintained, that the treaty gave the United States only such rights in the Zone as were necessary for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the canal, and that this did not include any right to take measures which threatened to ruin Panama's trade and to cripple the finances of her government. The United States, on the other hand,

pointed out that Article III of the treaty gave it "all the rights, power and authority within the zone . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory." Nevertheless, it disclaimed any desire to inflict unnecessary hardship on Panama, and when Secretary of War Taft visited the Isthmus in the fall of 1904 a compromise was arranged. Thereafter imports into the Zone were limited in general to goods for the use of the United States and its employees or for sale to vessels passing through the canal, and the general public was not permitted to trade at the commissaries which the American authorities established. This arrangement was satisfactory in principle to both governments, but it did not prevent disputes over the operation of the commissaries from embittering their relations at frequent intervals in succeeding years.

#### AMERICAN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS

Party strife again broke out in 1908 when a coalition of liberals and conservatives opposed President Amador's attempt to place Ricardo Arias in office as his successor. Two years before, at the time of the congressional elections, the United States had stated that it did not undertake to guarantee the holding of free elections in Panama, but it had later threatened to intervene if peace were disturbed and its representatives had helped to bring about an agreement between the contending parties. In 1908 both parties asked that an American commission be appointed to hear electoral complaints. The Amador government, however, had joined in this request only in response to diplomatic pressure, and Arias soon afterward withdrew his candidacy. José Domingo de Obaldía was consequently inaugurated as President in October, 1908. He died in 1910 and was succeeded by Pablo Arosemena.

A similar situation arose in 1912, complicated this time by the fact that the liberals, now in opposition, had a majority in congress and were thus able to control the electoral machinery. The government, on the other hand, could count upon the police. Under these circumstances both sides appealed for American supervision, and a committee of high American officials, with more than two hundred assistants, took charge of the election. Before the voting the administration party



withdrew from the contest, claiming that it had not received fair treatment, and Dr. Belisario Porras, the leader of the liberal party, became President.

#### CONSTRUCTION OF THE CANAL

Meanwhile the construction of the canal had been pushed forward under the energetic leadership of Colonel George W. Goethals. Some thousands of North Americans and a much larger number of Negro laborers from the British and French West Indies were brought to the Isthmus to work on the project. Large communities grew up at either end of the waterway, close to Panama City and Colon, with government-supported schools and club-houses and commissaries. Many other North Americans and several thousand colored West Indians settled in the territory of the Republic. The Panaman cities flourished on the great sums of money spent in the Isthmus during the construction period and on the tourist trade after the canal was opened to commerce in 1914.

The canal itself is one of the great achievements of modern engineering. At either end, three locks raise ships to Gatun Lake, an artificial body of water created by damming the Chagres River at Gatun and flooding 164 square miles in the center of the Zone. South of the lake, vessels pass through a cut, 300 feet deep, from which tremendous quantities of earth were removed before troublesome landslides were brought under control. The transit, from Cristóbal on the Caribbean to Balboa on the Pacific, requires about six hours. The waterway is one of the world's great trade routes, besides being a vital link in the naval defense of the United States.

#### THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION OF 1918

Dr. Porras, after his election as President in 1912, dominated Panaman politics for some twelve years. He declined to accept American supervision of the election of 1916, and the opposition consequently refused to participate in it. His follower, Ramón Valdés, became President, but died two years later. Thereafter Porras was again elected acting President, but only after a violent controversy during

which American troops took over the policing of Panama City and Colon.

The United States intervened on this occasion, not only to prevent political disorders but for other reasons. It had long been dissatisfied with conditions in the Panaman police force. There had been a series of clashes between police and American soldiers or sailors, some of which had ended in fatalities, and in 1916 the American legation had virtually compelled the Panaman government to take away the rifles with which the police had hitherto been armed. During the European war, when a large number of troops were stationed in the Canal Zone, the failure to control drug-selling and other undesirable activities had been a further cause for complaint. These conditions were now remedied, and an American instructor already in the employ of the Panaman government was given authority to effect a thoroughgoing reform of the police force. At the same time the United States insisted on reforms in the government's financial administration. A law passed in the latter part of 1918 provided for the appointment of a "Fiscal Agent," to be selected with the help of the United States, who was to be a sort of financial adviser and comptroller. Mr. Addison Ruan, who was appointed to this post, did much to place the hitherto disordered finances of the Republic on a sound basis.

#### THE COSTA RICA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

Dr. Porras resigned shortly before the election of 1920 in order to be eligible as a candidate for the new term. He was reelected without difficulty, after the United States had declined to interfere, and served until 1924. The chief event of his administration was a short war with the neighboring republic of Costa Rica.

The boundary between Panama and Costa Rica had long been in dispute. An arbitral award handed down by the President of France in 1900 proved impossible of execution, and its interpretation was submitted to a new arbitration before Chief Justice White of the United States Supreme Court. The decision, handed down in 1914, was rejected by Panama on the ground that the arbiter had exceeded his authority by drawing a new boundary line outside of the territory in dispute. Prolonged negotiations followed, but no agreement was

reached, although the United States urged Panama to accept the White award. In 1921 Costa Rica attempted to occupy by force the Coto region which Panama had continued to hold, though it lay on the other side of the line laid down by the White award. Her forces were defeated by an improvised army composed largely of Panama City policemen, and at this point hostilities were checked by the diplomatic intervention of the United States. Some months later, acting under the authority which it claimed as the guarantor of Panama's independence, the United States insisted that Costa Rica be permitted to occupy the Coto region without resistance.

## RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES,

1924-1931

Rodolfo Chiari, a political associate of Dr. Porras, became President in 1924. At the outset of his administration he was confronted with the problem of negotiating a new treaty with the United States. The Taft Agreement of 1904, which was intended only as a *modus vivendi* during the period while the canal was under construction, had been abrogated by the United States on June 1, 1924. This raised again the whole question of commercial operations in the Canal Zone, and there were problems which had arisen since 1903 in the relations between the two governments. An unsuccessful attempt to deal with several of these was made when a new treaty was signed on July 28, 1926. The United States offered to perpetuate the principles of the Taft Agreement so far as commerce in the Canal Zone was concerned, and made other important concessions. Panama, on the other hand, was to cede a part of Colon to the United States, receiving in return financial aid in the construction of a highway across the Isthmus. The two governments were to cooperate in controlling radio communication and commercial aviation, a provision of much importance in connection with the defense of the canal, and Article XI provided that Panama would consider herself in a state of war whenever the United States became involved in hostilities.

When this treaty was submitted to the Panaman congress there was much opposition to Article XI and also to the proposed cession of land in Colon. Ex-President Porras, who had quarreled with Señor

Chiari, inspired an active campaign against the treaty, and its ratification was defeated. Negotiations for a new agreement were begun soon afterward, but it was several years before one was signed. In the meantime, however, the United States of its own accord continued to exclude private business from the Canal Zone and to confine sales at the commissaries to persons connected with the canal or ships passing through.

Important changes were by this time taking place in the Caribbean policy of the United States, and these were reflected in relations between that country and Panama. The maintenance of order on the Isthmus, and especially in Panama City and Colon, was still essential for the proper functioning of the canal, but the responsibility was left more and more in the hands of the Panaman authorities. After 1922 the powers of the American Inspector General of Police and of the Fiscal Agent were gradually curtailed. Elections were conducted without American interference or supervision after 1918. It was nevertheless taken for granted before 1931 that any serious disorder or attempt at revolution would be promptly suppressed by the United States. The events of that year showed how complete the change in American policy had been.

#### THE REVOLUTION OF 1931

By this time party lines had broken down in Panama and politics had become almost entirely a matter of personalities and desire for office. Since the manner in which elections were conducted made it difficult if not impossible for an opposition candidate to win, a small group had been able to perpetuate itself in power, and there had been increasing corruption and inefficiency. Discontent with existing conditions, aggravated by the effects of the world depression, was especially evident during the administration of Florencio Harmodio Arosemena, who succeeded Chiari in 1928. On January 2, 1931, a group of the President's opponents suddenly seized control of Panama City. There was some fighting, in which several policemen were killed, but the United States did not intervene. After the revolt had succeeded, however, the American Minister used his good offices to bring about a settlement which had the outward appearance of con-

stitutionality, and the United States continued normal diplomatic relations with the new provisional regime headed by Dr. Ricardo Alfaro. In 1932 Harmodio Arias, one of the leaders of the revolution, was elected President.

The most important event of Arias' administration was the negotiation of a new treaty with the United States. The failure to ratify the agreement signed in 1926 had left unsettled many important questions. One of these, the troublesome problem of commercial operations in the Canal Zone, was adjusted in a manner highly satisfactory to Panama when Arias visited the President of the United States in 1933, but a new dispute arose in 1934. When the United States decreased the gold content of the dollar and attempted to pay the canal annuity in the new currency, Panama refused to accept payment on this basis. This and several other matters were dealt with in the treaty signed at Washington on March 2, 1936.

#### THE TREATY OF 1936

The new treaty made important concessions to Panama's national pride and material interests. Her independence was no longer formally guaranteed by the United States and the American government gave up its right to intervene to maintain order in Panama City and Colon. It also accepted important limitations on its freedom of action in the Canal Zone, in which only employees of the United States and persons connected with the operation of the canal were henceforth to be permitted to live. It gave up the right to take additional land outside of the Zone for canal purposes, and ceded to Panama a corridor connecting the city of Colon with the rest of the Republic's territory. The canal annuity was henceforth to be 430,000 Balboas, approximately the equivalent in Panamanian currency of \$250,000 gold.

One of the more important provisions of the new treaty was Article X which provided that in case of war or threat of aggression the two governments would act to protect their common interests and would consult regarding any measures that either government considered necessary, if these measures affected the territory of the other. Under the old treaty, the United States had claimed the right to use Panamanian territory for military purposes in any way that seemed

necessary, and a reluctance to give up full freedom of action in defending the canal was apparently responsible for the long delay which occurred before the treaty was approved by the United States Senate. By an exchange of notes in February, 1939, however, Panama agreed that manoeuvres of American troops in territory adjacent to the Zone were an essential measure of preparedness, and that in an emergency the United States might take action to defend the canal in advance of consultation between the two governments. This clarified the situation, and in July, 1939, the treaty was ratified and went into effect.

#### RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS

The election at which Harmodio Arias' successor was chosen in 1936 was one of the most closely contested in the history of the Republic. The official candidate, Juan Demóstenes Arosemena, was declared ineligible for technical reasons by the National Elections Jury, but the President insisted upon Arosemena's right to run and after the voting removed one member of the jury to procure a majority which would declare him elected. On the face of the returns, Arosemena received a small majority over his principal opponent, Domingo Díaz, but the latter's supporters loudly impugned the fairness of the final count.

Arosemena died in December, 1939, and Dr. Augusto Boyd served out the few remaining months of the presidential term. In the election of 1940 Dr. Arnulfo Arias, Harmodio Arias' brother, was the government candidate. His opponent, Dr. Ricardo Alfaro, withdrew from the race in May after several of his supporters had been arrested and others had been compelled to flee into the Canal Zone. A few months after Arias took office, the constitution was suspended and a new one adopted extending the president's term to six years. This action was criticized by the government's opponents, who accused the President of establishing a dictatorship with fascist tendencies. The suspicion that Arias inclined toward totalitarianism increased in October, 1941, when he forbade the arming of Panaman merchant ships. This was an act of some importance, because a large number of vessels owned by

companies in the United States had been registered under the Panaman flag and several had been sunk in the war zone.

On the day after this decree was issued, Arias secretly flew to Habana, where, as he later said, he wished to consult an oculist. His cabinet, discovering that he had left the country without obtaining the necessary permission from Congress, promptly declared that he had forfeited the presidency and installed Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia in his place. The change took place without disorder, and the new administration at once made it clear that it proposed to cooperate with the United States in questions of hemisphere defense.

#### IMPORTANCE OF THE CANAL

The opening of the canal at Panama changed many of the world's trade routes. It benefited especially the hitherto relatively isolated countries of the west coast of South and Central America, which now had a readier access to the eastern United States and Europe and began to enjoy the advantages of more frequent and adequate steamship services. It also became an important link in the domestic communication system of the United States, for it was cheaper to send many commodities by sea via Panama than overland by rail. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, 5,903 ocean-going commercial vessels passed through the waterway and paid \$23,661,021 in tolls. Equally significant, from the standpoint of the United States, was the usefulness of the canal from a military point of view. The ability to send the battle fleet quickly from one ocean to the other practically doubled its value. At the same time the defense of the canal and its approaches created new strategic problems and new diplomatic problems. Even more than in the past, the United States had a vital interest in preventing any potentially hostile power from obtaining a foothold anywhere in the Caribbean region. After the turn of the century this interest caused the American government to follow policies that radically affected the internal development of several other Spanish American republics.

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## *Chapter XXII*

### CENTRAL AMERICA BEFORE 1900

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#### THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

The five Central American provinces, today the Republics of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, were ruled in colonial times by a Captain General at Guatemala City, with governors under him in each provincial capital. Under the Spanish regime, and well into the period of independence, they had little contact with the outside world. The principal settlements, in the volcanic region on the western side of the Isthmus, were separated from the east coast by high mountains and tropical jungle. On the Pacific side there were few good ports, and even these were rarely visited by ships. The San Juan River in Nicaragua was used to some extent as a trade route, but dangerous rapids and a still more dangerous bar where it entered the Caribbean Sea made it of little value. Exports and imports were consequently unimportant, and most of the towns, which were the center of all political and intellectual activity, were small and unprogressive. Nevertheless, the region was densely populated, at the end of the colonial period, as compared with many other sections of Spanish America. With an area less than half that of Venezuela or New Granada, it probably had somewhat over a million inhabitants, of whom the majority were in Guatemala.

There were differences in the character of the population from province to province which must be borne in mind if we are to understand the history of the Central American republics as independent nations. Within this one small area, one may study many of the racial problems that have affected the development of Spanish America as a whole. In Guatemala the majority of the people are pure-blooded In-



dians of Maya stock, descended from a race that gave prehistoric America one of its highest civilizations, but now an ignorant and oppressed laboring class, speaking native dialects and completely excluded from the political and intellectual life of the conquering race. Economic and social conditions there are thus much like those of Central Mexico or Peru, and we should not expect to see any rapid progress toward democracy. On the other hand, the willingness of the white ruling class to support strong governments resting on military force, in order to maintain their own dominance over the Indians, has given the government a relative stability. In El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua the aboriginal population, less advanced and less numerous before the Conquest, was more completely assimilated and the masses of the people, as well as many of the principal families, are of mixed blood. In Honduras and Nicaragua especially the landowning aristocracy has been less powerful and the common people have taken a more active interest in politics. A larger proportion of them have participated in the civil wars, and the damage done by internal strife has been correspondingly greater. In Costa Rica, on the other hand, there were still fewer Indians, and only an insignificant number survived the first years of Spanish domination. The lack of a native labor supply made the colony unattractive to immigrants, but those who did come were hardy farmers whose descendants today are an industrious people more completely European in blood than those of any other Latin American country except Uruguay. In such a community the development of real republican government was possible.

#### CENTRAL AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

The Central American provinces were at first little affected by the movement for independence in the other colonies. There were small, easily suppressed revolutionary disturbances in a few places between 1811 and 1814, but the inhabitants as a whole seemed content to maintain the connection with Spain. The few creole leaders who felt otherwise had little following. After 1820, however, freedom of speech and of the press under the new Spanish constitution gave the more radical element an opportunity to advocate changes in the

colonial political and social organization. This alarmed the conservatives and the clergy, who were already shocked by the conduct of the liberal government in Spain, and made them less averse to breaking away from the mother country if they could thereby retain their own prerogatives. Iturbide's revolt in Mexico set the example and precipitated their action. Their movement met with little resistance because the acting Captain General, Brigadier Gabino Gaínza, proved willing to intrigue with the advocates of independence in return for their promise to make him head of the new government.

On September 15, 1821, an assembly of royal officials, high ecclesiastical officers, and prominent creoles met in Guatemala City to declare the independence of Central America. Gaínza retained his position but shared power with a *junta consultiva* of influential citizens. Both the conservatives and the more radical revolutionary leaders took part in the proceedings, but it was not long before the existence of the new regime was threatened by disputes between these two groups. The liberals objected to the predominance of conservatives in the *junta* and to the measures taken to assure the election of conservatives to the congress which was to decide the permanent form of the government. On the other hand, the Spanish governors of Honduras and Nicaragua, who were personally unfriendly to Gaínza, threw off his authority and announced their adherence to Iturbide's Plan of Iguala.

#### UNION WITH MEXICO

The idea of annexation to Mexico was soon taken up by other conservatives, and especially by those who opposed the establishment of a republic, and in November Iturbide announced his intention of sending troops to support his partisans. The latter, thus encouraged, hastily obtained approval of their scheme by a majority of the municipal councils throughout the five provinces, and on January 5, 1822, the union with Mexico was proclaimed. General Filísola, who was sent by Iturbide to take charge of the government, was well received in Guatemala. He encountered more resistance in El Salvador, where republican sentiment was especially strong, and where the Congress, in the hope of obtaining outside help, voted to ask that the

province be admitted as a state into the North American Union. Before this request could reach Washington, however, the city of San Salvador was occupied by the imperial troops. The union with Mexico lasted a little more than a year, for Filísola relinquished his authority when Iturbide fell in February, 1823.

#### THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Before leaving, Filísola convoked a Central American Congress which named a triumvirate to take charge of the administration. While this *junta*, torn by internal dissensions and handicapped by lack of money, strove to maintain some semblance of organized government, the Congress drew up a federal constitution modeled on that of the United States. There were to be a president and a congress at Guatemala City, with state governments in each of the provinces. A limited suffrage and a cumbersome indirect system of voting assured the maintenance of power in the hands of the wealthier and better educated class. Catholicism was made the state religion and the public exercise of all others was prohibited. Negro slavery, never a very important institution in Central America, was abolished.

In 1825 Manuel José Arce became President of the Republic. Arce was a liberal, but he soon quarreled with the liberal majority in the legislative body and was driven to seek conservative support. His term of office was a stormy one. It proved impossible for the federal and state authorities to exist side by side in harmony in Guatemala City, and minor quarrels over questions of jurisdiction culminated in the forcible ousting of the liberal state governor and his replacement by a conservative. Meanwhile the Congress was paralyzed by party strife, and the federal authorities were reduced to impotence by disorders in the states. The people of the city of San Salvador, angered by their failure to obtain the creation of a new diocese in their state, and led by Father Delgado, the disappointed aspirant to the bishopric, rose in revolt in 1827. They were joined by disaffected groups in other states, and there ensued two years of general civil war which finally ended in the government's defeat. The leader of the victorious liberal army was Francisco Morazán, a native of Honduras, who was barely thirty years old in 1829.

Morazán was elected to the presidency of Central America in 1830. His party obtained control of all the state governments, but within a few months the conservatives resumed the civil war. Revolts were suppressed in Guatemala and Honduras, but only after severe fighting. There was also renewed friction between the federal and the state authorities in Guatemala City, and when Morazán decided to move his headquarters to San Salvador, where the liberal party was stronger, the authorities in that state resisted him. Morazán defeated them, however, and made their city the capital of the Republic in 1834. Further friction led him to make it a separate federal district a year later. Meanwhile, Morazán had been elected for a second term as President, but his prestige was rapidly waning and the federal republic itself was disintegrating. In 1838 the national Congress closed its sessions and declared the states free to adopt any form of government that they desired. After more than a year of civil war, Morazán's army was defeated by the state forces of Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, and in April, 1840, he left San Salvador to go into exile.

#### THE AFTERMATH OF THE FEDERATION

The attempt to unite Central America under one government had thus failed. The people of the Isthmus were no better prepared to make a success of democratic institutions than their neighbors in Mexico, and the ignorance and indifference of the voters and the political inexperience of the leaders made it especially difficult for them to operate the complicated machinery of a federal system. The government's task had been complicated by the long distances from one province to another and by the lack of roads, which made communication and travel slow and uncertain. More serious still was the intensity of the localistic spirit, which made the people of the provincial towns and villages jealous of the national capital and even caused dissensions within the various states. The ideal of a united Central America, however, did not die out with the dissolution of the federal republic. It continued to be one of the aspirations of Central American patriots, espoused especially by Morazán's successors in the liberal party. Even today it has a powerful appeal to the people of the Isthmus.

Attempts to reunite Central America after Morazán's downfall were nevertheless uniformly unsuccessful. In Guatemala, many of the great families and the clergy preferred a local government under their own control to the uncertainties of a revived federation. In Costa Rica there was an equally strong separatist feeling. Geographical isolation had enabled the Costa Ricans to avoid participation in the civil wars which destroyed the federal republic, and they had no desire to become involved in new complications. In El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, on the other hand, unionist sentiment was stronger, and these states repeatedly endeavored to set up a new federal government, even though only the three of them participated in it. In 1842 they did establish a loose confederation, which broke up two years later when they started fighting among themselves. In 1849 they made another attempt, inspired by the desire for mutual defense against the British encroachments on the Mosquito Coast.<sup>1</sup> The central council which they established had little power, and when an effort was made to strengthen its authority in 1852 the whole project failed. Thereafter interest in the union seemed to decline, but it revived from time to time in later years. Throughout their history the Central American republics have regarded themselves as a separate community of states, bound to one another by peculiarly intimate ties.

This tradition had a bad as well as a good side. Personal and group political enmities formed during the federal period persisted after the union was dissolved, and liberals and conservatives in one country continued to support their former associates in the others and to aid them in time of civil war. Consequently international conflicts were frequently brought on by the mere fact that neighboring states were ruled by administrations of different political complexion. Each government in such a case was likely to organize or aid a revolution against the other, if only to forestall similar action on the other's part. The weaker states naturally suffered the most from this practice, and for many years after the breakdown of the federation the history of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras is little more than a confused story of international and internal conflicts which made orderly progress impossible. It would serve little purpose to enumerate the presidents who held office successively in each of these states, or to

<sup>1</sup> See above, Chapter XXI.

describe the circumstances in which they rose and fell. In El Salvador and Honduras, and to a less extent in more distant Nicaragua, the development of any independent national political life was made difficult by constant interference from Guatemala. During the first half century of independence the political history of the northern republic is thus the key to the history of Central America as a whole.

#### RAFAEL CARRERA

In Guatemala, more than in the other countries, the political parties were divided on real issues. Lines were drawn much as they were in Mexico, with the clergy, the remnants of the colonial nobility, and many of the great landowners and rich merchants on the conservative side, and creole and *mestizo* professional men and other groups who had had a less privileged position in colonial times forming the liberal party. The hostility between the two groups had become acute during the last years of the federal republic. The liberals, when they came into power with Morazán, had adopted several reforms, such as the suppression of monastic orders and the confiscation of their property by the federal government and the institution of civil marriage and divorce in the state of Guatemala, which outraged the Church and the conservative elements generally. As in Mexico, the country as a whole was not ready for such radical measures.

The priests, who still had much influence among the Indian and *mestizo* country people, exerted themselves to stir up discontent, and they had their opportunity when an epidemic of cholera appeared in 1837. By spreading a story that the government was poisoning the wells to destroy the natives and make way for Protestant immigrants from England, they fomented an uprising among the ignorant inhabitants of the isolated mountain region east of Guatemala City. The movement was at first little more than a local outbreak of banditry, but its leader, an illiterate youth named Rafael Carrera, soon built up a great following among his fellow Indians and became the chief general on the conservative side in the civil wars that caused the disintegration of the federal government. The liberals, weakened by their own factional quarrels, were finally driven out of Guatemala City, and when they attempted to set up the separate state of Los

Altos in the western part of the country they were defeated there. By 1840 the conservatives were in full control. The aristocratic party leaders, however, found themselves at the mercy of the chieftain of the half-savage horde that had won the victory for them, and though others occupied the presidency, Carrera remained at the head of the army and was the real ruler of the country. In 1844 he took the presidency himself. He met with some difficulties at first, and political opposition forced him to relinquish power for brief periods, but by 1852 his authority was firmly established. In 1854 he made himself President for life, and ruled as an absolute dictator until his death in 1865.

Carrera gave Guatemala a period of relative tranquility which was very welcome after the disturbances under the federal republic. His power rested chiefly upon the blind devotion of the Indian masses and the loyalty of a well-paid army, but he was also supported by native and foreign property owners who desired the maintenance of peace. His policy, in general, was reactionary. Anticlerical legislation was repealed, and the Jesuits and other religious orders were invited to return to Guatemala. The Church again became a powerful political force.

#### EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA AFTER 1840

Guatemala's neighbors enjoyed less internal peace, and their difficulties were made worse by Carrera's continual interference in their internal affairs. In 1840 a Guatemalan army defeated the liberal regime that had supported Morazán in El Salvador, and placed that country under the de facto control of a military leader named Francisco Malespín. In the same way, a conservative government was set up in Honduras. Personal quarrels, however, prevented any lasting co-operation between the rulers of the three states, and in 1844-45 all of them, and Nicaragua as well, were involved in a general war which was both an international conflict and an internal struggle in each state. In El Salvador, the liberals came into control for a brief period, were overthrown in 1851 by Carrera, and then returned to power in 1860 under the popular and able Gerardo Barrios. In 1863 a new

Guatemalan intervention replaced Barrios by Francisco Dueñas. In Honduras the story was much the same, Francisco Ferrera, an ally of Carrera, dominated the government through his control of the army until 1852. In that year Trinidad Cabañas, a liberal, became President. In 1855 Cabañas was overthrown by Carrera and was succeeded by General Santos Guardiola. The latter was assassinated in 1862, and a year later the liberals, who had regained power, were driven out by Guatemalan and Nicaraguan intervention.

In Nicaragua the enmity between the two chief cities, León and Granada, made party strife even more acute. León was the liberal center, Granada the conservative, and all differences of policy or principle were lost sight of in what became simply a regional feud. There were level-headed leaders in both cities who endeavored to bring about harmony, but their efforts were frustrated by popular hatreds and by the machinations of military leaders who profited from the continuance of disorder. The heads of the army, rather than the numerous "Chiefs of State" who succeeded one another for two-year terms, were the real rulers of the country. Casto Fonseca, a liberal, was *comandante de armas* until 1845, when the conservatives, with their allies from Honduras and El Salvador, barbarously sacked León and killed many of its inhabitants. The seat of government was transferred first to Masaya and then to Managua, both of them small towns near Granada, but a few years later the new *comandante de armas*, Trinidad Muñoz, betrayed his conservative supporters and reestablished the capital at León. When the conservatives regained power in 1851, with help from Honduras and Costa Rica, they first vainly attempted to set up a coalition government, and then subjected the liberals to a repressive regime which goaded the people of León into revolt in 1854.

#### WILLIAM WALKER AND THE FILIBUSTERS

The new civil war was the occasion for one of the most sensational episodes in Central American history. The liberals, at first successful, found themselves hard pressed when the conservatives obtained aid from Guatemala. They consequently turned for help to a band of adventurers recruited in the United States by one William Walker.



These "filibusters," fifty-eight in number, reached Nicaragua in June, 1855. In October they seized Granada by surprise and the conservative leaders, though their army was undefeated, made peace in order to save their families from mistreatment. A conservative became President, but Walker was made commander of the army. Disbanding the native troops, he soon made it clear that he proposed to rule the country with his "American Phalanx"; and in 1856, after the leaders of both parties had started a revolt against him, he had himself "elected" President of Nicaragua. By this time hundreds of adventurers were coming from the United States to join his forces.

Walker's venture had aroused much interest in the United States. It seemed likely to defeat the British machinations to obtain control of the Nicaraguan canal route, and in the South there were hopes that it might bring Nicaragua into the union as a new slave state. He was aided especially by the Accessory Transit Company, which had been established to transport passengers across Nicaragua on their way from the east coast to California. He made the mistake, however, of supporting a group within this company that was trying to wrest control from its former president, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and when he canceled the company's concession and granted a new one to his friends, Vanderbilt quickly avenged himself. By this time armies from all of the other Central American states as well as forces representing both parties in Nicaragua were marching against the intruders, and while Walker was preparing to make a stand against these enemies in western Nicaragua, Vanderbilt's steamers on the San Juan River and the great lake helped a Costa Rican force to cut off his communications with New York. The filibusters held out against overwhelming odds for several months, but they lost heavily from disease and desertion, and on May 1, 1857, Walker surrendered to the commander of an American warship. Twice in the next three years he attempted to return to Central America with filibustering expeditions, but his career ended when he was captured and executed in northern Honduras in 1860.

In Nicaragua both parties were under arms at the end of the war and it seemed probable that the disappearance of the common enemy would be followed by a new struggle between them. They reached an agreement, however, when Costa Rica attempted to take advan-

tage of the situation to retain possession of territory that Nicaragua claimed along the San Juan River; and Máximo Jerez, the leader of the liberals, consented to the establishment of a conservative government under Tomás Martínez. This was the beginning of a long period of relative peace under the control of the conservative party.

#### COSTA RICA, 1821-1870

Though they took an active part in the war against Walker, the people of Costa Rica were usually able to remain aloof from the political struggles that kept the neighboring countries in a state of turmoil. Most of the Costa Ricans lived in or near four little towns, all within a few miles of one another on a pleasant plateau in the interior far from any other settlement. Descended from sturdy peasants from northern Spain who had come to the colony because they were not afraid to work with their own hands, the majority were small farmers, ignorant and conservative, but hard-working and self-respecting. There were few wealthy landowners, and at the other end of the scale very few Indians or Negroes. The large proportion of European blood and the wide distribution of property made the prospect for the eventual development of democratic government brighter than in any of the other Central American countries.

Even in the first years of independence, the Costa Ricans suffered less from internal political strife than did their neighbors. There were brief struggles between the various towns, arising from disputes over the location of the capital, and during the first fifty years of independence there were periodic revolts and *coups d'état* provoked by factional rivalry, but they caused relatively little bloodshed or destruction of property. Political affairs were dominated by a few prominent families, among whom the Montealegres and the Moras, heads of rival groups, were the most important. Of the early presidents, the first one, Juan Mora (1825-33), and Braulio Carillo (1835-37 and 1838-42) were the most notable. It was Carillo who first promoted the cultivation of coffee, which soon became the basis for the country's commerce with the outside world. He also strengthened the position of the peasant class—by encouraging the subdivision of the lands formerly held by the municipalities—reorganized the courts

and the financial administration, and abolished the tithes. The country made rapid progress under his regime, but his dictatorial methods, and especially his attempt to make himself president for life, made him unpopular. His own troops deserted him when Francisco Morazán landed in Costa Rica to start a revolution in 1842.

Morazán still aspired to restore the federal republic of which he had so recently been the head, but when he began to raise money and recruit men for an attack on the other states of the Isthmus the Costa Ricans turned against him and put him to death. There followed seven years of factional quarreling, during which a number of presidents and provisional presidents vainly attempted to hold the reins of government. Fortunately there was little bloodshed and the country continued its slow but steady agricultural development. The government became more stable under the firm hand of Juan Rafael Mora, who was President from 1849 until his overthrow by revolt ten years later, and who distinguished himself more than any other Central American leader in the war against the filibusters in Nicaragua. When Mora was shot after attempting a counter revolution, the old rivalry between his family and the Montecalgres again threatened to cause a civil war, but a compromise was reached and the country was fairly peaceful under the administrations of Jesús Jiménez (1863-66) and José María Castro (1866-69). The army, under two leaders named Blanco and Salazar, exercised much influence in the government during this period.

#### THE LIBERAL REGIME IN GUATEMALA

In Guatemala Vicent Cefna, who succeeded Carrera when the latter died in 1865, was overthrown by the liberals after a brief civil war in 1871. Miguel García Granados became President, but his authority was overshadowed by that of the most prominent leader in the recent revolt, Justo Rufino Barrios. Under the latter's influence, the Jesuits and some of the higher church authorities were expelled from the country and the property of the monastic orders was confiscated. In 1873 Barrios became President, to rule as a dictator until his death twelve years later. With the enthusiastic support of a strong popular following, he ruthlessly crushed all opposition and permanently de-

stroyed the political influence of the Church and the conservative aristocracy. He helped to maintain liberal governments in power in Honduras and Salvador, and continued to interfere in the internal affairs of those countries whenever their rulers attempted to resist his domination.

Barrios' great ambition was to reunite Central America under his own leadership. In his efforts to achieve this, he met with opposition even in the neighboring countries whose governments owed their existence to his support. Political groups which had been glad of his help to maintain themselves in power were less willing to subordinate their local autonomy to a federal regime at Guatemala. This was especially true in El Salvador, where there was a deep-seated traditional jealousy of the more powerful state to the northwest. President Rafael Zaldívar of El Salvador had been one of Barrios' closest allies, but he refused to cooperate in the plan for a union, and in 1885 the Guatemalan dictator led an army against him. The war ended when Barrios himself was killed at the Battle of Chalchuapa.

The liberal regime was by this time so firmly established in Guatemala that even the death of its leader did not upset it. As in many other Latin American countries during this period, the development of agriculture and foreign trade made for political stability. Coffee growing had become an important industry, in which foreign as well as native capital was invested, and the planters exercised a powerful influence to prevent civil strife which would interfere with the harvesting of their crops. Manuel Lisandro Barillas, one of the *designados*, succeeded Barrios and was able to make himself President for the next term. In 1892 a comparatively free election placed José María Reyna Barrios, a nephew of Justo Rufino, at the head of the government. When he was assassinated in 1898, the first *designado*, Manuel Estrada Cabrera, assumed power. This was the beginning of a cruel and unprogressive dictatorship which was to last until 1920.

#### EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS

El Salvador also was enjoying prosperity with a rapid increase in coffee production and was moving slowly toward more stable political conditions. After 1885 the country suffered relatively little from

outside interference in its political affairs. Francisco Menéndez, who overthrew Zaldívar shortly after the battle of Chalchuapa, was President until his death in 1890. Thereafter the two Ezeta brothers seized control and maintained a rather barbarous military despotism until they were deposed by revolution in 1894. The next President was Rafael Gutiérrez, under whose administration El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua attempted to establish a new federal union, "The Greater Republic of Central America." A treaty signed in 1895 provided for a diet which was to draw up a constitution and in the meantime was to assume the conduct of the three states' foreign relations. In 1898 a federal council met at Amapala, Honduras, to assume the general government. At this point, however, there was a revolution in El Salvador, and General Tomás Regalado assumed the presidency with the support of a political group which opposed the unionist idea.

Honduras, with less land suitable for the growing of coffee and fewer other natural resources, remained comparatively poor and backward. The neighboring governments continued to interfere in her political affairs. Ponciano Leiva, who was made President by Guatemalan intervention in 1873, was forced out by Barrios in 1876, and Marco Aurelio Soto, his successor, was similarly compelled to resign in 1883, after giving Honduras one of the best administrations in her history. Luis Bográn was President from 1883 until 1891. Thereafter presidents followed one another in quick succession until 1894, when Policarpo Bonilla, an ardent liberal, came into office with the aid of President Zelaya of Nicaragua. Bonilla was followed by another liberal, General Terencio Sierra, in 1899.

#### N I C A R A G U A

The Granada conservatives, who came into power after the war with the filibusters, ruled Nicaragua until 1893. In contrast with what preceded and with what followed, this period of peace and good government was long looked back on as a sort of golden age. The Granada aristocracy was a fairly harmonious and well-organized group, with several able leaders who succeeded each other in the presidency by agreement and followed a conciliatory policy which helped to dissuade the liberals from revolt. The country made some

material progress, though its natural wealth was far less than that of Guatemala or El Salvador. As time went on, however, the continuation in power of one small group caused dissatisfaction not only in León but throughout the country. The first serious dissension within the conservative oligarchy was thus the signal for a successful liberal uprising, headed by a young leader from Managua named José Santos Zelaya. Zelaya soon established a personal dictatorship which endured for sixteen years and will be described in more detail in the next chapter.

#### COSTA RICA

The liberal victories in the four northern countries had their counterpart in Costa Rica in 1870, when an army officer named Tomás Guardia overthrew the government, exiled the leaders of the two political groups that had hitherto competed for control, and set up a regime in which the Moras and the Montealegres had no part. Guardia dominated affairs, though not always as President, until his death in 1882, and was succeeded in power first by his close friend Próspero Fernández and three years later by the latter's son-in-law, Bernardo Soto. Soto's administration was especially notable for the establishment of free compulsory education in the principal towns and villages of the Republic, under the direction of his minister Mauro Fernández.

In 1889 an aroused public opinion compelled Soto to permit the holding of a real popular election, probably the first in the history of Central America, in which the opposition candidate, José Joaquín Rodríguez, was chosen as President. Despite its origin, the new administration, supported by the Church, was practically a dictatorship, and Rodríguez' successor, Rafael Yglesias, was put in office for two terms (1894-1902) by the electoral methods formerly in vogue. Yglesias, however, was an able ruler, and the country owed much to his progressive policy. When he left office, Costa Rica, despite its small area and scanty population, was a well-governed and peaceful community, where an increasingly intelligent public opinion would very soon demand a government republican in fact as well as in form.

CENTRAL AMERICA AT THE TURN  
OF THE CENTURY

Elsewhere in Central America the prospect was not so bright. In Guatemala, coffee growing had brought prosperity to the landowners, but the benefit had accrued only to a very limited class. The Indians, who formed the great mass of the population, were on the whole worse off than when Thomas Gage gave so sad an account of their condition in the seventeenth century. As coffee planting developed, much of their land had been taken, often by force or fraud, and Justo Rufino Barrios and his successors had sought to help the new industry by extending and making more effective the systems of forced labor which had always existed. As in colonial times, Indian villages were compelled to furnish groups of laborers, called "mandamientos," when local planters needed them. Still worse, from the Indian's point of view, was the peonage system, enforced by law, under which laborers were tricked or forced into debt, and then compelled to work for wages which in 1916 were equivalent to from five to eight cents per day in United States currency.

In El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the *mestizo* laboring class was far better off, but wages and standards of living were low and tropical diseases made more miserable the lives of a large part of the population. In El Salvador, as in Guatemala, the rapid increase in coffee production had benefited principally the landowning aristocracy. In Nicaragua there had been less agricultural development; in Honduras almost none. In all three countries disorder and governmental poverty made it difficult to establish schools or to take other measures to improve the lot of the common people. The great majority were probably little better qualified to be citizens of free republics than they had been in 1821, and the governments under which they lived were consequently republican only on paper. Despite the trend toward greater stability in the last years of the century, changes of government by revolution or *coup d'état* were still the rule rather than the exception, and constant interference by the various states in one another's internal affairs brought on frequent international conflicts.

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## *Chapter XXIII*

### CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES: 1900—1942

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#### INCREASING CONTACT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

The Central American states had relatively little contact with the outside world in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Their commerce was too unimportant to arouse the interest of other nations, and political disorder and lack of transportation had discouraged the investment of foreign capital. Though most of their principal towns had by this time been connected by railroad with the Pacific coast, inadequate and irregular steamer service still made them difficult of access. Comparatively few of their people were able to travel or study abroad, and few foreigners came to Central America.

A number of factors, both economic and political, changed this situation after 1900. One of them was an improvement in means of transportation, largely as a result of the development of the banana industry. Minor C. Keith, an American, had begun the planting of bananas in Costa Rica in 1872 to provide paying freight for a railroad that he was building from the east coast to San José, and when the line finally reached the capital in 1890 the export of bananas from Port Limón, its eastern terminus, had already become an important business. Keith later established plantations in Colombia and Panama, and in 1899 he joined with other banana interests in creating the United Fruit Company. This great concern extended its operations to Guatemala in 1906 and to Honduras soon afterward. Wherever it operated it established lines of fast steamers which carried passengers as well as fruit and made the journey from Central America to the United



States a matter of days rather than of weeks. It also built railroads for the shipment of fruit to the ports, and through an allied company, the International Railways of Central America, took over and extended the railways in the interior of Guatemala and El Salvador. Mr Keith was the dominant figure in this enterprise, and it was owing to his persistent efforts that a connection was finally established between Guatemala City and Puerto Barrios on the Caribbean coast in 1908 and between San Salvador and Puerto Barrios in 1929.

The banana industry was important in other ways. Great tracts of hitherto uninhabited jungle were brought under cultivation, and bananas became the principal export, after coffee, in the trade of the Isthmus as a whole. The plantations at first were operated largely with imported Negro labor from the West Indies, but as time went on they gave to many natives of the country employment at relatively high wages. On the other hand, the Fruit Company was accused of ruthlessly eliminating competitors, and of oppressing the small growers, who had no other buyer for their fruit. It naturally dominated the economic life of the districts where it operated, and it inevitably became involved in local politics.

The centers of production in the banana industry shifted from time to time because disease usually invaded the plantations after some years of cultivation, destroying much of the value of the great investment in farms, railroad, and port facilities. Thus Costa Rica, the most important Central American banana area before the first World War, gave place to Honduras, which exported 31,000,000 stems in 1932 but now ships less than half of that amount. The production of bananas for export was at first confined to the hitherto neglected and almost uninhabited lowlands along the Caribbean coast, but more recently plantations have also been established on the Pacific side of the Isthmus.

Communications with the outside world were also improved by the opening of the Panama Canal. After 1914 an increasing number of steamers called at the west-coast ports to land goods or pick up coffee, and some of these were comfortable passenger vessels bound for New York or San Francisco which facilitated travel even from those countries which as yet had no access to the Caribbean Sea. The value of these services was increased by the advent of the automobile. Im-

proved highways brought places like Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, and Quezaltenango, the second city of Guatemala, within fairly easy reach of the coast and opened up many other sections of Central America where goods had before been transported on the backs of mules or on the backs of men.

#### POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE CENTURY

As we saw in the last chapter, the majority of the Central American states seemed at the turn of the century to have achieved a measure of political stability. In Guatemala and El Salvador, the two richest and most populous countries, the old party lines had broken down and the landowning classes were inclined to frown on efforts to provoke civil war because it hurt their interests. The governments still rested primarily on military force, but their position had been strengthened by increasing prosperity.

Manuel Estrada Cabrera was President of Guatemala from 1898 until 1920. An astute and unprincipled politician, without personal popularity, and apparently with no aspiration beyond merely staying in office, his regime was an unmitigated despotism maintained by a virtual reign of terror. All classes were demoralized by an omnipresent spy system and elections were the merest farce. Little or nothing was accomplished in the way of public works or social welfare, but the maintenance of order and the government's support of the increasingly oppressive peonage system made the regime acceptable to native and foreign property interests.

The government of El Salvador was also a military dictatorship, but of a better type. Politics were dominated by the wealthy landowners, and the administration was relatively efficient and progressive. As a rule each president surrendered his office at the end of his legal term, though almost always to a successor of his own choosing. General Tomás Regalado, the leader of the revolution that broke up the union with Nicaragua and Honduras in 1898, was President until 1903, when he was succeeded by Pedro José Escalón. Regalado continued to dominate the government until he was killed in an inconclusive war with Guatemala in 1906. Fernando Figueroa followed

Escalón in 1907, and Manuel Enrique Araujo became President in 1911. When the latter was murdered in 1913, Carlos Meléndez, the Vice-President, completed his term and was reelected in 1915. His brother, Jorge Meléndez, became President in 1919, and his brother-in-law, Alfonso Quiñónez, followed in 1923. During this long period of rule by one family there were no important revolts and the country made much progress. The school system was improved, good roads were built, and the coffee industry flourished.

In Costa Rica, where coffee had brought modest prosperity to thousands of small landowners, political conditions were entirely different. After the administration of Ascensión Esquivel, who was made President by a compromise between the political parties in 1902, real elections were held and nearly all of the qualified voters participated. The press was completely free, and revolutions seemed to have become a thing of the past. Cleto González Víquez (1906-10) and Ricardo Jiménez (1910-14) were able chief executives under whom the country enjoyed as truly republican institutions as any country in the American continent. The schools were among the best in northern Latin America and the Costa Ricans proudly boasted that they had more teachers than soldiers. The adjustment of the foreign debt removed a possible source of international complications, and the country acquired an enviable reputation for internal tranquility and orderly administration. The revolutionary tradition was by no means dead, but turbulent elements were kept in check by the opposition of the masses of the peasant proprietors to any armed outbreak.

In Nicaragua and Honduras, where less natural wealth and especially the relative lack of land suitable for coffee growing made material progress less easy, the revolutionary tradition was stronger. The ruling classes still seemed more interested in the contest for political power than in agriculture and commerce. In Nicaragua, especially, the traditional rivalry between León and Granada continued unabated, and a citizen was born a liberal or a conservative and regarded all members of the opposite group as personal enemies. In 1893, after a long period of conservative rule, the liberals had come into power under José Santos Zelaya. Being a native of Managua, Zelaya did not at first have the wholehearted support of the leaders at León, but he skillfully played off one group against another and

within a few years had firmly entrenched himself in power. His methods were despotic, but his administration was not unpopular except with the more militant conservatives, who made repeated though uniformly unsuccessful efforts to overthrow him. As time went on he became more powerful and aspired, as we shall see, to play a dominant rôle in Central American politics.

Honduras, at the beginning of the century, was the poorest and most backward of the five states. Her political life had always been dominated by her stronger neighbors, and frequent civil wars, instigated or aided from abroad, had kept party hostility alive. Guatemala, first under Carrera and then under Barrios, had been the principal offender before 1894. In that year there was a war between Honduras and Nicaragua, and Policarpo Bonilla, a personal friend of Zelaya, became President at Tegucigalpa after the Honduran government was defeated. His administration survived the breakdown of the effort to unite Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador in 1898. He was succeeded by another liberal, General Terencio Sierra, in 1899, but the conservatives returned to power after a revolt led by Manuel Bonilla in 1903.

Despite the progress of the last quarter century, political conditions in Central America as a whole were far from satisfactory. In each country except Costa Rica enemies of the regime in power were eagerly awaiting an opportunity to overthrow it. Without free elections they could only hope to do so by armed revolt. Since the customary method of starting a revolution was to obtain arms and a base for operations in some neighboring country, each government felt unsafe so long as neighboring governments were in unfriendly hands, and was thus inclined to give encouragement or open aid to exiles from neighboring states to make its own position more secure. This practice not only fomented internal strife but caused frequent international wars.

#### THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1907

As in Mexico and Venezuela, failure to protect foreign life and property in time of disorder had caused serious difficulties between Central American states and European powers, and foreign loans

which the debtor government was unwilling or unable to pay had been another source of trouble. Consequently when the United States began to interest itself in eliminating possible causes of European intervention in the Caribbean region, it inevitably became even more interested than hitherto in the internal and international problems of the Isthmian area. A new phase of its relations with Central America opened in 1906. In that year the United States and Mexico jointly offered their mediation to end a war between Guatemala on one side and El Salvador and Honduras on the other, caused by aid given to Guatemalan revolutionists by General Regalado, the Minister of War of El Salvador. At the ensuing peace conference, it was agreed that a general Central American conference should be held at San José, Costa Rica, to place the relations of the five republics on a more stable basis. This meeting took place, in September, 1906, and resulted in a number of treaties providing for compulsory arbitration of disputes, forbidding interference by one state in another's affairs, and creating agencies for closer cooperation along cultural and economic lines.

The San José Conference did little to diminish the growing tension in Central America, chiefly because of the attitude of President Zelaya of Nicaragua, who refused to send delegates and who promptly showed his contempt for the new treaties by invading Honduras and overthrowing the conservative government there. Zelaya also attempted to foment a revolution in El Salvador, hoping apparently to pave the way for a new union of Central America under his own leadership, and when Guatemala prepared to come to El Salvador's support a general war was imminent. Again the United States and Mexico offered their mediation, and this time Zelaya was compelled by diplomatic pressure to agree to send representatives to Washington to discuss the settlement of all outstanding Central American problems.

The Washington Conference of 1907, at which all five republics were represented, adopted a series of important treaties. It was agreed that all international disputes in Central America should be submitted in the future to a permanent court consisting of one judge from each state. Honduras, up to that time a battle-ground for her stronger neighbors, was to be neutralized. The five governments promised to

restrict the activities of political refugees from other states and to refrain from any encouragement to revolutionary movements. A number of conventions looking toward a closer cooperation in different economic and cultural fields were adopted. Some of these had little practical result, but they were an expression of the desire of the Central American statesmen to pave the way for the eventual reconstitution of the political union which was not considered feasible under existing conditions.

These treaties were designed to provide effective machinery to assure peace in the Isthmus, but it was clear from the first that some at least of the signatories had no intention of observing them. Zelaya seemed to the American government to be the chief offender. He continued to aid revolutionary attempts in El Salvador, and the United States finally ordered its naval forces to prevent his filibustering expeditions against that country. Both El Salvador and Guatemala, on the other hand, apparently aided a revolution against Zelaya's ally, Miguel Dávila, President of Honduras, in 1908.

A war involving all four countries was imminent when the United States and Mexico again interposed, and it was agreed at the suggestion of Costa Rica that the situation be dealt with by the new Central American court. This body ordered both sides to refrain from any further overt acts and proceeded to consider charges by Honduras and Nicaragua that Guatemala and El Salvador were responsible for the revolt in Honduras which had by this time failed. The accused governments were absolved. Unfortunately, it seemed clear that political considerations rather than the weight of the evidence had influenced the votes of several judges and the court lost much prestige as a result.

#### THE FIRST AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA

Relations between the United States and Nicaragua were by this time thoroughly bad, for there had been disputes over claims and other matters as well as friction arising from Zelaya's violations of the 1907 treaties. The authorities at Washington were thus predisposed to sympathize with a revolution that started on the east coast

of Nicaragua in 1909, and they openly took sides when the government's forces executed two American soldiers of fortune who were in the revolutionists' employ. Secretary Knox told the Nicaraguan chargé d'affaires that the Zelaya regime was "a blot upon the history of Nicaragua" and expressed the conviction that the revolution represented "the ideals and the will of a majority of the Nicaraguan people." Diplomatic relations were broken off, and were not resumed even after Zelaya resigned the presidency in favor of Dr. José Madriz, a generally respected liberal from León. When the revolutionists were defeated in the interior and driven back to their original base at Bluefields, the American naval commander refused to permit the government forces to attack them there, on the ground that fighting in the town would destroy the property of Americans and other foreigners. Soon afterward, in August, 1910, Madriz' regime collapsed, largely because its supporters felt that the attitude of the United States made their cause hopeless.

The events of 1909-10 involved the United States in a complicated situation from which it did not extricate itself for nearly a quarter century. The story of the intervention is a long and complicated one, involving questions of policy and ethics which were the subject of bitter controversy. Here it will be possible to give only a brief account of the outstanding facts without entering into other aspects of the complex situation.

The new regime at Managua clearly needed help if it were to survive. It was headed by General Juan J. Estrada, formerly Zelaya's governor at Bluefields, who had been promised the provisional presidency as an inducement to join the revolution with the troops under his command. One of his principal advisers was another liberal, General José María Moncada, who had been a personal enemy of Zelaya. But the other leaders of the revolution, and the overwhelming majority of the victorious army, were conservatives. Their most popular chieftain was General Emiliano Chamorro, the hero of many past revolts, but there were rival factions headed by General Luis Mena, who became Minister of War, and by Adolfo Díaz. The group in power was thus weakened by internal dissensions and mutual distrust, while the liberals were still strong numerically and united in their desire to regain control. It was only through the good offices of the

representative of the United States, Thomas C. Dawson, that the revolutionary leaders were persuaded to accept a program under which Estrada became President and Díaz Vice-President for a two-year term. At the same time they agreed that the pressing question of foreign claims should be dealt with by a commission in which the United States should participate and that a foreign loan should be obtained to relieve the government's desperate financial situation.

On June 6, 1911, a treaty providing for an American customs collectorship was signed with the government of the United States. The treaty was never ratified, because the United States Senate withheld its approval, but while it was still pending two New York banking firms which had obtained the contract for the proposed bond issue made a small short-term loan to meet Nicaragua's most pressing financial needs. To secure this, they established a customs collectorship under an American citizen named by them and approved by the Department of State. They also helped Nicaragua to establish a national bank and to reform the depreciated paper currency, and acted as agents of the Republic in making an agreement to resume service at a reduced rate of interest on a loan which Zelaya had obtained in 1909 from a British syndicate. The American bankers were thus deeply involved in the situation when the failure of the treaty made the proposed larger loan impossible. Nicaragua could not repay the advances already made, and in fact required several further small advances during the next two years. The customs collectorship was thus continued, and in 1913 the bankers bought a 51 per cent interest in the National Bank and in the national railroad, both of which companies they had already been managing.

Meanwhile, factional rivalries made the political situation even worse than before. A constituent assembly was elected, but Estrada dissolved it when he found that it was controlled by adherents of General Chamorro. The latter went into exile, but when a new assembly was elected it was dominated by friends of General Mena, the conservative Minister of War. On May 9, 1911, Mena staged a *coup d'état* which forced Estrada and his chief minister, General Moncada, to resign and made Díaz President. Mena remained as Minister of War, but in 1912, when he had the constituent assembly elect him President for the term beginning in 1913, Díaz removed him and placed Cha-



morro at the head of the army. Most of the government's forces followed Mena in a revolt in which the liberals also joined, and the government would have been overthrown if the United States had not intervened at Díaz' request and suppressed the movement by force.

For thirteen years after this affair a legation guard of about a hundred American marines was stationed at Managua. This small force was regarded in Nicaragua as a symbol of the determination of the United States to prevent further revolutionary movements and to uphold the existing government, and its presence enabled the conservative party to remain in power despite growing opposition. Adolfo Díaz was reelected as President and was succeeded by Emiliano Chamorro in 1917, after the American Minister informed the liberal candidate that he would not be recognized if elected. Diego Manuel Chamorro, a relative of Emiliano, became President in 1921.

#### THE BRYAN-CHAMORRO TREATY

The United States had sought by its intervention in Nicaragua not only to promote peace within the Republic and in Central America as a whole, but to improve the disorganized condition of the government's finances and thus to remove one possible cause of intervention by other foreign nations. Despite the failure of the loan treaty, upon which the whole program had rested, something had been accomplished. An efficient customs service had been created, the fluctuating and rapidly depreciating paper currency had been stabilized, and service on the British debt, in default after the revolution, had been resumed. The government nevertheless was constantly in financial difficulties, and payments for supplies and salaries were greatly in arrears. When the European war temporarily dislocated the country's foreign commerce in 1914, both the New York bankers and the English bondholders were compelled to agree to a suspension of payments due them, and even the new currency system seemed about to break down.

Partly with the idea of affording some financial relief to the Nicaraguan government, the Taft administration in 1913 entered into a treaty providing for the payment of three million dollars to Nicaragua

in return for the exclusive right to construct a transisthmian canal in her territory. The United States was also to obtain naval bases in the Gulf of Fonseca and on the Corn Islands in the Caribbean Sea. Later, Secretary of State Bryan added another article establishing a virtual protectorate over Nicaragua, but this was rejected by the United States Senate. The so-called Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, without the protectorate feature, was then signed on August 5, 1914, and ratified in 1916.

The provisions of this treaty were angrily protested by some of Nicaragua's neighbors. Costa Rica maintained that she had treaty rights, affirmed in 1888 by an arbitral award rendered by President Cleveland, that entitled her to be consulted before Nicaragua made any grant for canal purposes in the San Juan River. El Salvador claimed that the establishment of a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca would imperil Nicaragua's neighbors and also that the waters of the Gulf belonged jointly to the three states which bordered upon it. After futile protests to Nicaragua and to the United States, these two countries brought suits against Nicaragua in the Central American Court of Justice. Both obtained decisions condemning Nicaragua's action in entering into the treaty, but not declaring the treaty itself invalid. The United States and Nicaragua, however, refused to recognize the court's right to pass judgment in the matter. The affair caused much bitter feeling in other Central American countries, both toward Nicaragua and toward the United States. The canal has not yet been built, nor have the proposed naval bases been established.

#### THE NICARAGUAN FINANCIAL PLAN

The disposition of the \$3,000,000 paid to Nicaragua under the treaty also caused difficulties. The bankers asked that the money be used in accord with agreements that Nicaragua had made with them for payments due to them and to the British bondholders, but the Department of State insisted that claims of other creditors should also have consideration. After much discussion, a compromise was reached in the Financial Plan of 1917 which limited the Nicaraguan government's current expenditures to a fixed sum each month and provided that the surplus revenues be used to discharge those portions of the

floating debt that were not paid out of the treaty money or by means of a new issue of Guaranteed Customs Bonds. The service of these new bonds and the general supervision of the working of the arrangement were entrusted to a High Commission, consisting of the Nicaraguan Minister of Finance and two American members appointed by the Secretary of State at Washington. Another commission, similarly appointed, was to pass upon all claims against the Nicaraguan treasury, and the customs collectorship was to continue during the life of the new bonds.

A large measure of American control over Nicaragua's finances was thus established, especially as the High Commission had the important power to authorize limited expenditures outside of the budgetary allowance. A revised financial plan was adopted in 1920, when an unsuccessful effort was made to arrange a loan for the construction of the much-needed railway to the Atlantic coast. Under both plans, large sums were available for debt payment, and by 1924 the government had discharged its debts to the American bankers and repurchased the latter's stock in the National Bank and the national railroad. Even after the bankers had no further financial interest in Nicaragua, however, they continued for several years, at the government's request, to manage both of these companies.

#### DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES

The same motives which inspired its action in Nicaragua led the government of the United States to interest itself in the affairs of other Central American countries. The Taft administration, believing that financial mismanagement was the chief cause of instability and the most likely pretext for European intervention in the Caribbean, was especially interested in the establishment of some form of control over revenues and the refunding of the existing foreign debts, which were in default in every Central American state except El Salvador.

The United States had endeavored to promote a reorganization of Honduras' finances at the same time that it was drawing up the unsuccessful loan treaty with Nicaragua. Honduras' foreign debt, originating in bond issues floated under scandalous circumstances in

London between 1867 and 1870, had long been in default and by 1909 had reached an amount which the country could never hope to pay. After protracted negotiations the bondholders agreed to accept less than four cents on the dollar from funds to be provided by an American loan secured by a customs collectorship. The arrangement was accepted by President Dávila, the same man who had come into power through Zelaya's intervention, but a treaty with the United States, upon which it rested, was promptly rejected by the Honduran Congress. At almost the same time Dávila was overthrown by a revolution headed by Manuel Bonilla. The new administration expressed no objection to the proposed treaty but made little effort to procure its ratification, and when opposition developed in the United States Senate the whole scheme was abandoned. Years later, in 1926, the British bondholders agreed to accept thirty annual remittances of £40,000 each in full payment of a nominal debt of approximately £30,000,000.

While the Nicaragua and Honduras treaties were under consideration, Secretary of State Knox had expressed a willingness to help bring about financial reforms in all of the Central American states, but his proffers of assistance met with no very warm reception. Costa Rica forestalled possible interference by reaching an agreement with her European creditors in 1911. In Guatemala, Estrada Cabrera, who had been especially shameless in his treatment of foreign creditors, entered into negotiations with an American banking syndicate which proposed a refunding plan, but all of the State Department's efforts to bring about an agreement were futile. The wily dictator avoided any definite action until 1913, when the British government by a show of force compelled him simply to resume payments on the existing debt.

El Salvador, in this period, had no outstanding difficulties with foreign creditors. In 1922, however, in order to obtain a loan for public works, the government agreed to permit the supervision of its customs administration by American bankers, with a proviso that the actual collection of the customs revenues should be taken over in case of default by an official nominated by the bankers with the approval of the Secretary of State of the United States. All disputes under the contract were to be referred to a member of the United

States federal judiciary. These provisions, however, were not made effective when El Salvador defaulted in 1932.

#### THE NON-RECOGNITION POLICY AND THE TINOCO AFFAIR IN COSTA RICA

The United States was on the whole more successful in its efforts to promote political stability. The overthrow of Zelaya had been a warning to other potential trouble makers, and energetic diplomatic representations were generally enough to prevent flagrant violations of the Washington treaties in the years that followed. Discontented elements were thus cut off from outside aid, and outbreaks within a country were frequently discouraged by the prompt appearance of an American warship at the nearest port. For a time, revolutions almost seemed to have become a thing of the past. Estrada Cabrera remained in undisputed control in Guatemala, while small groups of political leaders passed on the presidency from one to another in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. Elections continued to be little more than a form, especially as the factions in power felt more and more secure in their position and governments which were outwardly constitutional benefited from the United States' policy, first enunciated by President Wilson, of opposing any one who sought to gain power by force rather than by legal procedures.

The first real test of this policy of non-recognition of revolutionary governments, so far as Central America was concerned, came, strangely enough, in Costa Rica. In the election held in that country in 1914 no candidate received a majority of the popular vote, and Alfredo González was made President by the Congress under circumstances which cast some doubt on the validity of his tenure. González made many enemies by his advocacy of heavy taxes on wealth, and in January, 1917 he was overthrown by a *coup d'état* led by Federico Tinoco, the Minister of War, who promptly had himself elected President. Nearly all of the country's political groups were prepared to cooperate with the new administration, but the United States publicly denounced Tinoco and warned American citizens against any business dealings with him. This attitude encouraged the opposition, though the United States did not countenance

open revolutionary movements, and Tinoco remained in power for two years only by dictatorial methods. In 1919 he was overthrown by a revolution headed by Julio Acosta, who was later elected President. Costa Rica thereupon resumed her normal orderly political life.

#### POLITICAL EVENTS, 1919-1923

The Tinoco affair showed how difficult it was entirely to prevent forceful changes of government in Central America, and a successful revolution by which the liberals returned to power in Honduras in 1919 further disturbed the relative tranquility that the Isthmus had been enjoying. Relations between the new regime at Tegucigalpa and the somewhat weak administration of Diego Manuel Chamorro in Nicaragua were not friendly, and each was soon accusing the other of encouraging revolutionary activity on the frontier. The 1907 treaties, which had been counted on to prevent trouble of this kind, seemed to have lost much of their efficacy. One reason was the disappearance of the Central American Court, which had ceased to exist because Nicaragua, after the decision against the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, had denounced the convention which established it. Another was the astonishingly poor quality of the American diplomatic representation in Central America, which greatly impaired the prestige and influence of the United States.

One very important new element had come into the picture with the overthrow of Estrada Cabrera in Guatemala. Partly because of diplomatic pressure from the United States, the old dictator had failed to suppress a political party which some of his opponents began to organize in 1919, ostensibly to work for a Central American Union. The movement rapidly gained strength, and by April, 1920, it had so affected the President's prestige that the Congress ventured to impeach him and to elect Carlos Herrera, a wealthy business man, as President. There was some fighting, because a part of the army remained loyal, but order was restored when Estrada Cabrera capitulated. He was imprisoned for some months, but later released and permitted to live quietly in Guatemala until his death in 1924.

There were still many persons who looked upon the reestablishment of a federal republic as one of the highest aspirations of Central

American statesmanship, and the victory of the unionist party in Guatemala made it seem possible that this ideal might now be attained. In December, 1920, a conference met at San José, Costa Rica, to draw up a treaty of union. At the outset, a violent quarrel over the validity of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty caused Nicaragua to withdraw from the proceedings. The other four states signed an agreement, but Costa Rica, traditionally reluctant to become involved in her neighbors' political affairs, refused to ratify it and only Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador went ahead with the plan. They set up a provisional federal council at Tegucigalpa in June, 1921, but the individual states had as yet not given up any of their authority to the new government when a *coup d'état* in Guatemala on December 6 drove the unionist party from power and killed the whole project.

#### THE 1923 CONFERENCE

At the beginning of 1922, therefore, the general situation in Central America was far from tranquil. There was political unrest in several states, and there were frequent accusations that one government or another was encouraging conspirators against the peace of its neighbors. The whole system set up by the 1907 treaties seemed to be crumbling. Under these circumstances the United States invited the five republics to a conference at Washington at which a new set of Central American treaties were signed early in 1923. These were in general similar to the treaties of 1907, except that a new form of court, consisting of a panel of Central American and foreign judges from which the parties to a dispute could select a tribunal in each case which arose, took the place of the five permanent, politically appointed judges of the old court. A new convention, to which the United States was also a party, provided for International Commissions of Inquiry to deal with disputes over questions of fact. The pledges to settle all disputes by peaceful means and not to give aid or permit aid to be given to revolutionists conspiring against the government of another Central American country were reiterated.

The new treaties also contained in more explicit form a provision which had appeared in the 1907 treaties but which had had little appli-

cation in practice. The five countries agreed not to recognize a government coming into power in a Central American country by revolution or *coup d'état* against a recognized government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people had not constitutionally reorganized the country, and even after such reorganization not to recognize a new government headed by one of the leaders in the revolutionary movement or by any one who had held certain high offices in the preceding government. Revolutions were thus to be made unattractive by preventing those who organized them from enjoying the fruits of victory. The significance of the provision was greatly enhanced when the United States announced that it would follow the same principle in its own policy in Central America, and it proved to be the most important and the most criticised part of the new treaties.

The non-recognition provision received its first application after a protracted and destructive civil war in Honduras which overthrew President López Gutiérrez and brought the conservatives back into power in 1924. The fighting had been ended and a provisional government established through the mediation of the United States. The chief leader of the conservatives, General Tiburcio Carías, had been the party's candidate in the election of 1923, and now expected to become President as a matter of course when new elections were held, but he was compelled to withdraw when the United States declared that he would not be recognized if elected. Dr. Paz Barahona, another conservative but a civilian, became President instead.

#### EVENTS IN NICARAGUA, 1923-1926

A still more important application of the provision occurred two years later in Nicaragua, where it helped to involve the United States in one of the most unfortunate episodes of its Caribbean policy. Nicaragua was still ruled by the conservative party, which had been able to remain in power chiefly because its opponents believed that the continued presence of the legation guard meant that it had the support of the United States. This situation had long since become an embarrassment to the American government, but the Department of State hesitated to withdraw the guard and thus almost certainly



precipitate a civil war. Instead, it pressed the Nicaraguan government to hold a free election. Its efforts met with little success in 1920, but after taking office, President Diego Manuel Chamorro had employed an American expert, Dr. Harold W. Dodds, to draw up a new electoral law and assist in its application. In November, 1923, the Nicaraguan government was informed that the United States intended to withdraw the legation guard upon the installation of a new administration at Managua in January, 1925. Secretary Hughes pointed out that the new government should be in a strong position if it were the result of a really free election, and he offered the assistance of American experts not only in holding the election but also in training an efficient constabulary to maintain order after the marines were withdrawn.

While this note was in the mail, President Diego Chamorro died and was succeeded by the Vice-President, Bartolomé Martínez. When Martínez showed a desire to be the conservative candidate in the approaching election, he was opposed by Emiliano Chamorro, who was still the chief figure in the party, and he therefore turned to the liberals and formed an alliance with them. He was forced to relinquish his own presidential aspirations when the United States pointed out that he could not legally be elected under the Nicaraguan constitution, but he threw his support to a coalition that nominated Carlos Solórzano, a conservative, as president, and Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa, a liberal, as vice-president. When the date of the election approached, he declined to accept any further assistance from the American experts who had helped earlier with the registration of voters. No one was surprised when the government candidate defeated Chamorro, the conservative nominee, by a substantial majority.

Soon after President Solórzano took office, in January, 1925, he asked that the legation guard remain for a short time pending the organization of the proposed constabulary. After some delay he employed an American expert to train this force. The work had barely begun when the legation guard was withdrawn in August, and the constabulary played little part in the disturbances that almost immediately followed.

The new President had little ability or political following and his

administration was weakened from the start by distrust and rivalry between the conservatives and liberals among whom the principal offices were divided. In August, 1925, two liberals withdrew from the cabinet after a military demonstration led by the President's brother-in-law, and in October the conservatives obtained full control by a *coup d'état* engineered by General Chamorro. The latter now sought to make himself president without open departure from legal forms. First the Vice-President, Dr. Sacasa, was forced to flee the country, and then the Congress, from which several supporters of the coalition had been expelled, named Chamorro first *designado*. He thus assumed the executive power early in 1926 when Solórzano was "given" a leave of absence.

The United States government, which repeatedly sought to dissuade Chamorro from this course of action, refused to recognize the new regime. So also did the other Central American governments, for the case fell clearly within the provisions of the 1923 treaty. The liberals almost immediately started a revolt on the east coast, which gradually developed into one of the most bitterly fought civil wars in the Republic's troubled history. The United States, after vainly endeavoring to bring about an agreement, was finally able to persuade Chamorro to withdraw from the presidency so that a government with some claim to constitutionality might be established, and in November a majority of the Congress, reorganized to include most of the members expelled by Chamorro, chose Adolfo Díaz as President. The United States now recognized the conservative regime. Unfortunately this did not satisfy the liberals, who supported the claims of the former Vice-President, Dr. Sacasa. The latter was not in Nicaragua at the time of Díaz' election, but he arrived on the east coast in December and set up a revolutionary government there. His regime was recognized by Mexico and received substantial support from that country.

The United States had by this time landed marines at several places to protect foreign interests, and in January, 1927, the legation guard was reestablished at Managua. By March 15 the American forces amounted to 2,000 men. After Díaz had been recognized, the American government more and more frankly supported him, selling him arms and making it possible for him to obtain a loan from New York

bankers. He was nevertheless unable to defeat the revolutionists and the war seemed rapidly to be developing into a stalemate. Much of the country was practically in a state of anarchy, and marauding brigands made the situation of non-combatants intolerable even outside of the zone of military operations.

In April, 1927, the President of the United States sent Mr. Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua as his personal representative. After brief negotiations, both sides agreed to surrender their arms to the American forces in return for a promise that the United States would supervise a free election in 1928. To assure fair play, a constabulary was to be trained by American officers, and until this was ready for service the American marines were to maintain order. Díaz continued as President, but liberals were restored to many of the positions which they had held in the coalition government before Chamorro's *coup d'état*.

In the negotiations that led to this settlement the liberals were represented by General José María Moncada, the principal leader of the revolutionary army. Sacasa and his civilian advisers were inclined to object to the arrangement, but they made no effort to prolong the war. The greater part of the forces on both sides cheerfully surrendered their weapons, and a few recalcitrants were forcibly disarmed. The population as a whole was relieved and pleased that the war had ended. It seemed probable that the program of pacification would be carried through without great difficulty. Matters took on a different aspect, however, when Augusto César Sandino suddenly attacked and very nearly overwhelmed a garrison of American marines and Nicaraguan constabulary at Ocotal in July.

#### SANDINO

Sandino, one of Moncada's lesser generals, had refused to disband his forces after the peace agreement and had escaped with them into the sparsely inhabited northern provinces. He never had more than a few hundred men under arms, but the mountainous, heavily forested terrain encouraged guerrilla warfare and made it difficult for the American marines to catch and destroy his forces. As he attracted more and more attention by ambushing small patrols or raiding un-

protected towns and plantations, he won much sympathy in Latin America and among anti-imperialists in the United States. His movement thus took on a significance far beyond its actual military importance. It did more to create Latin American ill-will than any other episode in our foreign policy since the "taking" of Panama.

Sandino's operations had less effect in Nicaragua itself. Peace was restored in the more important sections of the country, and the new constabulary, the *Guardia Nacional*, became a fairly efficient body under its American officers. The presidential election, supervised by General Frank R. McCoy, was held late in 1928 under conditions satisfactory to both parties. General Moncada was the liberal candidate, and Señor Adolfo Benard was nominated by the conservatives after the United States had pointed out that the Nicaraguan constitution would make General Chamorro's election illegal. Moncada won, and was peacefully inaugurated on January 1, 1929.

The bandits in the north continued to make trouble. Their activity diminished when Sandino went to Mexico in June, 1929, but again increased when he returned to Nicaragua in 1930. By this time, however, the training of the *guardia* had progressed to a point where it could assume most of the responsibility for maintaining order, and early in 1931 all American marines were withdrawn from combat duty. In April, 1931, when an earthquake destroyed the capital city of Managua and killed nearly 1,000 people, Sandino took advantage of the government's preoccupation with relief work to sack the town of Cabo Gracias on the east coast, murdering a number of civilians including nine Americans.

The American marines remained in the country to complete the training of the *guardia*, and also to help the Nicaraguan government in another respect. Shortly before the election of 1928, in order to assure peace during the forthcoming administration, both candidates had agreed that the winner would ask for American supervision of the election of 1932. Moncada not only did this but also arranged for American control of the congressional election of 1930. In both cases the liberals won, despite some dissension within the party. The President who took office in January, 1933, was Juan Bautista Sacasa, the titular leader of the revolt of 1926-27.

Immediately after Sacasa's inauguration, in accord with plans long

since announced, all American marines and American officers in the *guardia* were withdrawn from Nicaragua. The one objective for which Sandino had ostensibly been fighting was thus accomplished. At the same time he was confronted by an agreement between the leaders of the two Nicaraguan political parties to cooperate in energetic steps for the suppression of his activities. He therefore accepted an amnesty in February, 1933.

The agreement for joint action against Sandino was part of a general understanding between the liberals and the conservatives for the purpose of maintaining peace after the American marines left. There were other agreements for the appointment of members of both parties to offices in the *guardia* and for the formulation of constitutional amendments to give the party not in power representation in the Congress and other branches of the government and guarantees of electoral freedom. Sacasa had pledged himself to carry out these arrangements, and the Congress in 1933 created a bipartisan commission to draft the necessary constitutional amendments. As we shall see, however, events soon occurred which caused the plan to miscarry.

#### GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND COSTA RICA, 1923-1933

While Nicaraguan problems were causing so much concern to the government and to public opinion in the United States, the period between the Washington Conference of 1922-23 and the advent of the world depression was a more tranquil one in the other countries. The moral support given to constituted governments by the United States discouraged revolutions, and loans floated in the American market helped to make possible railroad and road construction and extensive municipal improvements in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Even Honduras, by this time the world's greatest producer of bananas, enjoyed a relative prosperity.

In Guatemala General José María Orellana, who had led the revolt of 1921, was President until his sudden death in 1926, when he was succeeded by General Lázaro Chacón. There was some disorder when Chacón was incapacitated by illness in 1930, but the United States

seems to have intervened diplomatically to insist upon the observance of constitutional forms. In 1931 General Jorge Ubico became President.

In El Salvador, the Meléndez family and their relative Alfonso Quiñónez had been in power since 1913, despite a rising popular demand for free elections. Quiñónez installed Pío Romero Bosque in the presidency in 1927 and had himself made first *designado*, but any hope which he may have had of regaining power for himself by this manoeuvre was disappointed when Romero Bosque repudiated his leadership and he was compelled to leave the country. In 1931 there was a relatively free and orderly election. Arturo Araujo was chosen President, but he was overthrown a few months later by General Maximiliano Martínez.

Honduras was fairly peaceful after the bloody civil war of 1923-24. Dr. Paz Barahona, at the end of his term as President (1925-29), held a really free election in which the opposition candidate, Vicente Mejía Colindres, defeated the conservative leader General Carías. The latter was more successful in another free election in 1932, and succeeded Mejía Colindres early in the following year.

Costa Rica, meanwhile, had resumed the orderly political life which had been rudely interrupted by the Tinoco affair, and Julio Acosta, at the end of his term in 1924, was succeeded by the highly respected and popular ex-President Ricardo Jiménez. Another former president, Cleto González Víquez, followed him in 1928, and Jiménez was again reelected in 1932. On this occasion there was trouble, because Manuel Castro Quesada, one of the defeated candidates, attempted to seize control by force, and was only persuaded to surrender, through the mediation of the diplomatic corps, after three days of armed resistance.

#### CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

The policy of the United States since the Washington Conference of 1907 had done much to promote peace in Central America. International wars had become a thing of the past and the refusal to recognize revolutionary governments had discouraged internal disorders.

In 1933 governments which were the result of real elections were in power in at least three of the five republics. On the other hand, some of the American government's actions had aroused much bad feeling. Foreign interference was unpalatable even when it took place at the request of local political leaders, and the Nicaraguan affair, especially, caused fear and distrust of the United States throughout the Isthmus. At the same time interventionist policies were extremely unpopular with North American public opinion. As a matter of fact, the trend of American policy had been away from interference in the Caribbean for some time before the Nicaraguan civil war, and this trend was accentuated after 1929. Under the Good Neighbor Policy, enunciated by President Roosevelt in 1933, absolute non-interference became the rule.

Before 1933 the United States had practically abandoned the policy of non-recognition as a means of promoting constitutional procedure in other Caribbean countries, but had been reluctant to do so in Central America because the policy was so closely connected with the whole system established by the 1907 and 1923 treaties. The threat of non-recognition failed, however, when General Martínez, the Vice-President and Minister of War, seized the presidency of El Salvador in December, 1931. Though the United States and the other Central American republics refused to continue diplomatic relations with him, he continued in power, after suppressing with much bloodshed what was described as a "communist" revolt. This created a situation that could not be changed without ignoring the treaty of 1923, but which was increasingly embarrassing to El Salvador's neighbors. When Costa Rica and El Salvador officially denounced the treaty, therefore, all four Isthmian governments recognized Martínez early in 1934, and the United States followed their example.

Events in Nicaragua also reflected the change in the policy of the United States. The *guardia*, which had so long been carrying on military operations against Sandino, was not pleased with the lenient treatment granted to the rebel leader, and incidents occurred after the peace agreement which intensified its hostility to him. He continued to maintain a small private army in the north, and soon began to carry on radical propaganda in the larger cities. The prestige that he had acquired during his long resistance to the United States

brought him many followers, but his career was soon cut short. On February 21, 1934, while he and his brother were on their way home after dining with President Sacasa, they and two companions were seized and killed by members of the *guardia*.

President Sacasa attempted to have the murderers punished but failed because the *guardia* commander, General Anastasio Somoza, assumed responsibility for their act. The police force, created to support the constitutional government, had apparently become the government's master. A year later Somoza announced his candidacy for the presidency in the approaching election. He was supported by ex-President Moncada, but opposed by the older leaders of both of the traditional political parties. How much conditions had changed was evident when Emiliano Chamorro and the liberal leader, Leonardo Argüello, bitter rivals in a generation of civil strife, agreed to put forward a coalition ticket headed by the latter.

Somoza, who was Sacasa's nephew, was ineligible under the constitution so long as his uncle remained President, but he solved this difficulty by engineering a revolt in May, 1936, which forced Sacasa to resign. A special session of Congress chose Carlos Brenes Jarquín as Provisional President, and Somoza was nominated for the next term by the Moncada wing of the liberal party and by one faction of the conservatives. In the ensuing election—held while Argüello and Chamorro, as well as Sacasa, were in exile—he obtained 117,000 votes against 1,000 for the opposing ticket. In 1939, at the end of his first term, a constituent assembly did away with the constitutional prohibition against reelection, extended the presidential period to eight years, and voted to continue Somoza in the presidency until 1947. Soon afterward he visited Washington and received one of the most imposing receptions ever given a foreign chief of state.

In remaining in power in this way, Somoza was following an example already set by the presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Each of these countries was under the rule of a powerful dictator. General Ubico, before his term expired in 1937, procured a constitutional amendment which permitted him to stay in the presidency of Guatemala six years more, and another constituent assembly in 1941 voted him a third term to begin in 1943 and end in 1949. Several revolutionary conspiracies have been discovered and sup-



pressed in recent years, but there has been no serious challenge to the government's power. In El Salvador, General Martínez was reelected in 1935, after withdrawing from office for a few months in compliance with constitutional provisions, and in 1939, after a constitutional amendment, he was again reelected, this time for a six-year term. His government also has had to crush occasional small uprisings. President Carías of Honduras met with more opposition, for the liberals revolted immediately after his election in 1933 and staged several small uprisings in subsequent years. But he too was able to do away with constitutional provisions against reelections and a constituent assembly that met in 1936 voted him a new term to expire in 1943.

In Costa Rica presidents followed one another after orderly elections. León Cortés succeeded Ricardo Jiménez in 1936 and Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia was elected President in 1940. Recent governments, however, have been troubled by the activity of subversive elements which took advantage of bad economic conditions to foment discontent. In 1934 a strike of several thousand banana workers under communist leadership caused a serious stoppage of production and led the government to adopt a policy of land distribution which might help to maintain the social democracy that had been the basis of Costa Rica's orderly political development.

On the whole, despite many unfavorable circumstances, the Central American states have made economic and social progress during the past ten years. The high quality of their coffee has enabled them to sell it at fairly profitable prices, despite depressed conditions in the trade in general, and banana exports, though far less than in the 1920's, are still an important source of income. The building of automobile roads has opened up much formerly inaccessible country, and the airplane has brought the Central American capitals within a day or two of New York. Labor conditions and standards of living have perhaps changed less, though in Guatemala the cruel peonage system has been replaced by a less oppressive form of compulsory labor resting on "vagrancy laws" and the wages paid to the Indians seem to have increased.

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## *Chapter XXIV*

### CUBA

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#### CUBA IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Cuba, and the smaller island of Puerto Rico, were the only Spanish possessions in America which did not become independent in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. With the strong naval base at Habana the colony was one of the chief centers of Spanish power, and its insular position made it practically immune from attack by the patriot armies on the mainland. Apparently, too, the Cubans had less desire to break off the connection with the mother country than the people of Venezuela or the River Plate, even though they complained of many of the same abuses that inspired the revolts in other regions.

There was less discontent, partly because the island was prosperous. The British occupation of Habana in 1762, during the Seven Years War, had opened that port to foreign ships, and a sudden outburst of commercial activity had revealed for the first time the colony's potential wealth. After the British withdrew, restrictions on trade with Spain were somewhat relaxed, and at times during the Napoleonic wars foreign vessels were freely admitted to Cuban ports. After 1818 commerce with other countries was generally authorized, though on less favorable terms than commerce with Spain. Meanwhile, beginning in the last years of the eighteenth century, there had been a phenomenal increase in production. After the slave revolt in French Saint Domingue, and the destruction of the rich sugar and coffee plantations of that colony, the cultivation of both of these crops in Cuba became much more profitable. Many refugees from Saint Domingue and many immigrants from Spain came to the island, and the importation of slaves rapidly increased.

The new settlers from Spain were little inclined to revolt, and after the revolution on the mainland started, the loyal population was increased by a further influx of refugees from the colonies there. Creoles who advocated independence consequently made little headway. After 1820 they formed a number of secret revolutionary societies, of which one called "The Suns and Rays of Bolívar" was the most important, but their feeble attempts to revolt were easily suppressed. In 1825 a scheme to free the island with help from Colombia and Mexico was discouraged by the United States. The attitude of the American government was probably influenced not only by a desire eventually to secure the island for itself but also by a fear that the breakdown of Spanish authority would lead to a slave revolt like that in Saint Domingue—a fear which also made conservative Cubans averse to any change.

#### GROWING OPPOSITION TO SPANISH RULE

Disaffection nevertheless increased as time went on. Spain's colonial policy changed little after the loss of her mainland possessions, and the island remained under an arbitrary and frequently corrupt regime in which native Cubans had little part. Trade was still subject to burdensome restrictions, taxation was heavy and unevenly distributed. Continual internal troubles in Spain prevented any intelligent consideration of the problems of her overseas possessions, and even when liberal political reforms were adopted in the mother country they were not extended to the colonies. Worse still, the prosperity of the early nineteenth century did not continue. Coffee production suddenly declined after 1835 because of foreign competition. Sugar growing continued to expand, but the subsidizing of beet raising in Europe greatly diminished the planters' profits.

Nevertheless, it was a long time before any serious revolutionary movement developed. In the first half of the nineteenth century the chief danger to Spain's continued possession of Cuba came from other powers, and loss of the island to France or England or the United States was probably averted only by the fact that each government was determined that neither of the others should acquire it. To the United States, the fate of Cuba, from which a powerful enemy might

control both entrances to the Gulf of Mexico, was vitally important for strategic reasons. Successive generations of American statesmen had hoped that the island would sooner or later become American territory, and in the South especially there was an active desire to add a new and rich slave state to the Union. In 1848 an offer to buy Cuba was summarily rejected by Spain. In the next three years filibustering attacks aroused the same interest and sympathy in the South which later supported Walker's venture in Nicaragua.

The leader of these attacks was Narciso López, a Venezuelan who as a boy had fought first for the patriots and then for the loyalists in his own country. After living several years in Cuba he organized a revolutionary conspiracy there in 1848. When it failed he escaped to the United States and recruited a force of North Americans for a filibustering expedition. The federal authorities checked his first attempt to leave American waters, but in 1850 he eluded them and landed with a small army at Cárdenas, only to be defeated and forced to flee. When he returned to the United States he was prosecuted in the courts, but public sentiment in his favor made it impossible to obtain a conviction, and a year later he sailed for Cuba with a new force. This time he was captured and he and fifty of his companions were executed.

The López affair nearly brought on a serious conflict between Spain and the United States and seemed likely for a time to cause complications with other powers. Great Britain and France threatened to send naval forces to protect Cuba and in 1852 suggested an arrangement by which they would join with the United States in guaranteeing Spain's possession of the island, but the United States refused to sign such a treaty. In 1854 the American ministers to England, France, and Spain met at Ostend in Belgium and let it become known that they were advising the Secretary of State that the United States would be justified under certain conditions in seizing Cuba if Spain refused to sell the island. This "manifesto" was criticised in the United States as well as in Europe. Fortunately the Pierce administration repudiated the policy which it suggested, and as the slavery crisis in the United States grew more acute, interest in Cuban affairs declined.





## THE TEN YEARS' WAR

In 1868, when the government in Spain had been overthrown by revolution, a group of Cuban patriots made the first formidable bid for independence. Their chief leader was Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, who was chosen Provisional President of the Republic of Cuba. The civil war lasted for ten years. Continuing internal troubles in Spain made it difficult for the royal authorities to cope with the situation, but there was a strong loyal element in Cuba itself, and the insurgents, despite many local successes, were unable to win a decisive victory. Their own dissensions weakened them, for, in 1873 Céspedes was impeached and deposed from leadership, to be captured and executed by the Spanish a few months later. There was much loss of life among combatants and non-combatants and much destruction of property by both sides. Atrocities were committed which horrified public opinion abroad. Among these was the execution of eight Cuban students in 1871 for a trivial offense of which they were apparently not even guilty. Another was the shooting of more than fifty members of the crew of the blockade runner *Virginius* in 1873. The majority of these were British or American, and the number killed would have been much greater if the captain of a British cruiser had not intervened by force to stop the executions. This episode might have caused a serious international conflict had it not been demonstrated that the *Virginius* was illegally flying the American flag. As it was, Spain paid an indemnity to the families of those killed.

The "*Virginius* affair" was only one of a number of incidents involving injury or death to American citizens and loss of American property, and there was some agitation in the United States for intervention to end the civil war. The American government offered its mediation, with no success, and later discussed with the British government the possibility of further interference. By 1875, however, the reestablishment of peace in Spain had made it possible to send more troops to Cuba, and Máximo Gómez, one of the chief insurgent leaders, was decisively defeated at Puerto Principe. Thereafter the revolution lost much of its strength and early in 1878 most of the leaders agreed to the Treaty of Zanjón, under which they laid down their arms in return for an amnesty and a promise of political reforms.

## LAST YEARS OF SPANISH RULE

The Cubans found that this promise meant little. Taxes continued high, for the expenses of the recent war were added to the already heavy Cuban debt, and much property belonging to insurgent sympathizers had been confiscated during the war and had passed into the hands of peninsular Spaniards. The changes which were being forced on the sugar industry by increasing foreign competition, and especially the concentration of production in larger units financed by Spanish or other foreign capital, had also ruined many formerly prosperous creole families. There was consequently much discontent and leaders like José Martí and Calixto García continued to conspire and agitate for independence.

One conservative creole group which had hitherto been especially interested in the maintenance of the status quo was seriously affected by the abolition of slavery. The importation of slaves, which had first assumed large proportions at the end of the eighteenth century, had continued through the first half of the nineteenth, despite the legal prohibition of the trade in 1820, and the Negro population came to outnumber the white. The liberals in Cuba opposed slavery, and during the ten years' war the revolutionists promised general emancipation after independence was established. Many Negroes obtained their freedom by serving in the army on one side or the other and in 1870, partly in response to pressure from the United States and partly as a conciliatory gesture to the Cubans, the Spanish government decreed the liberty of all children born thenceforth of slave mothers. In 1881 another law providing for gradual emancipation was enacted, and in 1886 slavery was totally abolished.

Nevertheless, the island as a whole prospered during the fifteen years after the "Great War," and the chief cause of the revolt which finally brought about independence seems to have been the sudden disappearance of this prosperity. In 1890 the United States placed sugar on the free list, and a reciprocity treaty with Spain a year later assured the Cuban planters the full benefit of this change. They promptly increased their crop by more than 50 per cent, so that it exceeded 1,000,000 tons in 1894, but in that year the Wilson tariff suddenly restored the American duty. At the same time sugar prices,



like other prices, were falling rapidly as a result of the world depression and Cuba began to suffer severely from poverty and unemployment. The bad economic situation nullified Spain's belated attempt to placate political discontent in Cuba by a grant of partial home rule early in 1895, for a new revolution broke out before it was possible to put the measure in execution.

#### THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

The leading spirit in the revolt was José Martí, who had worked for Cuban independence since the ten years' war, organizing Cuban exiles in the United States and other countries and making plans for the movement which now began. Martí was killed in the first weeks of fighting, but the veteran patriot Máximo Gómez carried on as commander of the forces in the field. Meanwhile Tomás Estrada Palma, who had been President of the revolutionary government during a part of the ten years' war, worked for the success of the movement as head of a *junta* in New York and did much to pave the way for the later intervention of the United States.

The events which led to this intervention and to the freeing of Cuba as a result of the Spanish American War are familiar to students of American history and need only be sketched very briefly here. Three years of fighting between 1895 and 1898 caused much destruction of property and terrific suffering among non-combatants. The revolutionists systematically attempted to paralyze the island's economic life and murdered those who did not cooperate with them. The Spanish commander, General Weyler, attempted to control the situation by "reconcentrating" the country people in garrisoned towns, where many died of disease and starvation. The horrors of the war were avidly played up and exaggerated by the "yellow press" in the United States, so that sympathy for the insurgents ran high and there was a rising popular demand for intervention.

The climax came when the U.S.S. *Maine* blew up in Habana harbor in February, 1898, with the loss of 266 men. The cause of the explosion was never ascertained, but the United States alleged that the Spanish authorities had failed to provide the protection due to a warship of a friendly power. The American government demanded reparation.

and further demanded the abandonment of the reconcentration policy and the granting of an immediate armistice to the rebels, to permit peace negotiations through the mediation of the United States. Spain ultimately acceded to most of these demands but her action came too late. President McKinley, who had hoped for a peaceful solution, could no longer withstand the pressure of Congress and public opinion, and on April 11, 1898, he asked Congress for authority to intervene by force to terminate the Cuban war.

A joint resolution of Congress, approved April 20, declared that "the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." It demanded that Spain withdraw from the island, authorized the President to use force against her if necessary, and disclaimed for the United States any intention to exercise sovereignty over the island except for its pacification. Diplomatic relations were broken off and war began.

#### THE TREATY OF PARIS AND THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Less than four months later Spain agreed to a preliminary peace protocol by which she surrendered all claims to Cuba. In the negotiations which followed she endeavored, without success, to have either the United States or the future government of Cuba assume responsibility for the large Cuban debt. She was also deeply concerned for the safety of Spanish residents and of the still very important Spanish investments in the island. She would have preferred to see Cuba annexed to the United States. The American government was determined to make the island independent, but it finally agreed to the inclusion in the peace treaty of the following provisions:

##### ARTICLE I

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

## ARTICLE XVI

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

American forces occupied the island and set up a military government after the Spanish troops withdrew. The never very important Cuban revolutionary government was disregarded, and the patriot army, after some difficulty, was persuaded to disband after receiving \$3,000,000 from the United States Treasury. The first task of the American authorities was the restoration of order and the relief of the starving civilian population. After this was accomplished, General Leonard Wood, who became Military Governor in December, 1899, reorganized all branches of the civil administration, set up a school system, and inaugurated a program of sanitation. It was during this period that a commission headed by Dr. Walter Reed demonstrated the truth of a theory which had already been set forth by the Cuban physician Dr. Charles Finlay: that yellow fever was carried by the *stegomyia* mosquito. It was this discovery which for the first time made possible the control of that dreaded disease.

## THE PLATT AMENDMENT

The most important purpose of the American occupation was to pave the way for the establishment of an independent Cuban government. To this end a census was taken, an electoral law was drawn up, and municipal officials were chosen by the voters. In November, 1900, a constitutional convention met. The Military Governor informed this body that one of its important duties would be the formulation of the relationship which would exist between Cuba and the United States, and in March, 1901, the United States Congress, in approving the so-called Platt Amendment to the Military Appropriation bill for the coming year, gave its approval to the demands which General Wood had already presented. The amendment provided that the United States should not withdraw from Cuba until certain provisions were incorporated both in the new Republic's constitution and in

a permanent treaty with the United States. These provisions, as they appeared in the treaty of May 22, 1903, were as follows:

## ARTICLE I

The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

## ARTICLE II

The Government of Cuba shall not assume or contract any public debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking-fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the Island of Cuba, after defraying the current expenses of the Government, shall be inadequate.

## ARTICLE III

The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

## ARTICLE IV

All acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

## ARTICLE V

The Government of Cuba will execute, and, as far as necessary, extend the plans already devised, or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.

## ARTICLE VI

The Island of Pines shall be omitted from the boundaries of Cuba specified in the Constitution, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

## ARTICLE VII

To enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations, at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

The United States felt that these provisions were necessary to protect its own political and strategic interests as well as to comply with the obligations assumed toward Spain in the Treaty of Paris. To the Cubans, on the other hand, they seemed to involve a serious restriction on the new Republic's independence, and the opposition in the constitutional convention was only partially allayed by assurances that the third clause of the amendment would not be "synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the affairs of the Cuban Government." The act of Congress left them no alternative, however, and on June 12, 1901, the convention accepted the Platt Amendment as an annex to the new constitution. Later, it was embodied in a Permanent Treaty which was to govern relations with the United States until 1934.

## THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Tomás Estrada Palma was elected President of Cuba in December, 1901, and on May 20, 1902, the Military Governor formally transferred to him the government of the island. The new chief of state was not a forceful leader nor an experienced executive, but he was generally respected and conspicuously honest. During his administration, the sugar industry developed rapidly under the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, signed December 11, 1902, which assured Cuba a 20 per cent customs preference as against any other nation. Other important events of the first years of the Republic were the cession to the United States of naval stations at Guantánamo and Bahía Honda, and the signature of a treaty, not ratified until 1925, which recognized Cuba's sovereignty over the Isle of Pines.

Economically, Cuba was one of the most important of the Latin American republics. Though the island's area and population were relatively small, its foreign trade was exceeded only by that of two or three of the largest South American countries. Large investments

of foreign capital had developed and were continuing to develop its natural resources. In some other respects, however, the prospect seemed less favorable. The great majority of the people were still illiterate and poverty-stricken. Though the proportion of white blood had been increasing through immigration, a substantial part of the inhabitants were still descendents of a race that had been in slavery until ten years before the war for independence.

#### THE REVOLUTION OF 1906

It became evident before the end of Estrada Palma's term that these conditions would make it difficult to operate republican institutions successfully. Political parties soon arose and though Estrada Palma at first attempted to conduct his administration on a non-partisan basis, his inability to obtain the enactment of urgently needed laws led him finally to seek support from the "moderate" or conservative group in congress as against the "liberals" who became the opposition. This did little good, so far as legislation was concerned, but it enabled the moderates to control preparations for the presidential elections of December, 1905, with Estrada Palma as their candidate, and the liberals, foreseeing defeat, withdrew from the contest. The opposition party was unable to prevent Estrada Palma's reinauguration, but in August, 1906, they started a revolt which rapidly spread through the entire island.

Estrada Palma, who had made no effort to build up a strong army, promptly appealed to the United States for help. President Roosevelt expressed great reluctance to intervene, but he sent Secretary of War Taft and Assistant Secretary of State Bacon to Cuba to give such aid as they could, and upon their arrival the belligerents agreed to a truce. The American commissioners' investigation convinced them that the recent elections had been vitiated by violence and fraud. They proposed that the President should remain in office, but that all of the other recently chosen officials should resign so that their places might be filled by new elections held under fairer conditions. The liberals seemed inclined to accept this proposal, but the government rejected it. The moderates, in fact, were determined to

compel the United States to intervene. First the cabinet and then the President and Vice-President resigned, and their partisans made it impossible to obtain a quorum in Congress. Cuba was left without a government, and on September 29, 1906, Secretary Taft proclaimed the establishment of a provisional regime under his own direction.

#### THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, 1906-1909

The sole purpose of the provisional government was to restore order and hold elections, but this required somewhat more than two years. After the delicate task of disarming and disbanding the military forces of both parties had been completed, a census was taken and an advisory commission headed by Colonel Enoch H. Crowder drafted laws covering elections, municipal and provincial government, the civil service, the judiciary, and other matters which should long since have been dealt with by the Cuban congress. The commission's work met with general approval and was of real permanent value, but the provisional government was less fortunate in dealing with some of its other problems. Charles E. Magoon, who succeeded Taft as Provisional Governor in October, 1906, had a number of American assistants, but the administration as a whole was still in the hands of the "moderate" officials who had served under Estrada Palma. This created a bad situation, which was little improved when the Governor, in accord with a promise made by his predecessor, filled vacancies as they arose with liberals recommended by a party committee. Playing politics did not make for efficiency or honesty in the administration as a whole, and the Governor was accused of permitting improper and extravagant expenditures, of pardoning great numbers of criminals for political reasons, and of undue generosity in awarding concessions and contracts. Competent American historians have exonerated Magoon of the more serious of these charges, but the fact that they were made, and that many Cubans believed them, had an unfortunate effect on subsequent Cuban-American relations.

The provincial and municipal elections in August, 1908, and the national election held three months later were supervised by a board

headed by Colonel Crowder. The conservative party, organized by some of the former "moderate" leaders, put forward General Mario García Menocal as its candidate for the presidency. The liberals were divided into two factions, headed by General José Miguel Gómez and Alfredo Zayas, but after their opponents had won some unexpected successes in the local elections, they combined forces. In the presidential election Gómez defeated Menocal by a substantial majority, and on January 28, 1909, the provisional government was withdrawn and Gómez was inaugurated as President.

#### THE ERA OF THE "PREVENTIVE POLICY"

Under the new administration, Cuban political life took on some of the characteristics that were to distinguish it for a long period. Gómez differed from Estrada Palma in many ways; he was popular, astute, and unscrupulous, especially where money was involved, and he retained his followers' loyalty not only by his personal magnetism but by permitting them to profit by their party connections. There were many times after 1907 when Cuban politics seemed little more than a systematic effort to exploit the treasury for the benefit of the professional political class.

This situation was not peculiar to Cuba, but graft was possible there on a relatively larger scale because of the island's great wealth. By 1907 the sugar industry was reaping the full benefit of reciprocity with the United States, and trade was rapidly increasing. The Cuban government's income was correspondingly large. Where Mexico's revenues, in the prosperous years of the Díaz regime, were approximately \$3.25 per capita, and Colombia's in the same period less than \$3.75, Cuba, where geographical conditions favored economical administration and facilitated the construction of roads and public works, collected \$14 or more per capita in the period immediately after the intervention. Ever since the Gómez regime, many of the higher officials, including especially members of congress, have had excessive salaries and allowances, and thousands of persons have been carried on the pay-roll who did no work whatever for the government. The country's prosperity also opened up opportunities for illicit profit in the granting of all sorts of concessions, and the Gómez



administration was involved in several highly questionable deals with foreign interests, some of them involving millions of dollars.

The United States government, acting through diplomatic channels, made ineffective efforts to prevent some of these transactions, for President Taft and Secretary of State Knox believed that a timely discouragement of policies that might lead a Caribbean government to insolvency and political disorder was better than armed intervention after a breakdown had occurred. This so-called "preventive policy" also led to interference in other matters. In 1913 the American legation successfully opposed the enactment of an "amnesty" bill which would have freed common criminals as well as political offenders, and on two occasions it felt compelled to make threats of intervention to discourage armed revolt.

The first of these was in 1911-12 when an organization of veterans of the war of independence began to agitate for the removal of all office holders who had been on the Spanish side in that struggle. The movement attracted support from many who were dissatisfied with Gómez' political and financial policies, and for a time an outbreak of civil war seemed possible. A warning from the United States, however, united both factions in opposition to outside interference, and the veterans and the President signed an agreement which ended the episode. The Negro revolt of 1912, instigated by colored politicians who claimed that their race had not received its fair share of government offices, was a more serious affair. There was some serious fighting and some destruction of Cuban and foreign property. The United States landed a force of marines and threatened further action, but order was fortunately restored within a few weeks.

When internal divisions had threatened to defeat the liberals in the election of 1908, Gómez, in order to obtain Zayas' support, had apparently promised that the latter should be the party's candidate in 1912. There had been continued friction between the two leaders, however, and there was more than a suspicion that Gómez, despite his denials, was seeking reelection for himself. Zayas obtained the liberal nomination, in spite of the President's opposition, but the administration's unfriendly attitude made it impossible for him to win the election and the conservative candidate, General Mario García Menocal, became President on May 20, 1913.

## MENOCAL AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1917

Menocal's election seemed to promise an improvement in Cuban political conditions. The new President had been educated in the United States and had worked for several years as a young man with American engineers in the Nicaraguan Canal Company. He had served brilliantly in the war for independence, rising from the ranks to a major generalcy, and had later been the successful manager of a great sugar plantation. Independently wealthy, he apparently had no need to indulge in dishonest practices for his own benefit. His first term was a period of steadily increasing prosperity, for the war abroad had cut off European supplies of beet sugar and encouraged a rapid increase in Cuban cane production and a consequent increase in the government's revenues. With all of these favorable factors, however, the President did not achieve any great popularity, and as the election of 1916 approached it became evident that his candidacy for reelection would meet with obstacles.

Menocal, like Gómez, had pledged himself not to seek a second term, but he seems to have changed his mind under pressure from friends and family. He obtained the conservative nomination only with difficulty and by the use of questionable methods, and his chances for reelection were not improved when the liberals succeeded in composing their factional difficulties and united in supporting Alfredo Zayas. In the campaign that followed, and during the voting, workers on both sides endeavored to influence the outcome by violence and fraud. The number of votes cast greatly exceeded any possible estimate of the number of qualified electors. The liberals were not at too great a disadvantage because they controlled the police in several provinces and municipalities and because Menocal did not attempt to make full use of the government's power. On the face of the earlier returns the opposition seemed to have won, but at this point the government began to intercept and apparently to alter the reports coming in from the provinces. The liberals protested and were upheld by the Central Electoral Board and the Supreme Court, which awarded them the majority in two of the most important provinces. This should have made a liberal victory certain, but the final

outcome hinged on the result of new elections which were ordered to be held in certain districts of two other provinces.

In February, 1917, before the new elections could be held, the liberals revolted, with ex-President Gómez as their leader. They were convinced that the government intended to steal the election, and hoped apparently to bring about a repetition of the events of 1906. In this they were disappointed. A small force of American marines was landed in Oriente Province and maintained there until after the close of the European war, but only to protect foreign life and property. Instead of a general intervention the United States issued public statements severely condemning the uprising, and its attitude was an important factor in the collapse of the revolt after a few weeks of fighting. Meanwhile the elections were completed and Menocal began his second term as President.

#### THE "DANCE OF THE MILLIONS"

On April 7, before the revolt was completely suppressed, Cuba followed the example of the United States in declaring war on Germany. The Republic's chief contribution to the allied cause was a further increase in the production of sugar and the sale of the 1917-18 and 1918-19 crops to an international committee at fixed prices, high enough to assure substantial profits to the growers but probably not so high as those they might have obtained in free trading. The expansion of the industry was aided by large investments of private American capital and by a \$15,000,000 loan from the United States Treasury, and all classes enjoyed undreamed of prosperity.

This prosperity attained its peak after the war when the governmental control of sugar sales ceased. For a brief period prices skyrocketed to unbelievable levels, until an all-time high of 22.5 cents per pound, at Cuban ports, was reached in May, 1920. Every one felt rich, and there was a period of governmental and private extravagance that has since been called "the dance of the millions." Then, suddenly and with little warning, came the inevitable collapse. In December, 1920, the price of sugar had declined to four cents. Prices of other merchandise had also fallen with the depression in other parts of the world, and importers and merchants as well as planters were hard

hit. The banks, which had made excessive loans on the basis of high prices, were in even worse shape. To prevent complete collapse the government was compelled in October, 1920, to proclaim a moratorium, which was continued from month to month during the first part of 1921.

#### THE ELECTION OF 1920

With matters in this state, the time arrived for a new presidential election. In 1919, at the suggestion of the United States government, both parties had invited General Enoch H. Crowder to come to Cuba to draw up a new electoral law, and the United States had made it clear that it would use its influence to prevent a repetition of what happened in 1916. It even sent a number of observers to watch the conduct of the election, but these had no real authority and they were powerless to prevent the violent and fraudulent practices which no mere change in the law could abolish. The result was an apparent victory by a narrow margin for Alfredo Zayas, who had become Menocal's candidate after Zayas' followers, now called the "Popular Party," had joined the conservatives to oppose the liberals under José Miguel Gómez.

The liberals, who had participated in the election only because the United States had urged them to, promptly took legal steps to demand new elections in a great number of districts. The conservatives obstructed the consideration of their appeals by the electoral boards and the courts, and there was every prospect that an armed revolt would make worse an already desperate situation.

#### GENERAL CROWDER'S MISSION

In an effort to clear up a situation which might well have led to another armed intervention, the President of the United States sent General Crowder to Cuba as his personal representative in January, 1921. In response to Crowder's urging, the electoral machinery began to work and the two presidential candidates reached an agreement which should have assured fair play in the new elections that were ordered in about 20 per cent of the voting districts. At the last moment, however, the liberals refused to participate and asked that a

new general election be held under American control. The United States could not comply with this request, and Zayas was consequently inaugurated as President of Cuba in May, 1921.

General Crowder had also devoted himself energetically to the consideration of Cuba's economic problems. At his suggestion, the moratorium was gradually lifted and normal business life began to revive; but it was not possible to prevent the failure of every bank in the island except the branches of two foreign institutions. This of course made worse the government's already bad financial situation. Menocal's second administration had been more extravagant and corrupt than any of its predecessors, and governmental expenditures had exceeded even the very large revenues of the war period. There was thus a considerable floating debt, which increased as income fell off without a corresponding reduction in expenditures.

General Crowder persuaded Zayas to make great reductions in the budget and helped him to get a small emergency loan which met the government's most pressing needs. It was obvious that only a much larger loan could put the government on its feet, but the United States refused to approve this pending assurances that Zayas would remedy some of the bad practices which had grown up under his predecessors. General Crowder demanded a long series of reforms, including the restriction of expenditures, the cancellation of illegal or improper contracts, and especially the reorganization of the national lottery, from which a great number of favored politicians were making illicit profits. After several months of negotiation, many of the measures which he advocated had been adopted, and the President, as an evidence of good faith, had appointed a cabinet which seemed to give assurance that the proposed reforms were made effective. In November, 1922, therefore, the United States gave its approval of the proposed \$50,000,000 loan. Two months later General Crowder's mission as personal representative of the President terminated, though he remained in Cuba as American Ambassador.

Zayas' interest in reform ceased when the money from the loan had been received. With loud assertions that Cuba would no longer tolerate foreign interference in her internal affairs, he dismissed the "honest cabinet" and proceeded to undo most of its work. As the government's revenues gradually increased economy was forgotten

and the government was no less extravagant and corrupt than former administrations. Discontent with its policies found expression in a small revolt started by the "Veterans and Patriots' Association" in 1924, but this was easily suppressed.

In 1924 the conservatives refused to renominate Zayas, and the President consequently avenged himself by supporting Gerardo Machado, the liberal candidate. The latter easily defeated Menocal, who headed the conservative ticket. This time there was little question but that the result fairly reflected the wishes of the majority of the voters, and Machado took office in May, 1925, without serious opposition.

#### MACHADO'S ADMINISTRATION, 1925-1933

Machado, a veteran of the war for independence and a successful business man, seemed likely to give the country a better administration. During his first term things went fairly well. The sugar industry was already feeling the effects of world overproduction, but the flotation of large foreign loans for public works and the growth of the tourist trade, resulting partly from prohibition in the United States, helped to hide the fundamental unsoundness of the economic situation.

By the end of his first term, Machado was able to obtain the support of all three party machines, liberal, conservative, and popular, in his plan to continue in power. This was accomplished chiefly through a skillful distribution of offices and other favors, and especially through the lottery, which was still one of the great sources of corruption in Cuban political life. Lottery tickets were regularly sold on the streets at considerably more than their face value, and this extra money went not to the government, which owned the enterprise, but to "collectors" who had the privilege of distributing stated quantities of tickets. It has been estimated that nearly a third of the \$31,000,000 that the people of Cuba spent annually on the lottery represented illegal profits of this sort.<sup>1</sup> This "slush fund," combined with changes in the electoral law that perpetuated the control of each party by one small group of men, were apparently the chief factors

<sup>1</sup> Chapman, *History of the Cuban Republic*, pp. 555-6.

which enabled Machado to be nominated by all three parties in 1928. Before the election, a constitutional amendment provided that the presidential term should be six instead of four years.

These proceedings aroused much antagonism, and discontent increased rapidly as Cuba felt more and more severely the effects of the world depression. Machado only made matters worse by his increasingly dictatorial policy. He had trouble especially with the students of the University of Habana, who noisily opposed his reelection and continued their agitation during the next four years, even after many of them had been killed or imprisoned and the University had been closed. Other opposition groups became more active as time went on. After the army easily suppressed a small revolt in 1931, the discontented elements began a campaign of terrorism and sabotage which led to still more harshly repressive measures by the police. Murders and bombings and cruel official reprisals received much publicity in the United States and brought about a growing demand for interference, voiced frequently by the same people who had most violently criticised other Caribbean interventions. This demand grew more insistent as conditions became worse, and by the spring of 1933 some sort of intervention seemed inevitable.

In June, 1933, most of the underground revolutionary groups agreed to accept the mediation of the American Ambassador, Mr. Sumner Welles, in an effort to restore order. They insisted, however, that Machado leave office, which he was apparently reluctant to do. Negotiations dragged on for some weeks until a general strike, which paralyzed commercial activity in Habana, and a bloody clash between the populace and the police brought matters to a head. On August 11, the army, which had been Machado's mainstay, demanded his resignation; the next day he fled from Habana in an airplane.

#### DE CÉSPEDES

Before leaving, Machado appointed Dr. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes as Secretary of State and consequently as his constitutional successor. De Céspedes was a former ambassador at Washington, not hitherto very active in politics but generally respected and apparently acceptable to several of the opposition political groups. Most of these

were represented in the cabinet which he appointed and it was hoped that he would be able with the strong moral support of the United States to restore normal political conditions. It would have been difficult, however, for any government to restore peace while conditions were what they were in the sugar industry.

The output of the Cuban sugar *centrales*, about one million long tons in the first years of independence and four million during the World War, had continued to increase in the 1920's and had reached five million long tons by the end of the decade. By this time overproduction had deprived Cuba of the benefit of the preferential duty under the reciprocity treaty of 1903, because competition among her producers tended to bring the price in the United States down to that prevailing in the world market. The world market price, meanwhile, had been pushed down by expanding production in other countries, and during the depression years great stocks had accumulated for which there was no demand at all. Under these circumstances many Cuban mills were forced to suspend or curtail operations, or at least to cut wages. The government made several efforts from 1925 on to reduce production in the island and to reach agreements with other producing countries to fix quotas in the world market, but none of these were notably successful.

The discontent aroused by these conditions was directed largely against the foreign financial interests that controlled not only the sugar industry but also the railroads, the banks, and much of the country's commerce. Of these, North American interests were by far the most important. American investments in Cuba were estimated at from one to one and a half billions of dollars in 1928—an amount greater than that invested by United States citizens in any other foreign country with the exception of Canada and Germany. More than a third of the crop had been ground at American-owned mills before the first World War, and many additional properties had been taken over by New York banks during the economic collapse of 1920-21. In 1934 it was estimated that North American mills produced 68.1 per cent of the annual output.<sup>1</sup> The actual growing of the cane remained to a greater extent in Cuban hands, but the *colonos*,

<sup>1</sup> Commission on Cuban Affairs, *Problems of the New Cuba*, p. 227.



as the farmers who produced it were called, had to sell their crops to the nearest *central* and were further dependent on the *central* for loans with which to carry on their operations. Foreign domination of the Republic's economic life was thus an important political issue, especially as Machado was accused of having unduly favored foreign interests. The principal revolutionary groups not only sought to destroy the evils of the traditional political system but also to do away with "economic imperialism."

De Céspedes was in no position to carry out any thoroughgoing reforms, and many of those who had supported him turned against him when it became evident that he would not do so. Other factions, like the conservative followers of Menocal and the university students, opposed him from the beginning.

The students had continued to act as a group in politics, although the University had been closed for several years and many of them were now mature men. Their activity and the prestige which they had acquired by their reckless opposition to Machado gave them an influence out of all proportion to their numbers, and in September they played a prominent part in a revolt, which overthrew the government. They were aided by a group of non-commissioned officers in the army, led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, who persuaded the enlisted men to mutiny against their officers and seized control of the forts and barracks. De Céspedes was forced out on September 5, 1933, and five days later Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, a former dean of the medical school at the University, was made Provisional President.

#### GRAU SAN MARTÍN

Dr. Grau represented the younger revolutionary element. He had had little administrative experience and his government was weakened from the start by dissension among his student supporters. Furthermore the economic situation was growing worse. Great numbers of men were out of work: a worse catastrophe in Cuba than in most tropical countries because so much of the arable land was planted to sugar cane that the island depended largely on imported food, which unemployed men were unable to buy. The distress of people

who were close to actual starvation offered a fertile field for communist and other agitators, who promised the redistribution of wealth and the confiscation of the foreign-owned sugar estates.

For a time, indeed, the country seemed threatened by anarchy. The United States withheld its recognition of the new administration and sent a number of warships to Cuban ports to protect American citizens—a step which was clearly necessary in view of the dangerous attitude of the workmen on sugar estates in many parts of the interior. On October 2 Habana's largest hotel was the scene of a pitched battle between the soldiers and five hundred of their former officers who had established themselves there. Even after Batista, now holding the rank of Colonel, began to restore the army's discipline and efficiency it was increasingly difficult to maintain order. Terrorist outrages, attempted revolts, a default on the foreign debt, and strikes which threatened to tie up vital public services destroyed confidence both in Cuba and abroad, and as the cane-grinding season approached it became evident that few of the mills would be able to operate unless conditions changed.

Confronted by this threat of complete economic disaster, Dr. Grau San Martín resigned on January 15, 1934. His successor, Carlos Hevia, remained in office only two days, and on January 18 Colonel Carlos Mendieta, one of the few veteran political leaders who had consistently and openly opposed Machado, became Provisional President.

#### MENDIETA AND THE ABROGATION OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT

The United States' refusal to recognize Grau San Martín, on the ground that his regime did not have the support of any substantial proportion of the Cuban people, unquestionably helped to bring about his downfall. When Mendieta came into office as the result of an agreement between the army and most of the less radical political groups, his government was recognized within a few days. The moral support of the United States, further evidenced by a \$10,000,000 credit for the purchase of food, did much to strengthen his position.

During the next few months other measures placed both economic

and political relations between the two countries on a new basis. One of these was the signature on May 29, 1934, of a treaty abrogating the Platt Amendment. The United States retained the naval station at Guantánamo, but gave up any formal right to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs. The agreement had little practical effect, since the provisions of the Amendment had not been invoked for many years, but it ended a situation which was galling to Cuban pride and which was a potential danger to the country's independence. It could not alter the fact that geography and economic ties made Cuba's welfare dependent on the policies that the United States government might adopt.

A realization of the responsibility involved in this relationship inspired several other measures which greatly improved Cuba's economic situation. In March, 1934, President Roosevelt set up the Second Export-Import Bank, with a capital of \$2,750,000, specifically to encourage trade between Cuba and the United States. Later, under the Sugar Stabilization Act of 1934, the Republic was granted a quota of nearly 2,000,000 short tons in the American market, with a reduction in duty which assured an opportunity to sell at least a part of the crop at fair prices. This helped to stabilize the Republic's economy, though the decline in Cuba's relative importance as a sugar-producing country continued. During the depression many companies had failed to replant worn-out areas or had gone out of business altogether. Before 1939 the crop had dropped to little more than half of what it had been in 1930, while production in other parts of the world—India, Africa, the Philippines, and the United States—greatly increased. The loss in sugar sales, however, was to some extent made up for by the operation of the trade agreement with the United States, signed in August, 1934, which granted concessions to a number of other Cuban products, and by 1935 business was reviving and the government's revenues were beginning to recover.

#### RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS

Political conditions improved more slowly. Besides the remnants of the older political groups, several new factions which had helped to overthrow Machado were ambitious for power. Some of these

opposed Mendieta from the start and others, like the A.B.C., which had been the strongest of the secret anti-Machado organizations, fell away as the result of quarrels within the government. All were jockeying for advantage in the elections which would set up a permanent constitutional government, and many of them again began to resort to the terrorist tactics which they had learned during the period of the dictatorship. The government was maintained in office chiefly by the strong hand of Colonel Batista, who was now building up the army into a more powerful force than it had ever been before, but whose rising power was viewed with increasing distrust by the civilian element.

The impossibility of persuading the various factions to agree on a program compelled the postponement of the elections, which were originally to have been held before the end of 1934. The situation grew especially bad early in 1935 when a series of strikes and revolutionary outbreaks compelled the government to adopt severe repressive measures against some of the radical groups. For a time thereafter the country was under military control, but the gradual return of tranquility made it possible to plan to hold the elections early in 1936. Mendieta resigned in December, 1935, and was succeeded by José Barnett.

After much political manoeuvring, accompanied by violent controversies which threatened at times to make the holding of any satisfactory election impossible, the more conservative factions grouped themselves behind two principal candidates: Dr. Miguel Mariano Gómez, the son of José Miguel Gómez, and ex-President Menocal. The radical elements, whose activities had been driven underground by the army, were temporarily out of the picture. Gómez won by a large majority, and the coalition that supported him obtained ninety of 162 seats in the lower house of congress and all of the seats in the Senate. Menocal, however, was won over to the support of the new regime by a constitutional amendment which increased the number of senators from twenty-four to thirty-six and enabled him to appoint his friends to the new positions. Gómez thus took office with the support of practically all of the old-line political elements.

The new President's authority was overshadowed, however, by

that of the chief of the army. Colonel Batista had by this time suppressed revolutionary opposition, so that only occasional minor instances of terrorism occurred during the next few years, and he had gradually extended his influence over the civilian departments of the government. A very large proportion of the government's revenues went to the maintenance of the military establishment, and the civilian politicians' preoccupation with personal political interests and squabbles over jobs, which made it difficult for the administration to accomplish anything constructive, encouraged Batista to expand his sphere of activity. In the summer of 1936 Batista announced a plan for a great system of primary schools under army control, and a few months later he came to an open break with Gómez when he asked Congress to impose a new tax for their support. In December, 1936, Congress passed the tax measure over the President's veto, and then impeached and removed Gómez himself. Federico Laredo Bru was elected in his place.

The large coalition which had backed the administration at the beginning of 1936 had by this time broken up. Gómez, Menocal, and Grau San Martín, now the principal radical leader, refused to permit their followers to participate in the congressional election of 1938, and their attitude made necessary several postponements of the projected election for an assembly to revise the constitution. This was finally held, however, in November, 1939. Not only the recognized political parties, but the hitherto outlawed revolutionary and terrorist groups were allowed to vote, and the fairness of the election was indicated by the fact that the various opposition factions won forty-one out of the seventy-six seats. After the assembly met, however, a deal between Batista and Menocal, who controlled one of the largest blocks of delegates, gave the two leaders control of the proceedings.

This same coalition enabled Colonel Batista to defeat Grau San Martín in the presidential election held in July, 1940. He thus became the titular as well as the real head of the government, serving under the new constitution which was proclaimed in the following October. In 1941 the use of great quantities of sugar to make industrial alcohol for war purposes caused a rapid rise in prices and made imperative

an increase in production Cuba, which declared war on the Axis immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, thus seemed likely again to play a helpful rôle as an ally of the United States by supplying a commodity essential to the successful conduct of the struggle.

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## Chapter XXV

### HAITI

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#### SAINT DOMINGUE UNDER FRENCH RULE

The western end of Hispaniola, or Española, as the Spaniards called it, is one of the most mountainous parts of the West Indies. Three great ranges, their slopes in most places too steep or too stony for cultivation, traverse the country from east to west and leave only a few areas of flat land along the coast and in the river valleys between them. Even in the plains there are large sections where the rainfall, cut off by the mountains, is inadequate or irregular. Where agriculture can be carried on, however, the soil is rich and the climate, though hot, is not unpleasant.

The French settlers, who occupied the country in the days of the buccaneers, turned their attention to planting as piracy was gradually suppressed. The colony flourished during the eighteenth century, and by 1789 Saint Domingue was supplying much of the world's sugar and most of the world's coffee.<sup>1</sup> Despite its small area, it was by far the most valuable of France's overseas possessions, with exports which exceeded in value those of the United States. The richest district was the Province of the North, and especially the plain behind Cap François, now called in English Cape Haitian, which was the principal city. The Province of the West, including the Artibonite Valley and the Cul de Sac near Port au Prince, had been settled more recently, but had made rapid progress with the construction of extensive irrigation works. So also had the isolated southern peninsula, the Province of the South.

<sup>1</sup> Von Humboldt, *Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne*, Vol. V, p. 193, footnote.

The wealth of the colony was divided among a very few people. Some 450,000 out of a total population of 520,000 were slaves, whose lot was if anything harder than that of the plantation laborers in the other West Indian colonies because the overwhelming preponderance of the blacks made constant vigilance and strict control imperative. Some 27,500 more were colored freedmen, some of them black, the majority of mixed blood. Many of the mulattoes, especially in the newer regions of the west and south, had been educated in France and owned property and slaves, but they were all subject by law and custom to humiliating regulations and discriminations, rigidly enforced by the whites who hated and feared their growing influence. The 39,000 whites<sup>1</sup> were themselves divided into mutually hostile groups: officials sent out from France, wealthy creole planters, and *petits blancs* or poor whites.

#### THE REVOLUTION

The revolution in France in 1789 weakened the home government's authority which had hitherto kept these class and race hatreds under restraint. The creoles seized control through assemblies which they elected in each province, and dissensions between planters and poor whites and between royalists and democrats kept the country in turmoil. Matters became worse when the mulattoes, with the support of sympathizers in the National Assembly at Paris, attempted to assert their claims to political and social equality. A freedmen's revolt in the north, led by Vincent Ogé, was cruelly suppressed in 1790, but in 1791 the mulattoes of the Artibonite Valley and the Cul de Sac joined with the still numerous royalist faction among the whites in a more serious outbreak.

At almost the same time a worse catastrophe overwhelmed the rich northern plain. On the night of August 22, 1791, there was a sudden uprising of the Negro slaves. The whites on the plantations were massacred, and dwellings and sugar mills were destroyed in an outburst of savage fury. Thereafter the Negro hordes held the rural districts in the north, while mulattoes and whites waged a confused

<sup>1</sup> These are the figures given by Moreau de St. Méry whose *Description Topographique, Physique, Politique et Historique de la Partie Française de Saint-Domingue* is the best description of the colony before the revolution.



struggle for dominance around Port au Prince. Only in the southern peninsula did the planters retain control.

In France the National Assembly followed a vacillating policy regarding the race question. This naturally made matters worse rather than better, and three commissioners sent to Saint Domingue in 1791 could do nothing to restore peace. After the radicals came into power at Paris the position of the planters seemed hopeless. The National Assembly ordered that mulattoes and free Negroes should have the same political rights as whites, and in 1792 a new commission with 6,000 troops was sent to reassert the home government's authority. Its most active member, Sonthonax, first alienated all classes of the white population by consorting with the mulattoes, and then lost the support of that group by his open sympathy with the blacks. In June, 1793, when the whites at Cap François resisted his authority, he permitted the rebel Negroes of the northern plain to loot and burn the city. A few months later he and his colleagues proclaimed the abolition of slavery—an act which made both the whites and the mulattoes more desperate than ever without stopping the Negro revolt.

#### TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE

By this time France was at war with England and Spain. English troops, at the invitation of the white planters in the south, occupied Port au Prince and other points on the coast in 1793 and 1794, and Spanish troops overran the north, obtaining help from several of the Negro chieftains. What is now Haiti might well have become a British or Spanish colony had it not been for Toussaint Louverture.

François Dominique Toussaint, who later took the surname "Louverture," was a full-blooded Negro born in Saint Domingue. Serving his master as a coachman, he seems to have picked up a little knowledge of reading and writing, a rare accomplishment among the slaves. He was one of the principal leaders among the revolted Negroes, and the 4,000 men under his command were the best-trained black troops in the island. He joined the Spanish army in 1793. A year later, when it seemed that the British invasion might restore slavery and the plantation system, he decided to throw his support to France. His desertion forced the Spanish to withdraw, and he soon became the real

ruler of the northern part of the colony, though nominally respecting the authority of the French representatives. Meanwhile the mulatto General André Rigaud had obtained control of most of the southern peninsula, and the British, with their ranks depleted by yellow fever, found it more and more difficult to maintain their position at Port au Prince. They finally signed an agreement with Toussaint in 1798 under which they withdrew their forces from the island.

A sanguinary struggle ensued between blacks and mulattoes. Toussaint put down mulatto uprisings in the north and then attacked Rigaud. He had by this time entered into commercial agreements with Great Britain and the United States, and warships of both of these powers helped him to defeat his rival. By 1800 he had control of the south, and his lieutenant, Dessalines, followed up the victory by systematically murdering some 10,000 persons of mixed blood. Toussaint next proceeded to conquer the Spanish end of the island, which had been ceded to France by the Treaty of Basel in 1795 but had not yet been actually transferred. Early in 1801 he was master of all Hispaniola.

While still maintaining an outward allegiance to France, Toussaint now assumed the title of Governor General for life, with power to name his own successor. Many white proprietors were encouraged to resume possession of their estates, upon which the former slaves were compelled to work under military control, and other properties were cultivated for the benefit of the new government and its officials. For a brief period the colony was again fairly prosperous.

The French government, beset by enemies in Europe, had been in no position since 1793 to reassert its authority in Saint Domingue, and the emissaries whom it did send to the island were intimidated or outwitted by the resourceful Toussaint. With the peace of Amiens, however, the situation changed and in December, 1801, Napoleon's brother-in-law, General Leclerc, sailed from France with 20,000 veteran troops. Leclerc's instructions were to pursue a conciliatory policy until he felt strong enough to remove the black generals and exile them to France, but he met with more resistance than was anticipated. Henri Christophe, Toussaint's lieutenant at Cap François, burned that city before abandoning it. In the interior the Negroes carried on a guerrilla warfare which culminated in the epic defense

of the fortress of Crête-à-Pierrot, which the French took only after heavy losses. Toussaint and his followers finally submitted in April and May, 1802, but were able to stipulate that they should retain their rank and their commands in the army.

#### THE END OF FRENCH RULE

Leclerc had barely achieved this rather doubtful victory when a terrific epidemic of yellow fever attacked his European troops. Within a few months his army had been virtually destroyed, and reinforcements sent from France suffered the same fate. Stupid acts of the French authorities had meanwhile united the Haitians against them. The mulattoes were infuriated by the restoration of the discriminations against their class, and the Negroes by the restoration of slavery in the near-by islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique and the abrogation of prohibitions against the slave trade in the French colonies generally. Toussaint had been treacherously arrested and sent to France soon after his capitulation, to die in prison a year later, but several of his former lieutenants were still in command of trained troops. When the mulatto leader Clervaux deserted the French army and took to the hills in October, 1802, Dessalines and Christophe, the principal black generals, followed his example.

By this time only a small fraction of the French troops were alive and fit for duty, but their health improved somewhat with the coming of the dry season. General Rochambeau, taking command after Leclerc died of fever in November, won some successes. The struggle was now a war of extermination, and each side vied with the other in wholesale atrocities. The outcome was still in doubt when the renewal of hostilities between France and England in May, 1803, and the restoration of the British blockade made the position of the French army hopeless. In November Rochambeau surrendered to a British admiral. On January 1, 1804, Jean Jacques Dessalines, the leader of the rebel army, proclaimed the independence of Haiti, the first free nation in Latin America. The territory of the new Republic included only the western end of Hispaniola, as French forces, and later Spanish forces, remained in control in the east.

## DESSALINES

Dessalines at first took the title of Governor General, but in September, 1804, in imitation of Napoleon, he had himself proclaimed Emperor. The former slave of a free Negro, entirely without education, the new ruler's chief qualifications for office were the courage and ferocity which had won him his position in the army. His administration was a military despotism, acquiesced in chiefly because both blacks and mulattoes feared a new French invasion. All functions of the government, and even the direction of agriculture—somewhat revived as in the days of Toussaint by means of forced labor—were concentrated in the hands of the army chieftains. The Frenchmen who remained in the island, with the exception of a few priests, physicians, and skilled artisans, were systematically massacred, but British and American merchants were encouraged to resume trade.

The brutality and corruption of Dessalines' regime caused much discontent, and it was not long before several of his chief lieutenants were actively conspiring against him. The mulattoes especially were restive under black rule, and when the Emperor arbitrarily deprived many colored planters of their lands there was a revolt which soon spread through the west and south. Dessalines marched against Port au Prince, but in October, 1806, he was killed in an ambush in the outskirts of the city.

## HENRI CHRISTOPHE

Henri Christophe, Dessalines' chief lieutenant in the north, was accepted by both factions as the head of a provisional administration pending the meeting of a constituent assembly. As the principal surviving hero of the war against the French, and the commander of the best military forces, Christophe expected as a matter of course to control the assembly and remain in power, but he had not counted on the ingenuity of the mulatto leaders who now controlled the west and the south. By the simple expedient of creating new parishes, each of which had a right to representation, these obtained a majority in the assembly and proceeded to draw up a new constitution which gave all real authority in the new government to an elected senate.

They offered Christophe the presidency, but he refused to accept it and attacked Port au Prince, where the assembly was sitting. He was repulsed, and from 1807 until 1820 the country was divided into the "State of Haiti" under his rule and the "Republic of Haiti" controlled by the mulattoes in the south.

The State of Haiti, which included the north and the Artibonite Valley, was a well-organized military despotism. Christophe was at first President for life, but in 1811 he made himself King and created a numerous nobility. His reign is perhaps the most picturesque episode in Haiti's eventful history. A native of one of the British West Indies, with some white blood,<sup>1</sup> he had served while still a slave as a waiter in a hotel and as a privateersman, and he is said to have taken part as a boy in the French expedition against Savannah during the American Revolution. He spoke English, as well as French, and had a predilection for things English. Though uneducated, he was intelligent and showed much administrative ability. Some effort was made to establish schools and other appurtenances of civilization, and foreign merchants were encouraged to visit Haitian ports, though they could trade only with a royal monopoly. Henri's system of government, however, bore heavily on the masses of the inhabitants, especially as he seemed to grow more cruel and arbitrary toward the end of his reign. The building of the great citadel of Laferrière is said to have cost many lives. Public works of this sort, and also the ordinary work in the fields, was carried on under a system little better than slavery, and the peasant masses were cruelly exploited for the benefit of the royal treasury and the military caste. Christophe maintained his power chiefly by the fear that he inspired in his subordinates, and when he had a paralytic stroke in 1820 his followers began to abandon him and he killed himself rather than fall helpless into their hands.

#### PÉTION IN THE SOUTH

In the Republic of Haiti the mulattoes retained control. Alexandre Pétion, elected President early in 1807, was the free-born son of a white Frenchman and a colored mother, better educated than most of his compatriots, and perhaps the most influential member of his

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie, *Notes on Haiti*, Vol. I, p. 159.

caste. He had fled to France after Toussaint's victory over Rigaud, but returned as an officer under Leclerc. When it became clear that the French would restore slavery and the color line, he left them and became one of Dessalines' chief lieutenants in the final struggle for independence. Thereafter he played a leading rôle in the constituent assembly in 1807 and was elected President of the Republic. Though chosen under the same constitution which Christophe had rejected, he soon rid himself of the Senate and ruled practically as a dictator. He was reelected in 1811 and 1815, and became President for life in 1816. His regime was milder but also less efficient than that of Christophe. He did not attempt, and probably did not dare, to maintain any system of forced labor among the peasants, and it was perhaps the contrast between their relatively easy existence and the harder lot of their brothers in the north which induced the Negro masses to remain quiet under mulatto domination.

An indecisive war between the two sections began in 1807 and continued for several years. Both Christophe and Pétion supported rebellions in the other's territory, and the situation grew more complicated when Rigaud returned to Haiti in 1810 and set up an independent state in the southern peninsula. Rigaud soon died, however, and his successor, General Borgella, reincorporated the south into the Republic in order to present a common front against a formidable attack launched by Christophe in 1812. The forces of the north were repulsed, and hostilities were thereafter suspended, though without a formal truce.

#### UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC

When Pétion died in 1818 the Senate, under pressure from the army, chose Jean Pierre Boyer, the chief of the presidential guard, as his successor. Boyer was a free-born mulatto who had had some education abroad and had served for a time in the French army. Able and honest, he proved to be one of Haiti's best presidents. In 1820, when Christophe killed himself, Boyer took advantage of the ensuing confusion to occupy Cape Haitian before the northern generals could concert measures to oppose him, and the two sections were thenceforth united under one government, with the capital at Port

au Prince. Two years later, when the inhabitants of Santo Domingo revolted against Spain, Boyer occupied their territory, bringing the whole island under Haitian rule. He maintained his authority with a firm hand for a quarter century, suppressing occasional minor revolts but on the whole giving the country an era of peace which all classes welcomed after thirty years of almost continuous bloodshed.

#### POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The mulattoes, who ran the government under Pétion and Boyer, were practically the only people in Haiti who had even a vague understanding of political problems. Their position was a precarious one. Their numbers had been greatly reduced by the wholesale massacres during the revolution, and the Negro peasants, who remembered that the freedmen had also been slave-holders, hated and distrusted them almost as much as they had the whites. The mulattoes, on their side, looked down on the peasants as an inferior race. They even drew a color line socially against the relatively small number of educated Negroes and the black officers in the army, though they found it politically advisable to give many of the higher offices to members of both of these groups. In the north, in fact, the Negro element remained predominant in politics, so that the rivalry between the two races tended to take on a sectional character.

There was indeed a great gulf between the *élite*, as the mulatto aristocracy called itself, and the masses of the people. The members of the *élite* spoke French, and many of them had some education, either in France or at home, which made them familiar with European ideas and ways of living. The culture of the masses, on the other hand, was essentially African. Only one-third of the slaves in the colony in 1789 had been born there.<sup>1</sup> The rest had been imported, most of them as adults, from various sections of the dark continent. Nearly all spoke the creole patois, based on French but African in structure, but they had otherwise learned little from contact with their white masters. The Church, which had little influence among the French planters, had had even less among the slaves, and most of them were votaries of *voudou*, a mixture of African superstitions and

<sup>1</sup> Moreau de St. Méry, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

Christianity which even today is the religion of the majority of the Haitian peasants.

By 1820 little remained of the rich plantations of the colonial period. Sugar mills and other buildings had been burned or torn down during the first slave revolt, and the great irrigation systems had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The lands confiscated from French proprietors were generally treated as public domain. Some were given to military officers as a reward for service in the revolution, some recognized as the property of the mulatto sons of former owners, and some rented to persons who attempted to farm them with the labor of the former slaves. The latter were forbidden by law to leave the *habitation* to which they were attached, but this and other provisions of the labor code were less rigidly enforced after 1820 because Boyer, like Pétion, hardly dared to jeopardize his position by oppressing the black masses. Large-scale agriculture was consequently practically abandoned. The peasants grew food for their own use on lands which they rented or occupied as squatters, and coffee, which they could pick from the trees on the abandoned plantations, took the place of sugar as the chief export. The *élite*, more and more divorced from any connection with agriculture, devoted themselves principally to politics. They had little interest in the welfare of the black masses or the development of the country, and little money was spent on schools or roads. The public treasury, in their eyes, existed to provide a living for their class.

The prosperity of the French colony was a thing of the past, but the Haitians had their freedom. The peasants no longer worked under the lash, and the *élite* were masters in their own house, free from humiliating discrimination on account of their race. All classes were determined to prevent the return of white domination in any form. African blood or marriage to a Haitian was a requisite for citizenship. Foreigners were looked on with suspicion, and each successive constitution from 1805 until 1918 forbade any one but a Haitian to own land. If this attitude discouraged trade and prevented the development of the country's resources, it also preserved the country from foreign economic domination.



## THE FRENCH INDEMNITY

For many years after 1804, all classes lived in fear of an attack from abroad. The new Republic was an international pariah, for none of the great powers were disposed to enter into normal diplomatic relations with a government which owed its origin to a successful slave revolt. The immediate danger, of course, was from France. Immediately after the Bourbon restoration, Louis XVIII sent unofficial representatives to seek to persuade the Haitians to acknowledge French sovereignty, but they were rebuffed in the south, and one of them was shot as a spy when he entered Christophe's domain. Later, the Haitian government indicated a willingness to pay an indemnity for the confiscated French properties in return for a recognition of independence, and negotiations were carried on for some years in an effort to reach an agreement on this basis. In 1825, when a French fleet appeared at Port au Prince, Boyer was finally forced to accept an offensively worded royal ordinance which granted independence on condition that French trade be given preferential treatment and that Haiti pay an indemnity of \$30,000,000 in five years. Only a small part of this sum was ever remitted, but efforts to meet the payments, and disputes with France because the government was unable to do so, caused trouble for years to come.

BOYER'S ADMINISTRATION AND THE LIBERAL  
REVOLT OF 1843

Boyer was the accepted leader of the mulatto class. His government was described by a foreign observer as "a sort of republican monarchy, sustained by the bayonet."<sup>1</sup> The Congress, chosen by a very limited franchise and with much official intervention, could only consider laws which the President saw fit to introduce. During its session of 1833, its most important act was to expel two members "for systematically opposing the measures of the executive, and persisting in demanding a statement of the public expenditures."<sup>2</sup> For more than twenty years there was astonishingly little opposition to the President's regime.

<sup>1</sup> Brown, *The History and Present Condition of St Domingo*, Vol. II, p. 259.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 260.

Toward the end of this period discontent became more apparent. Boyer had continued to rely on the assistance of a small group which had dominated affairs since the days of Pétion, and the younger elements of the *élite*, feeling that they were excluded from public office, were beginning to agitate for a change and to demand a more democratic form of government. In 1843 these "liberals" started a revolution in the southern peninsula. The government's forces were defeated and Boyer fled to Jamaica, which was to be the refuge of many defeated Haitian leaders in years to come.

The revolutionists installed Charles Rivière Hérard as President and proceeded to frame a new constitution, which provided that local officials and judges, as well as the president and congress, should be chosen by popular election. This arrangement naturally proved unworkable, and the disputes which arose weakened the prestige of the new regime. At the same time there was discontent in the army, where the older officers disliked having young revolutionary leaders placed in authority over them, and unrest among the peasants, whose hostility to the *élite* had been deliberately fomented by the liberals during their campaign to attain power. The Congress, attempting to assert its new authority, caused further discord. The weakness of the government at Port au Prince gave the Spanish-speaking inhabitants of the eastern end of the island the opportunity for which they had been waiting, and in February, 1844, they declared the independence of the Dominican Republic. Hérard led an army against them, but he had met with little success when a peasant revolt, instigated by the Salomon family, broke out in the southern peninsula. The specter of a new race war terrified the *élite*, and though the insurgents were defeated the incident caused a revulsion against the liberal regime and helped some of Boyer's former associates to overthrow Hérard in May, 1844.

#### NEGRO PRESIDENTS, 1844-1847

In the hope of strengthening their own position and allaying the growing discontent among the blacks, the group which now came to power decided to make a Negro general President of the Republic. Their first choice was Philippe Guerrier, an illiterate veteran of the

war for independence, eighty-seven years old, but still influential among the people of his own race and especially in the north, where there was always hostility to any mulatto regime at Port au Prince. When Guerrier died after a few months in office, he was succeeded by another octogenarian, a brother-in-law of Christophe named Jean-Louis Pierrot, who dismayed his sponsors by suddenly moving the capital to Cape Haitien. He was promptly removed with the help of the army, and still another aged general, Jean Baptiste Riche, became President in 1846.

## FAUSTIN SOULOUQUE

When Riche died a year later the mulatto statesmen who controlled the government made a bad mistake. They had some difficulty in agreeing among themselves upon a successor, but finally chose a captain of the palace guard named Soulouque, whose ignorance and stupidity seemed to assure his being a pliant instrument in the hands of his supporters. The new President had never shown an interest in politics, and it was difficult to persuade him that his election was not a joke. Once in office, however, he resented the superior airs of his aristocratic advisers and soon broke with them. When they conspired to regain power, he encouraged the mob in a savage attack on the mulattoes, and great numbers of them were killed or forced to leave the country. Meanwhile he made a determined effort to reconquer the Dominican Republic, but suddenly abandoned his campaign after some initial successes, and was dissuaded from renewing it by strong diplomatic representations from England, France, and the United States. In 1849 he had himself made Emperor of Haiti, and created a peerage which included four princes, fifty-nine dukes, ninety-nine counts, and a host of lesser nobility. During the next ten years Faustin I ruled with a firm hand, constantly growing more cruel and suspicious in his treatment of the terrified *élite*.

## GEFFRARD AND SALNAVE

Soulouque was overthrown in 1859 by Fabre Geffrard, the head of his general staff, who fled from the capital and started a revolt when he learned that he had fallen under suspicion of disloyalty. The new

President, a dark mulatto, attempted to obtain the support of both of the country's racial groups. During his administration, in 1862, the Haitian government was formally recognized by the United States. A still more important event was the conclusion of a concordat with the Holy See in 1860. The Haitian church had hitherto been in a deplorable state, without recognized bishops and served mainly by priests whose antecedents and character would hardly bear investigation. Its reorganization and the establishment of a regular priesthood recruited in France did much to bring the country into closer touch with European civilization. One of the most noteworthy consequences was the establishment of schools by several religious orders. Public instruction had hitherto been grievously neglected, and it had been difficult even for the *élite* to obtain any sort of an education except by going abroad.

Geffrard nevertheless had many enemies. There was strong and successful opposition to his proposal to amend the constitution to permit foreigners to own land, and there were frequent revolts followed by numerous executions. An uprising under Sylvain Salnave was suppressed in 1865 only because British warships bombarded the insurgents in retaliation for an attack on the British consulate at Cape Haitien. This incident hurt the President's prestige and strengthened his adversaries, and another outbreak in 1867 forced Geffrard to resign.

The liberals, who had participated in this revolt, hoped to return to power, but when a constituent assembly met to choose the new president threats of mob violence compelled it to elect Salnave, who was the idol of the troops and the populace. It was soon evident that the new government would be more despotic than its predecessor. Congress was arbitrarily dissolved, and several political opponents were put to death. The liberals organized revolts in several sections of the country, and they were supported by the leaders of the *cacos*, turbulent peasants from the districts along the northern part of the Dominican border who were to play an increasingly important rôle in Haitian politics as time went on. Salnave, on his side, sought help from the *piquets*—country people of the south—and for more than two years the country endured one of the worst civil wars in its history. The final outcome was the overthrow and execution of Salnave and the victory of the liberals.

## LIBERALISM AND REACTION, 1870-1879

The liberals were in power during the greater part of the next nine years. Nissage-Saget, whom they made President in 1870, was an elderly gentleman whose faculties are said to have been somewhat impaired by eight years of imprisonment under Soulouque. He was greatly hampered by factious opposition in congress, fomented by the rival liberal leader Boyer-Bazelaïs, but he refused to coerce the legislative body, saying, with a rare understanding of constitutional principles, that "each ass should bray in his own pasture."<sup>1</sup> Some of his advisers, however, were less tolerant, and as the end of his term approached they removed Nissage-Saget, installed a new and more subservient congress, and brought about the election of Michel Domingue, the commander of the army.

The new President was an African-born Negro, without education, and with an unpleasant reputation for cruelty. In political matters he was under the influence of his better educated but unscrupulous and erratic nephew Septimus Rameau. The murder of several political adversaries and the flotation of a loan in France, on very unfavorable terms, made the administration unpopular, and in 1876, when it was reported that the government was to be removed to Cayes, an infuriated mob killed Rameau and forced Domingue to flee.

Domingue's successor, Boisrond-Canal, was one of the ablest of the liberal leaders. He made a real effort to restore constitutional government, but continued quarrels within the liberal party paralyzed congress and finally made the President's position so intolerable that he resigned in 1879. His withdrawal left the country in disorder, and a weak provisional government was easily overthrown when Lysius Salomon, the chief adviser of Soulouque, returned from exile to seize power. This marked the end, for a long period, of the political power of the mulatto aristocracy of Port au Prince. Many of the *élite* continued to hold important positions in the government, but the rulers of the country, until the American intervention in 1915, were a series of military leaders, most of them from other sections of the Republic.

<sup>1</sup> Dorsainville, *Manuel d'Histoire d'Haiti*, p. 312.

SALOMON, HYPPOLITE, SIMON SAM, AND  
NORD ALEXIS

Salomon, with his great influence among the peasants of the southern peninsula, had been the most feared opponent of successive Haitian governments since the fall of Faustin I. As leader of the black party, he was disliked and distrusted by the *élite*, but he was as well educated as most Haitians of the upper class and he had shown ability in important governmental positions under Riche and Soulouque. He had lived in Europe, and was married to a white French woman. The understanding of political and economic problems which he had obtained during his long exile showed itself in an energetic and progressive policy when he returned to power in Haiti. He established a national bank, tried to encourage agriculture, and engaged French instructors for the higher schools and for the army. At the same time he was ruthless in his treatment of his liberal opponents and on one occasion he is said to have encouraged the mob to sack the better residential quarters of Port au Prince in retaliation for the *élite's* opposition to his government. The liberals were almost constantly in revolt until the death of Boyer-Bazelais in 1883, but thereafter they ceased to be an important political force.

Salomon was reelected in 1886, but he was overthrown two years later. After some months of civil war between the north and the south, the northern general Florville Hyppolite became President in 1889. One of the principal events of his administration was a flurry of excitement over an unsuccessful effort of the United States to lease the Mole St. Nicholas, which Hyppolite had apparently promised to cede for a coaling station in return for assistance from the American navy during his struggle for power. During the term of Tiresias Simon Sam, who became President after Hyppolite died suddenly of heart failure in 1896, there was another incident involving a foreign power. This was the "Luders Affair," when two German war vessels appeared at Port au Prince to compel the payment of a large indemnity to a German who had been imprisoned for a short time for resisting the local police.

Antenor Firmin, the most influential member of the cabinet, expected to succeed Sam, but other leaders opposed him. During the

civil war that ensued, Firmin's warship, the *Crête-à-Pierrot*, seized a shipment of arms which a German merchant ship was carrying to his adversaries. The German cruiser *Panther* was ordered to capture her, but Admiral Killick, the commander of the *Crête-à-Pierrot*, sent his crew ashore and blew up his ship. This caused Firmin's defeat, and in December, 1902, a victorious army compelled the congress to elect his rival, a general from the north named Nord Alexis, as President.

Though an uneducated soldier, already more than eighty years old, Nord Alexis was an able ruler. One of his first acts was to prosecute the leading men in the preceding government and several foreign officials of the National Bank for frauds in connection with the consolidation of the floating debt. Simon Sam and several of his ministers were convicted. None of them, however, seem to have been punished, and it is interesting to note that three of those found guilty later served as presidents of the Republic.<sup>1</sup> The National Bank, which had been established under French management in 1881, had been implicated in other scandalous transactions at the expense of the national treasury and its charter was now revoked.

From the accession of Salomon in 1879 until the end of Nord Alexis' administration in 1908 Haiti enjoyed a relatively stable government. High coffee prices made the country generally prosperous, and ample revenues strengthened the government's position. Unfortunately there was little real progress. A succession of military dictators had maintained order, but they had done little to relieve the poverty and ignorance of the masses of the people. Public funds were still spent solely for the benefit of the ruling class. Despite increased income the government's finances were in bad shape, for corruption pervaded all departments and continual deficits were met by borrowing or by issues of paper or nickel fiat currency. The fundamental unsoundness of the political structure was to become evident in the next few years.

#### THE "EPHEMERAL GOVERNMENTS"

Antoine Simon, a soldier of humble origin, led a revolution which compelled Nord Alexis to flee to Jamaica in 1908. The new President,

<sup>1</sup> Davis, *Black Democracy*, p. 138.

a southerner, was unpopular in the north and at Port au Prince. He was violently criticised when he contracted a large external loan in 1910, and the ever-present fear of foreign influence was further aroused by contracts with an American promoter for a railroad and for the development of a banana industry. It was not difficult, therefore, for Cincinnatus Leconte to march down from the north and seize Port au Prince with a "caco" army in August, 1911, and the Congress, as usual, did not dare to refuse to elect the leader of the victorious revolutionists as President.

During the next four years Haiti had six presidents, serving for periods which grew shorter and shorter. Leconte, before he had been in office for twelve months, was killed with 300 soldiers of his guard by an explosion in the national palace. Tancrede Auguste, hastily elected by the Congress to succeed him, died after eight months under circumstances which caused some suspicion of poison.<sup>1</sup> He had not been buried when street fighting broke out between rival military leaders who sought to surround the meeting place of congress to dictate the choice of his successor. The victor, a popular lawyer named Michel Oreste, was in office eight months before a revolt in the north led by Davilmar Théodore forced him to flee to Jamaica. Théodore had not even reached Port au Prince when he was defeated in February, 1914, by Oreste Zamor. In October, Théodore overthrew Zamor, only to be overthrown himself five months later by Vilbrun Guillaume Sam. Each revolution in turn was the work of the *cacos*, who barely installed one man in power and were paid for their services before they sold their support to another. Guillaume Sam remained in office until July, 1915, but on July 27 his *caco* troops deserted him, as they had his predecessors, and he took refuge in the French legation.

On the same night, 167 political suspects, many of them members of prominent families in Port au Prince, were slaughtered in cold blood in the prison by Sam's lieutenants. The people of the city learned of the massacre the next day, and an enraged mob of friends and relatives dragged the ex-President from the French legation and tore him to pieces in the streets. The capital was still in a state of anarchy a few hours later when Admiral Caperton entered the harbor

<sup>1</sup> Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 147.



with the U.S.S. *Washington* and landed forces to restore order. This was the beginning of an American military occupation that lasted sixteen years.

#### WHY THE UNITED STATES INTERVENED

Continual disorder and administrative inefficiency had involved Haiti in more and more serious complications with other governments. In the past four years especially, French, German, British, and American armed forces had repeatedly been landed to protect foreign life and property, and claims for losses or injuries to foreign nationals, some of them well-founded and some fictitious, had assumed alarming proportions. Certain European governments, moreover, had shown what seemed to the government at Washington an unwholesome interest in Haitian affairs. French cultural influences were predominant among the *élite* and French bankers had supplied the greater part of the loans that constituted the Republic's foreign debt. German merchants, on the other hand, controlled the Republic's trade, and they had been active during the past few years in financing revolutionary movements, buying at a fraction of their face value revolutionary bond issues which were afterward assumed as obligations of the state. Both France and Germany had served notice that they would wish to participate in any foreign financial control which might be established in Haiti, and Germany was believed to desire to obtain control of the Mole St. Nicholas as a coaling station. The outbreak of the World War had of course eliminated any danger of European interference in Haiti for the time being, but the United States wished to guard against the possibility of future interference.

Furthermore, American interests in the island had suffered from the turbulent conditions there and had repeatedly appealed to Washington for diplomatic support. The most important of these interests were the National Railroad Company, which was endeavoring to build a line from Port au Prince to Cape Haitien under government subsidy, and the American shareholders in the National Bank, which had been reestablished in 1910 with French, German, and American capital. The Bank played an especially important rôle in the events which led up to the intervention. Under its charter it was the treasury

of the Haitian government, receiving all revenues and paying over to the government's creditors the proceeds of the taxes which were pledged to them—an arrangement which had assured interest payments on the foreign debt even when political conditions were most disturbed. The bank had also regularly advanced money to the government for current expenses. In 1914, however, it refused to continue these advances and the government retaliated by taking the treasury service out of its hands. This made a default on the foreign debt unavoidable, and for some time before the intervention finally occurred the United States had been endeavoring without success to persuade successive revolutionary governments to accept American financial control.

#### THE TREATY OF 1915

With its forces in possession of Port au Prince, the American government embarked on a more ambitious program. The Congress, protected by American troops, was persuaded to elect a new president, Sudre Dartiguenave, who gave assurances in advance that he would accede to the wishes of the United States. A treaty was signed on September 16, under which the United States was to "aid the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis." A General Receiver of Customs and a Financial Adviser, both appointed upon the nomination of the President of the United States, were to control the Republic's financial administration. A constabulary, officered by Americans similarly appointed, was to assume the maintenance of order, and American engineers were to take measures for "sanitation and public improvement." In general, the United States was to "lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian Independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty." The treaty was to be in force for ten years, but in 1917 this period was extended by agreement to twenty years. American marines had meanwhile been landed at several ports, and a technical state of military occupation had been established throughout the Republic. The control of the United States

was made still more effective by two agreements signed in 1918. one providing that the American legation should be consulted before any project of law was submitted to the legislative body, and the other giving the financial adviser a veto over all expenditures.

#### THE CACO REVOLT

The first years of the occupation were troubled ones. There was much friction between the treaty officials and the Haitian government, and a bitter dispute with the Haitian congress over the adoption of a new constitution, written, in part, by officials at Washington. After President Dartiguenave dissolved the congress, with the support of the American-officered constabulary, the constitution was adopted by "plebiscite" in 1918. One of the provisions insisted upon by the United States was the partial elimination of the article prohibiting foreign landownership. These events increased the discontent already existing among the *élite*. At the same time the new constabulary officers had provoked much hostility among the peasants by blunders and abuses in the enforcement of the *corvée*, the system of compulsory labor on the roads. The result was a revolt of the *cacos* in the north and west, which continued for two years and cost nearly 2,000 lives before it was finally suppressed by American marines.

#### THE WORK OF THE TREATY SERVICES

The painful impression caused by this revolt, and the realization that little of real value had thus far been accomplished in Haiti, led to a reorganization of the American treaty organization in 1922. Brigadier General John H. Russell of the United States Marine Corps was appointed High Commissioner, to act as diplomatic representative of the United States and at the same time to supervise and direct the work of the treaty officials. This made possible a unity of direction which had hitherto been lacking, and at the same time brought about a marked improvement in the relations between the two governments. Hitherto, distrust and friction between Haitian and American officials had been a serious obstacle to the achievement of the purposes of the treaty of 1915, because either party to the treaty could obstruct measures which the other advocated, but Louis Borno, who succeeded

Dartiguenave as President in 1922, coöperated frankly and effectively with the American officials.

Much was accomplished during the next seven years. A loan floated in New York in 1922 made possible the refunding of the foreign and internal debts and provided a substantial sum for public works, which was supplemented by increased efficiency in the financial administration. It was consequently possible for the Public-Works Service to build roads and trails in all parts of the country and to repair and extend the old French irrigation works. The Public-Health Service, under the direction of United States Navy doctors, organized hospitals and rural clinics which brought medical care for the first time within the reach of the great mass of the population. In 1923, a Service of Agriculture and Vocational Instruction was set up under the treaty and small rural farm schools were gradually established throughout the country. Meanwhile, the constabulary maintained order, and its district commanders, most of them sergeants in the Marine Corps, took the place of the old military commandants as the principal local officials in the rural districts.

#### OPPOSITION TO THE INTERVENTION

The American occupation was nonetheless disliked by the majority of the Haitian *élite*. Though this group had returned to power with the intervention, after the long period of subjection to black military leaders and *caco* chieftains, they felt that they had derived little benefit from the change. In the past, the government's revenue had nearly all found its way, through one channel or another, into the pockets of the ruling class. Now, it was being spent by foreigners on projects that benefited the masses of the people. The expenditures of those departments of the government which were under Haitian control had been reduced to a minimum. Furthermore, foreign control was in itself offensive to national pride, and President Borno's policy of coöperation was increasingly unpopular. There was no legal channel, however, through which the opposition could act, because a "transitory" provision of the constitution of 1918 authorized the president to postpone congressional elections as long as he saw fit, and provided that the legislative power should be exercised

in the meantime by an appointed Council of State. It was this body which elected Borno in 1922, and which voted him a second four-year term in 1926.

As the end of this term approached, the fear that the President would be elected again, or would place in office one of his close associates, brought on a political crisis. In the last months of 1929, a minor dispute in the agricultural school led to a strike of Haitian employees in various government departments, accompanied by violent political demonstrations. For the first time in many years the American marines were compelled to assist in maintaining order. Normal conditions were restored without bloodshed at Port au Prince, but at Cayes, where there was an effort to incite the peasants to revolt, several persons were killed in a clash with a small marine detachment.

#### THE END OF THE INTERVENTION

Soon after these events, President Hoover appointed a commission headed by Mr. W. Cameron Forbes to consider "when and how we are to withdraw from Haiti" and "what we shall do in the meantime." This body made a brief visit to Haiti early in 1930, and recommended that a civilian minister be appointed to take over the functions of the High Commissioner and to carry out the early "Haitianization" of the treaty services. With General Russell's help, it also worked out an agreement between the contending political factions, by which Eugene Roy, a generally respected banker in Port au Prince, would become President when Borno's term expired in May, with the understanding that he would convene a congress and then resign in order to permit the election of a new chief executive. This plan was duly carried out. The election held in the summer of 1930 was as nearly free and fair as any could be in Haiti, and the Congress, meeting in November, chose Stenio Vincent, a leading opponent of the American occupation, as President.

The new American Minister at once began negotiations for the termination of the intervention. The military occupation was formally ended in 1931, and the public-works, public-health, and agricultural services were turned over to Haitian officials at the same time. The "Haitianization" of the constabulary was slower, because it was

first necessary to train native officers in the higher ranks, but it was effected in August, 1934, and all American marines were then withdrawn. The financial administration presented a more difficult problem. The United States felt that both governments had formally obligated themselves when the loan of 1922 was issued to maintain American control over the collection and application of the pledged revenues so long as the bonds were outstanding, but the Financial Adviser-General Receiver was nevertheless replaced in 1934 by a "Fiscal Representative" with more restricted powers.

#### SINCE 1934

Throughout the "Haitianization" negotiations, President Vincent and his advisers emphasized the importance of maintaining the efficiency of the treaty services, and to a great extent they were left in the hands of capable natives who had served in important positions under the American directors. Haiti, in the years immediately following the withdrawal of the American forces, was thus a very different country from the Haiti of 1915. The constabulary, under its trained officers, was a far more efficient and better trained force than the old army, and road building and other improvements carried out during the intervention had done much to unify the country and to raise the general standard of living. The people as a whole seemed little inclined to countenance a return of the turbulent conditions of pre-intervention days.

Nevertheless, the country's most serious social and political problems remained unsolved. The peasants were hardly better fitted than before 1915 to take their place as citizens of a free republic. The rural schools established under the treaty had hardly made a dent in their illiteracy or their ignorance of the first principles of farming. Production had increased very little, and only one or two of several agricultural enterprises established by American capital during the occupation had been at all successful. Meanwhile, population had increased even more rapidly than before 1915, partly because of the work of the Public-Health Service. With some three million people crowded into a none-too-fertile area of 10,000 square miles, Haiti is

today one of the most crowded countries of the Western Hemisphere.

President Vincent remained in power after the American withdrawal. In 1934 he arranged to buy the National Bank from the American interests that had acquired its stock in 1920. The plan met with opposition in the Haitian Senate, but a "plebiscite" upheld the President by a majority of 454,357 to 1,172, and eleven senators were thereafter summarily removed from office as being "rebellious against the will of the people." The Bank thus became the property of the government, and in 1941 the United States agreed that it should take over the loan service, under the supervision of American citizens appointed to its board of directors. The office of the Fiscal Representative was thus discontinued.

Another plebiscite in June, 1935, approved a new constitution which extended President Vincent's term to 1941 and provided for the election of future presidents by popular vote instead of by the congress, which had exercised this power under previous constitutions. This strengthened the executive's position, because a popular election, in Haiti, was easier to manipulate than a congressional vote. There was little effective opposition to the government during the next six years despite the fact that the vicissitudes of the coffee industry caused an acute economic depression. This was somewhat relieved after 1938, when the J. G. White Corporation of New York undertook a large public works program financed by a loan from the United States government.

During Vincent's second term Haiti nearly became involved in a war with its neighbor the Dominican Republic. The hostile feeling between the people of the two ends of the island, which had originated in the days of the buccaneers and had been intensified by the Haitian occupation of Santo Domingo between 1822 and 1844, had been kept alive by disputes over the boundary between the two countries. In recent years, great numbers of Haitians had entered the Dominican Republic to work on the sugar plantations or to farm land along the border as squatters, and in 1937 several thousand of these were suddenly massacred by Dominican troops, and thousands more were driven back across the border. A conflict between the two

republics was averted through the good offices of other American states, and the Dominican government agreed to pay Haiti a substantial indemnity.

Many observers had expected the President to be a candidate for a third term in 1941, but he decided to withdraw from office and Elie Lescot, who had held several important positions in his administration, was chosen to succeed him.



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*Chapter XXVI*

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

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THE COLONIAL PERIOD

The Spanish colony of Santo Domingo, the first European settlement in the New World, had been all but abandoned within a century after its establishment by Christopher Columbus. The extermination of the Indians and the emigration of the whites to more attractive places on the mainland left only a scanty population. The island had little importance in the eyes of the Spanish government, and when the buccaneers began to make forays on the north and west coast at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the authorities removed the settlements of that region into the interior instead of attempting to defend them. The resulting establishment of the pirate headquarters at Tortuga, and its development into the French colony of Saint Domingue, has already been described.

During the eighteenth century the growing prosperity of the French end of the island had its effect on the older Spanish settlements. The sugar and coffee plantations offered a market for cattle, and the trade that sprang up brought in wealth which made it possible for the landowners of the eastern end to import considerable numbers of slaves. There was also some white immigration from the Canary Islands, encouraged by the Spanish government as a means of strengthening its hold on the colony. By 1789 the population of the Spanish end of the island was estimated at 125,000, of whom 15,000 were Negro slaves. The colony still seemed backward, however, to the inhabitants of French Saint Domingue; and one of the French creoles, influenced no doubt by the inveterate antipathy between the people of the two colonies, described the people of the Spanish sec-

tion as illiterate, unprogressive, and superstitious.<sup>1</sup> In the rural districts even the wealthier farmers went barefoot and lived in a very primitive way. There were no good roads and little commerce except the cattle trade with the French settlements. On the other hand the Spanish colony did not have the social and racial problems which were soon to bring so terrible a catastrophe upon its western neighbor. There were no large plantations where heavy and regular labor was required, and the treatment of the slaves, as in other Spanish colonies, was relatively humane. More important still, the great majority of the Negroes were "creoles," who spoke Spanish and practiced Catholicism, rather than recent arrivals from Africa. They thus had little in common with the followers of Toussaint Louverture and Dessalines, and were more disposed to join with other classes of the population in resisting Haitian invasion than to support the Negro chieftains in a race war against their former masters.

#### HAITIAN, FRENCH, AND SPANISH RULE, 1795-1822

The people of Spanish Santo Domingo were nevertheless severely affected by the cataclysm in the other end of the island. The more conservative creoles were horrified when Spain ceded the colony to revolutionary France in 1795, and many began to emigrate to territory which remained Spanish. A great many other white families left the country after Toussaint Louverture occupied Santo Domingo City and freed the slaves in 1801. Only a part of them returned when Napoleon's expeditionary force occupied both ends of the island in 1802.

The French General Ferrand was able to maintain himself in Santo Domingo after the destruction of Leclerc's army in the west and with the help of a French fleet to repulse an invasion by Dessalines and Christophe in 1805. For a time all went well, but when the people of Spain rose against Napoleon, the Dominican creoles followed their example. In 1808-9, with the aid of the British fleet, Juan Sánchez Ramírez led a revolt which reestablished Spanish rule.

<sup>1</sup> Moreau de Saint-Méry, *A Topographical and Political Description of the Spanish Part of Saint Domingo* (Philadelphia, 1798).

After the restoration of Ferdinand VII the mother country's illiberal policy caused much of the colonists' loyalty to evaporate, and on November 30, 1821, the Spanish authorities at Santo Domingo City were overthrown with little or no bloodshed and an independent government was set up under José Núñez de Cáceres. The creole leaders proclaimed the union of "Spanish Haiti" with Great Colombia, but before they could ask help from Bolívar, Haitian troops under President Boyer were approaching the capital. The Dominicans offered little resistance, and the still strong pro-Spanish faction seems in fact to have welcomed the invaders, who promptly annexed the whole territory to the recently reunited Republic of Haiti.

#### THE SECOND HAITIAN OCCUPATION

For twenty-two years after 1822, the people of the eastern end of the island were ruled from Port au Prince. Their lot was an unenviable one. Even though the Haitian constitutional provisions which excluded whites from citizenship and landownership were not fully enforced in Santo Domingo, the white creole families found their situation almost intolerable. Many thousands of them again left the island. The inhabitants who remained were restive under the rule of people who differed from them in language and culture and whom they regarded as historic enemies. Boyer seems to have made a real effort to conciliate them and to protect them against abuses, but they were inevitably exploited and mistreated in many ways. All classes suffered from the inefficiency of Haitian rule and the total neglect of roads, schools, and other public services, and resented the government's hostile attitude toward the Church, which had been more influential in the east than in the west. They also resented the fact that taxes were levied in the east to help pay the heavy indemnity imposed on Haiti by France in 1825.

There was nevertheless little overt opposition to Haitian rule until the disorders following the overthrow of Boyer in 1843 encouraged the Dominican patriots to act. A secret society called "La Trinitaria" had been organized in 1838 by Juan Pablo Duarte, a young man who had been educated abroad and had only recently returned to Santo Domingo. This group joined in the conspiracy of the Haitian "lib-

erals" against Boyer and helped to make it a success; but when their real purpose became apparent the new Haitian government took measures which forced their leaders to flee into exile. President Hérard, however, soon had his hands full with opposition at home and on February 27, 1844, a group of Duarte's associates seized the forts at Santo Domingo and proclaimed the independence of the Dominican Republic. *Caudillos* in other sections of the former Spanish colony followed their example. Duarte returned from Curaçao to become a member of the *Junta Central* which took charge of the government, and an army was raised to repel the Haitian forces which had already crossed the border. The outcome was still uncertain when a new revolt in Haiti caused the invaders to withdraw.

#### SANTANA AND BÁEZ, 1844-1859

The Dominican leaders, in the meantime, had already quarreled among themselves, and in June Duarte's followers in the *Junta Central* attempted to dismiss Pedro Santana, the commander of the army, whose dilatory tactics against the Haitians had aroused their distrust. Santana promptly marched on the capital, exiled his opponents, and convened a congress which elected him President and gave him dictatorial powers. He remained President until 1848, when he fell ill and the Minister of War, Manuel Jiménez, seized the opportunity to supplant him. A year later, however, Santana was placed in command of the army when the Haitians invaded the country, and after his forces had repulsed the enemy it was an easy matter to force out Jiménez. This time he was content with the command of the military forces, while his associate, Buenaventura Báez, became President. Santana's control of the army and his popularity gave him much influence in the new administration, and he again took over the presidency in 1853 when Báez' term expired.

There was much quarreling and some armed strife during the first decade of independence, and the country's new rulers had little chance to organize an efficient government. At best they had scanty resources with which to work. With the emigration of a large proportion of the upper classes, most of whom did not again return, the country was deprived of many of its natural leaders. The masses of

the people were peasants, living under primitive conditions, among whom the proportion of Negro blood was far greater than in colonial times. Illiteracy was general, for there had been very few schools under the Haitian regime, and only five, accommodating forty pupils each, were provided for in the budget as late as 1857. Agriculture, stock-raising, and commerce had greatly declined. The government's revenues, in 1845-46, were estimated at less than \$650,000, and of its expenditures, estimated at \$1,186,000, \$1,000,000 went to the army.<sup>1</sup> Under such conditions it was difficult to look for any substantial material progress.

In the first years of independence there was little immediate danger of an attack by the weak administrations that succeeded one another at Port au Prince, but the Dominicans knew that the first strong government which established itself in Haiti would attempt to reconquer them. The western Republic had a far greater population and resources, and the recollection of earlier invasions, with their wholesale massacres and reckless destruction of property, made the renewal of hostilities a terrifying prospect. Many Dominican leaders, including Santana, felt that the only alternative to reconquest was help from some foreign power, and efforts to obtain European or North American protection were the central theme of the first thirty years of the Republic's history.

At first these efforts met with little success. Neither France nor Spain responded favorably to Santana's first overtures, and the United States failed even to accord diplomatic recognition to the new Republic. More urgent but still unsuccessful pleas were addressed to France and to the United States, both by Jiménez and Báez, when Faustin Soulouque came into power in Haiti and the expected invasion actually materialized. No foreign government wished to assume an unattractive and unprofitable responsibility. Great Britain, France, and the United States did, however, agree to make representations to Faustin, and their threats persuaded him to hold his hand for the time being. When the Haitian Emperor renewed the war in 1855, his army was defeated by Santana. This proved to be the last formidable Haitian invasion, but it seemed at the time merely a temporary success and did not diminish the desire to obtain foreign help.

<sup>1</sup> 41st Congress, 3rd Session, House Exec Doc. 42, p. 11.

Many Dominicans, however, opposed any arrangement which might impair the national independence, and their opposition was always encouraged by representatives of other governments as soon as negotiations with any one country began to look hopeful. None of the powers wished to see a possible enemy obtain control of Samaná Bay, the fine natural harbor in the northeastern corner of the island which commanded one of the principal entrances to the Caribbean Sea, and their representatives at Santo Domingo often engaged in intrigues of the most sordid character to prevent such a contingency. Several foreign consuls helped to bring about the fall of Santana in 1856, after premature publicity had defeated a clumsily handled scheme for the establishment of a coaling station by the United States at Samaná.

Báez, who had quarreled with his former chief, became President and adopted a policy of open hostility to the United States, but when he rewarded the Spanish, French, and English consuls by permitting them to profit with him in scandalous transactions connected with large new issues of paper money, public opinion turned strongly against him. After his foreign supporters quarreled among themselves, and the Spanish *chargé d'affaires* was recalled, he could no longer maintain himself. The capital was taken by revolutionists in 1858 after a long siege, and Santana returned to the presidency.

#### REANNEXATION TO SPAIN

The effort to obtain foreign protection now met with success. The government of Spain was less reluctant to assume the responsibility involved now that the United States, on the verge of a civil war, was not in a position to resist. In 1860, at Santana's request, Spanish troops were sent to support his administration, and on March 18, 1861, the Dominican President proclaimed the reannexation of the Republic to the mother country. The authorities at Madrid, after some hesitation, gave their approval and named Santana Captain General of the colony. More Spanish troops arrived, and with them a number of peninsular officials. Those who opposed the surrender of independence staged several small revolts, but they were repressed by Santana with

a cruelty which shocked his new associates and caused the first of a series of increasingly serious disagreements.

From the beginning, the reunion was an unhappy one. The Dominicans were disgusted when they saw Spain restoring the same unenlightened centralized regime which had been repudiated by other American colonies a half century earlier, and they resented the replacement of native by foreign officials. The clergy were aroused by tactless efforts of the new Spanish archbishop to bring about reforms in conduct and discipline. The attitude of some of the Spanish officials who came from the slave-holding colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico angered the colored inhabitants, and there was even a fear lest slavery be reestablished in Santo Domingo.

Santana, who found himself with less and less authority, resigned as Captain General and was given a title of nobility and a pension early in 1862. A year later he took the field against insurgents who revolted in the interior, but met with little success, and in 1864 he died suddenly, perhaps by his own hand. Meanwhile yellow fever, the old enemy of European conquerors in the West Indies, attacked the Spanish army, and the growing Dominican revolt caused further losses and heavy expense. By the end of 1864 the Spanish government was weary of the whole adventure, especially as it was clear that the approaching end of the civil war would soon permit the United States to follow up the strong protest against the occupation which it had made in 1861. After unsuccessful attempts to treat with the rebels, therefore, the Spanish forces simply abandoned the island in July, 1865.

#### BÁEZ AND THE UNITED STATES

The provisional government set up by the insurgents was already weakened by quarrels among rival leaders, and General Pimentel, who was its head when the Spaniards withdrew, was soon overthrown by a revolt at Santo Domingo City. General José María Cabral became President, but could not restore order, and at the end of 1865 Báez returned to power. Though Santana's old rival had lived in Europe during the Spanish occupation and had in fact accepted hon-

ors and money from the Spanish government until it was clear that the reconquest would not last, he was still the most influential of the Dominican political leaders, and intrigues which he directed from Curaçao had forced the victorious *caudillos* of the war of liberation to consent to his return. His rivals, however, were little disposed to coöperate with him, and the interference of the Haitian government helped to keep the country in a state of disorder. Cabral, with the aid of President Geffrard, forced Báez to flee into exile, and then found his own position weakened by Haitian aid to his enemies after Geffrard was overthrown by Salnave. By January, 1868, the "reds" or *Baecistas* controlled the country, and a few months later their leader was back in the presidency.

Báez revived the idea of a foreign protectorate. Though he had been pro-French and anti-American in his earlier career, he had no choice but to turn to the United States, for no European power was now likely to challenge the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, the government at Washington seemed not averse to assuming new responsibilities in the Caribbean Sea. Secretary of State Seward had visited Santo Domingo in 1866, and in the following year the American government had again proposed to lease or buy Samaná Bay for a coaling station. These negotiations failed because of popular opposition in the Dominican Republic, but they were resumed later in 1867 when the Cabral government was on the point of collapse. Báez continued them, and when President Johnson suggested to Congress the desirability of annexing the Dominican Republic he expressed his full agreement.

Congressional hostility to Johnson made the realization of this project impossible for the time being, but the advocates of annexation resumed their efforts after President Grant's inauguration. The chief movers in the scheme, on the American side, were two adventurers named Cazneau and Fabens, who had obtained various concessions which would increase in value if annexation were effected. Despite their unsavory records and equally questionable methods, these men had apparently gained Seward's confidence, and they were no less successful with the new administration. Grant became much interested in their proposals and in 1869 sent his military secretary, General Orville Babcock, to Santo Domingo to confer with Báez.



The result was the signature of two treaties, one providing for the annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States and the other for a ninety-nine year lease of Samaná Bay. A plebiscite held in February, 1870, ostensibly indicated that the Dominican people approved the proposed agreements by an overwhelming majority.

President Grant and some of his chief advisers were actuated by a real interest in the Dominican Republic and a desire for imperialistic expansion, but their annexation project was discredited when it became evident that other and more sordid influences were also behind it. Cazneau and Fabens had enlisted the support of several influential Americans who were financially interested in the scheme, and Fabens was connected with a London banker named Hartmont, who had agreed to make a loan to the Báez government in 1869. This latter contract was one of the most improvident transactions in the history of Caribbean finance. The government was to receive £420,000, out of which it was to pay Hartmont a commission of £100,000. In return it was to pay £58,900 annually for twenty-five years, giving the customs receipts at Santo Domingo and Puerto Plata as security and authorizing the bankers to maintain representatives in the custom-houses there. It also gave the bankers a mortgage on the coal mines and forests of the Samaná district, and by a separate concession authorized Hartmont to work the mines for his own profit. Under the loan contract, Hartmont offered £757,700 of the Republic's 6 per cent bonds to the public at 70 per cent of their face value. The arrangement would have been an unconscionable one if it had been carried out in good faith, and when Hartmont failed to comply with his end of the bargain it left the government with a heavy debt for which it had received little in return. The promoters had hoped to have their profits made secure by the consummation of the annexation project, but instead the contract was canceled, at the instance of the American government, when they failed to comply with their obligations. The bonds, however, could not be repudiated. They were long in default, but the government was compelled eventually to refund them.

When the Dominican treaties reached the United States Senate there was a bitter fight, with Senator Sumner leading the opposition. A tie vote, far short of the two-thirds necessary for ratification, de-

feated the proposal in June, 1870. Grant refused to drop the matter, and Congress authorized him to send a commission of inquiry which visited Santo Domingo early in 1871 and returned with a report supporting the administration's policy. By this time, however, the strength of the senatorial opposition and the indifference of public opinion precluded any possibility of favorable action, and the whole matter was dropped.

STRIFE BETWEEN "REDS" AND "BLUES,"  
1871-1882

American naval forces had helped to keep Báez in power during the negotiations, and his position was precarious when these were withdrawn. His opponents, the "blues," received help from Haiti, where Báez' enemy Nissage-Saget was now in power, and where the annexation project had caused much alarm, and he lost much support among his own followers when he sought to replenish the treasury by leasing Samaná Bay to a private American company. He was overthrown in 1874 by one of his own lieutenants, General Ignacio María González, who was in turn overthrown by a "blue" revolt in 1876.

The contest between "reds" and "blues" had by this time brought the country to a condition of near anarchy, and matters became still worse during the next three years. The "reds" still followed Báez, whereas the "blues" were led by Gregorio Luperón, a semi-illiterate, very popular Negro chieftain, who was content to let others occupy the presidency while his party was in power. Ulises Espaillat, elected President after the "blue" victory in 1876, was one of the Republic's most respected and enlightened citizens, but his effort to establish better conditions ended after a few months with a successful revolt under González. Before the end of 1876 the latter was in turn overthrown by Báez, only to return to power for a brief period in 1878, and again to be forced out by the "red" General Guillermo. Luperón regained control in 1879 and after a brief period as Provisional President made his friend Father Meriño head of the government. Order was now restored, though not until two attempts at revolt had been cruelly suppressed, and when Meriño's two-year term expired, his

minister of the interior, Ulises Heureaux, was "elected" without difficulty to succeed him.

#### HEUREAUX

The man who thus came into the presidency dominated Dominican political life during the next seventeen years. Though he was at first unable to control his own party, and was compelled to permit Luperón's candidate, General Billini, to succeed him in 1884, he soon forced Billini to resign in favor of Vice-President Woss y Gil. He returned to the presidency himself in January, 1887. Two years later he had a constitutional convention extend his term of office until 1893, and from then on until the end of his life he was reelected at regular intervals.

Heureaux was a full-blooded Negro, the illegitimate son of a Haitian and a woman from one of the other West Indian islands, with little education but much native energy and intelligence. He had distinguished himself by his courage and ruthlessness in the war against Spain and the ensuing civil struggles, and he was fairly popular when he first took office. His administration was comparatively liberal at first, but it soon became a cruel and greedy despotism, with all of the demoralizing features inherent in such a system. He won the support of many other political leaders by bribery or intimidation, and there was little internal disorder during his long tenure of power—the first era of peace in the history of the Republic. Agriculture prospered and commerce took on new life. Sugar production, which had begun to increase in importance during the ten years' war in Cuba (1868-78) when several refugees from that island set up mills in Santo Domingo, was still further expanded by North American capital. The country thus felt the effect of the same influences which were making for stability and economic development in other Latin American countries in the closing years of the century.

On the other hand, Heureaux's financial transactions involved the country in grave difficulties. His first foreign loan in 1888 was floated by the Dutch firm of Westendorp. Its primary purpose was to refund the Hartmont bonds, whose holders had been supported by the British

government in their demands for repayment, but it also provided a substantial sum for Heureaux's own use. Two years later, another loan was obtained from the same firm, ostensibly for railroad construction. This was a failure, and the Westendorp company, in financial difficulties, turned over its Dominican interests to an American firm, the "San Domingo Improvement Company," in 1892. The outstanding debt, already in default, was scaled down and refunded, and the customs receipts were pledged to the service of a new bond issue. Their collection was entrusted to a "*regie*" directed by the bankers, with a provision that it should be taken over in case of another default by nominees of the British, French, American, Dutch, and Belgian governments.

The Improvement Company thus not only supplied the government with funds but collected the major part of its revenues. It also carried on construction work on the Central Dominican Railway, and in 1895 it took over the control of the National Bank, hitherto owned by a French company. These operations were profitable to the bankers and to Heureaux personally, but successive bond issues were sold on more and more unfavorable terms, and the public debt rapidly increased. In 1897 there was a new default, followed by another adjustment at the bondholders' expense, and by still another default. When further loans became impossible, the government turned to the issue of depreciated currency to obtain funds.

#### INTERNAL DISORDER AND FOREIGN COMPLICATIONS, 1899-1904

Heureaux was assassinated on July 26, 1899, by Ramón Cáceres, one of a group of conspirators which included Horacio Vásquez, Cáceres' cousin, who was a powerful political leader in the Cibao, and Juan Isidro Jiménez, a merchant at Monte Cristi. This group obtained control of the government after a brief civil war, and Jiménez became President. The new administration, virtually penniless, was beset by foreign claims, supported by diplomatic pressure or by warships. It was compelled by public opinion to attempt to dislodge the Improvement Company from its control of the customs and the National Bank, but the attitude of the United States forced it

to agree to a compromise which satisfied no one. At the same time the Improvement Company's failure to maintain service on the government's bonds, most of which had been sold in European markets, and the government's own inability to meet bills for supplies and claims for damages, caused trouble with France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

The settlement of these problems was made more difficult by constant internal dissension. The *Horacistas*, as Vásquez' followers were called, overthrew Jiménez in 1902. Vásquez became President, only to be overthrown a year later by former partisans of Heureaux under General Alejandro Woss y Gil. Jiménez had supported this revolt, but later in the same year his followers joined with the *Horacistas* in a new one, which was likewise successful. Jiménez expected to become president, and he promptly started an uprising of his own when the *Horacistas* prevailed on the *Jimenista* military leader Carlos Morales to seize power for himself. There were some months of fighting before a truce was arranged through the good offices of an American naval officer.

These financial and political difficulties led a few of the Dominican leaders to turn to the old idea of foreign help. Woss y Gil had tentatively offered Samaná Bay to the United States in 1903, and Morales soon after he came into office advocated placing the custom-houses under North American control. This, he thought, would not only relieve the pressure from other foreign creditors, but would also discourage revolutions, for the first step in a revolt was usually the seizure of a custom-house as a means of obtaining funds. The idea was an unpopular one in Santo Domingo, but it became increasingly clear that foreign intervention of some kind was practically unavoidable. The Republic now owed more than \$32,000,000, and the annual fixed charge on the funded debt alone would have consumed \$1,700,000 of the government's total estimated revenue of \$1,850,000. If the debt service were maintained, there would be no funds for the conduct of the government.

The creditor powers, on the other hand, were insistent on a settlement. In January, 1903, the government was compelled to promise the United States that it would pay \$4,500,000 to the Improvement Company in return for the transfer of all the latter's interests in the

country; and an arbitral award which fixed the manner of payment authorized a fiscal agent appointed by the United States to take over the collection of customs at several ports in case of default. This conflicted with agreements previously extorted from the Dominican government by several European creditors, under which the revenues from the same ports had been promised to them, and complications became inevitable when the American fiscal agent actually took possession of the Puerto Plata custom-house in October, 1904.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CUSTOMS RECEIVERSHIP

Several of the creditor powers were by this time threatening to take action against the Dominican Republic unless a general settlement of claims were brought about. It seemed very probable that one or more of them would actually occupy some of the Dominican ports. Since a recent decision of the Hague Court in a case arising from the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela <sup>1</sup> had established the principle that nations which used force to collect debts should receive payment ahead of other creditors, it seemed probable that to permit European intervention in Santo Domingo would hurt the American creditors, besides creating possible political dangers. These considerations impelled President Roosevelt to propose a plan which would protect the interests of all concerned. Morales agreed, and on February 7, 1905, a treaty was signed under which the United States undertook to collect the Dominican customs revenues and to attempt a general arrangement with all of the Republic's creditors.

Opposition in the United States Senate prevented prompt ratification of this pact, but a customs collectorship was nevertheless established in March under a *modus vivendi* or informal agreement. Of the funds received, 55 per cent were held in trust for the creditors for the time being. During the next year, with the help of the United States, Federico Velásquez, the Dominican Minister of Finance, worked out a general settlement by which outstanding obligations were to be scaled down and paid from an American loan of \$20,000,000. A new treaty, providing that the customs receivership should

<sup>1</sup> See above p 403.

continue so long as the bonds were outstanding, was signed February 8, 1907, and was promptly ratified.

#### RAMÓN CÁCERES

For a time it seemed that the Republic's worst problems had been settled. The creditors were satisfied, revenues increased, and money was available for public works and other useful purposes. Revolutions became far more difficult, especially as the United States did not hesitate to use the authority given it by the treaty to prevent any interference with the collection of the customs. The country seemed to be making rapid progress, politically and economically.

The apparent success of the new regime was owing in large part to the ability and popularity of President Ramón Cáceres. Cáceres, as Vice-President, had succeeded Morales in 1906, when the latter made an unsuccessful attempt to free himself from the domination of his *Horacista* cabinet and to bring the *Jimenistas* back to power. He had been elected constitutional President for a six-year term in 1908. With the aid of Federico Velásquez, still the Minister of Finance, he gave the country one of the best administrations in its history, and though several other leaders of his party including Horacio Vásquez himself turned against him, he easily suppressed all attempts at revolution. On November 19, 1911, however, he was murdered by political enemies, just as he himself had killed Heureaux twelve years before.

#### INCREASING DISORDER, 1911-1914

The assassins gained nothing from their deed, for their leader was captured and killed and the commander of the government's troops at Santo Domingo, Colonel Alfredo Victoria, took advantage of the situation to seize power for himself. He was too young to be elected to the presidency, but he forced the Congress to choose his uncle, Eladio Victoria, who was a respectable but ineffective gentleman with little personal following. This disappointed the other political leaders, and several of them promptly started revolts.

For five years the country suffered from almost continuous disorder which finally ended in the catastrophe of American military intervention. Neither the *Horacistas* nor the *Jimenistas* would permit

the other party to obtain control, but both were quick to combine against any government which one of them did not dominate. More serious still were the activities of several ambitious military chieftains who welcomed civil war, even when they themselves were on the government side, because of the opportunity for personal profit. The most prominent of these was Desiderio Arias, a partisan of Jiménez, who was to play a leading part in the events leading to the intervention. The United States exerted every effort to maintain peace, but its interference often seemed to do more harm than good. This was partly because of the ineptitude of its diplomatic representatives. There are few sorer chapters in the history of American diplomacy than the career of James M. Sullivan, whose service as Minister at Santo Domingo from 1913 to 1915 was a shining example of the viciousness of the practice of treating diplomatic appointments as a reward for political services at home.

The United States could not remain aloof because it was obligated under the 1907 treaty to protect the customs service. The situation was especially bad along the land frontier, where the fact that there was no recognized boundary favored the operations of Haitian forces which were unofficially aiding Dominican revolutionists. In an effort to correct this situation, the United States simply fixed a *de facto* line in September, 1912, and insisted that both governments observe it. At the same time two American commissioners, accompanied by 750 marines, were sent to Santo Domingo to establish peace. At their suggestion, backed by a threat to withhold the customs collections from the government, President Victoria resigned, and the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Adolfo Nouel, was elected by the Congress as Provisional President.

Monsignor Nouel attempted to keep the support of all parties by dividing the government offices between them, but he found it impossible to satisfy one without arousing the enmity of the others, and even the moral support of the United States was not enough to make his administration a success. In the interests of peace, he yielded more and more to the arrogant demands of Desiderio Arias, until the latter's growing power caused the *Horacistas* to threaten a revolt. The Archbishop then refused to remain longer in an office which he had been reluctant to accept in the first place, and in March, 1913, he resigned



and went to Europe. After some weeks of balloting, the Congress elected José Bordas Valdés as Provisional President for a one-year term.

Bordas was an *Horacista*, but he soon quarreled with the other leaders of his party and began to intrigue with Arias and other military leaders in an effort to continue in power. The *Horacistas* revolted, but laid down their arms under pressure from the American Minister in return for a promise that a free election would be held. The United States did rather ineffectively attempt to supervise the election of a constituent assembly later in 1913, but trouble between the President and Congress prevented the holding of a new presidential election, and when Bordas' term ended he simply stayed in office. Meanwhile Arias took to the hills because the President had refused his demands for the vice-presidency and for a cash payment of \$300,000. Vásquez soon joined him, and by July, 1914, the country was again in a state of anarchy.

#### EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PEACE, 1914-1916

Throughout the disturbances of the past three years the American government had fruitlessly cajoled and threatened and remonstrated with the Dominican leaders. In August, 1914, it came forward with an ultimatum, described as the "Wilson Plan." The contending factions were told to lay down their arms and to choose a provisional president who would hold elections to establish a constitutional government. These would be closely observed by American representatives, and if they proved free and fair the United States would support the new government and would insist that no further revolutions should occur. If they were not satisfactory, a new election would be held. If the leaders failed to agree upon a provisional president, the United States would name one and would place him in office. The plan was to be presented and carried out, without giving "any person or faction" an "opportunity for argument."

Faced with the threat of armed intervention, the Dominican political leaders after some controversy selected Dr. Ramón Báez as Provisional President. Since Báez was a partisan, though not a very active follower, of Jiménez, the latter had an advantage in the elections that

were held under the supervision of American observers a few weeks later, and defeated Vásquez by a small majority. The new President took office on December 5, 1914. He had the promise of active North American support, by armed force if necessary, but at the same time he was confronted with demands from Washington to which he could not accede without alienating his followers in the Dominican Republic.

It had become clear by this time that the customs collectorship alone did not assure either political or financial stability, and the government of the United States had decided to insist upon a greater measure of control over the Republic's internal affairs as a means of attaining these ends. The heavy expenses occasioned by the disorders of the past three years had resulted in continual deficits, and many bills and claims had remained unpaid. The United States considered this situation a violation of Article III of the 1907 treaty, which provided that the Dominican public debt should not be increased except by previous agreement between the two governments. It had consequently compelled President Bordas to agree in May, 1914, to the appointment of a "financial expert" with authority to control expenditures, and after the inauguration of Jiménez, the United States urged him to strengthen the position of this official and also to place the internal revenues as well as the customs under the receivership. Reforms in the army and in the public-works service, to be carried out under the direction of American officials, were also proposed. Jiménez had agreed to some at least of these reforms while he was a candidate for the presidency, but he proved less amenable after he came into power, and in December, 1915, he refused a blunt demand for the appointment of a financial adviser with wide powers and the creation of a constabulary under American officers.

The internal political situation had meanwhile grown worse. The President was too old and infirm to deal effectively either with his subordinates or with his opponents. As the result of a preëlection bargain, Desiderio Arias had been made Minister of War, and he had used this position chiefly to enrich himself and his followers. He even seemed to be encouraging local political disorders, which increased the influence of the army and usually ended in buying off the malcontents at the expense of the treasury. The United States repeatedly

offered to send troops to repress these disorders, but the President declined to accept such assistance.

In April, 1916, Jiménez apparently decided to check Arias' growing power. He imprisoned two of the latter's chief lieutenants and the Minister of War promptly seized control of the capital. This was a direct challenge to the United States, which had repeatedly stated that it would not tolerate further revolutions. American marines promptly occupied Santo Domingo City, forcing Arias to withdraw into the interior, and soon afterward American forces were sent to other ports and to the more important inland cities. At the capital Jiménez preferred to resign rather than to remain in power with foreign aid, but the remaining members of his cabinet carried on the government until July 25, when the Congress elected Dr. Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal as Provisional President.

The United States withheld recognition from the new government pending an agreement on the reform measures which had been proposed to Jiménez. In August it even instructed the Receiver General of Customs not to pay over any funds to the Dominican authorities. Since the receivership in the meantime had taken over the collection of the internal revenues as well as the customs, this made the Provisional President's position all but impossible. Dr. Henríquez nevertheless remained in office, without funds, and vainly endeavored to obtain some modification of the American demands. In November he precipitated a crisis, probably unintentionally, by asking the electoral colleges to replace members of Congress whose terms were expiring—a step which promised to cause trouble because the electoral colleges were known to be composed in large part of followers of Desiderio Arias, whom the United States was determined to eliminate from any influence in the government. Under these circumstances President Wilson reluctantly authorized the United States naval forces already in the country to take over full control, and on November 29, 1916, Captain Harry S. Knapp issued a proclamation formally establishing an American military government.

## THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION

For nearly eight years the country was again under foreign rule. The Military Governor exercised legislative as well as executive authority. His American subordinates headed the various departments, though the majority of the other offices, including those in the judiciary, continued to be held by Dominicans. A native constabulary was trained by American officers.

In 1917 and 1918 this force and the American marines had to suppress minor disturbances in the eastern part of the island. When peace was established, martial law and the censorship of the press were continued, and their operation caused much dissatisfaction in the Dominican Republic and much criticism abroad. Some of the American officials were tactless and arbitrary and their conduct aggravated a situation which was in itself extremely offensive to Dominican pride.

At first foreign rule seemed to bring prosperity and material progress. The war situation stimulated sugar production and increased the public revenues, so that an ambitious public-works program could be inaugurated. Unfortunately this had not been completed when the post-war depression again prostrated agriculture and gravely affected the national treasury. This accentuated Dominican hostility to the occupation, which had been prevalent even when many of the population were unquestionably benefiting from it.

In December, 1920, President Wilson announced that the military occupation would soon be withdrawn. Six months later the Harding administration proposed that the Dominicans should elect a government which would assume power after ratifying a convention embodying only a part of the demands that the United States had presented in 1915. The Dominican political leaders, however, refused to cooperate in the plan, and in June, 1922, an agreement was reached in Washington under which the country was to recover its independence without giving the United States any control over its military forces or any financial powers beyond those conferred by the 1907 treaty. A provisional president, selected by the Dominican party chiefs, was to take over part of the Military Governor's authority, and under his administration a constitution and other new laws were to be adopted in preparation for the election of a permanent presi-

dent. A "convention of evacuation" was to validate the more important official acts of the military government, in order to protect vested interests created by them.

This plan was carried out, though not without some difficulty. Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos was inaugurated as Provisional President in October, 1922, but further progress was delayed for some time by quarrels and intrigues among the various party leaders. The difficulties were finally overcome through the tact and persistence of Mr. Sumner Welles, the personal representative of the President of the United States, and in March, 1924, General Horacio Vásquez was finally elected as constitutional President. Upon his inauguration four months later the military government ceased to exist and all the American forces were withdrawn.

#### HORACIO VÁSQUEZ

The next six years, as in most of the Latin American countries, were a period of prosperity and political tranquillity. Party bitterness had faded out during the occupation, and Vásquez was able to win the support of many of his former enemies. He no longer had to contend with the restless greed of local military leaders, for the new army, trained by American marines, was an efficient, well-disciplined force under its Dominican officers. It was not until near the end of his six-year term that political difficulties again made their appearance.

The President's announced candidacy for reelection had already given rise to much political agitation when a serious illness temporarily incapacitated him and brought on an acute rivalry between members of his own government who hoped to succeed him in power. There was bad feeling, especially, between General Rafael Trujillo, the head of the American-trained army, and Vice-President Alfonseca, who was a candidate for reelection and would presumably head the government if General Vásquez should die. The army consequently offered no resistance when a small force of revolutionists seized the fort at Santiago and then marched on Santo Domingo City in February, 1930. By an agreement effected through the good offices of the American Legation, Vásquez and Alfonseca resigned and Ra-

fael Estrella Ureña, the opposition candidate for the vice-presidency and the leader of the revolution, became Provisional President. The opposition parties, however, gained nothing by the change, for General Trujillo promptly announced his own candidacy for the presidency and was elected in May with the support of the army.

#### THE "ERA OF TRUJILLO"

The new President's power rested chiefly on the army, where he had been able to maintain the discipline and efficiency inculcated by the American instructors to whom he himself owed his military training. All branches of the government were soon completely under his control, and persons who openly opposed the new regime were severely dealt with. Many are said to have been killed, among them the veteran troublemaker Desiderio Arias. Many others, including the chief leaders of the hitherto existing parties, went into exile. An effective secret service made conspiracy dangerous. The enforcement of internal peace, on the other hand, enabled the country to recover rapidly from the depression, which had severely affected it in the first years of the new regime, and the government was able to do more than any preceding administration in building roads and public works and otherwise promoting material welfare. Its efficiency was demonstrated when it became necessary to reconstruct much of the capital city after the terrible hurricane of September, 1930.

In 1936, during General Trujillo's second term, the National Congress changed the name of Santo Domingo City to Ciudad Trujillo. Another important event of his second administration was the final settlement of the long-standing dispute over the boundary between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, by a treaty signed in 1935. Unfortunately, the agreement did not prevent the massacre of Haitians living on the Dominican side of the frontier in 1937, described in Chapter XXV.

General Trujillo declined to be a candidate again in 1938 and gave his support to Jacinto Peynado, who was consequently elected and inaugurated without opposition. When Peynado died in 1940, Dr. Manuel de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha, the Vice-President, took of-

fice in his place. General Trujillo, however, continued to be the acknowledged ruler of the Republic. It was he who arranged for the abolition of the American customs receivership under a treaty signed in 1940, and put into effect in the following year. He was the only candidate for the presidency in the election scheduled to be held in May, 1942.

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## *Chapter XXVII*

### LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

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To tell the full story of the relations between Anglo-Saxon America and Latin America one must begin at a period long before either portion of the continent achieved its independence. As early as the seventeenth century persons who were interested in the Plymouth Colony were also promoting settlement and organized piracy in the Spanish Main. Colonial questions were involved in each of the European wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and each of these wars was fought in part on the western side of the Atlantic. We have already seen how a desire to bar old-world political conflicts from the Western Hemisphere led President Monroe in 1823 to issue his famous warning against any further attempt by European powers to control the destinies of the newly independent Latin American republics.

The Monroe Doctrine, as time went on, became one of the fundamental principles of American foreign policy. On several occasions—in Mexico, in Santo Domingo, and in Venezuela—it helped to preserve the independence or the territorial integrity of a Latin American country, despite European unwillingness to recognize its validity. Until very recently, however, the United States was far more concerned with the application of the Doctrine in some parts of Latin America than in others. It was less important from the standpoint of national defense, and more difficult from a military point of view, to oppose European aggression in southern South America than in northern sections, and the American government consequently took no action to prevent such occurrences as Great Britain's occupation of the Falkland Islands and the Anglo-French intervention of the 1840's in the River Plate. In fact its general relations with



the countries south of the equator, during the greater part of the nineteenth century, were relatively unimportant. They, like ourselves, had far closer economic, cultural, and even political ties with Europe, to which they looked to provide markets for their goods and capital for the development of their resources.

With Mexico and the Caribbean region, the situation was different. Relations between the United States and Mexico have already been dealt with in Chapters XIX and XX. The more important episodes in the history of American policy in the Central American and West Indian republics have also been described above, and it will only be necessary to refer briefly to them in endeavoring to give a picture of the development of our Caribbean policy as a whole.

The proximity of the Caribbean area to our own territory and its strategic relation to the Isthmian canal routes made the United States particularly jealous of any foreign activity there. The situation was complicated, however, by the fact that other powers also had interests in the region. Great Britain, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark had colonies, and Great Britain, at least, was as unwilling as the United States to see any other great power control the Isthmian transit routes. The diplomatic history of the Caribbean during the nineteenth century was largely a story of rivalry for the control of these routes and of intrigues to gain possession of strategic points like Samaná Bay and the Mole St. Nicholas which dominated their approaches.

#### THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY TO THE ' MONROE DOCTRINE

Early in the twentieth century, after the Spanish American War and the beginning of construction at Panama, the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine took on a new importance. The United States was now more interested than ever in preventing any other power from improving its military position in the Caribbean. The canal, by enabling the battle fleet to reach either coast promptly in time of danger, would practically double the efficiency of the United States navy, but it could be used safely only so long as its approaches were kept clear of potential enemies. The existing European colonies were no

longer a cause for serious concern, because they had lost much of their economic importance and were in friendly hands, but the situation would be different if any foreign power should undertake to obtain new possessions, and thus make the Caribbean the scene of a contest for territory and spheres of influence like those struggles that were going on at the end of the nineteenth century in Africa and the Far East. Rightly or wrongly, many American statesmen of the period before the first World War believed that Germany and perhaps other powers had their eyes on the Caribbean as a field for imperial adventures and would not be indisposed to challenge the Monroe Doctrine should a favorable opportunity arise.

Internal disorder and financial mismanagement had already exposed Latin American countries to aggression on many occasions. Mexico had suffered twice from foreign invasions to collect claims, and Honduras and Nicaragua had nearly lost portions of their territory because they were too weak to resist British encroachments on the Mosquito Coast. Other countries had frequently been compelled by force to adjust pecuniary claims or to pay indemnities for the mistreatment of foreigners, and foreign troops had repeatedly been landed to protect lives and property in times of civil disturbance. Such occurrences had been especially common in the Caribbean, because the countries of that region were the smallest and weakest—and some of them were among the most turbulent—of the American republics. It was always possible that a European intervention of this sort might be made the pretext for a more permanent occupation.

In the early 1900's the right of a nation to intervene in the affairs of a weaker state to protect the lives and property of its own nationals was too firmly established in current international practice to be easily challenged. The Caribbean countries would apparently be safe from aggression only when the conditions that continually invited aggression were rectified. The Hague Court's decision in the Venezuela case in 1904 seemed likely in fact to encourage the practice of intervention.<sup>1</sup>

It was to meet this situation that President Theodore Roosevelt enunciated his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: that the United States could not prevent European interference in America

<sup>1</sup> See above pp. 403 and 578.

except by helping its neighbors to do away with the political instability and financial mismanagement which made such interference justifiable. This became the basis of American policy in the Caribbean during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The underlying principle of the corollary had already found expression in the Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the right to intervene to maintain a government adequate to protect life, property, and individual liberty in Cuba. It was to be invoked by later administrations to justify military interventions and other interference in the internal affairs of several Caribbean countries.

# PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS

The Roosevelt policy had as its primary purpose the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, but it was influenced also by other considerations. One of these was the growth of our own economic interests in the Caribbean. During the first years of the twentieth century American capital was invested in sugar companies in Cuba, in banana farms in Central America, in mines, and in railroads. Increasing numbers of American citizens were employed in the management of these enterprises. Except in Cuba, where American investments in 1928 were estimated at one to one and a half billion dollars, the amount of money involved was not particularly important, but controversies over the rights of American companies were troublesome and warships were frequently sent to protect resident Americans in time of civil disturbances.

Hardly less important was the question of public health. During the nineteenth century epidemics of yellow fever, brought in from Cuba and other Caribbean countries, had repeatedly caused a heavy loss of life at American Gulf ports and even at times in Philadelphia and New York. With increasingly close contact the danger became greater. It was imperative especially to protect the Canal Zone against infection from near-by countries. The United States consequently insisted upon measures to improve sanitary conditions in Panama and in Cuba, and at a later date the Public-Health Service was one of the most important of the Treaty Services in Haiti. A far greater number of people benefited, at a somewhat later date, from the magnificent

work done throughout tropical America by the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, which cooperated with several Latin American states in campaigns against yellow fever, hookworm, and other menaces to health.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERVENTION POLICY

The policy that the United States adopted under the Roosevelt corollary passed through several phases. At the beginning, during Theodore Roosevelt's administration, the United States confined its intervention to situations where immediate action seemed necessary to correct a bad situation. The Dominican customs receivership was established to avert the apparently imminent seizure of one or more ports by European powers. An American provisional government was set up in Cuba after the constituted authorities refused to continue longer in office, but it was discontinued as soon as needed reforms were effected and a new election held. In Central America international conflicts were ended by North American and Mexican mediation, and relations between the five countries were placed on a new basis under the Washington treaties. The Taft administration, with Mr. Knox as Secretary of State, went farther. Under the so-called "preventive policy" it constantly interfered in the internal affairs of the Caribbean countries on the theory that it was better to remedy conditions likely to cause civil war or foreign complications than to wait for crises to arise. It did not hesitate to threaten the use of force when its advice was not heeded, and its armed intervention in Nicaragua involved the United States in responsibilities which were troublesome for many years to come. It especially sought to extend to other countries the same sort of financial control that until 1911 had apparently been successful in the Dominican Republic. The period 1909-1913 was the era of "Dollar Diplomacy," though the treaties which would have set up customs receiverships in Nicaragua and Honduras failed of approval in the United States Senate, and other attempts to effect financial reforms were equally unsuccessful. In general the "preventive policy" accomplished little, except perhaps to make worse the already bad situations in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.

The Wilson administration expressed disapproval of "Dollar Diplomacy" but continued to interfere in Caribbean affairs. If there was less emphasis on the protection of foreign rights and interests, there was more insistence on the maintenance of constitutional forms and democratic practices. Governments that came into power by methods openly illegal were refused recognition and in some cases were forced out of office by American opposition. Acting on the same principle which underlay President Taft's "preventive policy," the Department of State attempted to strike at the roots of the Caribbean political and social problem by bringing about the establishment of efficient police forces, the reform of financial administration, and the adoption of broad programs of economic rehabilitation, all under the direction of North American advisers. When these objectives could not be accomplished by diplomatic pressure, there was a resort to force. Haiti, where revolutions had occurred with increasing frequency, was occupied by American forces in 1915, and the Haitian government was compelled to sign a treaty giving the United States control of several important branches of its administration. A year later a military government was set up in the Dominican Republic. American intervention in the Caribbean had reached its high point by the end of President Wilson's term in 1921.

Thereafter there was a gradual change in policy. In the decade that followed the World War, when no European power was in a position to challenge the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt corollary lost much of its significance. It became apparent, furthermore, that the policies hitherto followed were repugnant to Latin American public opinion and were becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States. Gradually the responsibilities already assumed were liquidated. There was less active interference in the internal affairs of Cuba and Panama, and the American forces were withdrawn from the Dominican Republic in 1924 and from Nicaragua in 1925. Unfortunately the second intervention in Nicaragua in 1926 and the continuance of the treaty regime in Haiti tended to obscure the fact that a fundamental change in policy was taking place.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER AMERICAN  
COUNTRIES: THE EARLIER PAN-  
AMERICAN CONFERENCES

The government of the United States had by this time been compelled to realize that its Caribbean policy was one of the principal obstacles to the success of the efforts which it had been making during the past forty years to improve its relations with the American countries outside of the Caribbean area. After a long period of comparative indifference, it had begun at the end of the nineteenth century to give more attention to the larger South American republics, which were by that time rapidly achieving political stability and commercial importance. The United States itself was reaching a point in its economic development where it was becoming more interested in new markets for industrial products and importing a larger amount of raw materials from other countries. There was thus a basis for increased commercial intercourse, and a desire to promote trade had been the chief objective of a series of international conferences which had met at irregular intervals in the capitals of different American countries.

The First Pan-American Conference was held in Washington at the invitation of the American government in 1889. Its chief accomplishment was to set up the International Bureau of American Republics, later renamed the Pan-American Union, which has since become one of the important organs of inter-American cooperation. Another result was a convention for the compulsory arbitration of pecuniary claims, a first step in the creation of the peace machinery which was to occupy so much of the attention of later gatherings. Extradition, uniform customs and commercial regulations, sanitary problems, and monetary and exchange questions also received attention, as they did at subsequent conferences, but most of the resolutions adopted, like many of the acts of later conferences, had little effect because few of the signatory governments were sufficiently interested to ratify them.

The Second and Third Pan-American Conferences, held at Mexico City in 1901-2 and at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, followed much the same

pattern and achieved little of consequence. At Mexico, however, the nations represented agreed that similar gatherings should be held every five years. At Rio de Janeiro they set up a Permanent Commission of Jurists to study the problem of codifying international law. The Fourth Conference, held at Buenos Aires in 1910, dealt, like its predecessors, with a wide range of commercial and sanitary problems, and adopted conventions for the protection of copyrights and patents which were ratified by most of the American states.

#### THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Neither the measures adopted at these conferences nor other efforts to promote inter-American trade had any very notable results before 1914. Meat and grain from the River Plate republics and nitrate from Chile continued to go to Europe. The people of those countries, and even the Brazilians, who sold much of their coffee to the United States, continued to buy chiefly in European markets, to send their children to Paris and other old-world centers to study, and to travel east rather than north for recreation. The lack of direct steamers made it easier to go from New York to Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires by way of Europe than direct. British, French, and German business men in South America far outnumbered the few and relatively uninfluential North American residents, and controlled much of the export and import business, the banks, the railroads, and many other enterprises. Little United States capital had been invested south of the Caribbean area.

The first World War brought about important changes both in economic and in political relations. As it became more difficult to buy goods in Europe, there was a great increase in trade with the United States. American banks established branches throughout Latin America, and the inflow of American capital increased. The events of the conflict made the American nations aware that they had common interests apart from those of Europe, and this feeling of solidarity found practical expression after the United States became a belligerent. Brazil, Cuba, Panama, Haiti, and all of Central America except El Salvador declared war on Germany. Five other countries severed diplomatic relations. On the other hand, Argentina, Chile, Mexico,

Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and El Salvador remained formally neutral.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE POST-WAR PERIOD

After the war, European trade recovered only a part of its former importance. Great Britain and the continent were still the principal markets for South American exports because the United States was in no position to buy large quantities of products like meat, grains, copper, or petroleum of which it was itself an exporter. In the import trade, on the other hand, American manufacturers retained an important position and supplanted the Germans as the chief competitors of the hitherto dominant British. The goods which they sold were paid for partly by the proceeds of loans which most of the Latin American countries floated in the United States and by capital flowing south as the result of large investments. By 1929 it was estimated that \$2,294,000,000 of American capital was invested in South America, and \$5,587,000,000 in Latin America as a whole.<sup>2</sup>

Trade and investment, unfortunately, did not in themselves promote more friendly relations. During the post-war period the feeling toward the United States in the larger southern republics left much to be desired. This was partly the result of inadequate representation of American interests. Many of the firms which had entered the South American field during and just after the war had been inexperienced and a few had been unscrupulous. Too many of them had failed to send representatives who spoke Spanish and were otherwise qualified to win the respect and friendship of the local community. Even the United States government conspicuously failed to realize the importance of appointing diplomats who were competent and whose character would command respect. These shortcomings were corrected to a great extent as time went on, but not until much harm had been done.

Even more detrimental to good relations was an uneasy suspicion of the growing political and economic power of the United States—a suspicion which was intensified by our actions in the Caribbean. The American government, as we have seen above, was already seeking

<sup>1</sup> P. A. Martin, *Latin America and the War*, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Winkler, *Investments of United States Capital in Latin America*, p. 278.



to free itself from some of its entanglements in that region, but the continued occupation of Haiti and the second intervention in Nicaragua gave European commercial interests and other unfriendly elements an excellent opportunity to stir up bad feeling. Even the great American press services, which had recently established themselves in South America, helped to give substance to the bogey of American imperialism by reporting sensational and sometimes misleading articles and speeches by anti-imperialists in the United States.

The obstacles to continental solidarity were painfully evident in the proceedings of the Fifth and Sixth Pan-American Conferences. The Fifth Conference, which met at Santiago, Chile, in 1923, was more concerned than any of its predecessors with purely political questions. It met under something of a cloud because Peru and Bolivia, still at odds with Chile over questions arising from the War of the Pacific, and Mexico, whose government had not been recognized by the United States, refused to attend. During the sessions there were several indications of unfriendly feeling toward the United States and this feeling was not diminished when the American delegation blocked proposals for a reorganization of the Pan-American Union designed to pave the way for the eventual establishment of an American League of Nations, and insisted that the United States must retain the right to interpret and enforce the Monroe Doctrine as it alone saw fit. There were at the same time disagreements between the larger South American countries themselves, and no accord was reached on the proposals for disarmament which were the most important item on the agenda. The chief positive accomplishment of the Conference was the Gondra Peace Treaty, which provided that any inter-American dispute not settled by diplomacy should be submitted to a commission of inquiry, and that no hostile move should be made until six months after the commission's report had been rendered. At the Sixth Conference, which met in Habana in 1928, the unfriendliness of several Latin American countries toward the United States was even more manifest, and efforts to bring about the adoption of a resolution condemning intervention by one state in the affairs of another, clearly directed at North American policies in Nicaragua and Haiti, were blocked only after a series of rather painful incidents.

THE ABANDONMENT OF THE INTERVENTION  
POLICY

Soon afterward it became clear that the Caribbean policies that had been the target for so much criticism both in North and in South America were definitely being abandoned. President Hoover, in the first year of his administration, took steps to terminate the intervention in Haiti, and in 1931 the American officials were withdrawn from the majority of the treaty services there. The training of Haitian officers in the constabulary took more time, but plans were worked out under which it was possible to withdraw the marines from the country in 1934. Only the finances remained under North American control. In Nicaragua, the American marines were withdrawn early in 1933. At the same time the policy of the United States changed in other respects. Except in Central America, where the treaties of 1923 created a special situation, the United States abandoned the use of non-recognition of revolutionary governments as a means of discouraging disorder.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration has gone considerably farther in the same direction. In December, 1933, when the Seventh Inter-American Conference of American States met at Montevideo, Secretary Hull's frank and tactful diplomacy completely disarmed groups which might have been unfriendly, and the change which had taken place in the policy of the United States became evident when the American delegation signed, though with reservations, a convention which provided that "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."<sup>1</sup> A few days later, President Roosevelt himself declared that "the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention," and that if a breakdown of law and order in any American country affected other nations, it was the joint concern of the whole continent and not of the United States alone.<sup>2</sup>

In the years that followed the United States modified several treaties with Caribbean countries which contained provisions inconsistent with the non-intervention principle. The Platt Amendment

<sup>1</sup> Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States.

<sup>2</sup> Speech before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, December 28, 1933.

was abrogated in 1934, and American rights in the Canal Zone and in the Republic of Panama were curtailed in the new treaty which was ratified in 1939. In 1941 the customs receivership in the Dominican Republic and the office of the Fiscal Representative in Haiti were abolished. The American government thus extricated itself from practically all of the responsibilities that it had assumed in connection with the internal affairs of its smaller neighbors.

#### ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

The abandonment of intervention was but one aspect of President Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy. There was also an effort to avoid controversies and friction, especially in cases where American financial interests were involved. The protection of these interests had become much more difficult during and after the world depression because there was a strong movement throughout Latin America to eliminate or reduce foreign economic influence.

During the first century of independence commerce and business affairs throughout the countries south of the Rio Grande had been almost entirely in foreign hands. European merchants controlled most of the export and import trade and the small shopkeepers were generally Chinese, Syrian, Italian, Spanish, or Portuguese. Since practically all capital came from abroad, railroads, mines, factories, and banks were managed by representatives of the investors. The natives of the country were more interested in agriculture and in politics, and in any event could rarely compete with the more active and aggressive immigrant, who had better connections abroad and more business training. Those who obtained positions in business enterprises found that all of the better jobs and higher salaries went to foreigners. This, and the privileged position which many foreign firms claimed under concessions obtained from the local governments, caused much jealousy. The eagerness with which foreign capital had been welcomed when it was needed for the building of railroads and the opening of mines or factories was forgotten when the benefits that it brought began to be taken for granted; and Latin American statesmen increasingly felt that alien control of such important sectors of their countries' economic life was an unwholesome situation.

Measures designed to break down this control, ranging from a natural and proper regulation of foreign enterprises to outright confiscation, were consequently adopted in most of the Latin American countries. Among the more important of these were laws restricting the proportion of foreigners who might be employed by any one company, and in each branch of a company's work—laws which opened up many new opportunities for native engineers, executives, and technicians. There were also efforts to promote local industry as a means of becoming less dependent on imports. These efforts received a great impetus during the depression, when the difficulty of selling goods abroad and the consequent lack of foreign exchange made it difficult to obtain goods from foreign countries. Another manifestation of economic nationalism was the reluctance to resume service on the foreign debts which had gone into default in the depression years. Even after the return of something like normal prosperity, several of the more important South American governments which had in the past been proud of their foreign credit standing compelled their bondholders to accept a few cents on the dollar in settlement of their obligations.

These nationalistic policies caused heavy losses to American investors, but the questions which they created were treated with a forbearance indicative of a new spirit in American foreign policy. Even such events as the seizure of the American oil properties in Mexico and Bolivia were not permitted to cause such acute diplomatic tension as they would have created if they had occurred a few years earlier. Efforts were made to obtain at least a measure of compensation for the owners, but it seemed clear that the State Department's policy was influenced more by a desire to maintain friendly relations with the other American governments than by its concern for the protection of property rights. This attitude was criticized by those whose interests were injuriously affected, but it did much to allay dislike and distrust of the United States in Latin America.

#### THE SHADOW OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

With the growing aggressiveness of fascism in Europe, inter-American relations entered a new phase. The regimentation of the

large German and Italian colonies in Latin America to act as agents of fascist policy, and the subversive activities of native fascist and communist parties, supported in some cases at least from outside, were offensive to Latin American nationalism and alarming to those who believed in democratic ideals. South Americans as well as North Americans began to realize that the new forces which had been let loose in the world were a danger to the existing institutions and perhaps to the independence of the American republics.

A realization of this fact was evident in the work of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, which met at Buenos Aires in 1936. President Roosevelt, who had proposed that the conference be held, visited Buenos Aires and attended its first session. The proceedings were characterized by a harmony which had been lacking in earlier gatherings and the delegates agreed upon conventions pledging the American republics to consult with one another if the peace of the continent were menaced by strife between themselves or by attack from without, and providing new machinery for the prevention and solution of controversies. Other conventions and resolutions provided for the exchange of students and professors and for artistic and cultural cooperation in various forms.

There was an even more impressive manifestation of continental solidarity when the Eighth International Conference of American States met at Lima in December, 1938. All of the American nations were represented, and all signed the Final Act, which stated more clearly than ever before the fundamental bases of Pan-American cooperation. The Act comprised 112 resolutions, of which one of the most important was the following "Declaration of American Principles":

1. The intervention of any State in the internal or external affairs of another is inadmissible.
2. All differences of an international character should be settled by peaceful means.
3. The use of force as an instrument of national or international policy is proscribed.
4. Relations between States should be governed by the precepts of international law.
5. Respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitute the indispensable rule for the development of peaceful relations between

States, and treaties can only be revised by agreement of the contracting parties.

6. Peaceful collaboration between representatives of the various States and the development of intellectual interchange among their peoples is conducive to an understanding by each of the problems of the other as well as of problems common to all, and makes more readily possible the peaceful adjustment of international controversies.

7. Economic reconstruction contributes to national and international well-being, as well as to peace among nations.

8. International cooperation is a necessary condition to the maintenance of the aforementioned principles.

Other resolutions reaffirmed the recommendation of the Montevideo Conference that barriers to international trade be reduced, reiterated "as a fundamental principle of the Public Law of America, that the occupation or acquisition of territory or any other modification or territorial or boundary arrangement obtained through conquest by force or by non-pacific means shall not be valid or have legal effect"; and asserted "that, in accordance with the fundamental principle of equality before the Law, any persecution on account of racial or religious motives which makes it impossible for a group of human beings to live decently, is contrary to the political and juridical systems of America." Finally, in the Declaration of Lima, the governments of the American states reaffirmed "their continental solidarity and their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the principles upon which the said solidarity is based" and "to defend them against all foreign intervention or activity that may threaten them." "And," the Declaration stated, "in case the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American Republic is thus threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, coordinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the procedure of consultation. . . ."

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## *Chapter XXVIII*

### PAN-AMERICANISM AND THE WAR

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When the second World War broke out in Europe the procedure of consultation agreed upon at the Lima conference was promptly invoked. On September 23, 1939, representatives of the foreign ministers of all of the American republics met at Panama to formulate a common policy to meet the political and economic dangers that confronted them. Their most important act, perhaps, was the Declaration of Panama, which affirmed that "the American Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American Continent, which they regard as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea, or air." This neutral zone was defined as a broad band some hundreds of miles off the American coast. Joint representations were to be made to persuade the belligerents to respect it, and each American republic was authorized to patrol that part of the zone adjacent to its coasts if it deemed this advisable. The principle thus laid down was not always respected by the belligerents, but it did a great deal to discourage acts of war on the western side of the Atlantic.

The conference also adopted a General Declaration of Neutrality which referred to the unanimous intention of the American republics not to become involved in the European conflict, and laid down general standards of conduct which they proposed to follow. Several other resolutions dealt with such matters as the "humanization of war," contraband, and the coordination of police and judicial measures for the maintenance of neutrality. One resolution recommended to the American governments that "they take the necessary measures

to eradicate from the Americas the spread of doctrines that tend to place in jeopardy the common inter-American democratic ideal."

The conference also dealt with economic problems. These were especially urgent, for the war had dislocated and in many cases had practically cut off the export trade upon which the prosperity of most of the Latin American nations depended. In an effort to meet the situation, an Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee was set up at Washington to study the whole range of commercial and financial problems created by the crisis.

#### THE HABANA CONFERENCE OF 1940

The Panama Conference proposed that a second meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be held at Habana in October, 1940, but events in Europe made an earlier consultation imperative. With the German conquest of the Netherlands and France, there was grave danger of a change in the status of the Caribbean possessions of these two countries. The situation was less acute with respect to the Dutch possessions, which were held for the government in exile by British forces, than with respect to the French, which remained under the control of the Vichy regime; but even the ability of Britain to hold out appeared doubtful after the collapse of France, and it was necessary to consider what might happen to her possessions. In June, 1940, the United States informed Germany and Italy that it "would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power," and at the same time Secretary of State Hull proposed that the second meeting of foreign ministers be convoked at once. The conference consequently met at Habana on July 21.

Its most important resolution was the Act of Habana, which provided that any European possession in the Americas which might be "in danger of becoming the subject of barter of territory or change of sovereignty" might be placed under the government of a provisional regime representing the American republics. This regime would end when the territory in question was ready for self-government, or when it was restored to its former status, "whichever of these al-



ternatives shall appear the more practicable and just." The Act set up an Emergency Committee to assume the administration of regions which might be attacked or threatened, but it also authorized any American state to act in its own defense if the danger should be too urgent to permit delay. The conference also drafted a convention which would take the place of the Act of Habana when ratified. This required the automatic establishment of a provisional regime in any territory in danger of occupation by a new non-American owner, and permitted the actual administration to be entrusted in a given case to one or more American states, under the supervision of an "Inter-American Commission for Territorial Administration."

The Habana Conference dealt with other questions which had become urgent during the past ten months, such as the spread of subversive totalitarian propaganda. It urged the American governments to prevent foreign diplomatic or consular agents from carrying on activities dangerous to the peace and the democratic tradition of America, and pledged the governments represented to prevent groups or individuals in their territory from carrying on such activities. On the economic side, the conference reaffirmed the adherence of the American nations to "the liberal principles of international trade" and voted to strengthen and expand the activities of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee.

One of its most important acts, in the light of later events, was Resolution Number XV which declared that:

Any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which sign this declaration.

The resolution pledged the American countries to consult among themselves in case of such aggression and provided for the negotiation of bilateral or other complementary agreements "to organize co-operation for defense and the assistance that they shall lend each other in the event of aggressions."

ECONOMIC DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN  
HEMISPHERE

The work of the Panama and Habana conferences seemed to show that all of the American republics were prepared to stand together in a situation fraught with danger to their common interests. As the war in Europe progressed, the need for such cooperation became more and more evident. The problem of hemisphere defense had both economic and military aspects.

In the first stages of the war, the economic problem seemed the more urgent. More than half of the exports of the hemisphere as a whole went to Europe in normal times. The bulk of this comprised foodstuffs and raw materials for which no other market could well be found. The United States might take additional quantities of some Latin American products, but it could do little to provide new outlets for goods of which we ourselves had a surplus or for commodities like coffee, sugar, and copper, of which the continental supply far exceeded our normal consumption. In the first World War, after an initial period of dislocation, a greatly increased demand from the Allies had brought prosperity to most of Latin America, but at that time great markets had been open on the continent of Europe as well as in the British Isles. In 1940, all of the continent was blockaded and British purchasing power was greatly restricted by lack of funds and lack of shipping. As a result great surpluses piled up, and the inability to export caused a shortage of foreign exchange which made it difficult to purchase the imports which the United States was still able to furnish.

This situation not only endangered the important commercial and financial interests of the United States in Latin America but threatened to diminish the effectiveness of inter-American coöperation for political and military defense. Many Latin American countries faced an economic crisis of the gravest nature, a crisis which might easily facilitate the work of subversive elements, both fascist and communist, which were working with outside help to destroy the whole idea of Pan-American solidarity. Joint action to improve the economic situation seemed one of the surest means to strengthen this

solidarity and to assure the Latin American states' internal stability and their ability to resist eventual military aggression.

More important still was the need to assure continued inter-American cooperation in the situation that might exist after the war should end. In the years before 1939 Germany had carried on an aggressive trade drive in Latin America. Taking advantage of their urgent need to sell their products, she had persuaded several states to enter into barter agreements under which she obtained great quantities of raw materials which were to be paid for solely through the shipment of German goods. Though the operation of these agreements had caused much discontent, her trade had greatly increased. British interests had suffered severely, and those of the United States to a much smaller extent; but all foreign merchants had been alarmed. Native statesmen were almost equally concerned about the prospect that similar or still more effective tactics might be resumed in case of a German victory. If the whole continent of Europe were converted into one great market under effective German control, the Nazi bargaining power would be so immense that the Latin American governments might well be compelled to make disastrous concessions, not only of an economic but possibly of a political nature. In North America even those who felt that current discussion exaggerated the danger involved, and that the United States with its own vast economic power could compete with a victorious Germany, realized that such competition would involve the abandonment of all liberal trade principles and the adoption of methods repugnant to democratic ideas. It seemed imperative to meet the challenge of totalitarian economic policies by doing everything possible to strengthen the ability of the Americas to resist them.

The Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, set up by the Panama Conference, has been the principal organ through which the American republics have sought to deal with these problems. Meeting in Washington, with one member from each of the twenty-one republics, it has worked on a great variety of projects. One of its accomplishments was the establishment of the Inter-American Development Committee, which has sought to find new non-competitive products which might be sold by Latin America to

the United States and in other ways to increase inter-American trade. Another was the convention for an Inter-American Bank which would seek to encourage investment, to develop industries, and to stabilize foreign exchange in the American countries. This convention, however, has not yet been ratified by the required number of governments.<sup>1</sup> In November, 1940, the Committee convened an Inter-American Maritime Conference, and in August, 1941, it took further action to relieve the acute shortage of shipping by recommending that the American countries make use of vessels lying idle in their ports because of the war. The United States and several other countries had already taken over many ships belonging to the Axis powers or to occupied countries, and in August, 1941, Argentina arranged to buy sixteen Italian ships which were in her territorial waters. Recommendations of the Committee also resulted in the imposition of controls on exports of strategic raw materials in several countries.

The Committee also brought about the Inter-American Coffee Marketing Agreement, which was signed November 28, 1940. Coffee producers, who had already suffered so many vicissitudes, were especially hard hit by the closing of European markets. The United States could not take their surplus, but it did agree to limit imports to a quota from each country, thus restricting competition and assuring a relatively high price for the amount purchased. The arrangement was not unlike that already in force for sugar, and the cost of maintaining economic stability in the countries benefited fell in both cases on the American consumer. Similar arrangements with respect to cacao and certain other products are said to have been under consideration.

The United States government itself was meanwhile extending financial aid to many of the other American countries through the Export-Import Bank, a government institution established in 1934 to aid American exporters. In September, 1940, the amount of loans which this Bank might have outstanding at any one time was increased to \$700,000,000 and the Bank was authorized to make loans to foreign governments, corporations, or individuals. By the end of 1941 it had extended aid in one form or another to most of the other American republics, emphasizing especially loans for the improvement of transportation systems, both railway and highway, as part of a program to

<sup>1</sup> As of May 18, 1942.

increase the delivery of strategic raw materials to the United States. Among the projects financed was the intensification of work on the Pan-American Highway between Mexico City and the Canal Zone. At the end of 1941 total disbursements amounted to \$327,313,604, of which \$141,183,148 had already been repaid, and the Bank had additional outstanding commitments of \$324,858,538.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile the United States Treasury had granted large additional credits to several Latin American governments from its stabilization fund, and corporations organized by the United States government had spent or agreed to spend several hundred million dollars in Latin America for strategic raw materials.

#### MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

As the war progressed, the possibility of an actual military attack on the Western Hemisphere became less remote than it had seemed in 1939. The United States, through its new naval and air bases in the British possessions in America, was increasing its ability to defend its own shores and the Caribbean region, but it was clear that it would need the cooperation of other American powers if it were to make good its announced policy of preventing aggression against any other part of the continent. The full story of its efforts in this direction has not been divulged. It is evident that measures have been taken to assist other American countries in strengthening their armed forces, and a majority of these countries have employed missions from the United States army or navy to assist them in technical matters. One potential military danger has been diminished with the extinction of most of the Axis-controlled air lines in Latin America.

The problem of naval and air bases, which would be available to our armed forces in time of need, has been a more difficult one. Mexico and some of the Caribbean countries have extended every coöperation, but in some other parts of the continent there has been a reluctance to contemplate the use of national territory by a foreign power for military purposes. A proposal that Uruguay establish bases at the mouth of the River Plate met with opposition from Argentina, though it has more recently been announced that Uruguay

<sup>1</sup> *Annual Report of the Export-Import Bank for 1941.*

would begin the construction of a naval air base using funds borrowed from the American government.

More serious, perhaps, than the danger of a military attack was the danger of "Fifth Column" activities within the Latin American countries themselves. The resolutions adopted by the Habana Conference on this subject were inspired by a realization of the extent of pro-Axis activity and by the knowledge that German diplomatic and consular agents were doing everything possible to foment it. Almost everywhere the influential German business colonies had been converted into carefully organized, effective agencies for the furthering of German policy. In several countries there were many German immigrants: several hundred thousand of them in Brazil, a considerable number in Argentina, and smaller but compact and largely unassimilated groups in Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and other republics. How far these permanent settlers had been converted to Nazi doctrines it is difficult to say, but they were clearly a source of potential trouble. So also were certain elements in the native population. The communists, a small but aggressive faction, cooperated with Axis agents until Hitler's attack on Russia, and in a few countries fascist groups had a not inconsiderable number of adherents. Many army officers were admirers of the German system, and German prestige tended to increase with each Axis victory. Here and there there have been reports of conspiracies or attempted uprisings to install pro-Axis regimes. In Latin America as a whole, however, public opinion has seemed to support the governments in their policy of cooperation with the United States.

#### CULTURAL RELATIONS

An important factor in bringing about the better understanding that has made this cooperation possible has been the inter-American program of "cultural relations." A convention providing for the interchange of students and professors was signed at the Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936, and this idea has since been carried further with the help of private individuals and institutions as well as governments, until a large number of Latin American students are now receiving financial help to study in the United

States and many North Americans are studying in Latin America. In 1938 a Division of Cultural Relations was established in the Department of State at Washington to concern itself not only with student exchanges but with a broad program of intellectual cooperation in the fields of literature, art, music, and moving pictures. This work has been further expanded by the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Relations, established in 1940 under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller.

#### THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL AS A FORCE IN INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS

As the war progressed, and the United States became more and more involved in the policy of extending aid to one side, the question how far we could count on Latin American support became increasingly important. The Declaration of Lima had expressed the determination of the American nations not to permit alien political philosophies to supplant the democratic ideal which had inspired their own political development, but there were some who questioned the sincerity of such an expression by a gathering where a majority of the delegates represented governments that were obviously dictatorships.

This skepticism failed to take into account the real strength and significance of the democratic ideal. The persistence with which the statesmen and the people of the Latin American countries have sought to make republican institutions a reality is one of the outstanding facts in their history. That only a few countries have thus far achieved this goal is not surprising when we consider the obstacles in their path. What these obstacles were has been indicated in preceding chapters. In the period just after independence, the first need of the new republics was internal peace, without which neither efficient government nor economic progress was possible. Political inexperience, local jealousies, violent controversies over the relation of the State to the Church, and apparently irreconcilable social conflicts made the achievement of peace difficult, but conditions gradually improved as new ideas and increased contacts with the outside world made the issues that had divided the people into hostile factions seem less important. Responsible people realized more and more that internal dis-

order was an intolerable nuisance, and an increasing number of merchants and miners and planters were disposed to support any government that promised to maintain order.

The effect of this development was apparent in the relative stability which nearly all of the more important Latin American countries enjoyed in the last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth. During this period foreign trade increased rapidly and much foreign capital was invested in mines, railways, and plantations. This economic development was not only a result but to some extent a cause of the establishment of peace. It did not really start until political conditions began to improve, and when it started it was a powerful factor making for further improvement, for any government is more secure in its position in times of prosperity.

In many countries, however, the change simply made it easier for one man or one group to remain in power without much progress toward real republican government. Powerful economic interests were more concerned for the maintenance of peace than for the achievement of democracy, and large revenues made it easier to purchase the support of troublesome political leaders and to pay the army regularly and generously. More important still, the army could be better equipped. New weapons and techniques of warfare made a revolt more difficult than in the days when untrained civilians, armed with the small stock of rifles that each *caudillo* had hidden away at the end of the previous war, could face the equally ill-equipped regular army on fairly even terms. With the introduction of the machine gun, and later of the airplane, and with the improvement of discipline in the permanent military forces, the government had an overwhelming advantage. It became almost impossible for a revolutionary movement to succeed unless at least a part of the army joined it, or unless it received very substantial help from some outside source.

Dictatorships flourished especially in some of the countries with large Indian or Negro populations, where democratic institutions from the first had been obviously unworkable and where elections continued to be little more than a form. Though all the outward aspects of constitutional government might be carefully observed, the president in fact chose all other officials including members of congress, and named his own successor when he did not wish or dare



to remain in power himself. Even the courts had no independence where any question involving politics was at stake. The governments differed from those of the first years of independence chiefly in that they were more efficient autocracies, normally set up and overthrown by factions in the army rather than by the older and more destructive type of civil war.

Similar conditions prevailed in some countries which did not have large unassimilated Indian populations. Where the masses of the people are *mestizos* or mulattoes the gulf between the upper and the lower class is not so wide, but the establishment of democratic institutions is still difficult. The *mestizo*, naturally intelligent and quick to learn, has shown much political capacity where a general prosperity has helped him to improve his situation, but in countries where geographical isolation or lack of natural resources have prevented economic progress he has remained in a state of ignorance and poverty. In such countries the forces which worked elsewhere for stable government at the end of the nineteenth century were less in evidence. Politics continued to be the chief interest of the ruling class, government jobs the most attractive form of employment, and the revolution the normal way to obtain them. When revolutions became more difficult because of changing techniques of warfare dictatorships were the natural result.

But even in countries where social and economic conditions offered the most serious obstacles, the better type of Latin American statesmen continued to work for the ultimate attainment of republican government. They were supported by a strong body of public opinion in the upper and middle classes, and they made progress despite occasional setbacks. For a time during the first quarter of the twentieth century they seemed measurably nearer their goal in many parts of the continent. More recently the depression and the troubled international situation have caused a resurgence of dictatorships. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these are dictatorships on the totalitarian model. The press may be muzzled and political opposition suppressed, but there is probably no Latin American country where the government would dare to attempt the regimentation of public opinion which is an essential feature of totalitarianism. Here and there powerful rulers may attempt to make a limited use of

fascist doctrines for their own purposes, but in general they are compelled by popular sentiment to observe the outward forms of republican government and to give lip service at least to democracy. In many cases it is more than lip service, for there is no necessary inconsistency between the acceptance of dictatorship as the best government for a given country under existing circumstances and a belief in democracy as the ultimate goal.

In several Latin American countries increasing prosperity, a more homogeneous population, and a healthier social organization have permitted much greater progress toward the development of truly republican institutions. In Costa Rica and Uruguay, and in the more important sections of Argentina, the Indians, never numerous, have been virtually exterminated. In Chile and Colombia they have been assimilated. None of these countries, therefore, has to contend with the social problems created by the presence of a subject race. In other respects they differ much from one another, and it is necessary to study the history of each to understand the factors that have entered into its political development. In all of them revolutions, though they still occur, are unusual events, and governments are normally established by the vote of the people rather than by force. If elections are still often characterized by bribery and fraud and intimidation, they are nevertheless held under conditions immeasurably better than half a century ago.

Similar progress will be difficult in many of the other countries until something has been done to raise the masses of the people from the oppressed and dependent condition in which they have been since colonial times. The Mexican Revolution was the first great attempt to accomplish something along this line, with what success it is yet too early to say, and in some of the other predominantly Indian countries far-seeing members of the ruling class are apparently beginning to give more attention to social problems. In Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala, the establishment of social and political democracy will be a slow and difficult process. In the *mestizo* countries, on the other hand, political progress will be chiefly a question of economic development and education.

There are, it is true, political groups in most of the Latin American republics that have powerful, selfish reasons for not wishing demo-

cratic government to come too rapidly, and there is a real danger that some of these may find it convenient to espouse foreign political doctrines which could help to justify the maintenance of their own power or special privileges. Here and there military cliques which are exploiting a country for their own benefit or landed aristocracies who face the threat of agrarian revolution or fear the transfer of political control to another class may be tempted to turn their backs on the democratic ideal. Thus far, however, there is little evidence that any substantial group has really done so, and there is no American republic where intelligent public opinion as a whole is prepared to admit failure in the effort to achieve republican government.

The opposition of the American nations to political philosophies repugnant to the ideals that have guided their internal political development finds expression also in a common determination to maintain their own standards in the conduct of international relations. The American concept of international relations has insisted upon the equality of states, the rule of law as opposed to force, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Here, as in internal politics, the ideal has not always been achieved in practice, but it has profoundly influenced the conduct of the American governments in their dealings with one another. There have been many wars in Latin America but most of them were simply internal political feuds that crossed state lines. Few were real conflicts between nation and nation, and fewer still could be called wars of aggression or conquest. Disputes between governments, including the troublesome boundary controversies which involved every one of the twenty republics, have in most cases been settled by diplomacy or arbitration, even though armed clashes sometimes occurred before a settlement was reached. A great part of the attention of recent Pan-American conferences has been devoted to the creation and perfection of machinery to prevent war.

#### THE TEST OF PAN-AMERICANISM

What Pan-American solidarity really meant became evident in December, 1941. Immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama declared war on Japan,

Germany, and Italy. Colombia and Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Mexico not only severed relations with the Axis but agreed in January, 1942, to the creation of a joint Mexican-United States defense commission to discuss the aid which the two countries would give each other in case of attack. Every other nation of the continent, without exception, assured the United States of its sympathy and moral support, and several of them, including Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile, declared that they would not impose upon the United States the restrictions applicable to belligerents under their neutrality laws.

This spontaneous manifestation of continental solidarity effectively disposed of allegations that certain American governments were more sympathetic to the Axis than to the democracies. There were still differences of opinion, however, as to the measure of support which the United States should receive, and these found expression when the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics convened at Rio de Janeiro on January 15. The great majority of the nations represented desired that the conference should recommend the severance at once of all diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Neither Argentina nor Chile wished to agree to immediate action, however, and the resolution finally approved recommended that all American governments break off relations, but that each country should act in accord with its constitutional procedure and with regard for its own special situation—a restriction which left any government free to delay action if it wished. At the same time the resolution reiterated the declaration that an aggression against one American country was an aggression against all. It reaffirmed the determination of the American nations to cooperate for mutual defense, and obligated the signatory powers to consult with one another before reestablishing diplomatic relations with the Axis. Every American nation except Argentina and Chile severed relations with the enemy during the conference or immediately after its close.

The disagreement over the resolution about diplomatic relations received more attention in the press than other acts of the Conference that were in reality more important. In the first place, the Foreign Ministers recommended far-reaching measures for the “economic

mobilization" of the American Continent in order to provide an adequate supply of basic and strategic materials both for military and civilian use. To this end they expanded the functions of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee and urged that steps be taken to increase production, to facilitate trade, to improve means of transportation, and to keep export prices at reasonable levels. The Conference also recommended that the American Republics adopt measures, in addition to those which most of them had already taken, to cut off "all financial or commercial intercourse, direct or indirect, between the Western Hemisphere and the nations signatory to the Tripartite Pact and the territories dominated by them," and to control commercial and financial activities of citizens of the Axis powers resident in American territory. Another resolution, stating that

. . . acts of aggression of a non-military character, including systematic espionage, sabotage, and subversive propaganda, are being committed on this Continent, inspired by and under the direction of member states of the Tripartite Pact and states subservient to them, and the fate of numbers of the formerly free nations of Europe has shown them to be both preliminary to and an integral part of a program of military aggression. . . .

reaffirmed the determination of the American republics to prevent such activities and recommended various steps to this end, including the coordination of police and judicial measures and of systems of investigation, and the appointment by the Pan-American Union of an "Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense."

Other resolutions emphatically condemned the Japanese aggression against the United States, endorsed the Atlantic Charter, laid down the principle that no American state at war with a non-American state should be considered as a belligerent, and recommended the creation of an Inter-American Defense Board. The Conference also requested the Pan-American Union to convoke a technical conference to study post-war economic problems. At the same time it brought about a settlement of the long-standing boundary dispute between Peru and Ecuador, the one international controversy which in recent years has been a real menace to the internal peace of the Continent. The American nations thus emerged from the meeting effectively

united in their determination to oppose all forms of foreign aggression. All of the other states of the Hemisphere, without exception, had assured the United States of their help in the economic and psychological warfare which are such important phases of the world conflict.

Mexico's declaration of war in June, 1942, brought to ten the number of Latin American republics participating in the conflict and assured the United States the support of all the countries between our southern border and the Panama Canal.

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## READING LIST

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The reading list given below includes but a small fraction of the great number of books dealing with Latin America. It is intended to serve as a guide to additional reading and not as an aid to scholarship. Only works in English, and works which seem likely to be of interest to the student who is not a specialist or to the general reader, are included. No effort has been made to list government documents, articles in periodicals, or monographs which are primarily of interest to the professional historian. On the other hand, most of the popular and journalistic books, of which so many have appeared in recent years, are also omitted.

An invaluable guide to current scholarly publications is the Handbook of Latin American Studies, edited by a group of American scholars, which has been published annually since 1936 by the Harvard University Press.

### I. THE INDIANS BEFORE THE CONQUEST

Those who wish to know more of the Mexican Indians before the Conquest will find G. C. VAILLANT's *The Aztecs of Mexico* (New York, 1941) especially interesting. There are many other books dealing with ancient Mexico and the Maya region, among them A. F. A. BANDELIER, *On the Social Organization and Mode of Government of the Ancient Mexicans* (Salem, 1879) and *The Gilded Man* (New York, 1893); BERNARDINO DE SAHAGÚN, *A History of Ancient Mexico* (translated by Fanny R. Bandelier, Nashville, 1932), L. SPENCE, *The Civilization of Ancient Mexico* (New York, 1912) and *The Popul Vuh* (London, 1908), H. J. SPINDEN, *Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America* (3rd ed., New York, 1928); J. E. THOMPSON, *Mexico Before Cortez* (New York, 1940) and *The Civilization of the Mayas* (2nd ed., Chicago, 1932); J. E. THOMPSON and T. W. F. GANN, *The History of the Maya* (London, 1931).

Among the best accounts of the history and civilization of the Incas are:

P. A. MEANS, *Ancient Civilizations of the Andes* (New York, 1931); SIR C. MARKHAM's fascinating though less up-to-date *The Incas of Peru* (London, 1910), the first part of PRESCOTT's *Conquest of Peru*; and the great source of our information about Peruvian society, *The Royal Commentaries of the Incas*, by the Inca GARCILASO DE LA VEGA, a translation of which was published by the Hakluyt Society in Vols. 41 and 45 of their original series. EDGAR L. HEWETT's *Ancient Andean Life* (New York, 1939) and OTFRID VON HANSTEIN's *World of the Incas* (translated from the German, London, 1924) should also be mentioned. T. A. JOYCE's *Mexican Archaeology* (London, 1914), *Central American and West Indian Archaeology* (London, 1916), and *South American Archaeology* (London, 1912) are more technical but contain much to interest the general reader. For good accounts of the Indians throughout the continent as a whole see D. G. BRINTON, *The American Race* (New York, 1891); E. R. EMBREE, *Indians of the Americas* (Boston, 1939); A. L. KROEBER, *Anthropology* (New York, 1923, with supplement, 1933), C. WISSLER, *The American Indian* (3rd ed., New York, 1938).

## II. THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA

The outstanding works in English are R. B. MERRIMAN's *The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New* (4 vols., New York, 1918 to 1934) and E. G. BOURNE's *Spain in America, 1450 to 1580* (New York, 1904—American Nation Series, Vol. 3). There are also W. H. PRESCOTT's great classics, *The Conquest of Mexico* and *The Conquest of Peru*, which are available in several editions. Of very great interest are several contemporary accounts of the Conquest. BERNAL DÍAZ DEL CASTILLO's *True History of the Conquest of Mexico* should be read by every student. English editions have been published in New York in 1927 and in the Broadway Travellers Series (London, 1928), the latter under the title *Discovery and Conquest of Mexico, 1517 to 1521*. A translation will also be found in Vols. 23, 25, 30, and 40 of the publications of the Hakluyt Society, 2nd series. Among other important contemporary accounts published in translation by the Hakluyt Society are *Expeditions into the Valley of the Amazons* (Vol. 24, 1st series); *Pascual de Andagoya* (Vol. 34, 1st series); *Reports on the Discovery of Peru* (Vol. 47, 1st series); J. DE ACOSTA, *The Natural and Moral History of the Indies* (Vols. 60, 61, 1st series); *The Conquest of the River Plate (Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt and Commentaries of Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca)* (Vol. 81, 1st series); PEDRO SARMIENTO DE GAMBOA, *History of the Incas* (Vol. 22, 2nd series), PEDRO CIEZA DE LEÓN, *Chronicles of Peru* (Vols. 33, 68, Part II, 1st series; Vols. 31, 42, 54, 2nd series), *Select Documents Concerning the Four Voyages of Columbus* (Vols. 65, 70, 2nd series).

PEDRO PIZARRO's *Relation of the Discovery and Conquest of the King-*



*doms of Peru* (2 vols., New York, 1921) and PEDRO SANCHO's *An Account of the Conquest of Peru* (New York, 1917) both translated by P. A. Means, will also be of interest. Other books which should be mentioned are C. S. BRADEN, *Religious Aspects of the Conquest of Mexico* (Durham, 1930); J. FISKE, *The Discovery of America* (2 vols., Boston, 1899), R. B. CUNNINGHAME-GRAHAM, *The Conquest of New Granada* (London, 1922), *Conquest of the River Plate* (New York, 1924), and *Pedro Valdivia, Conqueror of Chile* (London, 1926), F. A. KIRKPATRICK, *The Spanish Conquistadores* (London, 1934); SIR CLEMENTS MARKHAM, *The Conquest of New Granada* (London, 1912), P. A. MEANS, *The Fall of the Inca Empire* (New York, 1932), G. P. HAMMOND and A. REY, *Narratives of the Coronado Expedition* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1940), S. E. MORISON, *The Second Voyage of Christopher Columbus* (Oxford, 1939) and *Admiral of the Ocean Sea: A Life of Christopher Columbus* (Boston, 1942).

### III. THE SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM

Among the few books in English dealing with the colonial system in general are W. G. F. ROSCHER, *The Spanish Colonial System* (translated by E. G. Bourne, New York, 1904), and BERNARD MOSES, *The Establishment of Spanish Rule in America* (New York, 1898), *The Spanish Dependencies in South America* (2 vols., New York and London, 1914), *Spain's Declining Power in South America, 1730-1806* (Berkeley, 1919), and *South America on the Eve of Emancipation* (New York, 1908). In addition, chapters in the books by BOURNE and MERRIMAN mentioned above cover the earlier part of the colonial period. BERNARD MOSES, *Spain Overseas* (New York, 1929), C. E. CHAPMAN, *Colonial Hispanic America—A History* (New York, 1933), and A. C. WILGUS (ed.), *Colonial Hispanic America* (Washington, 1936), also deal with the subject. On the political and religious institutions of the Spanish colonies see A. S. AITON, *Antonio de Mendoza, First Viceroy of New Spain* (Durham, N.C., 1927); C. H. CUNNINGHAM, *The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies* (Berkeley, 1919); L. E. FISHER, *The Intendent System in Spanish America* (Berkeley, 1929) and *Viceregal Administration in the Spanish-American Colonies* (Berkeley, 1926), H. C. LEA, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies* (New York, 1908). J. F. RIPPY and J. T. NELSON, *Crusaders of the Jungle* (Chapel Hill, 1936) deals with the work of the Spanish missionaries, and R. G. B. CUNNINGHAME-GRAHAM, *A Vanished Arcadia* (London, 1901) deals with the Jesuit missions in Paraguay. L. B. SIMPSON's *The Encomienda in New Spain* (Berkeley, 1929) and *The Repartimiento System of Native Labor in New Spain and Guatemala* (Ibero-Americana No. 13, Berkeley, 1938) are indispensable to any student of Indian relations. For other aspects of colonial society see J. T. LANNING, *Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies* (New York, 1940), B. MOSES, *Spanish Colonial*

*Literature in South America* (New York, 1922); F. A. McNUTT, *Bartholomew de las Casas* (New York, 1909); D. H. POPENOE, *Santiago de los Caballeros de Guatemala* (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), and AGUSTÍN EDWARDS, *Peoples of Old* (London, 1929). The authoritative work on the colonial commercial system is C. H. HARING, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge, 1918). For the activities of interlopers and pirates, see C. H. HARING, *The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century* (New York, 1910), P. A. MEANS, *The Spanish Main, Focus of Envy, 1492-1700* (New York, 1935), A. P. NEWTON, *The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688* (London, 1933); and especially A. O. EXQUEMELIN, *Buccaneers of America*, written by a man who sailed with the pirates. The book is available in English in various editions, one published in New York, 1924. E. J. HAMILTON, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650* (Cambridge 1934); W. L. SCHURZ, *The Manila Galleon* (New York, 1939); and R. D. HUSSEY, *The Caracas Company, 1728-1784* (Cambridge, 1934) deal with special topics which throw light on Spanish colonial policy. A few of the contemporary travellers' accounts that are available in English are of special interest, among them: THOMAS GAGE, *A New Survey of the West Indies* (New York 1929), an English Dominican friar's account of experiences in Mexico and Central America in the seventeenth century; F. R. J. DE PONS, *A Voyage to the Eastern Part of Terra Firma* (New York, 1806), and JORGE JUAN and ANTONIO DE ULLOA, *A Voyage to South America* (translated from the Spanish, London, 1806). ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain* (English translations London and New York, 1811) and *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent During the Years 1799-1804* (London, 1814-29) give two of the best contemporary accounts of conditions at the very end of the colonial period.

Several excellent books deal with the colonial period in its relation to the history of our own west and southwest, among them. H. E. BOLTON, *The Spanish Borderlands* (New Haven, 1921); PHILIP BROOKS, *Diplomacy and the Borderlands: the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819* (Berkeley, 1939); C. E. CASTAÑEDA, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1936* (4 vols., Austin, 1936-1939); H. I. PRIESTLEY, *The Coming of the White Man 1492-1848* (New York, 1929), and the publications of the Quivira Society.

#### IV. COLONIAL BRAZIL

Of the very few books on the colonial period in Brazil, ROBERT SOUTHEY'S *History of Brazil* (3 vols., London, 1817-1822) is the best. More easily accessible is the section on colonial Brazil in Volume I of T. C. DAWSON'S *South American Republics* (New York, 1903-4). E. PRESTAGE, *The*

*Portuguese Pioneers* (London, 1933) deals with the period of discovery. L. E. DA COSTA, *Rio in the Time of the Viceroy* (translated by Dorothea H. Momsen, Rio de Janeiro, 1936) describes life in the colonial period. There are two translations of contemporary accounts: *The Captivity of Hans Stade of Hesse in A.D. 1547-1555 Among the Wild Tribes of Eastern Brazil* (Hakluyt Society's publications, 1st series, vol. 51) and PERO DE MAGALHÃES DE GANDAVO, *The Histories of Brazil* (Cortés Society, New York, 1922).

#### V. WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

The causes of the war are dealt with in many of the books listed under the colonial period. For further material see L. E. FISHER, *The Background of the Revolution for Independence in Mexico* (Boston, 1934) and B. MOSES, *The Intellectual Background of the Revolution in South America, 1810-1824* (New York, 1926). Most of the material in English on the war itself is in the form of biographies. W. S. ROBERTSON'S *Rise of the Spanish American Republics as Told in the Lives of Their Liberators* (New York, 1918) covers the whole period of the conflict, and the same author's *The Life of Miranda* (2 vols., Chapel Hill, 1929) is the best biography of that leader. There are several biographies of Bolívar, among them H. ANGELL, *Simón Bolívar* (New York, 1930) and the very important work by V. A. BELAÚNDE, *Bolívar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revolution* (Baltimore, 1938). A part of B. MITRE'S *Life of San Martín*, translated by W. Pilling, was published in London in 1893 under the title, *Emancipation of South America*. See also R. B. CUNNINGHAME-GRAHAM, *José Antonio Páez* (London, 1929) and A. HASBROUCK, *Foreign Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish South America* (New York, 1928), and for the relation of the United States to the war see: F. L. PAXSON, *The Independence of the South American Republics* (Philadelphia, 1903) and C. C. GRIFFIN, *The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822* (New York, 1937).

#### VI. LATIN AMERICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE

It is impossible to mention more than a few of the very numerous books that have been written about Latin America, especially in recent years. Some of the more important works dealing with several different countries and with Latin America as a whole are:

##### *History*

F. GARCÍA CALDERÓN, *Latin America: Its Rise and Progress* (translated by Bernard Miall, London, 1918); C. H. HARING, *South American Progress* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934); J. L. MECHAM, *Church and State in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1934); A. C. WILGUS (ed.), *Argentina, Brazil and*

*Chile since Independence* (Washington, 1935) and *South American Dictators During the First Century of Independence* (Washington, 1937); W. R. SHEPHERD, *The Hispanic Nations of the New World* (New York, 1920)

There are also several one-volume histories, among them W. S. ROBERTSON, *History of the Latin American Nations* (revised ed., New York, 1932), H. G. JAMES and P. A. MARTIN, *The Republics of Latin America* (New York, 1923), M. W. WILLIAMS, *Peoples and Politics of Latin America* (revised ed., New York, 1938); J. F. RIPPY, *Historical Evolution of Hispanic America* (New York, 1932), F. A. KIRKPATRICK, *Latin America: A Brief History* (New York, 1939), D. R. MOORE, *A History of Latin America* (New York, 1938); T. JONES, *An Introduction to Hispanic American History* (New York, 1939), A. C. WILGUS, *The Development of Hispanic America* (New York, 1941), and C. E. AKERS, *A History of South America from 1854* (New York, 1930). N. A. N. CLEVEN's, *Readings in Hispanic American History* (Boston, 1927) should also be mentioned.

### Geography

C. F. JONES, *South America* (New York, 1930), R. H. WHITBECK, *Economic Geography of South America* (3rd ed., New York, 1940); PRESTON JAMES, *Latin America: A Human Geography* (New York, 1942).

### Political and Economic Problems

JAMES BRYCE, *South America* (New York, 1917), GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, *South America Today* (New York, 1911), S. G. INMAN, *Latin America, Its Place in World Life* (Chicago, 1937), L. C. JANE, *Liberty and Despotism in South America* (Oxford, 1929); C. F. JONES, *The Commerce of South America* (Boston, 1928); J. F. NORMANO, *The Struggle for South America* (New York, 1931); D. M. PHELPS, *Migration of Industry to South America* (New York, 1936), Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Republics of South America* (London, 1937), W. L. SCHURZ, *Latin America, A Descriptive Survey* (New York, 1941); F. TANNENBAUM, *Wither Latin America?* (New York, 1934); A. C. WILGUS (ed.), *Modern Hispanic America* (Washington, 1933).

### International Relations

W. H. KELCHNER, *Latin American Relations with the League of Nations* (Boston, 1930); P. A. MARTIN, *Latin America and the War* (Baltimore, 1925); J. F. RIPPY, *Latin America in World Politics* (3rd ed., New York, 1938), and also the books listed below under Paragraph XV.

### Education, Literature, Art, and so Forth

H. L. SMITH and H. LITTELL, *Education in Latin America* (New York, 1934), C. C. GRIFFIN (ed.), *Concerning Latin American Culture* (New

York, 1940); W. D. FRANK, *America Hispana* (New York, 1940); I. \*GOLDBERG, *Studies in Spanish American Literature* (New York, 1920) and *Brazilian Literature* (New York, 1922); A. L. COESTER, *The Literary History of Spanish America* (New York, 1916), A. S. BLACKWELL, *Some Spanish American Poets* (2nd ed., Philadelphia, 1937), ALFONSO CASÓ and others, *Twenty Centuries of Mexican Art* (New York, 1940), ELEANOR HAGUE, *Latin American Music, Past and Present* (Santa Ana, Calif., 1934).

Travellers' accounts are a valuable source of information, especially for the earlier period. Besides those listed below under individual countries, the following are of interest. B. HALL, *Extracts from a Journal, Written on the Coasts of Chile, Peru, and Mexico, in the Years 1820, 1821, 1822* (new edition, London, 1851); A. CALDCLEUGH, *Travels in South America, During the Years 1819, 1820, 1821* (London, 1825); G. BYAM, *Wanderings in Some of the Western Republics of America* (London, 1850); SIR WOODBINE PARISH, *Buenos Aires and the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata* (2nd ed., London, 1852); T. J. PAGE, *La Plata, the Argentine Confederation, and Paraguay* (New York, 1859); CHARLES DARWIN, *Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History of the Various Countries Visited During the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle Round the World* (Everyman's Library, New York, 1906).

## VII. INDIVIDUAL SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS

### *Argentina*

There are two good one-volume histories: RICARDO LEVENE, *A History of Argentina* (translated and edited by W. S. Robertson, Chapel Hill, 1937) and F. A. KIRKPATRICK, *A History of the Argentine Republic* (Cambridge, 1931). J. F. CADY's *Foreign Intervention in the Rio de la Plata, 1835-1850* (Philadelphia, 1929) is a scholarly work on the history of one important period. PIERRE DENIS, *The Argentine Republic* (trans. by B. Miall, London, 1922) gives a general description. L. S. ROWE, *The Federal System of the Argentine Republic* (Washington, 1921) is an able study of governmental institutions. For economic problems see M. S. W. JEFFERSON, *Peopling the Argentine Pampa* (New York, 1926), E. TORNQUIST and Co., *The Economic Development of the Argentine Republic in the Last Fifty Years* (Buenos Aires, 1919); V. L. PHELPS, *The International Economic Position of Argentina* (Philadelphia, 1938); and S. G. HANSON, *Argentine Meat and the British Market* (Stanford University, 1938). Three other books especially recommended as vivid pictures of life in Argentina at different periods are SIR F. B. HEAD, *Rough Notes Taken During some Rapid Journeys across the Pampas and among the Andes* (new ed., London, 1861); D. F. SARMIENTO, *Life in the Argentine Republic in the Days of the Tyrants* (translated from the Spanish, New York, 1868), and W. H. HUDSON, *Far Away and Long Ago* (New York, 1918).

*Uruguay and Paraguay*

Uruguay has been grievously neglected by writers in English but S. G. HANSON, *Utopia in Uruguay* (New York, 1938), is an excellent study of contemporary conditions there. Conditions a century ago are portrayed in W. H. HUDSON's historical novel, *The Purple Land*, which is available in Everyman's Library.

There are more books on Paraguay, but except for A. E. ELLIOTT, *Paraguay: Its Cultural Heritage, Social Conditions and Educational Problems* (New York, 1931) they deal chiefly with the Francia regime and the period of the Paraguayan war. The more important are: P. H. BOX, *The Origins of the Paraguayan War* (Urbana, 1929); J. P. and W. P. ROBERTSON, *Letters on Paraguay* (3 vols., 2nd ed., London, 1839); J. R. RENGGER and LONGCHAMP, *The Reign of Dr. Joseph G. R. de Francia in Paraguay* (London, 1827), G. F. MASTERMAN, *Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay* (2nd ed., London, 1870), C. A. WASHBURN, *The History of Paraguay* (Boston, 1871), and EDWARD LUCAS WHITE's fascinating historical novel, *El Supremo* (New York, 1916).

*Brazil*

For the history of Brazil since independence see J. P. CALOGERAS, *A History of Brazil* (translated and edited by P. A. Martin, Chapel Hill, 1939), H. G. JAMES, *Brazil after a Century of Independence* (New York, 1925), JOHN ARMITAGE, *History of Brazil* (London, 1836) which deals with the early years of the Empire, and M. W. WILLIAMS, *Dom Pedro the Magnanimous* (Chapel Hill, 1937) which is a good biography covering another long period. Another book of special interest is MANOEL DE OLIVEIRA LIMA, *The Evolution of Brazil Compared with that of Spanish and Anglo-Saxon America* (Stanford Univ., 1914). PIERRE DENIS, *Brazil* (translated by B. Miall, London, 1926) and ROY NASH, *The Conquest of Brazil* (New York, 1926) are good general descriptions, and H. G. JAMES, *The Constitutional System of Brazil* (Washington, 1923) deals with the government in the first quarter of the twentieth century. L. F. HILL, *Diplomatic Relations Between Brazil and the United States* (Durham, 1932) is a history of relations with the United States. For economic problems see R. C. SIMONSEN, *Brazil's Industrial Evolution* (São Paulo, 1939), J. F. NORMANO, *Brazil: A Study of Economic Types* (Chapel Hill, 1935); A. K. MANCHESTER, *British Preëminence in Brazil* (Chapel Hill, 1933); Brazil, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Brazil 1939/40; An Economic, Social, and Geographic Survey* (Rio de Janeiro, 1940).

Among the travellers' accounts are ROBERT WALSH, *Notices of Brazil in 1828 and 1829* (2 vols., Boston, 1831); H. KOSTER, *Travels in Brazil* (London, 1816); H. W. BATES, *The Naturalist on the River Amazons*

(Everyman's Library, New York, 1910); D. P. KIDDER and J. C. FLETCHER, *Brazil and the Brazilians* (9th ed., Boston, 1879).

### Chile

There are surprisingly few scholarly works in English on Chile. LUIS GALDAMES, *A History of Chile* (translated and edited by I. J. COX, Chapel Hill, 1941) is the best history. See also A. V. HANCOCK, *History of Chile* (Chicago, 1893). G. M. MCBRIDE, *Chile—Land and Society* (New York, 1936) is important for an understanding of social institutions. H. C. EVANS, JR., *Chile and Its Relations with the United States* (Durham, 1927) and W. J. DENNIS, *Tacna and Arica* (New Haven, 1931) deal with international relations. For the first years of independence see AUGUSTÍN EDWARDS, *The Dawn* (London, 1931).

### Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador

Here again the material in English is scanty. SIR CLEMENTS MARKHAM, *A History of Peru* (Chicago, 1892) is useful, as is GRAHAM H. STUART, *The Governmental System of Peru* (Washington, 1925). G. M. MCBRIDE, *The Agrarian Indian Communities of Highland Bolivia* (New York, 1921) is a study of contemporary Indian problems, and N. A. N. CLEVEN, *The Political Organization of Bolivia* (Washington, 1940) describes the government and gives some information regarding the history of that country. M. A. MARSH, *The Bankers in Bolivia* (New York, 1928) deals with one aspect of relations with the United States. For travellers' accounts of early conditions in the Andean countries see T. J. HUTCHINSON, *Two Years in Peru* (2 vols., London, 1873); A. S. DUFFIELD, *Peru in the Guano Age* (London, 1877), H. BINGHAM, *Inca Land* (Boston, 1922), and F. HAS-SAUREK, *Four Years among Spanish Americans* (4th ed., Cincinnati, 1892). The latter gives a good picture of Ecuador seventy-five years ago.

### Colombia and Venezuela

J. M. HENAO and G. ARRUBLA, *History of Colombia* (translated and edited by J. F. RIPPY, Chapel Hill, 1938) is the best history of Colombia. Relations with the United States are dealt with in E. T. PARKS, *Colombia and the United States, 1765-1934* (Durham, 1935) and J. F. RIPPY, *The Capitalists and Colombia* (New York, 1931). P. J. EDER, *Colombia* (London, 1913) and W. L. SCRUGGS, *The Colombian and Venezuelan Republics* (Boston, 1900) are general descriptions, and FRANCIS HALL, *Colombia* (Philadelphia, 1825) is an early account. There is no general history of Venezuela in English, but THOMAS ROURKE (pseudonym for D. J. Clinton) *Gómez: Tyrant of the Andes* (New York, 1936) and P. M. ARCAÑA, *The Gómez Regime* (Washington, 1936) give contrasting pictures of one important period. MARY WATTERS has written *A History of the Church in Venezuela, 1810-1930* (Chapel Hill, 1933). For general descriptions see

J. M. SPENCE, *The Land of Bolivar* (2 vols., London, 1878); W. E. CURTIS, *Venezuela* (New York, 1896) and L. V. DALTON, *Venezuela* (London, 1912). For lighter reading, RICHARD HARDING DAVIS, *Three Gringos in Venezuela and Central America* (New York, 1896) and T. R. YBARRA, *Young Man of Caracas* (New York, 1941) are suggested.

#### Other Books

There are also a number of books by W. H. KOEBEL, C. R. ENOCK, N. O. WINTER and P. F. MARTIN, which deal, often somewhat superficially, with individual countries in South America and which may be of interest to the general reader.

### VIII. MEXICO

There is a wealth of material on Mexico. For the Republic's history see H. I. PRIESTLEY, *The Mexican Nation* (New York, 1930), W. H. CALLCOTT, *Church and State in Mexico, 1822-1857* (Durham, 1926) and *Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929* (Stanford Univ., 1931), H. H. BANCROFT, *History of Mexico* (6 vols., San Francisco, 1883-88), JUSTO SIERRA, *Mexico: Its Social Evolution* (English trans., 2 vols. in 3, Mexico City, 1900-4); ERNEST GRUENING, *Mexico and Its Heritage* (New York and London, 1934), L. B. SIMPSON, *Many Mexicos* (New York, 1941), and the following biographies. W. H. CALLCOTT, *Santa Anna* (Norman, Ok., 1936); U. R. BURKE, *Life of Benito Juárez* (London, 1894); E. C. CORTI, *Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico* (English translation, New York, 1928); JOSÉ LUIS BLASIO, *Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico; Memoirs of his Private Secretary* (translated from the Spanish, New Haven, 1934); DAVID HANNAY, *Díaz* (London, 1917); J. CREELMAN, *Díaz, Master of Mexico* (New York, 1911).

Probably the best description of the period since 1910 is F. TANNENBAUM, *Peace by Revolution* (New York, 1933). The recent period is also dealt with in J. VASCONCELOS and M. GAMIO, *Aspects of Mexican Civilization* (Chicago, 1926); RIPPY, VASCONCELOS, and STEVENS, *Mexico* (Chicago, 1928); M. SAENZ and H. I. PRIESTLEY, *Some Mexican Problems* (Chicago, 1926), *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March, 1940) "Mexico Today" (edited by A. P. Whitaker); C. L. JONES, *Mexico and Its Reconstruction* (New York, 1921) and in Section I of the *Survey of American Foreign Relations*, published for the Council on Foreign Relations in 1931.

Especially important are three books on the agrarian problem: G. M. McBRIDE, *The Land Systems of Mexico* (New York, 1923); F. TANNENBAUM, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution* (New York, 1929); and E. N. SIMPSON, *The Ejido—Mexico's Way Out* (Chapel Hill, 1937); also ROBERT REDFIELD's studies of life in rural communities: *Tepoztlán; A*



*Mexican Village* (Chicago, 1930) and *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago, 1941).

There are many books on relations with the United States, including G. L. RIVES, *The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848* (New York, 1913); J. H. SMITH, *The War with Mexico* (2 vols., New York, 1919); G. M. CALAHAN, *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations* (New York, 1932); J. F. RIPPY, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1926); F. S. DUNN, *The Diplomatic Protection of Americans in Mexico* (New York, 1933); C. W. HACKETT, *The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910-1926* (Boston, 1926). For some of the more controversial issues of recent years see P. E. CALLES, *Mexico Before the World* (New York, 1927); R. B. GAITHER, *Expropriation in Mexico* (New York, 1940); Government of Mexico, *Mexico: The True Facts about the Expropriation of the Oil Companies' Properties in Mexico* (Mexico City, 1940); and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, *Present Status of the Mexican Oil "Expropriations"* (New York, 1940).

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